

DAVID MATAS
BARRISTER & SOLICITOR

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Konstantin Kosatchev
Head of Section (Finland, Sweden)
2nd European Department
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Russian Federation
Fax: 244-14-80

Dear Mr. Kosatchev:

Thank you for meeting with me to discuss research into Raoul Wallenberg on March 6 when I was in Moscow. At that meeting you informed me that the Russian working group report on Raoul Wallenberg was already written but that you would be prepared to change it, if I had new information to provide to you before its release. Further, you indicated that you expected there to be a meeting of the Swedish and Russian working groups which would discuss the possibility of a joint statement at the time of the release of the two working group reports.

With this letter I wish to accept your invitation and propose matters for possible inclusion in the Russian report. Further, I wish to suggest propositions for possible inclusion in a joint Russian Swedish Wallenberg statement.

Since I have not seen your report in its current form, I cannot be sure that what I have to suggest is new. If what I have to suggest is already there, allow me to commend you now for its being there. I have three groups of suggestions to make. The first group of suggestions is legal. The second group deals with openness. The third relates to the follow up process.

First, I offer proposals that are essentially legal in nature. The existence of and content of any law is a reality, a fact. As well, the law provides criteria and standards by which facts can be assessed. So, I feel that I fit within the parameters of your invitation by making legal suggestions. I have four such suggestions to make.

The first suggestion has to do with the burden of proof. There are two possibilities. Either Raoul Wallenberg is alive. Or he is dead. There are two propositions at play. One is the proposition that he is alive. The other is the proposition that he is dead. I

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would suggest that in your report the burden of proof should be on the proposition that he is dead. The burden of proof should not be on the proposition that he is alive.

The reason I take this view is that, if we assume that Wallenberg is alive, when in fact he is dead, then all we have lost is our own time and effort in attempting to locate him when he is nowhere to be found. If, on the other hand, we assume that he is dead, when in fact he is alive, then we will be perpetrating a cruel injustice on Raoul Wallenberg himself. In view of all that he has done for others, our own assumptions should be structured to do as much as possible for him.

The second suggestion has to do with the standard of proof. For standard of proof, our choices are prima facie proof, reasonable possibility, balance of probabilities, clear and convincing evidence, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Prima facie proof is proof that is established after examining only the evidence in favour of a proposition, without examining any of the contrary evidence. Proof on a reasonable possibility is proof that establishes a proposition is more than a mere or hypothetical possibility, but goes no further. In terms of percentages, proof that establishes a proposition has one in ten chances to be true is considered to be proof on a reasonable possibility.

Proof on a balance of probabilities means proving that a proposition is more likely than not to be true. In terms of percentages, proof on a balance of probabilities must establish that a proposition has more than a 50% chance of being true. Clear and convincing evidence of truth is a standard that is higher than a mere balance of probabilities. It approaches the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, without quite reaching it. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the highest standard of proof. Demanding proof beyond this standard becomes unreasonable.

My suggestion to you is that, in the Russian report, in addition to the burden of proof being on the proposition that Raoul Wallenberg is dead, the standard of proof should be proof beyond a reasonable doubt. My reasons for preferring this standard are much the same as my reasons for preferring the burden of proof I have indicated. A burden of proof on the proposition that Raoul Wallenberg is dead, with a standard of proof of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is most likely to spur further inquiries and to answer all unanswered questions. Any other burden or standard is likely to leave matters hanging.

My third suggestion is that you consider and analyze the applicability of the United Nations Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance to the case of Raoul Wallenberg attached to this letter. It is my opinion that it does apply.

The Declaration was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 18, 1992, and Raoul Wallenberg disappeared long before that. Nonetheless, he remains a disappeared person to this day, and because of that the Declaration applies to his case today.

The Government of Russia may wish to take the position that the Declaration does not apply to the case of Wallenberg. That course I suggest would help neither Wallenberg nor the respect for the rights of the disappeared the Declaration attempts to promote. Paying no attention to the Declaration when reporting on the fate of Raoul Wallenberg would both be unfair to Wallenberg and a devaluation of the Declaration.

If your report accepts the application of the Declaration, there remains the question of compliance assessment. If consideration of the Declaration leads you to the conclusion that Russia has been and continues to be in violation in relation to the Wallenberg dossier, that conclusion, provided it leads to a remedy, can only help Wallenberg research. If, on the other hand, consideration of the Declaration leads you to the conclusion that Russia has respected the Declaration in relation to the Wallenberg dossier, the reasoning that leads to that conclusion would be useful information for readers of the Russian report trying to come to their own conclusions on the matter.

The Russian report, in order to come to a reasoned conclusion whether or not there is compliance with the Declaration in relation to Wallenberg, would have to contain substantial detailed information about the Russian legal system. If one examines the Declaration, virtually every provision, except for those about children and asylum, applies to the case of Raoul Wallenberg.

I will take only one example, Article 13(2). That subarticle provides: "Each state shall ensure that the competent authority shall have the necessary powers and resources to conduct the investigation effectively, including powers to compel attendance of witnesses and production of relevant documents and to make immediate on site visits." In Russia, which is the competent authority for the Wallenberg investigation? I presume it is your working group, but my presumption may be wrong. In any case, that is properly a question for you to answer. Does the competent authority have the necessary powers? What are those powers? What is their legal source? Does the competent authority have the necessary resources? What are those resources?

Answers to these questions, and other like them in relation to the other relevant articles of the Declaration would provide substantial factual information of interest to those concerned with the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. I encourage you to put them in the report if they are not already there.

My fourth suggestion has to do with the Russian treatment of

privacy and security values. When we met, you indicated that the disclosure of the truth about Wallenberg involves a clash with privacy and security values. My own view of the matter, which is buttressed by the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, is that privacy and security considerations are simply not relevant. The Declaration sets out only two exceptions to the general principle of disclosure of information about the disappeared. One is the situation where a desire for non-disclosure has been manifested by the disappeared person himself. [Article 10(2)] The other is the situation where release of information would jeopardize an ongoing criminal investigation. [Article 13(4)] Security considerations are explicitly excluded by the Declaration. [Article 7]

There is little if nothing about Wallenberg in Russian archives that does not also mention other persons. If the Russian government took the position that no document about Wallenberg would be disclosed, if the document also contained information about another person, without the consent of that person or his/her relatives, if dead, then Wallenberg information disclosure would be virtually non-existent.

However, my views may well not be your own. Whether they are or they are not, how privacy and security considerations came into play for the Russian working group when conducting its investigations and writing its report would I suggest be relevant and useful information that should be included in the Russian report.

When we met, you indicated that the report of the Russian working group had two essential goals: providing the truth about Wallenberg and showing that Russia is now an open society, not trying to hide anything. Those comments lead me to make three other suggestions for your report.

The first suggestion I make in support of openness is that is that all documents and witness statements which the Russian government has accumulated for the purpose of writing the Wallenberg report be made publicly available at the time the report is released. I expect that these documents and statements will be too voluminous to be part of the report. But they could easily be deposited at a publicly accessible archive, and I suggest that they should be.

The appropriate documents would not just be the documents that you consider relevant for the writing of your report, but as well, the documents which you have examined and decided, for whatever reason, are not relevant for the report you write. Other researchers may have a different view from yours on relevancy. As well, other researchers should be free to explore the avenues you have explored, even if they come to the same conclusion as you that the avenues lead nowhere.

The credibility of your report will depend in part on its verifiability. Ensuring that the source documents which you have considered in writing your report are available is bound to increase confidence in the result.

The second suggestion I make in support of openness is that the report focus on the history of Soviet disinformation and deceit about Raoul Wallenberg. That, at least, to me, is what the Soviet documentary record shows. The statement of Deputy Minister Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky in 1947 that Raoul Wallenberg was shot and killed in Buda in 1945, the memorandum released by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in 1957 that Raoul Wallenberg died of a heart attack in 1947, the active attempt to obliterate, obscure or conceal after 1947 any document in the Soviet system that made reference to Raoul Wallenberg, the attempt to intimidate all prisoners in the Soviet gulag who had any contact with Wallenberg to say nothing about him, and the statement in 1989 that the Raoul Wallenberg personal effects released that year were found by chance by a janitor cleaning out the KGB archives form to me part of a historical continuum, where the Soviet intent throughout was to lie, to hide, to obstruct.

That sort of focus strikes me as the most effective way of contributing to solving the Raoul Wallenberg mystery. It would explain why the truth has been so difficult to find, why questions remain unanswered. It would also I suggest be a compelling break with the past history of coverup. What better way to show present openness that to reveal past secretiveness and dissimulation? Justification for having the Russians provide now the documents that remain to be disclosed.

My third suggestion to enhance an appearance of openness is that the Russian report avoid any endorsement, however tentative, of any of the various death theories, that Wallenberg died on a certain date, and in a certain manner. Any conclusion that Wallenberg did die in combination with a series of unanswered questions prompted by the historical coverup creates a report that is operating at cross purposes and is self defeating. A death conclusion takes the wind out of the sails of the effort to answer the unanswered questions. And the unanswered questions make any death conclusion implausible, premature.

In an intellectual sense, the conclusion of his death and the conclusion of a historical coverup are not contradictory. In a practical sense, however, they are. News stories of your report will say essentially one thing. I have no doubt that media stories of this report, if it endorses any of the various death theories, will be that the report concludes that Wallenberg died. The need that will be in the report to answer further questions, if publicised at all, will be publicised only as a secondary matter. What analysis there might be in the report of the history of coverup, would, I suspect, be lost in the publicity about the death

conclusions.

Whatever political will might now exist to pursue further inquiries about Wallenberg would, I fear, be effectively extinguished by a report which concludes that he died. A report that reasons in favour of a death conclusion will take the steam out of further efforts to determine his fate.

I do not suggest that the possibility that he may still be alive be endorsed either. Rather I am arguing only that this possibility not be foreclosed. It is my belief that your report cannot, on the present state of evidence, come to the conclusion that his death has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly since the manner in which he died, if he did die, is so much up in the air. If your report cannot come to a death conclusion with certainty, it is far better that the report say nothing about such a conclusion.

At some time, which is surely not now, we will have to draw a line, say that we know all that reasonably can be known, and draw conclusions based on that knowledge. However, when that happens, conclusions must be drawn based on all the knowledge that is available both inside and outside Russia, and not just some of it.

There is a natural temptation, after the number of years that the Swedish and Russian working groups have been in existence and the extensive effort that have put into its work, to draw some sort of conclusion, even if it is not a final conclusion, to all the work that has been done. However, if that conclusion comes across as no more than an attempt to put aside what has been a troublesome dossier in order not to be bothered with the issue any more, then the report will boomerang, coming back to create more trouble for the government of Russia, rather than less.

There is one final group of suggestions I wish to make. When we met, you indicated that the Russian report contained nothing about a follow up process. I suggest that it should. The United Nations Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance Declaration provides that an investigation into the fate of a disappeared person should be able to be conducted for as long as the fate of the victim of the enforced disappearance remains unclarified. [Article 13(6)] You indicated that the Russian report would set out various theories, but not have one final answer. A follow up process should be designed that would bring us to that final answer.

What that follow up process should be involves an assessment of the effort made to date. As you may be aware, I have been publicly critical of Russian official efforts to shed light on the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. I enclose a copy of a newspaper article that sets out some of my criticism. I acknowledge that there has been Russian cooperation with the Swedish working group. Even that

acknowledgment has to be tempered by consideration of the Vladimir experience in March of this year of which you are aware.

From my perspective, since the days of Bakatin, there has not been any independent effort or initiative of Russian officials to find out what happened to Wallenberg. Russian officials today are far from being the driving force in Wallenberg research. The recent Russian official effort has been one of going along, I would say less than wholeheartedly, with the Swedish effort. And that is all.

The Russian working group on Wallenberg is very different from the Swedish working group. The Swedish working group is open, accessible and willing to cooperate with independent Wallenberg researchers. The Russian working group appears willing to cooperate with the Swedish working group only and no one else. As you are aware, I could not even meet with any of its members. The chair had resigned and the others were inaccessible.

If the Russian working group is not totally passive, its activity pales in comparison with the activity of the Swedish working group. The Vladimir incident was telling. The Vladimir research taking place the week I was in Moscow brought together three of the five members of the Swedish working group, as well as a number of independent researchers associated with that group. Though the research was on Russian soil, none of the members of the Russian working group was participating in it.

What Russian cooperation there has been on Wallenberg research has been with the Swedish working group and not with Wallenberg research in general. My conclusions from the interviews that I had when I was in Moscow with independent Wallenberg researchers was that the experience of cooperation that the Swedish working group has had with Russian officials is not a common experience, shared by everyone doing Wallenberg research.

I personally will be satisfied with Russian official cooperation not just when the Swedish working group is satisfied, but only when every qualified researcher who is doing work on Wallenberg whether associated with the Swedish working group or not is satisfied. For now, that is far from being the case. In my comments to the Globe and Mail, I was trying to reflect the more general problems faced by independent Wallenberg researchers.

In one sense, it may not matter with whom Russian officials cooperate, as long as they cooperate with someone. The truth about Wallenberg, even if told to only one person, can, through that one person, be spread round the world.

In another sense, it matters very much who it is Russian officials decide to help. Despite all the time and effort the Swedish and Russian working groups will have spent and will be spending on the

Wallenberg file, which I realize is substantial, neither working group will have the final answers. More work, other work, will have to be done. Russian cooperation with the Swedish working group does not necessarily mean cooperation with this other work.

Furthermore, any research benefits from a variety of approaches. The truth in any area of research is best found by different researchers trying different techniques to get at the truth. Russian officials, by providing cooperation with only those researchers working through the Swedish working group, close off this variety of approaches.

As well, any research to be convincing must be verifiable. As trustworthy as I personally am convinced the work of the Swedish and Russian working groups will be, it will be unpersuasive if the two groups were to ask for their work to be accepted on faith. That means not only producing the documents on which the groups rely, but also replicating the access that the working groups have had.

The Wallenberg case is a coverup within a coverup. The Soviet gulag was the antithesis of an open accessible system. Even within the more general secrecy of Soviet repression, the Wallenberg case was a separate more tightly held secret. Documents in Soviet archives that would otherwise have been classified as top secret, were, in the case of Wallenberg, relocated to central archives, obliterated or destroyed. Witnesses who would otherwise have been sworn to secrecy were, in the case of Wallenberg, terrorized into saying absolutely nothing about him. Finding out what happened to Wallenberg becomes a matter of not just pulling the Wallenberg file from the shelves, but rather going through many records to piece together from what remains the information about what happened to him.

The Russian government, in its wisdom, has decided neither to prosecute those who committed human rights violations during the Soviet regime, nor even to have a truth commission to bring those violations to light. Wallenberg investigations have to throw light throughout the gulag from 1947 till its end. It is a light thrown on a history that is otherwise pretty much in darkness.

This mammoth task can only be accomplished with the full throated cooperation we saw at the time of Bakatin and have not seen since. Because so much Russian archival material is behind closed doors, Wallenberg research must be led by those on the other side of those doors. Russian cooperation with the Swedish working group, while welcome, is not a final and complete answer.

The question becomes what Russian authorities could be doing to produce more in the way of documentation about Wallenberg than they have done. There are five possibilities that have crossed my mind. Three of these possibilities are general in nature. Two are

specific to the case of Raoul Wallenberg.

The three general possibilities are various ways of exploring all the wrongs of the old Soviet system. If the full truth about the gulag becomes known, then we will know all there is to know about Wallenberg. There are many reasons why the full truth about the history of Soviet oppression should be known, going far beyond the Wallenberg case. But surely shedding light on the fate of Raoul Wallenberg is one reason, amongst many.

Because these possibilities are general, the reasons why they should be done, and the obstacles to their not being done are also general. It would take me far beyond the intended scope of this letter or any focused Wallenberg investigation to argue for these general possibilities and attempt to deal with the obstacles to their realization. I would only say that all of these general possibilities are meritorious, and the fact that none of them has yet been realized is regrettable.

The first general possibility is systematic prosecution of all those involved in the human rights violations associated with the years of Soviet repression. While prosecution of human rights violators is not at bottom a documentation effort, one beneficial effect of such prosecutions is a public accounting of the crimes being prosecuted. If indeed any of the perpetrators of the enforced disappearance of Raoul Wallenberg were still alive and were now prosecuted for that enforced disappearance, that prosecution would produce evidence about Wallenberg that would form part of the public record about him.

The second general possibility is a truth commission. In many countries that have moved from a violator regime to a democratic regime, truth commissions have taken the place of systematic prosecutions, because prosecutions would be destabilizing. As well, prosecutions are nowhere near as systematic as truth commissions in their exposure of violations. Truth commissions may be limited in identifying perpetrators, but they are effective in providing information about victimization. A Russian truth commission whose mandate would be to tell the truth of human rights violations in the Soviet era would inevitably have the Wallenberg saga front and centre on its agenda.

The third general possibility is transfer of the KGB archives and the Presidential archives of the Soviet era to the state archives where they would be indexed and accessible to researchers on the same basis as all other state archives. That, as I understand it, was proposed, tentatively by the presidential commission on Soviet archives headed by the late Dmitri Volkogonov in 1992, but the proposal was dropped after lobbying from FSB officials. The proposal, in my own view, remains a viable one.

These three possible solutions go much beyond the Wallenberg

dossier. However, it is difficult to disentangle the search for the truth about Wallenberg from the general opacity of the old Soviet system. The search for Wallenberg is a conundrum precisely because the Russians have done so little to clarify the Soviet past. How can we know the truth about Wallenberg without knowing the truth about the whole gulag, all political prisoners, all abuses of psychiatry? Wallenberg was sighted, or claimed to have been sighted, in many different places in the Soviet prison and psychiatric system. Furthermore, if he was kept alive after 1947, it would have been as a prisoner whose identity was disguised even within the system. To be fully confident that we have traced down every Wallenberg lead, we would have to know who was in every cell, in every psychiatric hospital bed throughout all the years of Soviet oppression from 1947 to its end. Wallenberg research tells us of the difficulty of explaining the fate of any disappeared person victim of a system whose abuses have not been fully and thoroughly confronted.

The two possibilities particular to the case of Raoul Wallenberg are a Russian presidential commission on his fate, and access of authorized researchers to previously closed archives subject to a confidentiality undertaking. The advantage of a Russian presidential commission on the fate of Raoul Wallenberg is that it would have the authority and especially the drive that the present Russian working group, at least in my estimation, seems not to have. Furthermore, it would seem an appropriate to response to a report of both the Swedish and Russian working groups concluding that the question of what happened to Raoul Wallenberg remains unanswered to escalate the level of investigation. It would be inappropriate to respond to a report of both the Swedish and Russian working groups concluding that the question of what happened to Raoul Wallenberg remains unanswered with a follow up that has less intensity and less authority than the groups that led to the inconclusive report. If at first you do not succeed, then try harder. It is a recipe for failure to decide to try less hard if your first effort does not meet with success.


My final suggestion for a follow up process to the present effort of the two working groups is that all archives, Russian, Swedish, German, Hungarian, United Nations, British, American, allow unrestricted, open stack access to qualified Wallenberg researchers, subject only to a confidentiality undertaking. The undertaking would be not to disclose any information obtained through this research that was irrelevant to the Wallenberg case. That sort of access would leave research in the hands of those interested in the fate of Wallenberg, rather than in the hands of professional archivists whose time, energy and commitment to getting to the bottom of the Wallenberg case are not as great.

That concludes the suggestions I wish to make for the Russian report, but it does not conclude this already too long letter. The second task I gave myself for this letter is to suggest

propositions for inclusion in a possible joint Russian Swedish statement to be released at the time of the release of the Russian and Swedish working group reports. My proposed assertions are these:

1. Based on the current available evidence, it is impossible to come to any firm conclusion about the fate of Raoul Wallenberg.
2. The existing records show a history of Soviet coverup about what happened to Wallenberg.
3. The verifiable Soviet documentary record that shows Wallenberg alive and that shows where he was ends in 1947.
4. If Wallenberg died in 1947, where he died and how he died is unknown.
5. If Wallenberg survived 1947, where he was and what happened to him since is unknown.
6. Oral testimony about what happened to Wallenberg is inconsistent, some people saying he died in 1947, others saying that he survived much beyond 1947.
7. Further research into the fate of Raoul Wallenberg needs to be done.
8. The possibility remains that documentary evidence exists but which is yet to be discovered would further elucidate his fate.
9. The trail of evidence about Wallenberg must be followed wherever it leads.
10. Both governments remain committed to do everything in their power to shed light on the fate of Wallenberg.

Sincerely yours,



David Matas

cc: Hans Magnusson
 Martin Hallqvist
 → Lage Olsen
 Guy Von Dardel
 Greg Alton



REGERINGSKANSLIET

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1997-10-01

Utrikesdepartementet

Ambassadör Jan Ståhl

OTTAWA



HEMLIG

Frisläppande av Raoul Wallenbergdokument


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Broder,

Som Du kanske känner till är jag i färd med att på uppdrag av kabinetssekreteraren gå igenom Raoul Wallenbergarkivet i syfte att undanröja hemligstämpeln från ytterligare arkivmaterial tillhörande perioden 1971-91. Som bekant publicerade vi allt material för tiden 1944-70 den 19 juni i år.

Under hänvisning till Howard Strauss skrivelse till Dig den 17 juni 1997 översänder jag härmed vissa handlingar avseende Canada som vi ämnar offentliggöra. De avser kanadensiska demarcher i Moskva 1979 respektive 1986 och 1989 och innehåller knappast något kontroversiellt. Egentligen är det kanske bara 1989 års brev till statsministern, om ens det, som är av den art som åsyftas i Strauss skrivelse ("records that express Canadian official views"). Jag vore dock tacksam om Du ville utverka formellt kanadensiskt samtycke till publicering. - Benäget adressera svaret till mig under adress c/o Exp. Lejonet.

Sven Julin



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Telex
105 90 MINFOR S

Avsändningsort

Utr min kansli/kr Nilsson/ACF

Ärende

Wallenberg-ärendet

Datum

1979-11-30

Avd

Grupp

Mål

Adress

Svensk Moskva

Text

De Geer från Leifland re Wallenberg-ärendet.

PRIMO:

Under secundo återges telegram 1979-11-29 från Anger, Ottawa. Tacksam Du via Din kanadensiske kollega informerar Dig om den sovjetiska reaktionen.

SECUNDO:

Cit - Vid avskedslunchen som utrikesministern gav fö mig idag då man bl a uttryckte sin uppskattning över mitt engagemang i saken meddelades mig konfidentiell att man instruerat sin ambassad i Moskva att till ryska vederbörande framföra en demarch av följande innehåll: "We share the Swedish concern over the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. We support the Swedish initiative and emphasize the desire that great care should be exercised fully to verify the situation so that continuing uncertainties can be resolved and the fate of Raoul Wallenberg can be determined". - Slutcit.

Cabinet

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Leifland
Nilsson

Ärende:

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

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Kopia till:

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L.Å. Nilsson

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Utr min kansli/kr Nilsson/ACF

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1979-11-30

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SVENSK OTTAWA 1979-11-29-2233

CABINET STOCKHOLM ~~24-25~~. RE WALLENBERGAERENDET.

VID AVSKEDSLUNCHEN SOM UTRIKESMINISTEREN GAV FÖR MIG IDAG DÅ
HAN BL A UTTRYCKTE SIN UPPSKATTNING ÖVER MITT ENGAGEMANG
I SAKEN MEDDELADES MIG KONFIDENTIELLT ATT HAN INSTRUERAT SIN
AMBASSAD I MOSKVA ATT TILL RYSKA VEDERBÖERANDE FRAMFÖRA EN
DEMARCH AV FÖLJANDE INNEHÅLL "WE SHARE THE SWEDISH CONCERN
OVER THE FATE OF RAOUL WALLENBERG. WE SUPPORT THE SWEDISH
INITIATIVE AND EMPHASIZE THE DESIRE THAT GREAT CARE SHOULD BE
EXERCISED FULLY TO VERIFY THE SITUATION SO THAT CONTINUING
UNCERTAINTIES CAN BE RESOLVED AND THE FATE OF RAOUL WALLENBERG
CAN BE DETERMINED".

ANGER

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SVENSK MOSKVA 1979-12-21

CABINET STOCKHOLM

FOER LEIFLAND RE WALLENBERG.

PRIMO. DEN KANADENSISKA DEMARCHEN I MID GJORDES DEN 17 DECEMBER PAA ANDREMANNANIVAA TILL BITRAEDANDE CHEFEN FOER ANDRA EUROPEISKA AVDELNINGEN SUCHODREV (F.OE. BREZJNEVS TOLK TILL ENGELSKA). MINISTERRAADET HANCOCK HAENVISADE TILL KANADENSISK OPINION OCH KANADENSISKA REGERINGENS INTRESSE OCH VAEDJADE TILL DE SOVJETISKA MYNDIGHETERNA ATT UNDERSOEKA FALLET PAA NYTT, I LJUSET AV DE NYA UPPGIFTER SOM FRAMKOMMIT, I SYFTE ATT SKAPA SLUTGILTIG KLARHET.

SUCHODREV FOERKLARADE ATT SVAR I AERENDET GIVITS SVENSKA REGERINGEN 1957, VARAV FRAMGICK ATT WALLENBERG AVLIDIT 1947. DE UPPGIFTER SOM SENARE FRAMKOMMIT HADE VISAT SIG VARA HELT GRUNDLOESA RYKTEN. SOVJETISKA REGERINGEN BETRAKTADE AERENDET SAASOM AVSLUTAT 1957 OCH HADE INTET ATT TILLAEGGA TILL DET DAA LAEMNADE SVARET. SUCHODREV SADE VIDARE ATT HAN FOERSTOD DEN ANDA I VILKEN DEN KANADENSISKA FRAMSTAELLNINGEN GJORDES, MEN, TILLADE HAN, DE SOVJETISKA MYNDIGHETERNA SKULLE FINNA DET BEKLAGLIGT OM DEN KANADENSISKA SIDAN FORTSATTE ATT DRIVA AERENDET. KANADENSISKA AMBASSADEN BORDE KONSULTERA SINA SVENSKA KOLLEGOR, RAADDE SUCHODREV.

HANOCK GENMAELDE ATT DET VAR SVAART ATT BETRAKTA AERENDET SOM AVSLUTAT DAA NYA UPPGIFTER OM WALLENBERG FORTSATTE ATT DYKA UPP. SUCHODREV HAENVISADE TILL VAD SOLZJENITSYN HAFT ATT

LIC D-20-2 20.000x6 1979.08 (10.000x6 på bärbara)

RESDEPARTEMENTET

Ärende:

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Åtgärd: (se regler på blankettkopia)

- 2 -

SAEGA OM LAEGERMYTOLOGIN OCH EXEMPLIFIERADE YTTERLIGARE
MED FANNY KAPLAN, OM VILKEN, TROTS ATT HON BEVISLIGEN
AVRAETTATS EFTER ATTENTATET MOT LENIN, DET LÄNGE GICK
RYKTEN ATT HON SATT I ETT LAEGER, OCH MED ANASTASIA.
SUCHODREV AVSLUTADE HAEREFTER SAMTALET.

SECUNDO. HANOCK RAADGJORDE MED LUNDVIK FOERE BESOEKET PAA MID.
LUNDVIK UTTRYCKTE TVEKSAMHET INFOER FORMULERINGEN I DEN KANA-
DENSISKA INSTRUKTIONEN "WE SUPPORT THE SWEDISH INITIATIVE"
OCH SADE ATT UR SVENSK SYNPUNKT VORE EN SJAEVSTAENDIG
KANADENSISK AKTION ATT FOEREDRA. HANOCK TOG DENNA SYNPUNKT
AD NTOAM OCH HAENVISADE SAALEDES I SIN DEMARCHE INTE TILL
SVENSKA INITIATIV.

TERTIO. DEN AMERIKANSKA AMBASSADOEREN SADE MIG IGAAR ATT HAN
STUDERAT DOSSIERN OM WALLEMBERG OCH KOMMIT TILL SLUTSATSEN
ATT DENNE MAASTE VARA DOED OCH ATT DET FOELJAKTLIGEN
INTE VAR MYCKET ATT GOERA.

DE GEER+


SVENSK MOSKVA

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UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET
Politiska avdelningen
Första enheten (Pol I)

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PROMEMORIA
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HEMLIG

Kanadensisk démarche om Raoul Wallenberg

Förste sekreteraren d'Arcy Thorpe vid kanadensiska ar
saden meddelade mig per telefon idag att konsuln vid
kanadensiska ambassaden i Moskva i början av innevar
månad formellt hade uppvaktat MiD i fråga om Raoul
Wallenberg. Detta hade skett genom att han till Cana
"desk officer" vid MiD:s konsulära avdelning hade öv
lämnat en kopia av den parlamentsresolution genom vill
Raoul Wallenberg utsågs till kanadensisk hedersmedbor
Han hade därvid uttalat förhoppningen att klarhet sku
skapas om dennes öde.

Vid ett återbesök någon tid senare hade konsuln fått
skedet att den sovjetiska regeringen hade lämnat att
gänglig information i fråga om Raoul Wallenberg år 19

57

Sven Julin

EXPEDIERAT	
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Prime Mini
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STOCKHOLM

My dear Pr

During Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's recent visit to the USSR, the subject of Raoul Wallenberg was raised with Soviet Foreign Minister Edvard Shevardnadze. The report on this element of the bilateral discussions reads as follows:

"The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Joe Clark) expressed appreciation for Mr. Shevardnadze's discussion with Wallenberg's family and hoped the dialogue would continue. "Raoul Wallenberg, although a Swedish national, is the only Honourary Canadian citizen," Mr. Clark said. Mr. Shevardnadze replied that unfortunately there is no doubt that Wallenberg is not alive. Documents to this effect have been given to the family. However, the Soviets are ready to consider "any traces". "It was a tragedy," Mr. Shevardnadze said, "but there is no doubt he is dead."

I believe this reaction is similar to that received by Sten Andersson during his visit last month. At least Mr. Shevardnadze did express a willingness to consider any traces of evidence, some of which, I believe, still exist.

Yours sincerely,

Dennis Browne

Dennis Browne
Ambassador

STATSRÅDSBEREDNINGEN
Registratörn

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Dnr. 6161/89

HOLM, December 8, 1989

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To: Mrs. Irene S. B. Anderson
Counsellor
Embassy of Sweden
Ajtosi Durer sor 27/A
1146 Budapest
Fax: 36 - 1 - 3522807

INK. AMB. BUDAPEST
D. No 16/337
19. 97-09-30
AVD. GR. MAL.
R 18 Wallenberg

From: Mrs. Prokofeva L.A.
Russia, Moscow, Samarinskaya st., 1-5, 158
Tel.: 952-98-75

Budapest 1997-10-02

Överlämnas av Ambassaden i Buda-
pest till Ambassadör Martin
Hallqvist, UD EC-3.

Уважаемая госпожа Ирене Андерсон,

направляю Вам мои биографические данные, составленные мною 17 сентября 1997 года, когда я вернулась в Москву из Будапешта.

“Отец” - Драгульский Александр Семёнович, 1912 года рождения, 17 сентября, в паспорте русский, родился в семье телеграфиста, Сальской области, Ставропольского края. Его отец был расстрелян белогвардейцами в гражданскую войну, коммунисты дали ему возможность закончить финансовый институт в Ростове-на-Дону. Он познакомился с Хосровьян Марией Семёновной в городе Ставрополе.

Хосровьян Мария Семёновна работала до замужества секретарем в НКВД, не помню точно город - Орджоникидзе или в Ставрополе. В 1938 году 20 апреля у них родился сын Вадим в городе Ставрополе. Драгульский А.С. был переведен на работу в г. Куйбышев в июне 1941 года и переехал с семьей в г. Куйбышев. В 1941 году 27 октября у них родился сын Семён. Вадим в детском саду сломал коленную чашечку в г. Куйбышеве и остался инвалидом.

В 1944 году А.С. Драгульский переведен на работу из г. Куйбышева в Москву и работал в должности начальника финансового отдела наркомата обороны СССР у маршала Воробьева, руководителя отдела лагерей для политических заключенных.

“Отец” получил одну комнату в 3-х комнатной квартире в 1944 году, по адресу ул. Малая Тульская, дом 2/1, корп. 19, кв.506. Этот жилой корпус во время бомбежки г. Москвы был разбит бомбой, от него остался один подъезд, пригодный для жилья, два других подъезда были восстановлены в 1947 г. В 1944 г. в нашем подъезде также временно получили комнаты сотрудники из аппарата маршала Воробьева, впоследствии они все получили новые благоустроенные квартиры.

В нашем доме жил с семьей адъютант маршала Воробьева полковник Андрей Михайлович Трофимов. Мою “мать” он всегда называл “грузиночкой”, зная, что она армянка. Я позднее поняла почему. Когда я стала взрослой, полковник Трофимов А.М. объявил мне, что я приёмная дочь и добавил, что я дочь шведа, и чтобы я запомнила фамилию - Валленберг, но эта фамилия мне была уже знакома.

Драгульский А.С. не был военнослужащим, но он являлся образцом коммуниста. Он всегда гордился своим партийным билетом, выслуживался и

был карьеристом. Его сын Семён впоследствии подражал своему отцу и тоже являлся образцом коммуниста, очень гордясь своим партийным билетом. Я ненавижу коммунистов! Мне "мать" на мой вопрос, почему мой "отец" сидит в тюрьме, ответила, что он любил ходить по ресторанам и когда он входил в ресторан, за ним закрывалась дверь и больше в ресторан никого из посетителей не впускали, а он мне, своей дочери, даже не купил шоколадки! Я думаю, что эту информацию она получила о моем папе, когда забирала меня на реке Печора, из политлагеря в 1947 году. Но она мне рассказывала также, что Драгульский А.С. боялся ресторанов и приглашал гостей к себе домой на пиво. Её нелогичности нашли в моей душе подтверждение и мои воспоминания детства. Я помню, как моя мама положила меня на детские весы и ушла от меня навсегда!

Я помню, как меня "мать" забирала из политлагеря. Я стояла у стены, а моя "мать" сидела за столом с женщиной в белом халате, а я очень сильно плакала. У меня на руке привита оспа на все плечо, так делают девочкам только в тюрьме.

Моя "мать" в Воркуте, в гостях, перепутала кружки, из которых пили спирт, и дала мне вместо воды - спирт, я чуть не задохнулась, я тоже это помню; она мне всегда рассказывала об этом эпизоде смеясь. Моя "мать" мне говорила, как я маленькая ездила на оленях на реку Печора, но этого я не помню. Но я помню самое первое и дорогое воспоминание моей жизни - это моя родная мама! Мы с ней лежим ногами вперед к окну, за окном зима, на окнах занавески в широкую полосу, и моя мама, видимо, шептала мне на ухо фамилию моего папы. Разумеется, я этого не помню. Но когда я впервые услышала эту фамилию в 1949 или в 1950 году, она мне была очень знакомой.

К нам приезжал в гости родной брат Драгульской М.С. (После войны родной брат Драгульской М.С. - полковник Хосровьян Георгий Семенович, был комендантом г. Магдебурга или г. Потсдама, точно не помню.) Мы были одни в комнате: мой "отец", "дядя" и я, и я услышала, как они произносили фамилию моего папы и я стала напевать: Валленберг, Валленберг. Этот эпизод я хорошо помню.

1949 или 1950 г. мой отец отвел меня на новогоднюю ёлку в клуб НКВД, и показал меня офицеру, я этот эпизод тоже помню. НКВД контролировали мою жизнь. Мы с "матерью" ездили зимой в кинотеатр "Метрополь", она тоже показывала меня офицеру - генералу (я запомнила широкие красные лампасы, и он мне сказал, что я хорошая девочка). Этот эпизод я тоже помню, 1951 или 1952 год.

Моя "мать" называла меня Лялей и в школе меня также звали Лялей. Только когда я стала взрослой, я сама стала называть себя Людмилой, по паспорту. Нелогичность "матери", (она была неумной женщиной), меня всегда удивляла. Я ее спрашивала, почему вы все меня зовете Лялей, когда я в паспорте Людмила, моя "мать" мне ответила, что когда я родилась, "отец" был в командировке, и они (два "брата" и "мать") не знали, как меня назвать, и поэтому называли Лялей. Затем она мне могла рассказать противоположный вариант, что она меня очень не хотела, то есть иметь третьего ребенка. Но "отец" ее уговорил, чтобы у них была дочь Людмила, я еще не родилась, а мой "отец" меня назвал Людмилой. Так меня назвал мой родной папа! Он дал мне это имя, чтобы я была милая людям, чтобы мне

легче жилось среди чужих людей одной. Я помню, как я периодически получала в подарок синее платье и зеленое пальто. Все остальное при встрече с Вашим русским переводчиком.

В 1947 году мои "отец" и "мать", были приглашены в Большой театр, в правительственную ложу, два раза на одну и ту же оперу - "Князь Игорь" А.П. Бородина. Объясню, почему два раза : Сталин лично хотел видеть новых родителей дочери Валленберга. Первый раз он не смог приехать, а во второй раз он тайно мог посмотреть на моих "родителей". Обо всем писать невозможно, прошу меня понять и извинить.

В 1950 году Драгульского А.С. направляют на работу в г. Холмск, остров Сахалин, в качестве начальника финансового отдела пароходства и мы всей семьей "отец", "мать", два "брата" и я едем на остров Сахалин, в город Холмск. В 1951 году он получает 15 лет заключения и отправляется в тюрьму г. Паранайска, остров Сахалин.

Летом мы возвращаемся в Москву, моя "мать", два "брата" и я тоже. Моя метрика высылалась "матери" в г. Холмск, когда шел судебный процесс над моим "отцом".

После 1954 г. моего "отца" освободили из заключения и он проездом через Москву видел только своих двух сыновей, а меня не захотел видеть. Алименты он платил только на своих сыновей, а на меня нет.

После тюрьмы, со своей новой женой, тоже бывшей заключенной г. Паранайска, он поехал жить в г. Вильнюс. Моя "мать" меня отправляла к нему в 15 лет в г. Вильнюс, но мой "отец" отослал меня обратно в г. Москву. Я его еще один раз видела, весной 1970 года в Москве. С ним отношения я не поддерживала и он никогда мной не интересовался.

И еще я хочу рассказать, что моя мать физически хотела отделаться от меня в детстве, да и не только в детстве. Об этом я расскажу при встрече.

Драгульская М.С., армянка, родилась 18 сентября 1914 года, в городе Моздок, Северный Кавказ, в семье священнослужителей. Ее дед и прадед были протоиереями, но её отец не захотел быть попом и стал чиновником. Её мать была дочерью богатого купца первой гильдии, Герасим Эстатов (Эстотян). НКВД постаралось по приказу Сталина подобрать новых родителей для дочери Валленберга, с приблизительно похожей биографией.

Драгульская М.С. меня ненавидела всю свою жизнь! Я работала на неё и её сыновей с раннего детства. Мы жили бедно, она шила бюстгалтеры на дому, я ей помогала: в раннем возрасте я ездила по магазинам, покупала нужный материал, пришивала пуговицы, гладила, стирала, убирала. Когда я училась в 8 классе, она пошла работать продавцом.

В 1996 году она скончалась 29 июня в г. Москве.

Я, (Драгульская Людмила Александровна, русская, родилась 18 октября 1945 года в г. Москве) в 1953 году поступила в первый класс. Ещё один эпизод из детства, а именно: мы жили очень бедно, но моя мать мне срочно из старых мужских брюк сшила платье, приехала женщина с фотоаппаратом и мы с ней вдвоем спустились во двор. Она меня сфотографировала и уехала, в те времена приглашать фотографа на дом было неслыханной роскошью, это было в 1953 году. В 1964 я закончила школу, в 1965 я работала в институте

стюардессой в Аэрофлоте, аэропорт Внуково. Летала по всей России на всех типах самолетов: Ил-18, Ту-134, Ту-104, Ту-154, от Сочи до Анадыря, от Мурманска до Магадана и, разумеется, в Воркуту.


В 1969 вышла замуж за Прокофьева Владимира Викторовича, офицера. Когда сыну было восемь месяцев, я вернулась в Аэрофлот, расставшись с мужем. В 1973 году мы оформили развод. Отношения с 1973 года с мужем я не поддерживаю.

В 1976 году я устроилась на работу в Управление по обслуживанию Дипломатического корпуса МИД СССР, на должность горничной. Работала телефонисткой, поваром, горничной, официанткой, курьером. Самые светлые воспоминания о семье господина посла Ирландии Эдварда Джона Бренана и его супруги госпожи Т.Л. Бренан. Они меня любили и я их тоже. Я обслуживала ланч и приемы г-на посла. Мне предлагали в УПДК следить за иностранцами. Я этого никогда не делала! Я была очаровательной обезьянкой с тремя достоинствами. Подробно о своей личной жизни я надеюсь Вам рассказать при личной встрече.

Мои "братья", Драгульский В.А. и Драгульский С.А., проживают в г. Москве, отношения я с ними не поддерживаю более 20 лет. Сын - Виктор Владимирович Прокофьев, родился в Москве 23 сентября 1970 года. Живет самостоятельно.

Убедительно прошу Вас извинить меня за отсутствие перевода.

С уважением к Вам



Людмила Прокофьева

To: Mrs. Irene S.B. Anderson
Counsellor

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Ajtosi Durer sor 27/A
1146 Budapest

Fax: 36 - 1 - 3522807

From: Mrs. Prokofeva L.A.
Russia, Moscow, Samarinskaya st., 1-5, 158
Tel.: 952-98-75

Уважаемая госпожа Ирене Андерсон,

сообщаю Вам, что справки от 12 и 14 сентября 1997 года не правильные. Моя справка от 12 сентября 1997 составлена господином Нибаумом утром, в отеле "Фортуна", город Балатонфюред.

Все эпизоды моей жизни господин Нибаум просил меня пересказывать не один раз, включая мою информацию в свой компьютер. Я полностью ему доверяла. Я даже не заподозрила его, когда справку от 12 сентября он попросил подписать в трех экземплярах. Господин Нибаум болен сахарным диабетом, но он специально спровоцировал меня на большой скандал 13 сентября 1997 года, симулируя истерию и занимаясь рукоприкладством.

Утром 14 сентября 1997 года мы выехали в город Будапешт машиной. Вечером в отеле он опять спровоцировал скандал, а утром 15 сентября 1997 года он сел за компьютер и перепечатал справку перед самым отъездом в посольство, объяснив мне, что он хочет дополнить текст, а в вестибюле отеля я ее подписала и только обратила внимание на дату: 14 сентября. Он ответил мне, что это не имеет значения и мы поехали в посольство к господину Лондваллю.

Тексты справок он составлял самостоятельно; я не имею возможности досконально проверить текст, я плохо знаю немецкий язык, а господин Нибаум плохо знает русский язык, но за восемь лет мы научились понимать друг друга. Один экземпляр письма от 12 сентября 1997 года он порвал у меня на глазах, а два других экземпляра у него остались с моими подписями. После визита к господину Лондваллю, когда мы сели в машину, на обратном пути в наш отель, в машине, он мне устроил истерику и был ужасно недоволен тем, что я сказала господину Лондваллю, что он мой друг, а не спонсор. Я потребовала у него копию справки от 14 сентября, он мне ее вернул с большим нежеланием. А копии от 12 сентября при нем не было, я его попросила их уничтожить. Он сказал мне, что он это сделает.

Справку от 14 сентября 1997 года я догадалась перевести на русский язык в Москве, меня ужаснул искаженный текст моих данных, несерьезный характер письма, особенно извращен эпизод с театром, который господин Нибаум знает наизусть, я ему много раз рассказывала об этом факте.

Господин Нибаум прекрасно знает, что с письмом непременно работает психолог (он мне сам об этом говорил). Но он мою справку умышленно исказил так, чтобы Вы приняли меня за идиотку не только умственно, но и физически, травмируя меня на Балатонфюрд и перед поездкой в посольство, которую я ждала всю жизнь!

Он уехал машиной 16 сентября 1997 в Германию, сразу после обеда, а я улетила самолетом 17 сентября утром в Москву.

Господин Нибаум говорил мне о себе, что он китаец, который всегда улыбается, но держит нож в кармане. Я в этом лично убедилась!

Я самостоятельно приехала в Будапешт ко дню рождения моего папы, и сама хотела пойти в шведское посольство в городе Будапеште, но г-н Нибаум предупредил все мои действия, взяв все в свои руки. Пользуясь моим доверием и Вашим незнанием этого человека, господин Нибаум продумал все заранее.

На озеро Балатон я приехала 5 августа утром, а он приехал 6 августа утром. А 8 августа мы поехали к Вам. Господину Нибауму была очень интересна Ваша реакция по отношению ко мне, как мне кажется она была положительной и господин Нибаум остался этим очень доволен и я тоже. На другой день, 9 августа 1997 года он рано уехал машиной обратно в Германию, заверив меня в том, что он через неделю обязательно прилетит самолетом, специально для того, чтобы передать Вам мою справку, но приехал только 10 сентября на машине из Германии. На протяжении моего пребывания он мне ежедневно в 18-30 звонил в отель "Фортуна" (с 10.08. по 9.09.) и спрашивал меня о моей работе. Я хотела составить краткую справку и дать основную информацию о себе и привести Вам, но он мне сказал, чтобы я все написала о своей жизни подробно обо всем, и добавил, что психологи сами отберут нужные данные и факты.

Господин Нибаум в данное время имеет 2 юридических процесса в Германии, которые он очень надеется выиграть и получить большие деньги. На эти деньги он хочет купить нам квартиру в Германии и оформить развод с Е. Нибаум. А когда я буду жить в Германии - повезти меня к своему правительству как трофей, а не в шведское посольство. Я разгадала его план!

Я делаю Вам официальное заявление, что мои справки от 12 сентября и 14 сентября, составленные господином Нибаумом, являются неправильными и подлежат аннулированию.

Пользуясь моментом, сообщаю Вам, что я делаю свои переводы в Бизнес-Центре отеля "Метрополь", все квитанции сохраняю, а дублирую факсы на Центральном телеграфе. В гостинице "Метрополь", я думаю, что мой папа был арестован именно здесь и обвинен в шпионаже.

Несколько слов о себе. Я люблю классическую музыку, много читала, люблю живопись, знаю историю России.

Да, и еще я обнаружила две большие неточности в справке от 15 сентября 1997 года, составленной господином Нибаумом, а именно: я себя никогда не отождествляла с Великой княжной Анастасией, это фантазия г-на Нибаума.

Г-н Нибаум допустил серьезную ошибку, написав о моем шведском гражданстве и я его исправляю: я хочу быть верноподданной Его Величества Короля и Ее Величества Королевы Швеции.

Я заканчиваю, с большим уважением к Вам, госпожа Ирене Андерсон. Еще раз хочу поблагодарить Вас за то внимание, которое было оказано мне. Прошу Вас позвонить мне в Москву по моему домашнему телефону в 11-00 (время московское). Телефон : 952-98-75.

Уважаемая госпожа Андерсон, убедительно прошу Вас меня извинить за отсутствие перевода.

С уважением



Л. Прокофьева

P.S. Господин Нибаум продолжает мне звонить ежедневно, желая получить от меня информацию, но я ему никакой информации не даю. 29 сентября я сделала большой акцент на эпизоде с театром, он опять сказал, что это не важно. Я ответила, что для меня это очень важно и потребовала, чтобы он позвонил Вам и извинился перед Вами за искаженный текст моих справок, составленных им лично. Он ответил, что сделает это, позвонит и извинится.

Mr. Martin Hallqvist
Mr. Lage Olson
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Stockholm, Sweden

Dear Martin and Lage:

I have described below the objectives of the analysis of the prisoner registration cards that we selected in the kartoteka of the Vladimir Prison last March, and I have outlined three possible methods of the data collection that preserve as well as possible accuracy of data input and privacy of the prisoners and their families. I understand that this letter will be transmitted to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an aide-memoire within the next week. I trust the objectives and various methods are clearly described, and I do hope that this matter can be settled in the near future.

Please, do not hesitate to inform me if further information may be required. Since I am still temporarily at the University of Colorado as a Visiting Professor, I have provided all information below by which I can be contacted.

With best wishes,

Marvin W. Makinen

October 2, 1997

Chairman
Swedish-Russian Working Group
on the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation
Moscow, Russia

As a permanent consultant to the Swedish-Russian Working Group on the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg, I have been requested by Mr. Hans Magnusson to prepare an outline of methodology and purpose to continue the analysis of prisoner registration cards in the kartoteka of the Vladimir Prison, No. 2. This letter is to be transmitted to you as an aide-memoire. Thus, this letter is to provide an outline of methods to collect information from the Spetzchast kartoteka in the Vladimir Prison that I have proposed to analyze for the Swedish-Russian Working Group on the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg. There are three parts to this work which are closely interconnected and need to be completed together as a whole. They are:

(1) the review of the personal files of 99 former prisoners in the Soviet Union which with Susan Mesinai we have established as relevant to the case of Raoul Wallenberg. The files are to be reviewed in Moscow through the offices

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*Bifoget brev är
närskatet aide-
memoire till
nytt ordföranden
i arbetsgruppen
i Raoul Wallenberg-
ärendet. I nedskrivna
i särskild ordning
till ombuderna i
Moskva och Riga
1997-10-03*

a.a.

MR

and assistance of Msrs. Konstantin Sergeivich Nikishkin and Vladimir Konstantinovich Vinogradov who are members of the Swedish-Russian Working Group, and a list of the names of the individuals and details regarding our objectives have already been transmitted to you. Many of these files have been on request through the Working Group already for a number of years and have been earlier promised for review. In the intervening time, we have added to this list and have now limited it to these 99 prisoners. A handful of these files have been already analyzed, and we have provided that information in our master list transmitted through the Swedish Foreign Ministry, indicating that those files that have been reviewed by Susan Mesinai and myself need not be seen again.

(2) the compilation of date of entry and Case No. (in Russian, Dela No. No.) from the prisoner registration cards in the prison kartoteka for all prisoners having entered the Vladimir Prison, No. 2, in the years 1947, 1954, and 1972. This information is restricted only to these two pieces of information on the cards and involves no further form of prisoner identification or personal information. In late February-early March of this year, I brought, as you know, a team of assistants to the Vladimir Prison for carrying out further photography and analysis of prisoner registration cards. During this time Ms. Susan Mesinai, who was one of my assistants then, had received approval from Mr. Yuri Miroshin of the prison administration staff to collect these data. We estimate that we succeeded in collecting only about one-half of the relevant data and need to be able to complete this part in order to finalize our analysis.

(3) the compilation and analysis of cell occupancy data from the Vladimir kartoteka of prisoners who have been kept in Korpus II of the Vladimir Prison over the 1947-1972 period, prisoners who have died in the Prison, and prisoners for whom no cell occupancy data are provided on their cards (a small number) but for which their dates of entry and departure from the prison are recorded. The methodology and reasons for carrying out this analysis are summarized below.

As you will recall, through several visits over the 1993-1997 period to the Vladimir Prison with Professor Guy von Dardel, undertaken within the framework of the Working Group, we uncovered two individuals who have been employed at the Vladimir Prison over a lengthy period of time and who described a foreign prisoner not of German origin who had been held in solitary confinement for a long period of time in cell No. 49 of Korpus II. These individuals were Larina, Varvara Ivanovna, who had worked in the hospital and clinic of the Vladimir Prison in Korpus II, and Kukin, Alexandr Timofeivich, who was at the time of our interview with him, retired but had been a guard and later the head guard in the Vladimir Prison in the 1950's and 1960's.

During our initial first three contacts with Larina, we never informed her of the name or family of the prisoner for whom we were searching, and through our later discussions with her, it was evident that she did not know the name Wallenberg nor was she familiar with newspaper articles that have been published about him. She described the physical characteristics of this prisoner, which were such as to be compatible with those of Raoul Wallenberg, and she stated that she remembered this particular prisoner because of his constant critical comments and complaints about anything that was not suitable to him. For instance, she stated that he would complain if the soup was cold. Since this prisoner was located in Cell 49 on the third floor of the building and the soup was distributed from a large kettle with which they served prisoners on the ground floor, then the second floor, and finally on the third floor, it is to be expected that the soup would have cooled off by the time she got to him. Because of his constant complaints, however, she was ordered to bring the soup

first to the third floor. This is of course a vivid reason to recall a prisoner out of many others because he made life unpleasant for her. Larina stated that she did not know the name of this prisoner but she described him as a Westerner of non-German origin. She also stated that at the time of this prisoner's incarceration, a prisoner by the name of Osmak died who was located in a nearby cell. From a group of photographs of men of various ages and appearances, one of which was a side profile of RW not ever used in the international press, she identified this prisoner by picking out the picture of RW. Larina was not certain of the period during which this prisoner had been in Vladimir but thought that it was likely to have been in the mid or late 1950's.

Kukin in our interview with him confirmed that there had been a foreign prisoner held in solitary for a long period of time in Korpus II, but he stated that he did not know the name or origin of the prisoner. He described the prisoner similarly according to physical characteristics and when shown photographs he stated that the photograph of RW (also not one that had been in the international press) was not unlike this prisoner.

There are also, as you are aware, other reports that have been collected in the Swedish Foreign Ministry made by former prisoners who had been incarcerated in the Vladimir Prison that they had heard of RW or had heard that he had been incarcerated there. These reports, most of which have been discussed within the meetings of the Working Group, date from 1947 to 1972. I myself through my own incarceration in the Vladimir Prison have reported about having heard about a Swedish prisoner who had been there sometime in the 1950's or early 1960's. One prisoner named him "van den Berg."

As is known from our first investigation of the Vladimir Prison kartoteka in August of 1990, we were not able to locate a registration card with the name of Wallenberg. We cannot be certain that we have missed the card because of a pseudonym used rather than the name of Wallenberg. In addition, there was evidence in the kartoteka for up to 32 numbered prisoners. While most of these have been accounted for, some have not been identified, and cards for some numbered prisoners were not in the kartoteka. For instance, there were cards for numbered prisoners 26, 28, 29, and 32, but as I recall (here in Colorado where I am presently a visiting professor I do not have all of my records and notes on this matter) the cards for numbers 27, 30, and 31 were missing. There also may have been numbered prisoners higher than 32.

This background information thus points to the circumstance that a cell, in particular No. 49 in Korpus II, was occupied for a lengthy period of time and that this occupancy is likely not to be accounted for by the kartoteka if the registration card of this prisoner has been removed by authorities earlier in Soviet times or if the prisoner was numbered but the numbered card has been removed from the kartoteka. Also since prisoners were shifted from cell to cell periodically to hinder paths of communication through knocking, etc., it is probable that this prisoner had been transferred to other cells. Since the registration cards in the kartoteka contain a chronicle of date and cell number each time the given prisoner was transferred to a cell, a simple cell occupancy analysis made by extracting this information from the cards would point to the circumstance either that (1) a cell must be considered as "empty" since no card in the kartoteka can account for a prisoner having been in the cell, (2) a prisoner whose card is in the kartoteka turns out to have been kept in solitary for a long time and therefore the name on the card may be a pseudonym, or (3) it may show that all cells were occupied and thus deny the contention that there was a prisoner there in lengthy solitary confinement.

Furthermore, by identifying cards of prisoners who died while imprisoned in

Vladimir, we should be able to determine the details about the prisoner by the name of Osmak and when he died (During our visit to the Vladimir Prison in February-March, 1997, we indeed did determine that there had been a prisoner by that name who died.) Thus by identifying who may have been his cellmates in this period and which prisoners were in other nearby cells during this time, there would be a basis to try to find whether any of them may still be alive and could be interviewed to learn what they knew about special foreign prisoners in Vladimir at that time.

Also since it is possible that this special prisoner may have been in the Vladimir Prison at other times, having been transferred from other prisons, and since other reports place Wallenberg to have been in the Vladimir Prison over the 1947 to 1972 period, by analyzing cell occupancy data from the prisoner registration cards it would be possible to establish whether other cells were ostensibly "empty" at other times over this period and could therefore be considered to have had a prisoner in them that is not accounted for by the cards. Again, prisoners who could be identified and were located in other nearby cells, if alive, may be able to shed further light on the identity of this special prisoner.

In the end of February-beginning of March of this year, with a team of assistants, I traveled to the Vladimir Prison because through the Working Group and through the Swedish Embassy we had been informed that approval had been granted to our request to select and photograph registration cards of all prisoners who had occupied cells in Korpus II over the 1947 -1972 period. As is well known, we were not permitted to photograph or copy any of the cards, although we did select cards of those prisoners who had been in cells in Korpus II over the 1947-1972 period, who had died in the Vladimir Prison, or who had entered the Vladimir Prison during this time but did not have any cell occupancy information written into their cards. We prepared a list of the names of all of these prisoners which numbered close to 6000. The cards of these approximate 6000 prisoners were identified by being placed into a rotated orientation with respect to the other cards in each drawer of the kartoteka, and we were assured that they would be kept in that state in a storeroom of the prison administration until the matter of copying of the cards would be decided.

Thus, through this background information the objectives of the cell occupancy analysis are evident and it is clear that this analysis could either confirm the reports of a special prisoner held in solitary or deny the statements. The issue to be dealt with is how this information can be collected and analyzed so that Russian authorities can be assured that it will be used only for purposes of the Swedish-Russian Working Group on the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg and that it will not compromise the privacy of prisoners who are not associated with the case of Raoul Wallenberg. Therefore, I outline below three different methodologies for compiling the cell occupancy data that preserve the intactness and rigorousness of the analysis of the cell occupancy data from those approximate 6000 cards that have been selected earlier in February-March of this year and that protect the privacy of all prisoners whose cards must be examined. The Russian authorities will then have to decide which method is preferable to them. The three methods for compiling the cell occupancy information needed are as follows:

- (1) We photograph the cards as outlined above, carry out the analysis, and after the report has been made to the Working Group upon completion of the analysis, we return the photographic images of the cards to the Russian authorities. Under this condition, we assure the authorities that further copies of the cards will not be made. In this way the Russian authorities can feel assured that all information from their archival documents has been

returned to them. This is the most accurate method for the analysis since it allows us to verify during the analysis that all data have been entered accurately. Since we must extract the cell occupancy information from each card to be analyzed by computer algorithms developed for this purpose, it is likely that some errors in data input are to be expected. This method allows verification of data input and makes for the most accurate analysis possible. I point out that Professor Guy von Dardel and I have worked since 1990 so as to use all archival material only according to the objectives of the Working Group. This method permits complete verification of data input and preserves complete accuracy of data analysis. All other methods, such as the two outlined below, are subject to greater error in the analysis.

(2) With a team of assistants, I be allowed to direct the collection of cell occupancy information in the kartoteka of the Vladimir Prison by entering into our own laptop computers only the following information from the approximate 6000 cards selected: name of prisoner and date of birth, case number, date of entry into the prison, cell occupancy data including cell number and date when transferred, and date of departure from prison. This method allows collection of the data that are necessary for the analysis and does not involve making records of other information about each prisoner that do not serve the objectives of the analysis, such as date of arrest, basis of arrest, statute according to which the prisoner was charged and sentenced, length of sentence, etc. Should certain prisoners need to be contacted or identified further for purposes outlined above, we can then simply provide the name and date of birth, etc. to the Russian authorities. During our work in the Vladimir Prison in February-March of 1997, I discussed this possibility with my assistants. We decided that this method would probably require five assistants each with a personal laptop computer to work in the kartoteka for 7-10 consecutive days to enter just the minimal information from each card described above. We would have to use this period of time to verify accuracy of data input as much as possible, but the method suffers from the possibility that some errors in data input may go through undetected and that after our departure from the Vladimir Prison there would be no opportunity to make corrections. The resultant effect on the analysis may be small but cannot be accurately predicted since it would depend on the frequency of errors. There would be no information collected by this method that would allow further public identification of prisoners or of their families.

(3) With a team of assistants, I be allowed to direct the collection of data as described above in point (2) but under the condition that the names of the prisoners not be entered into our laptop computers although the other information such as case number, date of entry into the prison, cell occupancy data, and date of departure from the prison would be recorded. In this case we would prepare a separate list for the authorities of prisoner name and date of birth with a corresponding identification number which would be entered into our computerized records, for instance, prisoners A1,A2,.....,A9, etc. for those whose family names begin with the letter A, prisoners B1,B2,B3,...., etc. for those whose names begin with the letter B, and so forth. In this manner we keep no copies of personal identification information about the prisoners. Should a prisoner have to be identified as a result of the analysis for reasons described above, we would simply provide the Russian authorities with the number A10, for instance, and the Russian authorities could then carry the work further themselves. This method has the same disadvantage as pointed out in method (2) above that verification of input data can be made only while working in the Vladimir Prison. There would be no further means for public identification of prisoners or their families since we will not be able to memorize a list of over 6000 names. However, it will be necessary for the

Russian authorities to preserve the list of prisoner names and identification numbers for some period of time, at least until the analysis of the work is completed.

For well over a year I have tried to think of a method of making a permanent copy of just the minimum information needed from each card without recording other data such as length of sentence, etc., that is of no use to us and is of no interest. Unfortunately there is no manner in which only part of each card could be photographed because both sides of each card must be examined to extract the necessary information and the data are not written onto the cards in a uniform manner. Short of this, I have outlined above three possible methods to collect the necessary information for the analysis and to arrive at a reasonably satisfactory conclusion by ensuring as much as possible accuracy of data input. I hope that agreement can be reached for implementing one of the above described methods. They are listed in order of decreasing preference to me purely on the basis for the opportunity for verification of data input.

I hope that this description of the goals and objectives of our archival research are clear and understandable. Please do inform me if further information may be required.

Sincerely,

Marvin W. Makinen

Temporary address August 18 - October 18, 1997:

Marvin W. Makinen
Department of Chemistry & Biochemistry
University of Colorado
Campus Box 215
Boulder, Colorado 80309-0215

Tel: 303/492-4503 or leave message at 303/492-3545
FAX: 303/492-3586 or 303/492-5894

E-mail: makinen@colorado.edu
makinen@atlantis.colorado.edu

E-mail can be directed also to my permanent address:

m-makinen@uchicago.edu

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1997-10-03

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Amb London

Från Julin, GAT

Re Frisläppande av RW-dokument; Gordijevskijs vittnesmål
(Hbrev Julin-Hartelius 1997-06-02)

offentliggörande

av vad som förekommer om Oleg Gordijevkij i Raoul Wallenberg-arkivet. Anledningen är att departementet i januari i år erhöll en framställning från en kanadensisk advokat att få del av allt hemligstämpelat material om RW mer eller mindre samtidigt med - och oberoende av - att departementsledningen beslöt att i största möjliga utsträckning avhemliga RW-arkivet. Framställningar av detta slag ska ju enligt tryckfrihetsförordningen (2 kap. 13 paragrafen) behandlas skyndsamt, och förberedelserna för frisläppandet av handlingarna för 1971-91 är nu så långt framskridna att det blir svårt att motivera ytterligare uppskov.

Utöver vad som anförs i ovan citerade handbrev kan nämnas att utelämnande av G:s vittnesmål naturligtvis skulle vara djupt olyckligt emedan det förmodligen skulle ge upphov till vilseledande spekulationer med åtföljande, ständigt återkommande misstankar att departementet försöker dölja viktiga uppgifter. G:s vittnesmål är ju känt från hans memoarer, och tidigare i år framträdde han inför finländsk press i frågan. Till saken hör också att G inte längre skyddas av den svenska sekretesslagens skadekriterier. ("Sekretss gäller för uppgift som rör utlänning, om det kan antas att röjande av uppgiften skulle medföra fara för att någon utsätts för övergrepp eller annat allvarligt men som föranleds av förhållandet mellan utlänningen och utländsk stat eller myndighet").

Tacksam sålunda om ambassaden skyndsamt enligt ovan.

CABINET



REGERINGSKANSLIET

1997-10-03

Utrikesdepartementet

EC 2

Martin Hallqvist

Telefon 08- 405 3236

EI/ESEK

Lage Olson

Telefon 08 - 405 3280

[Handwritten signature]

Ambassaden Moskva
Ambassaden Riga

BRÅDSKANDE

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P 2 Eu'
(EC)
✓ Exp. 971003 / ME

Re Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet

(1 bil.)

Efter kommentarer från Hans Magnusson den 2 oktober beträffande utkast till aide-mémoire att överlämnas till ryssarna i Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet bifogas ett något reviderat textförslag. Ändringar eller tillägg har gjorts under avsnitten 2b, 2d, 2g och 3. Till detta har fogats ett nytt brev från Marvin Makinen, som innehåller ett tredje alternativ omfattande kodning av personuppgifter för undersökning av registret i Vladimir.

Cabinet

MD



1997-10-02

Utrikesdepartementet

Enheten för Central- och Östeuropa

Martin Hallqvist

Telefon 405 - 3236

1. Den svensk-ryska arbetsgruppen rörande Raoul Wallenbergs öde har nu varit verksam i nästan sex år. Betydande ansträngningar har lagts ned på att få fram dokumentation och uppgifter ur olika arkiv och på att intervjua personer som har förmodats äga närmare kännedom om en eller annan aspekt av Raoul Wallenbergs öde. Att arbetet dragit ut på tiden och ännu inte kunnat avslutas beror på att arbetsgruppen icke - med någon tillfredsställande grad av säkerhet och bevisning - lyckats slå fast Raoul Wallenbergs öde efter att ha hamnat i sovjetisk fångenskap eller ens varför han arresterades och kvarhölls resp. hur besluten härom fattades. Arbetet har också försenats p.g.a. att de ryska myndigheterna inte godkänt slutförandet av undersökningarna i Vladimirfängelset.

Vi befinner oss i en situation där en rad motstridiga vittnesmål fortfarande inte kunnat definitivt avfärdas eller bekräftas och där följaktligen endast mer eller mindre starkt underbyggda hypoteser om motiven för RW:s arrestering resp om hans öde kan framläggas.

Den svenska sidan noterar att man icke heller från rysk sida hävdar att fullständig bevisning för RW:s död 1947 föreligger. Vi har också med tillfredsställelse noterat att man i flera officiella ryska uttalanden understrukit sin beredskap att fortsätta söka efter alla de fakta och handlingar, vilka hänger samman med RW:s liv och verksamhet, senast i utrikesminister Primakovs brev till Sveriges utrikesminister den 17 juli 1997.

Nedan redovisas de åtgärder som enligt svensk uppfattning är nödvändiga för att en publicering av rapporten skall vara möjlig. De bör vara genomförda under loppet av första halvåret 1998, men redan vid tiden för president Jeltsins besök i Sverige i december bör det kunna slås fast att arbetet på de ännu utestående punkterna är i full gång.

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Vi är från svensk sida medvetna om att inte ens nedan föreslagna åtgärder med nödvändighet kommer att leda fram till att fullständig klarhet nås. I så fall bör detta påpekas i rapporten och öppenhet finnas för att göra de ytterligare undersökningar som kan bli nödvändiga i framtiden.

2. Följande åtgärder bör genomföras.

a) Från rysk sida har man avvisat begäran om kopiering av 6.000 registerkort från Vladimirfängelset, trots utförlig motivering för syftet med denna undersökning. Mot bakgrund av de argument som framförts från rysk sida föreslås nu en ny undersökningsmetod, som även om den är mer arbetskrävande, torde ta hänsyn till invändningar föranledda av den ryska informationslagen. I detta sammanhang bör erinras om de åtaganden som de stater, inkl. Ryssland, gjorde när de år 1992 antog "the UN Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance" bl a när det gäller att tillhandahålla register över alla personer som berövats sin frihet.

Professor Marvin Makinens förslag till åtgärder bifogas.

Det kan tilläggas att det, om denna undersökning inte genomförs, blir omöjligt att en gång för alla fastställa om RW vistats i Vladimirfängelset under annat namn eller nummer.

b) Officiell framställan har överlämnats om genomgång avpersondossierer rörande fångar som på ett eller annat sätt haft anknytning till R Wallenberg. Det är angeläget att Susan Mesinai får göra detta för arbetsgruppens räkning. Någon kopiering av dokument kommer ej att bli erforderlig.

c) Som bekant finns vittnesuppgifter att RW skulle ha förvarats på en eller flera psykiatriska kliniker. Inom arbetsgruppen finns sedan tidigare en överenskommelse om att stödja ansträngningarna att utröna sanningshalten i dessa uppgifter. Susan Mesinai har redan inlett ett samarbete med Serbskijinstitutet som hittills gällt perioden fram t.o.m. 1947. Det är angeläget att undersökningarna fortsätter samt att även tillträde ges till Kazankliniken. De bör fastställas huruvida detta arbete kan utföras i samarbetet med Presidentens kommission för rehabilitering av repressionens offer.

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d) Det är angeläget att största möjliga öppenhet framgent visas när det gäller tillträde till relevanta ryska arkiv även för oberoende, seriösa forskare. Som ett exempel kan nämnas op.fond 451 (exakt benämning?). Vitboken kommer att innehålla skrivningar om lämpliga uppföljande åtgärder.

e) Från rysk sida har hävdats att de chiffterelegram som förvaras separat i det ryska utrikesministeriets arkiv inte innehåller något av intresse rörande Raoul Wallenberg. Om inte tillträde kan ges till denna del av arkivet krävs en uttrycklig försäkran i rapporten om att inget relevant materiel rörande RW finns i dessa chiffterelegram.

f) Sedan arbetsgruppen sist sammanträdde har en del nya uppgifter framkommit som behöver verifieras närmare. Det gäller bl a de f d KGB-medarbetarna Igor Prelin och Gennadij Sokolov.

g) Såsom tidigare föreslagits bör ytterligare ett, väl förberett, samtal föras med D. Kopelanskij och B. Solovov.

h) I ett svar från MID i januari 1997 på tidigare svenska frågor sägs bl a att Lubjanka-fängelsets särskilda akter från 1947 förstörts 1955, varvid en handling om detta upprättades. Denna uppgift har tidigare inte nämnts för arbetsgruppen och det vore därför värdefullt att erhålla en kopia av den nämnda handlingen.

Om det från rysk sida inte är möjligt att vara tillmötesgående, främst vad gäller punkterna a-d ovan - kommer detta klart att påpekas i rapporten. Ansvaret för undersökningen som inte kan genomföras kommer alltså att helt läggas på den ryska sidan.

3. Från svensk sida vill vi slutligen föreslå att arbetsgruppen har ett möte i Moskva några veckor före president Jeltsins besök i Sverige. För att ett sådant möte skall bli meningsfullt är det dock en förutsättning att begärda undersökningar redan kunnat sättas igång.

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October 2, 1997

Chairman
Swedish-Russian Working Group
on the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation
Moscow, Russia

As a permanent consultant to the Swedish-Russian Working Group on the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg, I have been requested by Mr. Hans Magnusson to prepare an outline of methodology and purpose to continue the analysis of prisoner registration cards in the kartoteka of the Vladimir Prison, No. 2. This letter is to be transmitted to you as an aide-memoire. Thus, this letter is to provide an outline of methods to collect information from the Spetzchast kartoteka in the Vladimir Prison that I have proposed to analyze for the Swedish-Russian Working Group on the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg. There are three parts to this work which are closely interconnected and need to be completed together as a whole. They are:

(1) the review of the personal files of 99 former prisoners in the Soviet Union which with Susan Mesinai we have established as relevant to the case of Raoul Wallenberg. The files are to be reviewed in Moscow through the offices

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and assistance of Mssrs. Konstantin Sergeivich Nikishkin and Vladimir Konstantinovich Vinogradov who are members of the Swedish-Russian Working Group, and a list of the names of the individuals and details regarding our objectives have already been transmitted to you. Many of these files have been on request through the Working Group already for a number of years and have been earlier promised for review. In the intervening time, we have added to this list and have now limited it to these 99 prisoners. A handful of these files have been already analyzed, and we have provided that information in our master list transmitted through the Swedish Foreign Ministry, indicating that those files that have been reviewed by Susan Mesinai and myself need not be seen again.

(2) the compilation of date of entry and Case No. (in Russian, Dela No. No.) from the prisoner registration cards in the prison kartoteka for all prisoners having entered the Vladimir Prison, No. 2, in the years 1947, 1954, and 1972. This information is restricted only to these two pieces of information on the cards and involves no further form of prisoner identification or personal information. In late February-early March of this year, I brought, as you know, a team of assistants to the Vladimir Prison for carrying out further photography and analysis of prisoner registration cards. During this time Ms. Susan Mesinai, who was one of my assistants then, had received approval from Mr. Yuri Miroshin of the prison administration staff to collect these data. We estimate that we succeeded in collecting only about one-half of the relevant data and need to be able to complete this part in order to finalize our analysis.

(3) the compilation and analysis of cell occupancy data from the Vladimir kartoteka of prisoners who have been kept in Korpus II of the Vladimir Prison over the 1947-1972 period, prisoners who have died in the Prison, and prisoners for whom no cell occupancy data are provided on their cards (a small number) but for which their dates of entry and departure from the prison are recorded. The methodology and reasons for carrying out this analysis are summarized below.

As you will recall, through several visits over the 1993-1997 period to the Vladimir Prison with Professor Guy von Dardel, undertaken within the framework of the Working Group, we uncovered two individuals who have been employed at the Vladimir Prison over a lengthy period of time and who described a foreign prisoner not of German origin who had been held in solitary confinement for a long period of time in cell No. 49 of Korpus II. These individuals were Larina, Varvara Ivanovna, who had worked in the hospital and clinic of the Vladimir Prison in Korpus II, and Kukin, Alexandr Timofeivich, who was at the time of our interview with him, retired but had been a guard and later the head guard in the Vladimir Prison in the 1950's and 1960's.

During our initial first three contacts with Larina, we never informed her of the name or family of the prisoner for whom we were searching, and through our later discussions with her, it was evident that she did not know the name Wallenberg nor was she familiar with newspaper articles that have been published about him. She described the physical characteristics of this prisoner, which were such as to be compatible with those of Raoul Wallenberg, and she stated that she remembered this particular prisoner because of his constant critical comments and complaints about anything that was not suitable to him. For instance, she stated that he would complain if the soup was cold. Since this prisoner was located in Cell 49 on the third floor of the building and the soup was distributed from a large kettle with which they served prisoners on the ground floor, then the second floor, and finally on the third floor, it is to be expected that the soup would have cooled off by the time she got to him. Because of his constant complaints, however, she was ordered to bring the soup

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first to the third floor. This is of course a vivid reason to recall a prisoner out of many others because he made life unpleasant for her. Larina stated that she did not know the name of this prisoner but she described him as a Westerner of non-German origin. She also stated that at the time of this prisoner's incarceration, a prisoner by the name of Osmak died who was located in a nearby cell. From a group of photographs of men of various ages and appearances, one of which was a side profile of RW not ever used in the international press, she identified this prisoner by picking out the picture of RW. Larina was not certain of the period during which this prisoner had been in Vladimir but thought that it was likely to have been in the mid or late 1950's.

Kukin in our interview with him confirmed that there had been a foreign prisoner held in solitary for a long period of time in Korpus II, but he stated that he did not know the name or origin of the prisoner. He described the prisoner similarly according to physical characteristics and when shown photographs he stated that the photograph of RW (also not one that had been in the international press) was not unlike this prisoner.

There are also, as you are aware, other reports that have been collected in the Swedish Foreign Ministry made by former prisoners who had been incarcerated in the Vladimir Prison that they had heard of RW or had heard that he had been incarcerated there. These reports, most of which have been discussed within the meetings of the Working Group, date from 1947 to 1972. I myself through my own incarceration in the Vladimir Prison have reported about having heard about a Swedish prisoner who had been there sometime in the 1950's or early 1960's. One prisoner named him "van den Berg."

As is known from our first investigation of the Vladimir Prison kartoteka in August of 1990, we were not able to locate a registration card with the name of Wallenberg. We cannot be certain that we have missed the card because of a pseudonym used rather than the name of Wallenberg. In addition, there was evidence in the kartoteka for up to 32 numbered prisoners. While most of these have been accounted for, some have not been identified, and cards for some numbered prisoners were not in the kartoteka. For instance, there were cards for numbered prisoners 26, 28, 29, and 32, but as I recall (here in Colorado where I am presently a visiting professor I do not have all of my records and notes on this matter) the cards for numbers 27, 30, and 31 were missing. There also may have been numbered prisoners higher than 32.

This background information thus points to the circumstance that a cell, in particular No. 49 in Korpus II, was occupied for a lengthy period of time and that this occupancy is likely not to be accounted for by the kartoteka if the registration card of this prisoner has been removed by authorities earlier in Soviet times or if the prisoner was numbered but the numbered card has been removed from the kartoteka. Also since prisoners were shifted from cell to cell periodically to hinder paths of communication through knocking, etc., it is probable that this prisoner had been transferred to other cells. Since the registration cards in the kartoteka contain a chronicle of date and cell number each time the given prisoner was transferred to a cell, a simple cell occupancy analysis made by extracting this information from the cards would point to the circumstance either that (1) a cell must be considered as "empty" since no card in the kartoteka can account for a prisoner having been in the cell, (2) a prisoner whose card is in the kartoteka turns out to have been kept in solitary for a long time and therefore the name on the card may be a pseudonym, or (3) it may show that all cells were occupied and thus deny the contention that there was a prisoner there in lengthy solitary confinement.

Furthermore, by identifying cards of prisoners who died while imprisoned in

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Vladimir, we should be able to determine the details about the prisoner by the name of Osmak and when he died (During our visit to the Vladimir Prison in February-March, 1997, we indeed did determine that there had been a prisoner by that name who died.) Thus by identifying who may have been his cellmates in this period and which prisoners were in other nearby cells during this time, there would be a basis to try to find whether any of them may still be alive and could be interviewed to learn what they knew about special foreign prisoners in Vladimir at that time.

Also since it is possible that this special prisoner may have been in the Vladimir Prison at other times, having been transferred from other prisons, and since other reports place Wallenberg to have been in the Vladimir Prison over the 1947 to 1972 period, by analyzing cell occupancy data from the prisoner registration cards it would be possible to establish whether other cells were ostensibly "empty" at other times over this period and could therefore be considered to have had a prisoner in them that is not accounted for by the cards. Again, prisoners who could be identified and were located in other nearby cells, if alive, may be able to shed further light on the identity of this special prisoner.

In the end of February-beginning of March of this year, with a team of assistants, I traveled to the Vladimir Prison because through the Working Group and through the Swedish Embassy we had been informed that approval had been granted to our request to select and photograph registration cards of all prisoners who had occupied cells in Korpus II over the 1947 -1972 period. As is well known, we were not permitted to photograph or copy any of the cards, although we did select cards of those prisoners who had been in cells in Korpus II over the 1947-1972 period, who had died in the Vladimir Prison, or who had entered the Vladimir Prison during this time but did not have any cell occupancy information written into their cards. We prepared a list of the names of all of these prisoners which numbered close to 6000. The cards of these approximate 6000 prisoners were identified by being placed into a rotated orientation with respect to the other cards in each drawer of the kartoteka, and we were assured that they would be kept in that state in a storeroom of the prison administration until the matter of copying of the cards would be decided.

Thus, through this background information the objectives of the cell occupancy analysis are evident and it is clear that this analysis could either confirm the reports of a special prisoner held in solitary or deny the statements. The issue to be dealt with is how this information can be collected and analyzed so that Russian authorities can be assured that it will be used only for purposes of the Swedish-Russian Working Group on the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg and that it will not compromise the privacy of prisoners who are not associated with the case of Raoul Wallenberg. Therefore, I outline below three different methodologies for compiling the cell occupancy data that preserve the intactness and rigorousness of the analysis of the cell occupancy data from those approximate 6000 cards that have been selected earlier in February-March of this year and that protect the privacy of all prisoners whose cards must be examined. The Russian authorities will then have to decide which method is preferable to them. The three methods for compiling the cell occupancy information needed are as follows:

(1) We photograph the cards as outlined above, carry out the analysis, and after the report has been made to the Working Group upon completion of the analysis, we return the photographic images of the cards to the Russian authorities. Under this condition, we assure the authorities that further copies of the cards will not be made. In this way the Russian authorities can feel assured that all information from their archival documents has been

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returned to them. This is the most accurate method for the analysis since it allows us to verify during the analysis that all data have been entered accurately. Since we must extract the cell occupancy information from each card to be analyzed by computer algorithms developed for this purpose, it is likely that some errors in data input are to be expected. This method allows verification of data input and makes for the most accurate analysis possible. I point out that Professor Guy von Dardel and I have worked since 1990 so as to use all archival material only according to the objectives of the Working Group. This method permits complete verification of data input and preserves complete accuracy of data analysis. All other methods, such as the two outlined below, are subject to greater error in the analysis.

(2) With a team of assistants, I be allowed to direct the collection of cell occupancy information in the kartoteka of the Vladimir Prison by entering into our own laptop computers only the following information from the approximate 6000 cards selected: name of prisoner and date of birth, case number, date of entry into the prison, cell occupancy data including cell number and date when transferred, and date of departure from prison. This method allows collection of the data that are necessary for the analysis and does not involve making records of other information about each prisoner that do not serve the objectives of the analysis, such as date of arrest, basis of arrest, statute according to which the prisoner was charged and sentenced, length of sentence, etc. Should certain prisoners need to be contacted or identified further for purposes outlined above, we can then simply provide the name and date of birth, etc. to the Russian authorities. During our work in the Vladimir Prison in February-March of 1997, I discussed this possibility with my assistants. We decided that this method would probably require five assistants each with a personal laptop computer to work in the kartoteka for 7-10 consecutive days to enter just the minimal information from each card described above. We would have to use this period of time to verify accuracy of data input as much as possible, but the method suffers from the possibility that some errors in data input may go through undetected and that after our departure from the Vladimir Prison there would be no opportunity to make corrections. The resultant effect on the analysis may be small but cannot be accurately predicted since it would depend on the frequency of errors. There would be no information collected by this method that would allow further public identification of prisoners or of their families.

(3) With a team of assistants, I be allowed to direct the collection of data as described above in point (2) but under the condition that the names of the prisoners not be entered into our laptop computers although the other information such as case number, date of entry into the prison, cell occupancy data, and date of departure from the prison would be recorded. In this case we would prepare a separate list for the authorities of prisoner name and date of birth with a corresponding identification number which would be entered into our computerized records, for instance, prisoners A1,A2,...,A9, etc. for those whose family names begin with the letter A, prisoners B1,B2,B3,..., etc. for those whose names begin with the letter B, and so forth. In this manner we keep no copies of personal identification information about the prisoners. Should a prisoner have to be identified as a result of the analysis for reasons described above, we would simply provide the Russian authorities with the number A10, for instance, and the Russian authorities could then carry the work further themselves. This method has the same disadvantage as pointed out in method (2) above that verification of input data can be made only while working in the Vladimir Prison. There would be no further means for public identification of prisoners or their families since we will not be able to memorize a list of over 6000 names. However, it will be necessary for the

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Russian authorities to preserve the list of prisoner names and identification numbers for some period of time, at least until the analysis of the work is completed.

For well over a year I have tried to think of a method of making a permanent copy of just the minimum information needed from each card without recording other data such as length of sentence, etc., that is of no use to us and is of no interest. Unfortunately there is no manner in which only part of each card could be photographed because both sides of each card must be examined to extract the necessary information and the data are not written onto the cards in a uniform manner. Short of this, I have outlined above three possible methods to collect the necessary information for the analysis and to arrive at a reasonably satisfactory conclusion by ensuring as much as possible accuracy of data input. I hope that agreement can be reached for implementing one of the above described methods. They are listed in order of decreasing preference to me purely on the basis for the opportunity for verification of data input.

I hope that this description of the goals and objectives of our archival research are clear and understandable. Please do inform me if further information may be required.

Sincerely,

Marvin W. Makinen

Temporary address August 18 - October 18, 1997:

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Mike McGill
405 3236

3 October 1987

06-10-1987

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100% 07-17
10-6
a.a./No
2. en

Je tiens à remercier les gens qui se penchent sur
mon dossier et qui m'aident à faire passer
mon dossier à l'étape suivante.

Dans les années 1980 suite à des
contacts avec des Parlementaires, j'ai
pu obtenir presque toutes les
informations que j'ai besoin de M. Raftery et M. O'Brien
pour déposer une motion au Parlement
concernant le sort de l'île d'Orléans.
M. Raoul Warlenberg, premier ministre
de l'Amérique du Nord à l'époque
a pu de la même façon
obtenir l'information en janvier 1985.

J'aurais - je vous demander, V^{otre}
Excellence si éventuellement vous
pourriez envisager de marquer votre
accord pour le projet de créer
dans le cadre du Parlement
européen une fondation ayant
pour but de commémorer les victimes
de l'acte de M. Raoul Wallenberg?

Vous remerciant anticipativement
je vous prie de croire, V^{otre}
Excellence, à l'assurance de
ma plus haute considération

(RÉP)

RÉP. Christiane
13 rue Victor Cousin
1250 Bruxelles

1997-10-06

Handl: Wallberg/Fredén

aa/
R

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

Avd.	Grupp	Mål
P	2	Eu ²

För: UD-EC (Hallqvist)

Kopia: UD-EI (Olson) rekryfax amb Riga (Magnusson),
kabs

M Y C K E T B R Å D S K A N D E

Re Raol Wallenberg

1. Allmänt

Det av departementet författade utkastet till aide-mémoire är som helhet bra. Det finns nu en strategi för hur det fortsatta arbetet i Wallenberg-ärendet skall bedrivas. Nedan några kommentarer till aide-mémoiren och Makinens framställan.

2. Den föreslagna aide-mémoiren

Punkt 1, fjärde stycket: "..., men redan vid tiden för Jeltins besök bör det kunna slås fast att arbetet på de ännu utestående frågorna är i full gång". Innebörden av "i full gång" bör förtydligas, alternativt bör meningen omformuleras så att det inte finns något utrymme för missförstånd om vad den svenska sidan anser vara en tillfredsställande nivå. Risker är annars att den ryska sidan tolkar meningen på ett sätt som inte ligger i vårt intresse. Det finns inför Jeltsins besök ett politiskt tryck från rysk sida att avföra ärendet från dagordningen och visa att det inte finns några utestående frågor kvar. I texten skulle man därför kunna påpeka att det med hänsyn till den uppmärksamhet i media kring ärendet som kan förväntas, ligger i båda sidors intresse, inte

minst den ryska, att visa att arbetet är "i full gång", dvs att den ryska sidan gör verkliga ansträngingar för att knyta ihop återstående lösa trådar i ärendet.

Punkt 2, första stycket: "Följande åtgärder bör genomföras". Formuleringen är svag. Ett faktiskt konstaterande av läget skulle ge ett stramare intryck, såsom "Följande punkter är ännu oklara" eller "Följande frågor återstår att lösa".

2a), andra meningen: "...föreslås nu en ny undersökningsmetod...". Möjligen bör anges att det rör sig om flera alternativa metoder.

Under 2d) vore vi tacksamma för den exakta benämningen av "op.fond 451". Ambassaden har såvitt vi vet inga uppgifter härom.

Under 2e), andra meningen: "...krävs en uttrycklig försäkran i rapporten". Kanske borde man ange vem som skall avge denna försäkran, exempelvis "...krävs att den ryska sidan/MID avger en försäkran.."

2f) " ..en hel del nya uppgifter framkommit som behöver verifieras närmare. Det gäller bl a de f d KGB-medarbetarna D. Kopelanskij och Solovov." Vilka uppgifter avses? Vad avses med bl a?

2h) i andra stycket bör det stå "Ansvar för undersökningar...".

Punkt 3: Sista meningen är något av en nyckelmening; vi instämmer i Magnussons (kryfax 223) bedömning rörande nästa arbetsgruppsmöte att det finns en poäng i att göra en koppling till ett klartecken för berörda undersökningar.

3.Makinens begäran om arkivundersökningar

Beträffande Makinens begäran instämmer vi i Magnussons påpekande att det blir svårare att motivera ett nej om den ryska sidan erhåller flera alternativ (kryfax 223 amb Riga).

Vi uppskattar de förtydliganden som gjorts i Makinens förslag sedan ambassaden delgavs det första utkastet. Framställan är emellertid fortfarande mycket lång (ca 8 A4-sidor), och skulle i nuvarande format riskera att bli liggande hos ryska myndigheter. Ambassadens översättningskapacitet är med hänsyn till stor arbetsbörda f n

begränsad, vilket med tanke på de snäva tidsramarna innebär en flaskhals. Texten är i sin nuvarande utformning resonerande och innehåller ett flertal exempel. Det torde enligt vår mening vara möjligt att fokusera mera på problemställningen, och därmed skära ned textmassan betydligt. Vi vore därför tacksamma om textförfattaren eller departementet omformulerade framställan. (Det är synd att Makinen tydligen uppmanats att omformulera sin text innan ambassaden hunnit inkomma med sina synpunkter).

4. Ambassaden avvaktar en ny version av aide-mémoiren. För att ge extra tyngd åt framställan föreslås att Magnusson överlämnar denna i samband med sitt besök i Moskva den 8-10 oktober. Med hänsyn till tidsåtgång för översättning bör ett underlag vara ambassaden till handa senast tisdag den 7 oktober kl. 09.00.

HIRDMAN



SVERIGES AMBASSAD
RIGA

Sid 1 (2)

1997-10-06

Handläggare: H Magnusson

u

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

Avd.	Grupp	Mål
P.	Q	Fu ¹

MYCKET BRÅDSKANDE (EC)

a-a- / K

Re Raoul Wallenberg
Moskvaamb.

Till: EC (Hallqvist)
Kopia: EI (Olson),

amb Moskva

Kommentarer

Punkt 1, fjärde stycket: "...bör det kunna slås fast att positivt svar på föreslagna åtgärder givits från rysk sida och att angivet arbete kunnat sättas igång."

Punkt 2, första stycket: OK.

Punkt 2a): OK.

Punkt 2d): "Operativa styrelsens fond nr 451 (vid NKVD:s/MVD:s överstyrelse för frågor rörade krigsfångar och internerade [GUPVI])"; finns numera i TsChIDK.

Punkt 2e): OK.

Punkt 2f): avser Igor Prelin och Gennadij Sokolov (Kopeljanskij och Solovov nämns i 2g). Det gäller

radiointervju i Tyskland resp. tidningsartikel. "Bl
a" avser att man inte behöver vara uttömmande på
denna punkt.

2h): OK.

Makinens text: Man kanske kan överlämna översatt
kortversion men också bifoga den längre texten på
engelska?

MAGNUSSON

Bachmann/A-ARK
Besv. brev 1997-11-24

Raoul Wallenberg

1/2

TO: Bernd Frederikson

Chief ^xArchivist
UD/Archive
Stockholm

Fax: 0046 8 723 1176

From: Susanne Berger
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(703) 237-0946 (Tel & Fax)

Nr. of Pages: 2

October 3, 1997

INK UD		
1997-10-06		
INK. UTRIKESDEP.		
DNR	276/003	
1997-10-06		
Avd.	Gr	Mål
P	2	Eu'

2/2

October 3, 1997

Dear Mr. Frederikson,

Thank you very much for taking the time to go over some questions related to the Raoul Wallenberg case during my most recent visit to Stockholm.

I wanted to ask you whether you have been able to locate any of the material connected with the discussions between representatives of the Swedish Foreign Office and the Swedish Police in the time from December 1965 to the end of 1967, in the matter of an apparent offer from the Soviet side to seek an exchange of convicted agent Stig Wennerstrom. I had raised this question some months ago with Mr. Backman who suggested that the material in question could easily have been filed with the Defense Department, since this obviously was a matter dealing with National Security.

I also wanted to check with you where one can find the communications and telegrams which are not included in the first three volumes of the so-called Blue Books on the Wallenberg case - 1944 - and the CD-ROM collection; exchanges for the most part between the Swedish Foreign Office and the Swedish Legation Budapest and the UD and the Swedish Legation Moscow. Are these telegrams lost? I would assume that they are not being withheld. There are, however gaps in the telegram traffic - communications are being referred to which are not printed in the collection. One example is the list of 50 names the UD forwarded to the Swedish Legation, Budapest in July 1944 - persons who were to be protected. The list begins with "Nadas, Buchinger".

My last question concerns the questionnaires the Russian and other prisoner of war had to fill out and which were handled by Swedish Legation, Budapest personnel. According to some statements these questionnaires were forwarded to the UD. They contained sensitive military information. Where are these questionnaires filed? And why have they not been included in the RW case file? If these questionnaires fell into the wrong hands, German hands for instance, it could have been easily imaginable that the Russians would interpret this as a flagrant breach of Swedish neutrality. This obviously has some bearing on the case even though RW's name is not attached to the document.

Thank you again for your help , best wishes

Susanne Berger

Author: INTERNET:makinen@atlantis.Colorado.EDU/ at INTERNET

Date: 1997-10-07 10.42

Priority: Normal

TO: Martin (UD) Hallqvist at (Pk)UD-3

CC: Lage (UD) Olson at (Pk)UD-3

Subject: analysis of prison archival materials.

DNR 79/001	
1997 40-07	
AVD	GP 2
Eu	

October 6, 1997

Chairman
Swedish-Russian Working Group
on the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation
Moscow, Russia

*Texten ingår
i installation till
arkiv i Moskva
1997-10-06*

a.a. / L

As a permanent consultant to the Swedish-Russian Working Group on the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg, I have been requested by Mr. Hans Magnusson to prepare an outline of methodology and purpose for analysis of prisoner registration cards in the kartoteka of the Vladimir Prison, No. 2. There are three parts to this work which are closely interconnected and need to be completed together as a whole. They are:

(1) the review of the personal files of 99 former prisoners in the Soviet Union which with Susan Mesinai we have established as relevant to the case of Raoul Wallenberg. The files are to be reviewed in Moscow through the offices and assistance of Messrs. Konstantin Sergeevich Nikishkin and Vladimir Konstantinovich Vinogradov. A list of the names of the individuals and details regarding our objectives have already been transmitted. Many of these files have been on request through the Working Group already for a number of years and have been earlier promised for review. In the intervening time, we have added to this list and have now limited it to these 99 prisoners. A handful of these files have been already analyzed, and we have provided that information in our master list transmitted through the Swedish Foreign Ministry, indicating that those files that have been reviewed by Susan Mesinai and myself need not be seen again.

(2) the compilation of date of entry and Case No. (in Russian, Dela No. No.) from the prisoner registration cards in the prison kartoteka for all prisoners having entered the Vladimir Prison, No. 2, in the years 1947, 1954, and 1972. This information is restricted only to these two pieces of information on the cards and involves no further form of prisoner identification or personal information. In late February-early March of this year, I brought, as you know, a team of assistants to the Vladimir Prison for carrying out further photography

and analysis of prisoner registration cards. During this time Ms. Susan Mesinai, who was one of my assistants, had received approval from Mr. Yuri Miroshin of the prison administration staff to collect these data. We estimate that we succeeded in collecting only about one-half of the relevant data and need to be able to complete this part in order to finalize our analysis.

(3) the compilation and analysis of cell occupancy data from the Vladimir kartoteka of prisoners who have been kept in Korpus II of the Vladimir Prison over the 1947-1972 period, prisoners who have died in the Prison, and prisoners for whom no cell occupancy data are provided on their cards (a small number) but for which their dates of entry and departure from the prison are recorded. The methodology and reasons for carrying out this analysis are summarized below.

As you will recall, through several visits over the 1993-1997 period to the

Vladimir Prison with Professor Guy von Dardel, undertaken within the framework of the Working Group, we uncovered two individuals who have been employed at the Vladimir Prison over a lengthy period of time and who described a foreign prisoner not of German origin who had been held in solitary confinement for a long period of time in Korpus II. These individuals were Larina, Varvara Ivanovna, who had worked in the hospital and clinic of the Vladimir Prison in Korpus II, and Kukin, Alexandr Timofeivich, who was at the time of our interview

with him, retired but had been a guard and later the head guard in the Vladimir Prison in the 1950's and 1960's. Larina was not certain of the period during which this prisoner had been in Vladimir but thought that it was likely to have been in the mid or late 1950's. She stated that during the time of his incarceration, a prisoner by the name of Osmak died in a nearby cell. From a group of photographs of men of various ages and appearances, she picked out one as the prisoner in question. This was a side profile of RW taken at the time he

was in Budapest. The picture had not been used in the international press. Kukin described the prisoner similarly according to physical characteristics and when shown photographs he indicated that the photograph of RW (also one that had not been in the international press) was not unlike this prisoner. There are also, as you are aware, other reports that have been collected in the Swedish Foreign Ministry made by former prisoners who had been incarcerated in the Vladimir Prison that they had heard of RW or had heard that he had been incarcerated there. These reports date from 1947 to 1972.

As is known from our first investigation of the Vladimir Prison kartoteka in August of 1990, we were not able to locate a registration card with the name of Wallenberg. We cannot be certain that we have missed the card because of a pseudonym used rather than the name of Wallenberg. In addition, there was evidence in the kartoteka for up to 32 numbered prisoners. While most of these have been accounted for, some have not been identified, and cards for some numbered prisoners were not in the kartoteka. There also may have been numbered prisoners higher than 32.

Since the registration cards in the kartoteka contain a chronicle of date and cell number each time the given prisoner was transferred to a cell, a simple cell occupancy analysis made by extracting this information from the cards would

point to the circumstance either that (1) a cell must be considered as "empty" since no card in the kartoteka can account for a prisoner having been in the cell, (2) a prisoner whose card is in the kartoteka turns out to have been kept in solitary for a long time and therefore the name on the card may be a pseudonym, or (3) it may show that all cells were occupied and thus deny the contention that there was a prisoner in Korpus II in lengthy solitary confinement. Furthermore, by identifying cards of prisoners who died while imprisoned in Vladimir, we should be able to determine the details about the prisoner Osmak (During our visit to the Vladimir Prison in February-March, 1997, we indeed did determine that there had been a prisoner by that name who died.) Thus, by identifying who were Osmak's cellmates in this period and which prisoners were in other nearby cells, there would be a basis to try to find whether any of them may still be alive and could be interviewed to learn what they knew about special foreign prisoners in Vladimir at that time.

In the end of February-beginning of March of this year, with a team of assistants, I traveled to the Vladimir Prison because through the Working Group and through the Swedish Embassy we had been informed that approval had been granted to our request to select and photograph registration cards of all prisoners who had occupied cells in Korpus II over the 1947-1972 period. As is well known, we were not permitted to photograph or copy any of the cards, although we did select cards of those prisoners who had been in cells in Korpus II over the 1947-1972 period, who had died in the Vladimir Prison, or who had entered the Vladimir Prison during this time but did not have any cell occupancy

information written into their cards. We prepared a list of the names of all of these prisoners which numbered close to 6000. The cards of these approximate 6000 prisoners were identified by being placed into a rotated orientation with

respect to the other cards in each drawer of the kartoteka, and we were assured that they would be kept in that state in a storeroom of the prison administration until the matter of copying of the cards would be decided.

I outline three different methods for compiling the cell occupancy data that preserve the intactness and rigorousness of the proposed analysis to various extents and protect the privacy of all prisoners whose cards must be examined.

(1) We photograph the cards as outlined above, carry out the analysis, and after the report has been made to the Working Group upon completion of the analysis, we return the photographic images of the cards to the Russian authorities. Under this condition, we assure the authorities that further copies of the cards will not be made. In this way the Russian authorities can feel assured that all information from their archival documents has been returned to them. This is the most accurate method for the analysis since it allows us to verify during the analysis that all data have been entered accurately. Since we must extract the cell occupancy information from each card to be analyzed by computer algorithms developed for this purpose, it is likely that some errors in data input are to be expected. This method allows verification of data input and makes for the most accurate analysis possible. All other methods, such as the two outlined below, are subject to greater error in the analysis.

(2) With a team of assistants, I be allowed to direct the collection of cell occupancy information in the kartoteka of the Vladimir Prison by entering into our own laptop computers only the following information from the approximate 6000 cards selected: name of prisoner and date of birth, case number, date of entry into the prison, cell occupancy data including cell number and date when transferred, and date of departure from prison. This method allows collection of the data that are necessary for the analysis and does not involve making records of other information about each prisoner that do not serve the objectives of the analysis, such as date of arrest, basis of arrest, statute according to which the prisoner was charged and sentenced, length of sentence, etc. Should certain prisoners need to be contacted or identified further for purposes outlined above, we can then simply provide the name and date of birth, etc. to the Russian authorities. We estimate that this method would probably require five assistants each with a personal laptop computer to work in the kartoteka for 7-10 consecutive days to enter just the minimal information from each card described above. We would have to use this period of time to verify accuracy of data input as much as possible, but the method suffers from the possibility that some errors in data input may go through undetected and that after our departure from the Vladimir Prison there would be no opportunity to make corrections. The resultant effect on the analysis may be small but cannot be accurately predicted since it would depend on the frequency of errors. There

would be no information collected by this method that would allow further public identification of prisoners or of their families.

(3) With a team of assistants, I be allowed to direct the collection of data as described above in point (2) but under the condition that the names of the prisoners not be entered into our laptop computers although the other information such as case number, date of entry into the prison, cell occupancy data, and date of departure from the prison would be recorded. In this case we would prepare a separate list for the authorities of prisoner name and date of birth with a corresponding identification number which would be entered into our computerized records, for instance, prisoners A1, A2, ..., A9, etc. for those whose family names begin with the letter A, prisoners B1, B2, B3, ..., etc. for those whose names begin with the letter B, and so forth. In this manner we keep no copies of personal identification information about the prisoners. Should a prisoner have to be

identified as a result of the analysis for reasons described above, we would simply provide the Russian authorities with the number A10, for instance, and the Russian authorities would then identify the prisoner in question and determine whether he could be interviewed for more information. This method suffers from the same disadvantage as pointed out in method (2) above, namely, that verification of data input can be made only while working in the Vladimir Prison. Furthermore, it will be necessary for the Russian authorities to preserve the list of prisoner names and identification numbers for some period of time, at least until the analysis of the work is completed.

For well over a year I have tried to think of a method of making a permanent copy of just the minimum information needed from each card without recording other data such as length of sentence, etc., that is of no use to us and is of no interest. Unfortunately there is no manner in which only part of each card could be photographed because both sides of each card must be examined to extract the necessary information and the data are not written onto the cards in a uniform manner. I have, therefore, outlined above three methods to collect the necessary information for the analysis and to arrive at a reasonably satisfactory conclusion by ensuring as much as possible accuracy of data input. I hope that agreement can be reached for implementing one of the above described methods. They are listed in order of decreasing preference to me purely on the basis of the opportunity for verification of data input.

I hope that this description of the goals and objectives of our archival research are clear and understandable. Please do inform me if further information may be required.

Sincerely,

Marvin W. Makinen

Temporary address August 18 - October 18, 1997:

Marvin W. Makinen
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Tel: 303/492-4503 or leave message at 303/492-3545
FAX: 303/492-3586 or 303/492-5894

E-mail: makinen@colorado.edu
makinen@atlantis.colorado.edu

E-mail can be directed also to my permanent address:

m-makinen@uchicago.edu

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

ID 1 (2)

Handl.: Fredén

1997-10-07

MYCKET BRÅDSKANDE

(EC)

Avd.	Grupp	Mål
P.	2	Eu ¹

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

Till: Hallqvist (EC)✓

Kopia: ~~Kabs~~, Lage Olson (EI/ESEK) samt Magnusson, amb
Riga.✓

Re: RW-ärendet: Aide-mémoire mm

(Magnussons från Riga igår)

Magnussons kommentarer bra, inkl formuleringen re punkt 1, fjärde stycket. I den mån departementet också instämmer i våra förslag och Magnussons kommentarer härtill emotser vi snarast motsvarande exakta formuleringar. En så viktig text som denna måste naturligtvis, bl a av principiella skäl, utformas i Stockholm och inte av oss.

För tids vinnande börjar Dahnberg idag översätta de delar av aide-mémoiren som inte är föremål för ytterligare överväganden.

Makinens text: Magnusson föreslår att en kortversion överlämnas. Bra idé. Emotser en sådan. Dahnberg påpekar att med nuvarande tidsramar han endast hinner översätta en text som uppginge till en fjärdedel av den nu befintliga. Det förutsätter att han får den under dagen. I sista hand får kanske den oavkortade texten överlämnas på engelska. Effekten av budskapet blir då förstås väsentligt mindre. Ett tredje alternativ är att bilagan överlämnas efter aide-

mémoiren så att Dahnberg får mera översättningstid.
Som vi tidigare framhållit måste den dock även i ett
sådant fall kortas och koncentreras väsentligt.

HIRDMAN

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

Handl.: Fredén

1997-10-07

MYCKET BRÅDSKANDE

(EC)

Avd.	Grupp	Mål
P.	2	Eu ¹

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HIRDMAN

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

SID 1 (2)

Handl.: Fredén

1997-10-07

(EC)

P 2 Eu¹

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

Till: Hallqvist (EC)

Kopia: Kabs, Ch EC, Lage Olson (EI/ESEK) samt
Magnusson, amb Riga.

Re: Om svensk "profil" i Wallenberg-ärendet

(
f

Vi har med intresse tagit del av Magnussons
reflektioner i hithörande ärende. De är naturligtvis
kloka och berättigade.

De berör dock inte de frågor vi ville väcka. Vi ville
förmedla hur RW-arbetet uppfattas på rysk sida,
nämligen så att det svenska intresset minskat och att
energin i ärendet numera kommer från de oberoende
experterna, alla utländska. Det är sant att Wallenberg
är en internationell personlighet och att ärendet
aldrig kan bli en enbart bilateral affär mellan
Sverige och Ryssland. Men det är väl ändå Sverige som
s a s har dossiern? Om detta ärende generellt sett är
högprioriterat i departementet och om vi anser att en
kraftsamling bör göras inför Jeltsins besök är det väl
angeläget att allt görs för att också ge ryssarna det
intrycket?

Man måste också ställa frågan huruvida - om det är så som Magnusson skriver att vi efter att ha avslutat undersökningarna i centrala arkiv och i avsaknaden av det avgörande, övertygande beviset om RW:s öde "känner oss tvingade att genomföra mer perifera undersökningar" - det är klokt att satsa så mycket krut som vi nu gör på att få ryssarna att hjälpa oss avsluta dessa? Ambassadens svar är ja, men det förutsätter att vi inte efter aide-mémoiren kommer med flera, mer perifera önskemål. Det innebär också att ärendet avslutas inom en rimlig tidsrymd, säg på våren 1998. Vi måste med beklagande kunna konstatera att vi trots alla ansträngningar inte nådde total klarhet. Det är ingen skam att avsluta ärendet för UD:s del. En mycket gedigen och långvarig insats har gjorts. Det finns tvärtom anledning att med stolhet framhäva det enorma arbete som utförts på svensk sida.

Vi måste också redan nu tänka igenom vilket stöd vi från svensk sida avser ge till de oberoende experterna när vitboken publicerats och UD:s direkta handläggning av ärendet avslutats. Ambassaden har väckt denna fråga tidigare, utan att få någon reaktion.

Det vore i sinom tid av intresse att höra vilken bedömning departementet gör av vårt ovancit kryfax, liksom av detta.

HIRDMAN

Professor Guy von Dardel
Hem: 45 Route de Peney-Dessus;
CH-1242 Satigny Tel & Fax: 41+22-
753 1619

Mat till UD via ISP (faxn 08/203100
gamla KM: s m) 1997-10-06. Tills
UD 1997-10-07

CH - 1242 Satigny, 971003

Er referens:

Min referens: Hallqvist 970930

Beträffar: Alltjämt felande handlingar.

Ambassadör ?
Kansliet Martin Hallqvist
Utrikesdepartementet
Stockholm

Delges:

Magnusson, Riga Fredriksson, A-ARK
Hallqvist, EC & Backman, A-ARK
Olson, EI/ESEK Jolin, GAT, EXP
Amb. Moskva
exp. 97-10-07
Broder, /

INK. UTR
DNR 276/0057
1997-10-08
AVD. P GR 2 EU
Fax 0468-203100

Vår Stockholms resa för att titta på arkiven för några veckor sedan var tyckte jag mycket givande. Den rörde dock framförallt SÄPO:s och de militära iunderrättelsearkiven, medan UD:s arkiv, bl.a. av tidsskäl slapp relativt gynnsamt undan. Vi kunde inte ägna oss åt en så noggrann genomgång den här gången som vi skulle ha önskat.

Vi vet dock att det kommit till en hel del nya dokument, som exemplifierats av de finska dokumenten inför Gromykos memorandum, som finnarna släppt och som ju också publicerades i finsk och svensk press. Detta och en del andra UD-dokument har vi matats med av Lage under de senaste månaderna. Av avgörande betydelse är dock frågan: "Är detta allt, eller kommer bilden av RW:s öde att förbli en olöst gåta tills nästa omgång av frisläppning kommer".

För oss som utomstående är det svårt att veta, vad nytt material, som frisläppts av UD i den här omgången. I princip skulle man behöva gå igenom hela CD-ROM versionen och jämföra dokument för dokument med den gamla versionen så som den presenterats i de "blå böckerna" för att få klart för sig vad som frisläppts nyligen. Dessutom tillkommer osäkerhet om vilka sekretessgrader alljämt finns kvar att avhemliga och vilka dokument som ännu inte fallit för ålderstreck. Med denna osäkerhet är det givetvis mycket svårt att bilda sig en uppfattning om vad som hände.

Jag har ju i min DN-artikel påpekat att uppgifter ofta saknas om de åtgärder som vidtogs av UD som en följd av dokument från t.ex. Moskva ambassaden, t.ex. vid så viktiga händelser som Dekanosovs not. I en del fall finns det anteckningar på dokumenten men i regel bara

om vem som fått del av handlingarna, och nästan aldrig förslag eller beslut om åtgärder. Skall detta verkligen tolkas som att inga åtgärder vidtogs. Finns det kanske åtgärder redovisade på andra ställen i UD:s arkiv, och i så fall var och hur kan vi få ta del av dem?

En särskild fråga som man måste reda ut är Valdemar Langlets roll för vad som hände RW. I min tidningsartikel redovisade jag ju Vilmos Böhms rapport till UD om Langlets intervju för Kossuthradion, och den helt missvisande bild denna gav om RW:s ställning och roll. Jag har också fått tag i en del ytterligare dokument som belyser frågan, och som jag bifogar.

1) Från Nana Svartz dossier i Riksarkivet har jag genom tillmötesgående av hennes dotter, ~~har jag~~ fått en rapport av en ungersk kollega till henne som spontant vid Nannas besök i Budapest redogjorde för hur Langlets motarbetade RW.

2) En märkligt dokument av ⁵70211 från en f.d. överkonstapel i Stockholm har kommit fram i mina föräldrars arkiv, som av en källa - vars pålitlighet jag inte vågar yttra mig om antyder att L. dels samlat en stor förmögenhet i Budapest, dels begått vissa oegentligheter i sitt arbete för Röda Korset, och slutligen antyder att Langlet tagit kontakt med ryssarna för att se till att RW icke skulle få tillfälle att avslöja Langlets verksamhet.

⁶⁶
3) Ett oadresserad redogörelse av ⁵70511 för Langlets roll kommer från Rudolph Philipp, som uppger att L. varit spion för Horthy innan han blev "extraordinärt skriv biträde hos svenska honorärkonsuln", och genom honom oavlönad representant för Svenska Röda Korset. Han tycks ha samarbetat nära med vår gamle bekant Tolsby Kutusov som enligt Philipp samarbetade med nazisterna i Belgien och med pilkorsarna.

Jag tror att det är värt att närmare undersöka Langlets roll. Vi borde t.ex. be att få se UD:s och Svenska Röda Korsets dossier om Langlet. När det gäller RW:s egen dossier hos SRK har det sagts att den överlämnats till UD, medan UD uppgivit att den inte kan återfinnas i dess arkiv. Jag tror också det skulle löna sig, bl. a. på basis av de nya uppgifterna att söka få fram nytt material om Langlet. Har t.ex. Per Anger och andra överlevande hörts om L? Finns det t.ex. ännu levande f.d. tjänstmän vid SRK som kan tänkas veta något?

4) En inbäsad PH av ⁷5702-11 från en f.d. polisintendent Ragnar Enwall riktar grova anklagelser mot RW

5) I ett brev av 44-07-18 från RW i Budapest till Lennor framgår att det rådde en konflikt mellan RW och RW över 1,000,000 SFR:

Med hälsningar



Ang:besök i Budanest 1962.

Vid flera tillfällen hade jag inbjudits att besöka Bukarest och hålla föreläsningar där. Hösten 61 kom en inbjudan från rumänska vetenskapsakademien med förslag om olika tidpunkter. Jag svarade, att om det lämpade sig, kunde jag komma i början av april 62. Då tiden närmade sig, skrev jag till presidenten för den ungerska vetenskapsakademien, prof. I. Ruzzniak (internist, som jag själv), som tidigare föreslagit mig att besöka Budapest och frågade, om jag kunde komma endast för en dag den 12/4. Ruzzniak svarade, att jag var välkommen.

Uppehållet i Rumänien var mycket angenämt. Emellertid märkte jag en dag på hotellet, att min kappsäck varit öppen, men gästfriheten och trevnaden var stor.

Den 12/4 kom jag mellan 9 och 10 på f.m. till Budapests flygfält, där jag möttes av prof. Ruzzniak. Pass etc. avklarades snabbt av honom, och vi hade just satt oss i akademiens bil, när en uniformsklädd man kom utrusande och sade till prof. R., att han måste se ytterligare på mitt pass. Jag ville givetvis gå med in, men R. sade, att jag gärna kunde sitta kvar i bilen. Då det hade gått c:a 15 min., bad jag chauffören, som talade tyska, att gå in och fråga prof. R., om jag inte borde komma in. Chauffören kom tillbaka och sade, att det ej behövdes. Fem min. senare kom R. med mitt pass och sade att "alles ist in schönster Ordnung". Jag fick ej veta värpå dröjsmålet berott.

Efter att ha besett badanstalten S:t Gellert, där jag också bodde över natten, åkte R. och jag i akademiens bil runt i staden. R. föreslog, att vi skulle ta en promenad i gamla stan, och vi satte oss småningom på en utsiktsplats. Jag frågade då R., om han kände R.W. Jag sade, att jag hört mycket om W. särskilt på grund av att hans mor var min patient. R. svarade: "Jag kände honom mycket väl. En lång tid träffade jag honom nästan dagligen. Vi var mycket goda vänner. W. var en av de tappreste och mest orädda människor, jag kände." Ego: "Känner Ni till något om hur han försvann?" R.: "Nej, intet säkert, Jag träffade honom sista gången en vecka innan han försvann". Han hade dessförinnan haft mycket stora svårigheter på olika

som hette Langlet.R.W. och han var bittra fiender".Ego:"Talade Langlet illa om W.?" R.:"Ja,det tror jag säkert,att han gjorde."Ego:"Det lär ju ha kommit ut ett rykte,att W. var spion." R.:"Ja,men det anser jag vara ett helt och hållet falskt rykte.Ingen av oss vänner trodde på det."Ego:"Vet man något om hur ryktet uppkom? Kan hans ovän ha haft någon del i det?" R.:"Det vet jag ingenting om,men det var mycket hårt för W.att motarbetas av en person på hans egen legation." Ego:"Har Ni hört något om försvinnandet?" R.:"Man vet, han tog hela den kassa,han disponerade,med sig.Vi har aldrig kunnat förstå, varför han gjorde det.Han skulle ju gå till ryska lägret. Det måste ha varit egendomligt,att han hade en mängd pengar med sig."

Ego:"Vet man något om W:s fortsatta öden?" R.:"Han lär ha försvunnit Sovjet,men jag vet ingenting om detta.Jag vill än en gång säga,att vi satte R.W. mycket högt.Han gjorde sitt yttersta för de judiska flyktingarna och räddat många människoliv."

Det jag här relaterat är ett sammandrag av samtalet,som ju givetvis i verkligheten inte hade den "förhörskaraktär",som ^{det som} jag här nedskrivit,kan ge intryck av.

Jag träffade prof. Ruszniak ett par månader senare vid en kongress i München.Han sade då endast beträffande vårt samtal,att han efteråt varit ledse att han ej kom att visa mig det hus,dit W. haft sitt huvudsakliga arbete förlagt.

Anna Varte

14th May 1944
Langlet

Konfidentiell P.M.

till Wallenbergskommittén angående Raoul Wallenberg.

Kommittén har säkerligen kännedom om vad jag kommer att berätta här nedan, men jag har velat avbörda mig följande:

Jag har ett sommarställe vid Trintorp i Tyresö, och under kriget och de följande åren måste jag och min fru åka buss till våra arbeten. Härunder lärde min fru känna fröken Aida Johansson, Klöveberg, (vid s.k. Tegelbruket) Tyresö, telefon 91 02 78, då fröken Johansson även åkte buss till sin anställning som föreståndarinna för en telefon- eller telegrafstation i jag vill minnas Sundbyberg. Även jag lärde så småningom känna fröken Johansson, som jag tyckte verkade litet överspänd och påträngande, och så småningom blev hon även förtidspensionerad. På hennes enträgna begäran besökte vi henne några gånger och härunder berättade hon vid ett tillfälle att hennes syster - namnet okänt - var gift med en son till professor Langlet i Budapest. Förnamnet på Langlet junior kan jag tyvärr ej heller minnas. Vidare omtalade fröken Johansson att professor Langlet förut varit "fattig som en rätta" men under kriget blivit mycket förmögen genom att roffa åt sig konstskatter från judar i Budapest under uppgift att han skulle hjälpa dessa. Detta förhållande skulle Raoul Wallenberg mycket väl känna till.

Härutöver berättade fröken Johansson att svågern - Langlet junior - på Röda Korsets uppdrag företagit en resa i öststaterna och att fröken Johanssons syster härvid fått följa med och att svågern låtit Röda Korset även betala hennes resa. Vid tiden för här ifrågavarande samtal skulle svågern resa i nytt uppdrag och systemen ville att fröken Johansson skulle följa med. Det skulle inte "kosta henne ett öre." Då fröken Johansson förstod att svågern även då skulle handla bedrägligt mot Röda Korset, ville hon icke vara med härom, och någon resa för hennes del blev alltså icke utav.

Jag hade svårt att tro på fröken Johanssons uppgifter, i synnerhet som jag var av den uppfattningen att professor Langlet vore svensk medborgare och därför inte kunde handla så hjärtlöst mot judarna. Så småningom har jag emellertid kommit till en annan uppfattning, dels på grund av statsminister Erlanders interpellationssvar på ett tidigt stadium i Wallenbergssaken, då Erlander yttrade bl.a. att det kanske finns personer här i landet, som inte önskar Wallenberg tillbaka och dels vad som sedermera framkom att Wallenberg av ryssarna blev förd till professor Langlets villa i Budapest. Det var med föräran jag läste denna uppgift i tidningarna. Varför skulle han föras just till Langlets villa ?

Jag kan inte komma från den tanken att Professor Langlet för att bli av med ett besvärligt vittne till sina rofferier för ryssarna pådyvlat Wallenberg en massa brott - spioneri m.m. och t.o.m. fått ryssarnas löfte att aldrig släppa Wallenberg fri. Är det omöjligt att få professor Langlet hörd ? I tidningspressen har jag i vart fall icke sett något härom.

Därest Kommittén skulle finna anledning höra fröken Johansson, vill jag hemställa att hon icke får vetskap om att jag lämnat förestående uppgifter.

Stockholm den 11 februari 1957.

Ragnar Ekvall
(Ragnar Ekvall)

F.d. krim.överkonstapel.

Finn Malmgrens väg 8, Johanneshov, tel. 49 06 90.
Till arbetet 51 69 45.

Uppgifter af Rudolph Philipp

11 Mai . 1966 Petri

betrifft Fil. Kand. Valdemar Langlet .

L. var von seiner Studentenzeit an ein Abenteurer . 1895 / 1896 machte er eine erste "Erkundungsreise" per Fahrrad und Pferd bis Russland . Nach dem 1. Weltkrieg fuhr er nach Ungarn , wo der ~~miterxe~~ ~~WEISSE TERROR~~ unter Admiral Horthy herrschte , der nach Hitlers Vorbild seines Ausrottungskrieges gegen die Juden war .-L. stellte sich Horthy als P.R.-Schreiber zur Verfügung und verherrlichte diesen Terrormann . Noch in seinem 1946 publizierten Buch "Verk och Dagar i Budapest" , Wahlström och Widstrand förlag , Stockholm verherrlicht er Horthy - Ungarn und nennt zum B. Horthy resp. graf Bethlen "den enda stora statsman i nuvarande generation." - (se sidan 15) etc .

Bis 1942 var Jugoslavians Minister in Stockholm , dessen Frau intim befreundet war mit ~~minnens~~ ~~Freundin~~ der Familie meines Freundes Dr. Pops (Vorsitzender der aschkenas .Kulturgemeinde in Beograd, wo ich nach dem 1. Weltkrieg korrespondent war), mit mir befreundet. So erfur ich 4 Jahre vor Raouls Budapestaktion , dass V.L. als Spion Horthys ~~härsketenne~~ ~~härsketenne~~ ~~härsketenne~~ für Lebenszeit aus Jugoslavien ausgewiesen wurde. Er hatte "als schwedischer Tourist" zu Pferd das Land ausspioniert . 1931 hatte er 2 ungar. Kavalleriepferde und einen ungar. Reitknecht zur disposition bekommen .-Auch nach S.S.S.R . fuhr L. mit seiner russischen Frau Nina .- Getarnt als universitätslektor für schwedische Sprache lebte er bis 1945 in Budapest . Er hatte selten drei Hörer , tre faciut collegium . und daher /keine Einkünfte von dieser Funktion .- Nominell wurde L. auch /arteordinär skrivbiträde beim schwed. Honorärgeneralkonsul und durch diesr unbezahlter Repräsentant des Schwed. Roten Kreuzes .-Auf sid 21/22 seines zitierten Buches schreibt L. unter anderem: "Nu måste väl medges , att det verkliga fanns grund för antisemitiska känslor ." Das begründet L. dann ausführlich , schreibt zum B.B . att de 94% " ariska medborgare kunde låtas sig toppridas av en ring minoritet tillhörande en annan ras.

L. war empört dass nicht er sondern Raoul diplom . Leiter der Rettungsaktion wurde .- Er versuchte mit der offiziellen Schwed. Aktion zu konkurrieren , producierte eigene Schutzbriefe - die dann Raoul gezwungen war , bei den Ungar . Behörden zu legalisieren .L. und Nina hatten intimen kontakt mit Grafen Michael Tolstoj - Kutusov, belgischer Mitbürger ,Kollaborator mit den Naziokupanten in Belgien und den Pfeilkreuzlern .

Dieser Nazi war wirklicher chef der Aktion Langlets und so zugesagt zu seiner für Raoul unheilvollen Funktion als Bevollmächtigter Schwedens beim Einzug der Roten ~~Armé~~ Armée in Budapest

Der Graf wurde Bürochef der N.K.V.D. und bekam Ehrenwachezeichen der NKVD und war Ehrengast beim Hauptquartier, in Debrecen, als Raoul verhaftet wurde. - Er weigerte sich Heimzukehren, als UD ihm dazu aufforderte. Erst als das Schwed. Rote Kreuz ihn vollmacht erzog, fuhr er zurück. - Hier intrigierte er gegen Raoul. So erklärte er vor eine Pressenkonferenz Juli 1947: Raoul sei nie in sowjet Gefangenschaft gekommen. - Sein Sohn Emil schrieb - von Prag aus - Artikel für Stockholm - Tidningen in gleichen Sinn. Bezahlt wurde dieser von Raoul Wallenberg Komitee, welches Hillel Storch organisierte!

Nina erklärte während unseres Kampfes noch vor wenigen Jahren: Sie besitze ein Manus ihres verstorbenen Mannes, aus welchen hervorgeht, dass ihr Mann der wirkliche Judenretter war."

Die Ehrung Ninas und Waldemars ist also wieder ein politischer Nonsense ähnlich der unnötigen und falschen Behauptung des Generalanklägers im Eichmann prozess es: Eichmann sei auch für Raouls Ermordung verantwortlich. Diesen Nonsense suchte ich gutschumachen, indem ich sowohl den Anklager wie auch den damaligen Justizminister Rosen sofort informierte dass Eichmann und alle Gestapomänner am 24.12.1944 per Flug Budapest verliessen und dass Raoul am 31.1.1945 in Zelle 123 des Zentral gefängnisses Ljubljanka in Moskva eingeliefert wurde. - Wird man diesmal eine Israel kompromittierende Dummheit rechtzeitig verhindern?

2/ Betrifft eventuelle Ehrung Raouls:

Für uns ist Rettung - solange noch das geringste Chance hierzu gegeben das Wichtigste. -

Bilaga 7.
 Königlich

Schwedische Gesandtschaft

Lieber Koloman!

anster 2 24

Lieber Koloman!

Enn und falls die Heimkehr den 648 Personen gelingen würde so sollte man selbstverständlich die humanitäre Aktion weiter fortsetzen in denjenigen Richtungen welche möglich sind. Persönlich habe ich mir folgende Möglichkeiten vorgestellt,

a./ Ein Roteskreuzlager wird eingerichtet in welchem sowohl Juden wie andere aufgenommen werden, aber bis jetzt hat die ungarische Regierung abgelehnt, dass sich das Rote Kreuz mit Juden befassen soll.

b./ Geld wird verteilt an verschiedene Vertrauenspersonen von mir, von denen ich weiss, dass sie sich mit der Rettung von Juden betätigt haben. Diese Personen werden die Gelder hauptsächlich dazu verwenden die Juden unterzubringen und sie mit Taufscheinen und Identitätskarten zu versehen. Ich bin überzeugt, dass man in dieser Weise viele Personen retten könnte, und die Kosten für jede Person wären natürlich viel kleiner als wenn auf dem Bestechungswege versucht würde die Leute aus dem Land zu bringen. Ich bitte Dich jedoch zu versuchen, dass ich ungefähr über die bezüglichen Pengöbeträge verfahren kann. Selbstverständlich kann ich mich bei meiner Personenauswahl täuschen, aber ich glaube ich habe schon einige Verbindungen die als ernst betrachtet werden können.

c./ Man wird weiter versuchen nochmals einen Transport nach Schweden oder nach Palestina auf offiziellem Weg zu erwirken ohne dafür etwas zu zahlen, 200 Kinder will die mosaische Versammlung Stockholm unterbringen. (Untersuche ob dies kein Irrtum ist, Langlet hat ein Telegramm bekommen am 17.7.

d./ Über die Möglichkeit tatsächlich deutsche oder ungarische Stellen mit Erfolg zu bestechen werde ich später zurückkommen. Ich glaube solche Annäherungsversuche werden von den betreffenden Leuten viel für Erpressungen ausgenutzt. X

Von Milos bekomme ich hoffentlich morgen Bescheid ob

er uns hier 1,000.000 Pengöe geben könnte.^{x/}

Es ist ein grosser Mangel an Zahlungsmittel deshalb schwierig Pengöe zu verschaffen.

Über die Lage ist ausführliches offiziell berichtet worden.

Ich werde versuchen in ganz kurzer Zeit wegen Bericht-
erstattung nach Hause zu kommen.

Es grüsst Dich

Rudolf

Budapest, den 18. Juli 1944.

x/ Langlet Sp. 1,000,000 wenn selbstverständlich nicht
zu haben.



REGERINGSKANSLIET

1997-10-07

1(8)

EC

P 2 Eu¹

Utrikesdepartementet

EC 2

Martin Hallqvist

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Lage Olson

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✓

Ambaasaden Moskva

Ambassaden Riga

1
20971007/77

MYCKET BRÅDSKANDE

Re Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet

Ert (Moskva)

Ert (Riga)

(1 bil)

Efter inkomna kommentarer från ambassaden i Moskva och Hans Magnussons synpunkter på dessa beträffande aide-mémoire att överlämnas till den ryske ordföranden i arbetsgruppen i Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet bifogas ett nytt underlag jämte reviderat brev från Marvin Makinen att närslutas skrivelsen.

Obs. att uppgifterna under punkt 2 f) gäller Igor Prelin och Gennadij Sokolov.

Cabinet

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1997-10-07

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1. Den svensk-ryska arbetsgruppen rörande Raoul Wallenbergs öde har nu varit verksam i nästan sex år. Betydande ansträngningar har lagts ned på att få fram dokumentation och uppgifter ur olika arkiv och på att intervjua personer som har förmodats äga närmare kännedom om en eller annan aspekt av Raoul Wallenbergs öde. Att arbetet dragit ut på tiden och ännu inte kunnat avslutas beror på att arbetsgruppen icke - med någon tillfredsställande grad av säkerhet och bevisning - lyckats slå fast Raoul Wallenbergs öde efter att ha hamnat i sovjetisk fångenskap eller ens varför han arresterades och kvarhölls resp. hur besluten härom fattades. Arbetet har också försenats p.g.a. att de ryska myndigheterna inte godkänt slutförandet av undersökningarna i Vladimirfängelset.

Vi befinner oss i en situation där en rad motstridiga vittnesmål fortfarande inte kunnat definitivt avfärdas eller bekräftas och där följaktligen endast mer eller mindre starkt underbyggda hypoteser om motiven för RW:s arrestering resp om hans öde kan framläggas.

Den svenska sidan noterar att man icke heller från rysk sida hävdar att fullständig bevisning för RW:s död 1947 föreligger. Vi har också med tillfredsställelse noterat att man i flera officiella ryska uttalanden understrukit sin beredskap att fortsätta söka efter alla de fakta och handlingar, vilka hänger samman med RW:s liv och verksamhet, senast i utrikesminister Primakovs brev till Sveriges utrikesminister den 17 juli 1997.

Nedan redovisas de åtgärder som enligt svensk uppfattning är nödvändiga för att en publicering av rapporten skall vara möjlig. De bör vara genomförda under loppet av första halvåret 1998. Med hänsyn till den uppmärksamhet i masmedia kring ärendet som kan förväntas, ligger det i båda sidors intresse att redan vid tiden för president Jeltsins besök i

Sverige i december det bör kunna slås fast att positivt svar på föreslagna åtgärder givits från rysk sida och att angivet arbete kunnat sättas igång.

Vi är från svensk sida medvetna om att inte ens nedan föreslagna åtgärder med nödvändighet kommer att leda fram till att fullständig klarhet nås. I så fall bör detta påpekas i rapporten och öppenhet finnas för att göra de ytterligare undersökningar som kan bli nödvändiga i framtiden.

2. Följande frågor återstår att lösa.

a) Från rysk sida har man avvisat begäran om kopiering av 6.000 registerkort från Vladimirfängelset, trots utförlig motivering för syftet med denna undersökning. Mot bakgrund av de argument som framförts från rysk sida lanseras nu ett nytt förslag med flera alternativa undersökningsmetoder, som även om det är mer arbetskrävande, torde ta hänsyn till invändningar föranledda av den ryska informationslagen. I detta sammanhang bör erinras om de åtaganden som de stater, inkl. Ryssland, gjorde när de år 1992 antog "the UN Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance" bl a när det gäller att tillhandahålla register över alla personer som berövats sin frihet.

Professor Marvin Makinens förslag till åtgärder bifogas.

Det kan tilläggas att det, om denna undersökning inte genomförs, blir omöjligt att en gång för alla fastställa om RW vistats i Vladimirfängelset under annat namn eller nummer.

b) Officiell framställan har överlämnats om genomgång avpersondossierer rörande fångar som på ett eller annat sätt haft anknytning till R Wallenberg. Det är angeläget att Susan Mesinai får göra detta för arbetsgruppens räkning. Någon kopiering av dokument kommer ej att bli erforderlig.

c) Som bekant finns vittnesuppgifter att RW skulle ha förvarats på en eller flera psykiatriska kliniker. Inom arbetsgruppen finns sedan tidigare en överenskommelse om att stödja ansträngningarna att utröna sanningshalten i dessa uppgifter. Susan Mesinai har redan inlett ett samarbete med Serbskijinstitutet som hittills gällt perioden fram t.o.m. 1947. Det är angeläget att undersökningarna fortsätter samt att även tillträde ges till Kazankliniken. De bör fastställas huruvida detta arbete

kan utföras i samarbetet med Presidentens kommission för rehabilitering av repressionens offer.

d) Det är angeläget att största möjliga öppenhet framgent visas när det gäller tillträde till relevanta ryska arkiv även för oberoende, seriösa forskare. Som ett exempel kan nämnas operativa styrelsens fond nr 451 (vid NKVD:s/MVD:s överstyrelse för frågor rörande krigsfångar och internerade [GUPVI]); finns numera i TsChIDK. Vitboken kommer att innehålla skrivningar om lämpliga uppföljande åtgärder.

e) Från rysk sida har hävdats att de chiffterelegram som förvaras separat i det ryska utrikesministeriets arkiv inte innehåller något av intresse rörande Raoul Wallenberg. Om inte tillträde kan ges till denna del av arkivet krävs att den ryska sidan/MID avger en försäkran i rapporten om att inget relevant materiel rörande RW finns i dessa chiffterelegram.

f) Sedan arbetsgruppen sist sammanträdde har en del nya uppgifter framkommit i ett tyskt TV-program tidigare i år respektive i en brittisk tidningsartikel som behöver verifieras närmare. Det gäller bl a de f d KGB-medarbetarna Igor Prelin och Gennadij Sokolov.

g) Såsom tidigare föreslagits bör ytterligare ett, väl förberett, samtal föras med D. Kopelanskij och B. Solovov.

h) I ett svar från MID i januari 1997 på tidigare svenska frågor sägs bl a att Lubjanka-fängelsets särskilda akter från 1947 förstörts 1955, varvid en handling om detta upprättades. Denna uppgift har tidigare inte nämnts för arbetsgruppen och det vore därför värdefullt att erhålla en kopia av den nämnda handlingen.

Om det från rysk sida inte är möjligt att vara tillmötesgående, främst vad gäller punkterna a-d ovan - kommer detta klart att påpekas i rapporten. Ansvaret för undersökningar som inte kan genomföras kommer alltså att helt läggas på den ryska sidan.

3. Från svensk sida vill vi slutligen föreslå att arbetsgruppen har ett möte i Moskva några veckor före president Jeltsins besök i Sverige. För att ett sådant möte skall bli meningsfullt är det dock en förutsättning att begärda undersökningar redan kunnat sättas igång.

October 6, 1997

5(8)
1(4)

Chairman
Swedish-Russian Working Group
on the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation
Moscow, Russia

As a permanent consultant to the Swedish-Russian Working Group on the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg, I have been requested by Mr. Hans Magnusson to prepare an outline of methodology and purpose for analysis of prisoner registration cards in the kartoteka of the Vladimir Prison, No. 2. There are three parts to this work which are closely interconnected and need to be completed together as a whole. They are:

(1) the review of the personal files of 99 former prisoners in the Soviet Union which with Susan Mesinai we have established as relevant to the case of Raoul Wallenberg. The files are to be reviewed in Moscow through the offices and assistance of Mssrs. Konstantin Sergeivich Nikishkin and Vladimir Konstantinovich Vinogradov. A list of the names of the individuals and details regarding our objectives have already been transmitted. Many of these files have been on request through the Working Group already for a number of years and have been earlier promised for review. In the intervening time, we have added to this list and have now limited it to these 99 prisoners. A handful of these files have been already analyzed, and we have provided that information in our master list transmitted through the Swedish Foreign Ministry, indicating that those files that have been reviewed by Susan Mesinai and myself need not be seen again.

(2) the compilation of date of entry and Case No. (in Russian, Dela No. No.) from the prisoner registration cards in the prison kartoteka for all prisoners having entered the Vladimir Prison, No. 2, in the years 1947, 1954, and 1972. This information is restricted only to these two pieces of information on the cards and involves no further form of prisoner identification or personal information. In late February-early March of this year, I brought, as you know, a team of assistants to the Vladimir Prison for carrying out further photography

and analysis of prisoner registration cards. During this time Ms. Susan Mesinai,

who was one of my assistants, had received approval from Mr. Yuri Miroshin of the prison administration staff to collect these data. We estimate that we succeeded in collecting only about one-half of the relevant data and need to be able to complete this part in order to finalize our analysis.

(3) the compilation and analysis of cell occupancy data from the Vladimir kartoteka of prisoners who have been kept in Korpus II of the Vladimir Prison over the 1947-1972 period, prisoners who have died in the Prison, and prisoners for whom no cell occupancy data are provided on their cards (a small number) but for which their dates of entry and departure from the prison are recorded. The methodology and reasons for carrying out this analysis are summarized below.

As you will recall, through several visits over the 1993-1997 period to the

Vladimir Prison with Professor Guy von Dardel, undertaken within the framework of the Working Group, we uncovered two individuals who have been employed at the Vladimir Prison over a lengthy period of time and who described a foreign prisoner not of German origin who had been held in solitary confinement for a long period of time in Korpus II. These individuals were Larina, Varvara Ivanovna, who had worked in the hospital and clinic of the Vladimir Prison in Korpus II, and Kukin, Alexandr Timofeivich, who was at the time of our interview

L(4)
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with him, retired but had been a guard and later the head guard in the Vladimir Prison in the 1950's and 1960's. Larina was not certain of the period during which this prisoner had been in Vladimir but thought that it was likely to have been in the mid or late 1950's. She stated that during the time of his incarceration, a prisoner by the name of Osmak died in a nearby cell. From a group of photographs of men of various ages and appearances, she picked out one as the prisoner in question. This was a side profile of RW taken at the time he

was in Budapest. The picture had not been used in the international press. Kukin described the prisoner similarly according to physical characteristics and when shown photographs he indicated that the photograph of RW (also one that had not been in the international press) was not unlike this prisoner. There are also, as you are aware, other reports that have been collected in the Swedish Foreign Ministry made by former prisoners who had been incarcerated in the Vladimir Prison that they had heard of RW or had heard that he had been incarcerated there. These reports date from 1947 to 1972.

As is known from our first investigation of the Vladimir Prison kartoteka in August of 1990, we were not able to locate a registration card with the name of Wallenberg. We cannot be certain that we have missed the card because of a pseudonym used rather than the name of Wallenberg. In addition, there was evidence in the kartoteka for up to 32 numbered prisoners. While most of these have been accounted for, some have not been identified, and cards for some numbered prisoners were not in the kartoteka. There also may have been numbered prisoners higher than 32.

Since the registration cards in the kartoteka contain a chronicle of date and cell number each time the given prisoner was transferred to a cell, a simple cell occupancy analysis made by extracting this information from the cards would

point to the circumstance either that (1) a cell must be considered as "empty" since no card in the kartoteka can account for a prisoner having been in the cell, (2) a prisoner whose card is in the kartoteka turns out to have been kept in solitary for a long time and therefore the name on the card may be a pseudonym, or (3) it may show that all cells were occupied and thus deny the contention that there was a prisoner in Korpus II in lengthy solitary confinement. Furthermore, by identifying cards of prisoners who died while imprisoned in Vladimir, we should be able to determine the details about the prisoner Osmak (During our visit to the Vladimir Prison in February-March, 1997, we indeed did determine that there had been a prisoner by that name who died.) Thus, by identifying who were Osmak's cellmates in this period and which prisoners were in other nearby cells, there would be a basis to try to find whether any of them may still be alive and could be interviewed to learn what they knew about special foreign prisoners in Vladimir at that time.

In the end of February-beginning of March of this year, with a team of assistants, I traveled to the Vladimir Prison because through the Working Group and through the Swedish Embassy we had been informed that approval had been granted to our request to select and photograph registration cards of all prisoners who had occupied cells in Korpus II over the 1947 -1972 period. As is well known, we were not permitted to photograph or copy any of the cards, although we did select cards of those prisoners who had been in cells in Korpus II over the 1947-1972 period, who had died in the Vladimir Prison, or who had entered the Vladimir Prison during this time but did not have any cell occupancy

information written into their cards. We prepared a list of the names of all of these prisoners which numbered close to 6000. The cards of these approximate 6000 prisoners were identified by being placed into a rotated orientation with

respect to the other cards in each drawer of the kartoteka, and we were assured that they would be kept in that state in a storeroom of the prison administration until the matter of copying of the cards would be decided.

3(4)
7(8)

I outline three different methods for compiling the cell occupancy data that preserve the intactness and rigorousness of the proposed analysis to various extents and protect the privacy of all prisoners whose cards must be examined.

(1) We photograph the cards as outlined above, carry out the analysis, and after the report has been made to the Working Group upon completion of the analysis, we return the photographic images of the cards to the Russian authorities. Under this condition, we assure the authorities that further copies of the cards will not be made. In this way the Russian authorities can feel assured that all information from their archival documents has been returned to them. This is the most accurate method for the analysis since it allows us to verify during the analysis that all data have been entered accurately. Since we must extract the cell occupancy information from each card to be analyzed by computer algorithms developed for this purpose, it is likely that some errors in data input are to be expected. This method allows verification of data input and makes for the most accurate analysis possible. All other methods, such as the two outlined below, are subject to greater error in the analysis.

(2) With a team of assistants, I be allowed to direct the collection of cell occupancy information in the kartoteka of the Vladimir Prison by entering into our own laptop computers only the following information from the approximate 6000 cards selected: name of prisoner and date of birth, case number, date of entry into the prison, cell occupancy data including cell number and date when transferred, and date of departure from prison. This method allows collection of the data that are necessary for the analysis and does not involve making records of other information about each prisoner that do not serve the objectives of the analysis, such as date of arrest, basis of arrest, statute according to which the prisoner was charged and sentenced, length of sentence, etc. Should certain prisoners need to be contacted or identified further for purposes outlined above, we can then simply provide the name and date of birth, etc. to the Russian authorities. We estimate that this method would probably require five assistants each with a personal laptop computer to work in the kartoteka for 7-10 consecutive days to enter just the minimal information from each card described above. We would have to use this period of time to verify accuracy of data input as much as possible, but the method suffers from the possibility that some errors in data input may go through undetected and that after our departure from the Vladimir Prison there would be no opportunity to make corrections. The resultant effect on the analysis may be small but cannot be accurately predicted since it would depend on the frequency of errors. There

would be no information collected by this method that would allow further public identification of prisoners or of their families.

(3) With a team of assistants, I be allowed to direct the collection of data as described above in point (2) but under the condition that the names of the prisoners not be entered into our laptop computers although the other information such as case number, date of entry into the prison, cell occupancy data, and date of departure from the prison would be recorded. In this case we would prepare a separate list for the authorities of prisoner name and date of birth with a corresponding identification number which would be entered into our computerized records, for instance, prisoners A1, A2, ..., A9, etc. for those whose family names begin with the letter A, prisoners B1, B2, B3, ..., etc. for those whose names begin with the letter B, and so forth. In this manner we keep no copies of personal identification information about the prisoners. Should a prisoner have to be

identified as a result of the analysis for reasons described above, we would simply provide the Russian authorities with the number A10, for instance, and the Russian authorities would then identify the prisoner in question and determine whether he could be interviewed for more information. This method suffers from the same disadvantage as pointed out in method (2) above, namely, that verification of data input can be made only while working in the Vladimir Prison. Furthermore, it will be necessary for the Russian authorities to preserve the list of prisoner names and identification numbers for some period of time, at least until the analysis of the work is completed.

4(4)
8(8)

For well over a year I have tried to think of a method of making a permanent copy of just the minimum information needed from each card without recording other data such as length of sentence, etc., that is of no use to us and is of no interest. Unfortunately there is no manner in which only part of each card could be photographed because both sides of each card must be examined to extract the necessary information and the data are not written onto the cards in a uniform manner. I have, therefore, outlined above three methods to collect the necessary information for the analysis and to arrive at a reasonably satisfactory conclusion by ensuring as much as possible accuracy of data input. I hope that agreement can be reached for implementing one of the above described methods. They are listed in order of decreasing preference to me purely on the basis of the opportunity for verification of data input.

I hope that this description of the goals and objectives of our archival research are clear and understandable. Please do inform me if further information may be required.

Sincerely,

Marvin W. Makinen

Temporary address August 18 - October 18, 1997:

Marvin W. Makinen
Department of Chemistry & Biochemistry
University of Colorado
Campus Box 215
Boulder, Colorado 80309-0215

Tel: 303/492-4503 or leave message at 303/492-3545
FAX: 303/492-3586 or 303/492-5894

E-mail: makinen@colorado.edu
makinen@atlantis.colorado.edu

E-mail can be directed also to my permanent address:

m-makinen@uchicago.edu



SVERIGES AMBASSAD
BUDAPEST

1997-10-08

281/001

LG

ME

EC P 2 Eu¹

Ambassadör Martin Hallqvist

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET/EC

Delges:

von Dardel

Carl Persson

Magnusson, Riga

Hallqvist, EC 2

Olsen, EI-ESEK

Amb. Moskva

Kp. 97-10-93/Lo

M

O. a. /Lo

Raoul Wallenberg

(7 bil)

Broder,

Den ryska medborgaren Lioudmila Prokofeva fortsätter att korrespondera med ambassaden och närslutet översänds 7 skrivelser/fax inkomna fr o m 24 september t o m 6 oktober.

För någon vecka sedan kontaktades jag av Horst Niebaum per telefon som efterfrågade om ambassaden hört något i ärendet från Stockholm, detta utan att antyda något om att Prokofeva tydligen sagt upp bekantskapen med honom. Jag referade till vad som sagts vid besöket på ambassaden i augusti att erhållen information och dokumentation vidarebefordras till Utrikesdepartementet i Stockholm och att eventuella framtida kontakter kommer att ske direkt med Moskva.

*Hälsningar
Irene Anderson*

Irene Anderson

24/9
An: Frau Anderson/Hallqvist

Amb Budapest 97-10-08

An: Frau Anderson
Herr Londvall

Embassy of Sweden
Ajtosi Duerer sor 27/A
1146 Budapest
Fax: 36 - 1 - 3522807

Sehr geehrte Frau Anderson und Herr Londvall,
Ich brauche keinen Antwort von Ihnen, entschuldigen Sie, bitte meine Schaerfe. Ich weiss, das ich eine Tochter von Raoul Wallenberg bin! Es interessiert mich, wer meine Mutter ist. Mein Vater, R. Wallenberg, hat beipflichtet in GULAG zu leben und zu arbeiten, un damit hat er mein Leben in GULAG bei Erpressung erhalten. Meine Mutter hat mich in Vorkuta am 18. Oktober 1945 geboren. Sie kam ums Leben, und wenn ich 2 Jhare alt war, die fremde Leute haben mich in ihre Familie nach Moskau mitgenommen. Ich habe fuer das alles eine Information. Um mich zu verstehen, mus man meine biographische Auskunft lesen. Ich hatte sie fanatisch am Balatonsee, in der Stadt Balatonfuered, im Hotel "Fortuna", Zimmer 202 ohne Rest und Unterhaltung vom 8. August bis 10. September geschrieben. Spaeter hastte ich verstanden, das ich eine uebliche Fehler machte, das war ein eigenartige Masochism, und ich habe das abgelehnt. Ich habe verstanden, dass niemand dafuer interessieren wird.

Herr Niebaum hatte Ihnen meine kurze biographische Auskunft eingeraeumt. Sie war aber mit einigen Ungenauigkeiten. Oder kann ich eine andere Variante vorschlagen: alles ueber mich selbst erzaehlen, ohne Sprachbarriere (Simultanuebersetzung), ich kann z.B. einen swedischen Repraesentant, der Russisch spricht, nach Hause einladen. Leider spreche ich selbst keine Fremdsprachen, ich hatte keine Bedingungen die Sprachen zu lernen, aber ich beschaeftigte mich mit Selbstbildung, und ich bin geistig gut entwickelt. Ich sehe meinem Vater sehr aehnlich, und meine Biographie ohne Ihre Untersuchung beweist, dass ich eine Tochter von Raoul Wallenberg bin. Aber ich verstehe, dass nicht alle daran interessiert sind - die Wahrheit ueber letzten Jahren von meinem Vater und Schicksal seiner Tochter zu finden. Es sind viel Geld mit meinem Vater verbunden. Waere er ein Bettler, alle haetten ueber ihn schon lange vergessen, besonders, ich glaube, Herr Lantosch.

Aber ein Gedaechnis ueber meinem Vater und ein Wille meiner verstorbenen Grossmutter und meines verstorbenen Vater geben mir kein Recht zu vergessen, wessen Tochter ich bin.

Die zahlreiche, auf meiner Grossmutter Geld begruendeten Ausschuesse, und alle Herren, die Krokodilstraenen ueber meinem Vater vergiessen, benutzen sein Geld, und das gibt ihnen kein Recht ueber seine Tochter vergessen.

Ich sehe meinem Vater sehr aehnlich. Wenn am 4. August 1997 Herr Lantosch mich am ersten Mal gesehen hatte - er fuhr auf, warum? Vielleicht hat er mit dem Vater genauso wie Judas mit Christus verfahren das kann sein, aber alles muss man geprueft werden. Aber wenn ich unrecht bin, biete ich im voraus um Entschuldigung. Aber ich bin ueberzeugt, er wurde verraten, weil er sehr vorsichtiger und kluger Mann war. Aber vielleicht passt es allem nicht, dass ich noch ein Mal geboren wurde? Dann brauche ich ueberhaupt nichts von Ihnen!

Ich habe ein vollen Recht auf meiners Vaters Name und zu wissen, wer war meine Mutter. Wenn Sie meine Mutter finden, dann wird alles klar: meiners Vaters Tod in GULAG, und das Leben seiner Tochter, welche er von der Lieblingsfrau in Gefaengnis bekommen hatte, und welche er am Leben liess. Es war unmoeglich fuer ihm sich von seiner Tochter lossagen. Er hat so viele Juden gerettet. Verstehen Sie bitte, die Kommunisten, genauso wie Faschisten, nehmen gleichzeitig auch den Lieblingsfrauen von den interessierenden Personen.

Ich lebe wuerdig und erlich, Sie und Ihre Regierung koennen da fuer sicher sein, obwohl mein Leben sehr schwer war. Aber ich blieb gefuehlsmaessig gutem Person. Aber ich will als eine Tochter von Diplomat Raoul Wallenberg leben. Ich beanspruche auf keinen Familienkapital, auf keine Erbschaft. Herr Niebaum hat mir gesagt, dass ich ueberhaupt keine Ahnung ueber Westen habe, die Reaktion - nur Geld. Ich sage Ihnen erlich, ich brauche keine Sensation, ich werde keinen Prozess anstrengen. Ich gehe einen erlichen Weg, und vermutete, dass mein Geheimnis fuer alle eine Freude wird. Aber mir scheint, ich bin schon wie eine zudringliche Fliege, tut mir leid, wenn Sie so ueber mir denken. Ich bin die einzige gesetzliche Tochter von meinem Vater. Jene Kinder, welche in GULAG aufkommen koennten, halte ich fuer die gemeine und unreinliche Experimenten von NKVD ueber meinem Vater. Ich glaube, er hat diese Kinder nicht anerkennt. Ich auch anerkenne sie als meine Geschwister nicht.

Ich habe keine Erben. Ich habe einen erwachsenen Sohn von meine erste Ehe, seine Name ist Viktor Vladimirowitsch, geb. im Jahre 1970, er wohnt selbstaendig.

Die ganze Information ueber mein persoenliches Leben kann ich in Privatgespraeche erzaehlen.

Offiziell kann ich ueber mich nur am 30. Juni 1997 aeussern, nach Tod meiner Pflegemutter Dragulskaja-Chosrowjan Maria Semenovna, sie hat am 29. Juni 1996 in Moskau gestorben. Ich bin orthodox, und nach den Kanons der orthodoxe Religion darf man ueber den gestorbenen nur nach einen Jahr nach dem Tod sprechen.


Ich rechne auf eine Rente, die mir meine Tante oder mein Onkel bestimmen koennten, die Gott sei Dank noch am Leben sind, oder die Regierung. Der Vater wurde bei Erfuehlung seiner Pflichten entfuehrt.

Ich werde Ihnen weiter keine Sorgen machen, und noch ein Mal moechte ich Frau Anderson fuer ihre Aufmerksamkeit bedanken.

Mit Hochachtung

Lioudmila Prokofeva

P.S. Ich habe eine Pilgerfahrt zum Denkmal von meinen Vater in Budapest am 4. August 1997 an seinem 85-en Geburtstag gemacht. Es war schwer fuer mich in Budapest zu sein, und ich fuhr nach Balatonsee, um ueber mein Leben dort zu schreiben, wo, glaube ich, meine Eltern seine letzten gluecklichen Tagen verbracht hatten.



Fax: 36-1-3522807

SVED NAGYKOVETSEG

1146 Budapest XIV

Ajtosi Durer sor 27/A

Tel: 352-28-04

From: Mrs.Prokofieva L.A.

Russia, Moscow, Samarinskaya st., 1-5,158

Tel: 952-98-75

Bill

2

Mr. Anderson-Hallquist

Amb Budapest

97-10-08

26/9

To Mrs.Irene Anderson and Mr.Londvall

Dear Mrs. Irene Anderson,

A great misunderstanding has happened!

The first fax that was sent by me on September 22,1997 was translated by an unprofessional translator with awful distortion. Accidentally I trusted to make translation to an incompetent person. I present my apologizes for misleading you.

Lower I present the correct text.

Mr. Horst Niebaum, with whom we lived for 8 years without registration of our marriage, and with whom I don't support any relations from September 15, 1997, after his statement to Mr.Londvall that he is my sponsor. This statement of Mr.Niebaum I consider as treachery and villainy. He was invited by me to the presentation as a friend and interpreter. My case, with wich I addressed you, giving information about myself, from September 14, 1997, does not need any sponsorship and Mr.Niebaum will turn out to be a souteneur. I used to know Mr.Niebaum as an honest person, but unfortunately, it turned out that he considers my question from mercantile personal interests, what brought us to a breaking-off of our relationship and my puzzelment. How could he offend me so cruelly and betray me, about which I informed you by fax from September 22, 1997.

I want to remind you once again, that Mr.Niebaum is not my sponsor and ask you not to give any information about me to Mr.Niebaum (his address: 4390, Gladbek, Teodor-Heus Strasse 31).

With many respects,



L.Prokofieva

P.S.: The first person to whom I revealed my scret was Horst Niebaum. This happenned in extremal conditions in Romania in September 1996. We were in opera-house and listenned to "Aida" by Verdi. I love Verdi's music but never can listen the opera to the end and leave after the 2-nd act. Before our trip to Romania I have got a bad cold, my temperature was 40 C and I thought that I would die on our way (we were travelling by car from Germany to Bucharest) and did not want to take my scret with me into the grave. I explained Mr.Niebaum that this opera arouses in me gloomy accociations, that my father was Raul Wallenberg. For this he exclaimed:"Oh, this is big money!". But that time I could forgive him indulgently because he was German, though even then I was very offended that he didn't consider my feelings.

But September 15, 1997 this repeated in a disgusting form, when he stated to Mr.Londvall that he was my sponsor. This gave me a heart attack and brought complete extrangement and eversion from Mr.Niebaum.

3

Anderson/Hallqvist

26/

1997-10-08

Frau Anderson

26 September 1997

Herr Londvall

1146 Budapest

Ajtosi Durer sor 27/A

Fax: 36 - 1 - 3522807

INK. AMB. BUDAPEST		
16/330		
1997 09 26		
AVD.	GR	MAL.
R	18	Wallenberg

Sehr geehrte Frau Anderson und Herr Londvall,

In der Auskunft von 14. September sind einige wichtige Tatsachen meiner Kindheit von Herr Niebaum entstellt. Das habe ich nur heute beim Uebersetzung entdeckt. Vertrauen, Sie bitte, ihm nicht.

Eine neue Auskunft und meine Angaben werde ich Ihnen naechste Woche per Fax schicken.

Mit Hochachtung



Lioudmila Prokofeva

29/9

Fax: 36-1- 3522807
SVED NAGYKOVETSEG
1146 Budapest XIV
Ajtosi Durer sor 27/A
Tel: 352-28-04
From: Mrs.Prokofieva L.A.
Russia, Moscow, Samarinskaya st., 1-5,158
Tel: 952-98-75

H. Anderson/Hallqvist
97-10-08

To Mrs. Irene Anderson and Mr.Londvall

Send you copies of 3 telegrams sended by me to H. Niebaum.

Faithfully yours

Ludmila Prokofieva

Adress: 4390, Gladbeck, Teodor-Heus Strasse 31,
Frau E. Niebaum

Frau Niebaum,
Sagen Sie, bitte, Ihrem Mann, Herr Niebaum, das man dem Sponsor waescht man die Hemde und die Socken regelmaessig wachrend acht Jahren nicht.

24.09.97

Horst,

ich entbinde dich von allen Verpflichtungen, welche du mir gemacht hat: die Scheidung mit Frau Niebaum gesetzlich regeln und unsere Ehe uns standesamtlich trauen lassen, uns eine Wohnung in Deutschland zu kaufen. Du kannst frei sein. Unseres Zusammenleben dauerte 8 Jahren und ich habe das am 15. September 1997 aufgehoben.

Bitte, gebe meine Sachen zurueck.

26.09.97

Horst Niebaum

Your references made up by you for Mrs. Irene Anderson dated the 12th and the 14th of September are incorrect. On the 15th of September 1997 you destroyed 1 copy of reference dated 12th of September 2 copies signed by me were left at your disposal. I ask you to destroy them immediately.

I ask you to output my data from your personal computer. I forbid you to use them. Don't disgrace yourself and your country.

My biography and my private life are my property, not yours.

I kindly ask you to forget me and my biography.

Otherwisc I'll make an official statement to the German government that you are a swindler.

Ludmila Prokofieva

28.09.97

1/10
BII 5 hbr. Anderson/Hallqvist
Amb Budapest 97-10-08

To: Mrs. Irene S.B. Anderson
Counsellor

1.10.1997

Embassy of Sweden
Ajtosi Durer sor 27/A
1146 Budapest

Fax: 36 - 1 - 3522807

From: Mrs. Prokofeva L.A.
Russia, Moscow, Samarinskaya st., 1-5, 158
Tel.: 952-98-75

Sehr geehrte Frau Anderson,

ich schicke Ihnen eine Kopie des Telegramms, welche ich an Herr Niebaum, nach seiner ueblichen Anruf heute am Morgen, auch heute geschickt habe. Er hat mein drittes Telegramm erhalten. Er hat ein grosser Akzent auf das Wort "der Gauner" gemacht und hat mich erpresst. Das ist mein Antwort an Herr Niebaum per Telegramm.


Horst,

Ich bitte um Entschuldigung fuer die Ungenauigkeit der Uebersetzung. ich habe dich nicht beleidigt, ich habe nur deine Handlungen richtig abgeschaezt. Deine Auskuenfte ueber meine Biographie von 12. September und 14. September hast du nicht richtig aufgesetzt. Ich habe selbst eine neue Auskunft ueber meine Biographie aufgesetzt.

Es liegt in deinem Interesse nicht, einen Skandal einzurichten. Ich verlange nach folgendem: mich nicht zu erpressen, nach Hause nicht anzurufen, mich und meine Biographie zu vergessen. Das liegt in deinem Interesse.

L. Prokofeva

Mit Hochachtung



L. Prokofeva

To: Mrs. Irene S.B. Anderson
Counsellor


1.10.1997

Embassy of Sweden
Ajtosi Durer sor 27/A
1146 Budapest

Fax: 36 - 1 - 3522807

From: Mrs. Prokofeva L.A.
Russia, Moscow, Samarinskaya st., 1-5, 158
Tel.: 952-98-75

Sehr geehrte Frau Anderson,



Центральный телеграф
Москва
квитанция за телеграмму
109913 01.10.97 16:58
куда GERMANY
число слов: 098
стоимость: 108270 руб.

Претензии принимаются
в течение 4 месяцев
со дня подачи

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of several loops and a long horizontal stroke at the end.

6/1

To: Mrs. Irene S.B. Anderson
Counsellor

4.10.1997

Embassy of Sweden
Ajtosi Durer sor 27/A
1146 Budapest
Fax: 36 - 1 - 3522807

6 Anderson/Hallguist

97-10-08

INK AND REST		
D. 4	16/346	
13 97	10	06
AVD.		
R	18	Wallenberg

From: Mrs. Prokofeva L.A.

Russia, 113191, Moscow, Samarinskaya st., 1-5, 158

Tel: 952-98-75

Sehr geehrte Frau Anderson,

Ich schicke Ihnen eine Kopie von der Telegramm, welche ich an Horst Niebaum heute geschickt habe. Die Adresse von Herr Bernd Maier weiss ich nicht. Das ist sein Hausnummer: (621) 696686. Er wohnt in Deutschland, in der Stadt Luedwigshafen. Herr Horst Niebaum hat Geschaeftsbeziehungen mit ihm.

Eine Gesundheitszeugnis ueber meine psychische Gesundheit ist im Notariat auf Grund des von dem Arzt gegebenen Dokument bescheinigt.

Mit Hochachtung



L. Prokofeva

P.S. Sehr geehrte Frau Anderson. Im Fax von 30. September 1997 wurden einige Saetze zwieschen der Seite 3 und der Seite 4 ausgelasst:

" В 1964 году я закончила школу, в 1965 я работала в институте Генерального плана г.Москвы ГлавПУ у директора института Евстратова Н.Ф. в качестве секретаря. В 1966 году я работала стюардессой в Аэрофлоте, аэропорт Внуково".

Text des Telegramms

Horst! Am 2. Oktober 1997 года um 8.45 hatte ich einen Anruf von Kriminalelementen (Banditen) im deines Namen und im Namen deines Freund Bernd Maier unter Drohung in den gemeinen Ausdruecken ueber die gewalttaetige Abrechnung mit mir.

Du weiss, wie deine ehemalige Frau, war ich inuner gegen deiner Freundschaft und Geschaeftsbeziehungen mit Herr B. Maier. Ich persoendlich hatte niemals irgendwelche Beziehungen mit Herr Meier. Aber meinen Wunsch und meine Bitte hast du niemals erfuehlt. Ich verlange von dir und deiner Freund mich nicht zu erpressen und mir nicht zu drohen.

Mit dem Ziel meiner persoentlichen Sicherheit habe ich zwei Kopien dieses Telegramm den Amtspersonen uebergegeben. Falls etwas mit mir passiert - eine Kopie wird nach Deutsche Botschaft in Moskau uebergeben; die zweite wird in Foederale Sicherheitsbehoerden des Russlands geschickt, mit einem Zettel, der ich am Leben geschrieben hatte, mit der Erklaerung der Ursachen meiner Ermordung.

Am 3. Oktober 1997 war ich bei Psychiater. Ich bin psychisch gesund. Ich habe eine Gesundheitszeugnis.

Ich habe euch vergessen. Ich verlange von euch mich auf immer zu vergessen!

L. Prokofeva



To: Mrs. Irene S.B. Anderson
Counsellor

Embassy of Sweden
Ajtosi Durer sor 27/A
1146 Budapest

Fax: 36 - 1 - 3522807

From: Mrs. Prokofeva L.A.
Russia, Moscow, Samarinskaya st., 1-5, 158
Tel.: 952-98-75

Sehr geehrte Frau Anderson,



ПСИХОНЕВРОЛОГИЧЕСКИЙ ДИСПАНСЕР №21
109180, г. Москва, ул. Полянка д.9 тел. 238-03-42

Гр. Прокоева Людмила Алексеевна
Прож. Самаринская д.1-5 кв.158 1945г.

По данным освидетельствования

" 3 октября 1997 г.

противопоказаний для управления автотранспортными средствами
не имеет

Врач



To: Mrs.Irene S.B.Anderson
Counsellor

3.10.1997

Embassy of Sweden
Ajtosi Durer sor 27/A
1146 Budapest

Fax: 36 - 1 - 3522807

From: Mrs.Prokofeva L.A.
Russia, Moscow, Samarinskaya st., 1-5, 158

Tel: 952-98-75

Sehr geehrte Frau Anderson,

Направляю Вам альбом с моими фотографиями.

Первая страница.

Первая фотография 1947 года. Мне здесь два года.

Вторая - я в 5-6 классе. Третья фотография - мне 32 года. Четвертая фотография - 33 года.

Остальные фотографии рассказывают о моей жизни.

С уважением Л.Прокофьева



4/10





To: Mrs. Irene S.B. Anderson
Counsellor

Embassy of Sweden
Ajtosi Durer sor 27/A
1146 Budapest

Fax: 36 - 1 - 3522807

From: Mrs. Prokofeva L.A.
Russia, Moscow, Samarinskaya st., 1-5, 158
Tel.: 952-98-75

Sehr geehrte Frau Anderson,



Центральный телеграф
Москва
Квитанция за телеграмму
149913 26.09.97 19:38
куда GERMANY
число слов: 076
стоимость: 84070 руб.

Претензии принимаются
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со дня подачи

Центральный телеграф
Москва
Квитанция за телеграмму
149913 24.09.97 17:40
куда GERMANY
число слов: 039
стоимость: 43370 руб.

Претензии принимаются
в течение 4 месяцев
со дня подачи




To: Mrs. Irene S.B. Anderson
Counsellor

Embassy of Sweden
Ajtosí Durer sor 27/A
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Fax: 36 - 1 - 3522807

From: Mrs. Prokofeva L.A.
Russia, Moscow, Samarinskaya st., 1-5, 158
Tel.: 952-98-75

Sehr geehrte Frau Anderson,



Центральный телеграф
Москва


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число слов: 125
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Претензии принимаются
в течение 4 месяцев
со дня подачи

Центральный телеграф
Москва

квитанция за телеграмму
59913 04.10.97 18:35
куда GERMANY
число слов: 201
стоимость: 221570 руб.

Претензии принимаются
в течение 4 месяцев
со дня подачи



!(3)

1997-10-08

P 2 Ew¹

Amb Moskva

EXP 971008/g

Från Julin, c/o Lejonet

Re Offentliggörande av Raoul Wallenberg-dokument
(1 bil)

Översänder härmed PM om rubricerade ämne.

CABINET

MD

REGERINGSKANSLIET
Utrikesdepartementet

PROMEMORIA

1997-10-08

Sven Julin
Telefon 08-405 32 41

Delges:
Kabs
Magnusson, Riga
Fredriksson, A/DOK
Hallqvist, EC 2
Foyer, EC 4
Olson, EI/ESEK
Amb Moskva
Amb London

HEMLIGOffentliggörande av Raoul Wallenberg-dokumenten

Vid möte idag förklarade sig kabinetssekreteraren införstådd med att offentliggörandet av RW-dokumenterna för tiden 1971-september 1991 inte längre borde sammankopplas tidsmässigt med publiceringen av vitboken om RW:s öde. Det stod ju klart efter mötet hos honom den 17 september 1997 att vitboken skulle försenas ytterligare in på 1988, medan det i fråga om dokumenten handlade om ett ärende enligt tryckfrihetsförordningen med anledning av advokat Matas framställning från januari i år. Det var dock försvarbart att av lämplighetsskäl skjuta på publiceringen av handlingarna till efter Jeltsins besök. Undertecknad påpekade att den tidskrävande tekniska hanteringen hur som helst skulle göra det vanskligt att offentliggöra före december 1997. Omkring februari 1998 var mera realistiskt.

Under alla förhållanden skulle hanteringen av både vitboken och dokumenten dryftas på nytt efter Jeltsins besök i ljuset av de samtal som då ägt rum.

Arkivgenomgången fortskrider, och gensvaret hos vidtalade regeringar (London, Washington, Bonn, Wien, Ottawa, Tel Aviv, Haag) har varit välvilligt. En uppsättning dokument avseende Sovjet har tillställts ambassaden i Moskva för granskning och kommentarer beträffande lämpligheten av att bibehålla hemligstämpeln för dessa akter. Det enda egentliga problem som hittills uppstått är har anfört kraftiga reservationer, främst dikterade av deras egna sekretesskrav,

3

Utrikesdepartementet

Arbetspapper

2(2)

1997-10-08

beträffande offentliggörandet av Gordijevskijs vittnesmål.

Sven Julin

REGERINGSKANSLIET
Utrikesdepartementet

282/002
PROMEMORIA

7 2 Ew¹

1997-10-09

Sven Julin
Telefon 08-405 32 41

Delges:

Fredriksson, A-DOK (utan bil)

Hallqvist, EC 2 (utan bil)

Olson, EI-ESEK (utan bil)

Amb Bonn



HEMLIG

Genomgång av Raoul Wallenbergarkivet; Tyskland

(5 bil)

Vid besök idag av ministerrådet Eberhard Schuppius från tyska ambassaden lät jag honom ta del i lugn och ro av bifogade fem dokument med förklaringen att det var vår avsikt att låta dem ingå i de handlingar från Raoul Wallenbergarkivet för 1970-91 som vi ämnar offentliggöra.

Schuppius sade sig inte se några problem. Intresset på tysk sida gällde publicerandet av tyska officiella dokument, och verbalnoten från 1981, som också gällde avhemligande, kunde knappast betraktas som känslig längre. Det övriga var svensk rapportering, och dess publicering ville man inte lägga sig i.

Om AA likväl hade synpunkter skulle Schuppius återkomma.

Sven Julin

MD

SVERIGES AMBASSAD


BONN

1981-07-02 Nr. 344

P 2

Handläggare: J. Wingstrand

Utrikesdepartementet



Dnr	14 344
Avd	P 2 EU

Svenskt offentliggörande av visst aktmaterial rörande efterforskningarna efter Raoul Wallenberg i Tyskland under 1950- och 1960-talen

(1 bil)

Auswärtiges Amt (= AA) har med note 24 juni 1981 meddela att det ur tyska synpunkter ej råder några politiska eller rättsligt principiella invändningar mot ett svenskt offentliggörande av aktmaterial rörande efterforskningarna i Tyskland efter Raoul Wallenberg. AA framhåller att svenska regeringen har slutliga avgörandet. AA erinrar om att allmänhetens informationsönskemål i många fall kan väga tyngre än den enskildes intresse att skydda sina privata förhållanden. I den mån dokument offentliggörs, måste åtgärden emellertid vara nödvändig för att uppnå svenska regeringens syfte att informera allmänheten, men offentliggörandet får å andra sidan ej i orimlig grad skada enskild person. AA ifrågasätter det nödvändiga i att offentliggöra namn- och adresslistor på personer, vilka på sin tid förmodades kunna bidra till att bringa klarhet om Raoul Wallenbergs öde men som ej visade sig ha dylika informationer. AA ställer även frågan om det är erforderligt att genomgående namnge personer, som gjort utsagor. Man önskar att svenska utrikesdepartementet måtte pröva i vilka fall namn kan strykas. AA föreslår att namnen strykes i alla handlingar, som innehåller negativa personomdömen. - Ambassadens kommentar är att hänsyn givetvis måste tas till de tyska synpunkterna och önskemålen. Praktiska konsekvenserna därav torde bli att icke många dokument behöver undantas men att många namn måste strykas.

./.

Med bifogade note den 24 juni 1981 har Auswärtiges Amt (= AA) besvarat ambassadens note den 28 januari 1981 med förfrågan om eventuella tyska invändningar skulle resas

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SVERIGES AMBASSAD

BONN

1981-07-02 Nr. 344 P 2

mot det beslutade svenska offentliggörandet av visst aktmaterial i UD:s arkiv rörande de svenska efterforskningsarna efter Raoul Wallenberg under 1950- och 1960-talen i Tyskland.

I sitt svar meddelar AA bl.a. att förbundsregeringen icke har politiska eller rättsligt principiella invändningar mot ett offentliggörande, eftersom varje beslut härom endast kan vila på svenska regeringen och därför ej kan relateras till några bestämmelser i tyska grundlagen. Man betraktar ambassadens åtgärd att delge Auswärtiges Amt ett antal handlingar med uppgifter som erhållits genom tyska regeringens och tyska myndigheters förmedling såsom utgörande en ren courtoisieåtgärd.

Icke desto mindre erinrar man om att namnstrykningar (Anonymisierung) jämlikt tysk grundlag kan krävas i vissa fall, d.v.s. när medgivande till ett senare offentliggörande ej uttryckligen givits. Samtidigt påpekas att allmänhetens intresse att få kännedom om vad som förekommit i dylika fall dock ofta kan väga tyngre än den enskildes intresse att skydda sin personliga integritet (private Lebensgestaltung).

Den större delen av den överlämnade dokumentationen, säg det därefter i AA:s note, innehåller namnen på - och ibland även adresser till - personer samt redogörelser för vad dessa berättat. Dessa utsagor har för det mesta utgjort faktaredovisningar, men ibland också innehållit värdeomdömen rörande andra namngivna personer. Dylika berättelser bör ej utan vidare undantas från offentliggörande; allmänhetens informationsintresse bör dock (sollte) i sådana fall klart rättfärdiga ett offentliggörande.

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1981-07-02 Nr. 344 P 2

Förbundsregeringen, fortsätter AA, anser att Wallenberg-dokumentationen har ett klart allmänintresse - framför allt i Sverige - och att den därför bör offentliggöras. Under dylika omständigheter erkänner även tysk rätt att allmänhetens intresse av informationer kan rättfärdiga vissa ingrepp för den enskilde, framför allt när informationsbehovet avser omständigheter som berör personer, vilka spelat en roll i nutidshistorien. Ett offentliggörande måste anses lämpligt, när det avsedda informationsytet kan täckas utan att enskild annan person drabbas i orimlig (unzumutbar) utsträckning.

AA ifrågasätter dock nödvändigheten att offentliggöra listor med enbart namn och adresser på personer, vilka på sin tid förmodades kunna lämna informationer om Wallenberg men som visade sig ej kunde bidra till att bringa klarhet i dennes öde. Svenska regeringen bör enligt AA ta ställning till om det skulle gå att avstå från att offentliggöra sådana listor.

AA ställer även frågan i vad mån det för att uppnå det avsedda informationsändamålet är nödvändigt att genomgående namnge alla personer, som gjort muntliga eller skriftliga utsagor. AA säger sig icke kunna bedöma om namnstrykningar i det ena eller andra fallet skulle förta trovärdigheten och autenticiteten i de gjorda utsagorna. AA ber att svenska regeringen, "som dock såttillvida har att göra den slutliga bedömningen", måtte pröva, i vilka fall det skulle vara möjligt att stryka namn utan att dokumentationen nämnvärt förlorar i värde såsom upplysning och vittnesutsaga. AA föreslår att man under alla omständigheter (jedenfalls sollte) stryker namnen i samtliga handlingar, som innehåller negativa personomdömen.

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BONN

1981-07-02 Nr. 344 P 2

Rörande det övriga innehållet i AA:s note ber jag att få hänvisa till densamma.

x x x

Muntligen har vederbörande handläggare i AA:s rättsavdelning, Dr. Göttelmann, den 30 juni sagt Wingstrand att det väsentligaste i AA:s svarsnote - enligt hans mening - är att förbundsregeringen klart tillstyrkt ett offentliggörande i Sverige. Samtidigt understrykes i noten - vad eventuella skadeståndsyrkanden för ingrepp i personlig integritet beträffar - att förbundsregeringen dock ej anser sig ha något som helst medansvar för offentliggörandet. Förbundsregeringens granskning av det överlämnade aktmaterialet samt dess kommentarer den 24 juni 1981 upplevs enligt Göttelmann såsom en ren courtoisie-åtgärd - i likhet med den tyska synen på det svenska överlämnandet av aktmaterialet. Förbundsregeringen anser - liksom ambassadens juridiska ombud (hbr Wingstrand - Jödahl 1981-09-30) - fortsatte Göttelmann, att svensk lag enhetligt bör tillämpas vid eventuella yrkanden om ersättning för skada på enskild tysk medborgares integritet. Icke desto mindre har - enligt Göttelmann - AA med sin note velat uppmärksamma svenska regeringen på olika fall, då tyska medborgare jämlikt tysk lag skulle kunna uppleva ett offentliggörande såsom ingrepp i deras personliga integritet.

Vad eventuella risker för uppgiftslämnarnas och andra personers säkerhet beträffar, är - enligt Göttelmann - den tyska uppfattningen - ehuru förbundsregeringen ej heller i detta hänseende anser sig ha något medansvar för offentliggörandet - att personer som gjort negativa uttalanden om Sovjet och sovjetmedborgare ej kan utesluta risker, därest de skulle besöka Sovjetunionen. Risker torde ej heller kunna uteslutas vid besök i DDR, därest de gjort grava "antisovjetiska" uttalanden (jfr hbr

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SVERIGES AMBASSAD

BONN

1981-07--2 Nr. 344 P 2

Wingstrand - Jödahl 1980-10-07). I bl.a. dylika fall ifrågasätter därför AA i sin note den 24 juni 1981 om icke namnen på uppgiftslämnarna bör strykas, enligt Göttelmann eventuellt dock med tillägget i en fotnot att de fullständiga namnen på uppgiftslämnaren är bekanta för svenska regeringen.

x x x

Min egen kommentar till noten den 24 juni 1981 är att hänsyn givetvis måste tas till de synpunkter och önskemål som AA framfört i frågor om såväl personlig integritet som personlig säkerhet. Om man från svensk sida ej skulle beakta de av Auswärtiges Amt framförda synpunkterna och önskemålen skulle irritation kunna uppstå hos förbundsregeringen, vilken ju varit utomordentligt hjälpsam i denna fråga. Det skulle bl.a. heller icke förstås av alla dem, som med stor omsorg och diskretion ägnar sig åt familjesammanföring med polska, ryska och östtyska medborgare.

De praktiska konsekvenserna av en tillämpning av de tyska synpunkterna och önskemålen blir att icke många dokument behöver undantas från frisläppandet men att namnen däri på de tyska uppgiftslämnarna som huvudregel bör strykas. Detta nästan generella strykande förefaller mig böra och tillika avgjort bäst kunna göras i Stockholm

J. Wingstrand

för Sven Backlund

CHM

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
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AUSWÄRTIGES AMT

513-544.10



V e r b a l n o t e

Bil. till Amb. i Bonn
Skr. nr. 344 den 8/10 1981

P 2 E u I
(Pe)

MM:

Das Auswärtige Amt beehrt sich, der Königlich Schwedischen Botschaft unter Bezugnahme auf ihre Verbalnote vom 28. Januar 1981 betreffend die Veröffentlichung einer Dokumentation über das Schicksal des schwedischen Diplomaten Raoul Wallenberg durch die Schwedische Regierung mitzuteilen, dass aus deutscher Sicht grundsätzliche politische Bedenken gegen die Veröffentlichung der Dokumente aus den Jahren 1951 bis 1969 nicht bestehen.

Auch unter rechtsstaatlichen Gesichtspunkten hat die Bundesregierung keine grundsätzlichen Einwände gegen eine Veröffentlichung der Dokumentation, da Akte ausländischer Hoheitsgewalt am Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland nicht gemessen werden können und eine Veröffentlichung in der alleinigen Entscheidungsgewalt der Schwedischen Regierung liegt.

Das Auswärtige Amt ist der Schwedischen Botschaft dankbar, der Bundesregierung Gelegenheit gegeben zu haben, sich mit den übersandten Dokumenten befassen zu können; sie betrachtet diese Beteiligung jedoch als einen rein internen Akt der Courtoisie, der auch von schwedischer Seite nicht so verstanden wird, dass deutschen Regierungsstellen ein Mitentscheidungsrecht eingeräumt werden soll. Vielmehr kommt in der Verbalnote der Schwedischen Botschaft zurecht zum Ausdruck, dass sich die Schwedische Regierung die endgültige Entscheidung über Art und Weise der Veröffentlichung vorbehält.

Allenfalls könnte sich aus der nach dem Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland der Bundesregierung aufgegebenen Pflicht, allen Deutschen im Sinne des Artikels 116 Abs. 1 des Grund-

An die
Königlich Schwedische
Botschaft
B o n n

gesetzes Schutz und Fürsorge angedeihen zu lassen und sie in ihren Grundrechten zu unterstützen, die Notwendigkeit ergeben, angesichts des - in den meisten Fällen wohl anzunehmenden - Fehlens einer ausdrücklichen Einwilligung der betroffenen befragten Personen und im Hinblick auf das durch Artikel 2 Abs. 1 in Verbindung mit Artikel 1 Abs. 1 des Grundgesetzes gewährleistete allgemeine Persönlichkeitsrecht eine Modifizierung, insbesondere Anonymisierung personenbezogener Daten von Deutschen in der Wallenberg-Dokumentation vorzunehmen. Der Kernbereich dieses allgemeinen Persönlichkeitsrechtes erscheint dem Auswärtigen Amt jedoch insoweit nicht berührt zu sein, als jedermann im Rahmen der Gemeinschaftsgebundenheit staatliche Massnahmen hinnehmen muss, die unter Wahrung des Gebotes der Verhältnismässigkeit im überwiegenden Interesse der Allgemeinheit erfolgen und den Bereich privater Lebensgestaltung nicht beeinträchtigen.

Die geplante Veröffentlichung der Dokumentation beschränkt sich überwiegend darauf, Namen, zum Teil auch Anschriften bestimmter Personen zu nennen und Aussagen wiederzugeben, die in Vernehmungen gemacht worden sind. Diese Aussagen haben zumeist Tatsachenschilderungen, vereinzelt aber auch Werturteile zum Gegenstand, die sich auf andere, zum Teil ebenfalls namentlich genannte Personen beziehen. Personenbezogene Daten dieser Art sind, weil nicht zum absolut geschützten Kernbereich privater Lebensgestaltung gehörend, einer Veröffentlichung nicht schlechthin entzogen. Ihre Publikation sollte allerdings durch überwiegende Allgemeininteressen gerechtfertigt werden können und den Anforderungen des Grundsatzes der Verhältnismässigkeit genügen.

Von der Bundesregierung wird ein überwiegendes Allgemeininteresse an der Publikation bejaht. Die in Aussicht genommene Veröffentlichung dient dem Ziel, die Öffentlichkeit, insbesondere die schwedische Öffentlichkeit, über Einzelheiten und Hintergründe eines vor allem für Schweden bedeutsamen zeitgeschichtlichen Vorganges zu unterrichten. Dass das Informations-

Interesse der Öffentlichkeit Eingriffe in die Persönlichkeits-sphäre des einzelnen legitimieren kann, ist auch in der deutschen Rechtsprechung anerkannt; dies gilt insbesondere dann, wenn sich das Öffentlichkeitsinteresse auf sog. Personen der Zeitgeschichte bezieht. Die in der Wallenberg-Dokumentation namentlich genannten und mit Äusserungen zitierten Personen rechnen zwar selbst überwiegend nicht zu diesem Personenkreis; ihre Aufnahme in die Dokumentation erklärt sich jedoch daraus, dass sie zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt tatsächlich oder doch möglicherweise Berührung mit dem Diplomaten Wallenberg hatten und insoweit zur Aufhellung eines zeitgeschichtlichen Vorgangs beitragen konnten.

Dieser Zusammenhang kann die Veröffentlichung der Dokumentation mit den personenbezogenen Daten der befragten Deutschen allerdings nur rechtfertigen, wenn deren öffentliche Wiedergabe mit dem Verhältnismässigkeitsgrundsatz vereinbar erscheint. Die Publikation der Daten sollte daher dann als geeignet angesehen werden, wenn sie erforderlich ist, um das mit der Dokumentation verfolgte Ziel zu erreichen, ohne die betroffenen Personen unzumutbar zu belasten.

An der Geeignetheit, jedenfalls aber unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Erforderlichkeit könnten insofern Zweifel bestehen, als in die Dokumentation auch Namens- und Anschriftenlisten über Personen aufgenommen werden sollen, unter denen zwar Informanten über Wallenberg vermutet wurden, die aber, soweit ersichtlich, in der Folgezeit tatsächlich nichts zur Aufklärung des Schicksals des schwedischen Diplomaten beigetragen haben. Es entzieht sich der Beurteilung der Bundesregierung und muss daher der Schwedischen Regierung überlassen bleiben, ob gegebenenfalls auf die Veröffentlichung dieser Listen verzichtet werden könnte.

Es stellt sich auch die Frage, ob es zur Erreichung des mit der Veröffentlichung der Wallenberg-Dokumentation verfolgten Zieles durchweg erforderlich ist, Personen, die im Zuge der Wallenberg-Ermittlungen schriftliche oder mündliche Erklärungen

abgegeben haben und in Vernehmungsprotokollen erwähnt worden sind mit ihren Namen zu nennen. Insbesondere vermag das Auswärtige Amt nicht zu beurteilen, ob die Namensnennung in dem einen oder anderen Falle deshalb geboten ist, weil anders Glaubwürdigkeit und Authentizität von Aussagen nicht hinreichend gewährleistet wären.

Das Auswärtige Amt wäre der Königlich Schwedischen Botschaft dankbar, wenn von der Schwedischen Regierung, auf deren Einschätzung es insoweit ankommen wird, geprüft werden könnte, in welchen Fällen auf die namentliche Erwähnung bestimmter Personen verzichtet werden könnte, ohne dass die Dokumentation nennenswert an Information und Aussagekraft verlieren würde. Die Namensnennung sollte nach Auffassung des Auswärtigen Amts jedenfalls dort vermieden werden, wo die Dokumentation negative Werturteile über einzelne Personen wiedergibt.

Das Auswärtige Amt benutzt diesen Anlass, die Königlich Schwedische Botschaft erneut seiner ausgezeichneten Hochachtung zu versichern.

Bonn, den 24. Juni 1981





SVERIGES AMBASSAD

BONN

1987-10-23

Kabinettssekreterare
Pierre Schori



Raoul Wallenberg

Q296/m/

Broder,

Den av Dig i handbrev 1967-05-18 ställda frågan har genom förmedling av utrikesministeriet utretts av såväl Bundesnachrichtendienst som Bundesverfassungsschutz och båda myndigheterna har kommit till liknande resultat. Detta framfördes idag muntligen när Lars-Erik Lundin och jag besökte chefen för Skandinavienreferatet Schnepfen och kan i korthet sammanfattas enligt nedan:

- För närvarande finns ingen känd avhoppare från ungerska säkerhetstjänsten kvar i Förbundsrepubliken
- Däremot har man tidigare haft kontakt med en Karoly Remenyi, född den 18 april 1922 i Budapest. Denne tjänstgjorde under åren 1947-1958 i ledande ställningar i den ungerska säkerhetstjänsten AV0/AVH. Från mars 1958 till augusti 1962 tjänstgjorde han vid den ungerska ambassaden i Rom i underrättelsefunktion. Samma år förlorade han sin ställning och överflyttades till tjänst som ställföreträdande chef för press- och informationstjänsten i "Landesamt für Leibeserziehung und Sport" inom det ungerska sportministeriet. I april 1983 tog han sig över till Förbundsrepubliken.

Såväl Bundesnachrichtendienst som CIA hade i detta

sammanhang kontakt med honom. 1984 var hans senaste kända adress i Förbundsrepubliken Stemplingerranger 5/IV Stock, Eingang mitte i München. Samma år fick han inresetillstånd till USA. Huruvida han befinner sig i USA är inte känt. Han hade uppgivit att han skulle uppsöka det svenska generalkonsulatet i München för att lämna upplysningar om Wallenberg. Det var inte känt om han hade gjort detta.



Hjärtlig hälsning
Din Lennart
Lennart Eckerberg

SVERIGES AMBASSAD

BONN

1987-10-23

Kabinettssekreterare
Pierre Schori



Raoul Wallenberg

296/001
Broder,

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Hjärtlig hälsning
En vän
Lennart Eckerberg
Lennart Eckerberg

RE RAOUL WALLENBERG

1988-11-18

FRAAN FOERBUNDSKANSLERAEMMET HAR VI ERFARIT ATT FALLET WALLENBERG FOERTS PAA TAL UNDER DET "VIERAUGENGESPRAECH" SOM KOHL HADE MED SACHAROV OCH JELENA BONNER DEN 25 OKTOBER I MOSKVA. DETTA HADE SKETT UNDER EN DISKUSSION OM MAENSKLIGA RAETTIGHETSLAEGET DAA SACHAROV ENLIGT DEN UPPTECKNING SOM GJORTS SAGT FOELJANDE I ANSLUTNING TILL SIN REDOGOERELSE FOER HUR STALINTIDENS TERROR NU BLEV ETT OFFICIELLT TEMA: AEVEN FRAAGAN OM WALLENBERGS OEDE SKULLE KOMMA ATT STAELLAS PAA NYTT. NAER GROMYKO FORTFARANDE VAR "IN AMT UND WUERDEN" HADE HAN TILL HELA VAERLDEN SAGT ATT WALLENBERG VAR DOED. NU KUNDE DET FINNAS EN MOEJLIGHET ATT PAA NYTT TA UPP FRAAGAN PAA DIPLOMATISK VAEG". FRU BONNER HADE DAERPAA BESKRIVIT ETT LAEGER DAER WALLENBERG MOEJLIGEN HAALLITS FAANGEN. DETTA HADE BETECKNINGEN ON-55/4 OCH VAR BELAEGET I UTKANTEN AV STADEN TORSHOK VID DEN VAEG SOM GAAR MOT STARITZA.

ECKERBERG

AMBASSADEN BONN KL14.10/
+++++/EVM

RE RAOUL WALLENBERG

19 89-12-15

P R I M O UNDER EN LUNCH I GAAR MED KOHLS TALSKRIVARE OCH DEN SOM SVARAT FOER BREVVAXLINGEN MELLAN FORBUNDSKANSLERN OCH WALLENBERG-FOERENINGEN FRAMFOERDE KARLSSON AEN EN GAANG DEN SENARES TACK FOER FOERBUNDSKANSLERNS ENGAGEMENG I FALLET. SVERAET BLEV ATT KOHL AEVEN FORTSAETTNINGSVIS SKULLE ENGAGERA SIG I FRAAGAN. FOERBUNDSKANSLERNS RENT PERSONLIGA INTRESSE I SAKEN FOERSTAERKTES AV ATT WALLENBERGS OEDE AEVEN VAR EN FRAAGA SOM STARKT ENGAGERADE HANS PERSONLIGE VAEN SIMON WIESENTHAL.

VAAR SAGESMAN SADE SIG DOCK SJAELV TVIVLA PAA ATT WALLENBERG VAR I LIVET. OM SAA VAR FALLET BORDE RIMLIGEN GORBATJOV PERSONLIGEN HA SETT TILL ATT HAN FRISLAEPPTES. EN STARKARE SIGNAL TILL VAESTVAERLDEN OM ATT UPPGOERELSEN MED SOVJETUNIONENS STALINISTISKA FOERFLUTNA VAR TOTAL KUNDE KNAPPAST GES OCH GORBATJOV SKULLE HA UTNYTTJAT MOEJLIGHETEN ATT GE EN SAADAN SIGNAL OM DEN FUNNITS.

ECKERBERG

AMBASSADEN BONN KL 15.30 EVM

RE GORBATJOV TILL KOHL OM RAOUL WALLENBERG

1991-09-04

ONUMR. FAX UD 910904

P R I M O DEN SPONTANA REAKTIONEN I KANSLERSAEMBETET AER ATT OESTGOETA CORRESPONDENTENS ARTIKEL MAASTE VARA EN "ANKA". AATMINSTONE PAA TJAENSTEMANNANIVAA, SAEGER TUF SOVJETCHEFEN VON MORR, KAENNER VI INTE IGEN DE AATERGIVNA UPPGIFTERNA. ATT KOHL PAA SAETT SOM BESKRIVITS SKULLE FOERESLAGIT WALLENBERG SOM FREDSPRISTAGARE, MENAR MORR, AER HELLER KNAPPAST TROLIGT.

S E C U N D O DET FOEREFALLER OCKSAA AMBASSADEN MINDRE SANNOLIKT ATT DEN TYSKE REGERINGSCHEFEN SKULLE FAATT NYA OCH VIKTIGA UPPGIFTER - OCH ALLTSAA FRAAN GORBATJOV - OM WALLENBERGS OEDE UTAN ATT PAA NAAGOT SAETT KOMMUNICERA DEM TILL STOCKHOLM.

PAAPEKAS SKALL SAMTIDIGT ATT KOHL - SOM TILL SIN LAEGGNING AER EN SPONTAN PERSON - OCH GORBATJOV HAR EN MYCKET GOD PERSONLIG KONTAKT, DE AER "DU" MED VARANDRA, TALAR OFTA I TELEFON OCH HAR EN OMFATTANDE PRIVAT BREVVAEMLING I VILKEN VARKEN AA ELLER TJAENSTEMANNEN I KANSLERSAEMBETET HAR NAAGON INSIKT. ATT, I DETTA FALL VON MORR ELLER SOVJETENHETEN, FAKTISKT INTE VET ALLT VAD SOM SAEGS MELLAN DE TVAA MAASTE ALLTSAA HAALLAS I MINNET.

FOER ATT SAEKERT ERFARA VAD SOM EVENTUELLT FOEREVARIT MELLAN KOHL OCH GORBATJOV I FALLET WALLENBERG BEHOEVER VI BORRA YTTERLIGARE, UTAN ATT DET AER SAEKERT ATT SAA MYCKT MER FRAMKOMMER AEN VAD SOM SAGTS UNDER PRIMO.

T E R T I O DEN ANGIVNA KAELLAN TILL ARTIKELN, WERNER KILZ, SOM UNDER UTGIVAREN OCH CHEFREDAKTOEREN RUDOLF AUGSTEIN, AER EN AV SPIEGELS TVAA REDAKTIONSCHEFER AER EN FOER OSS EN OKAEND JOURNALIST. EN MOEJLIGHET AER GIVETVIS ATT PAA LAEMPLIGT SAETT APPROCHERA HONOM.

LUNDBORG

AMBASSADEN BONN KL 13.30/LC



REGERINGSKANSLIET

Utrikesdepartementet

Avg.

7 2 En¹
009971010/AM

1997-10-10

Amb Washington

Från Julin, c/o Exp Lejonet

Publicering av Raoul Wallenbergdokument

1997-06-26

(2 bil)

Vi har med tillfresställelse noterat States medgivande att offentliggöra de handlingar i RW-arkivet som gäller våra talrika mellanhavanden med dem. Deras tillmötesgående underlättar väsentligt vår ambition att eftersträva maximal öppenhet vid frisläppandet av dokumenten för 1971-september 1991, som nu förestår.

CIA aviserade genom State att man önskade bli konsulterad innan handlingar som rör amerikansk underrättelsetjänst publiceras.

Arkivgenomgången har givit vid handen att vi, med State som mellanhand, haft kontakt med CIA huvudsakligen åren 1974 och 1978 för att få upplysningar om den eventuella förekomsten av fångläger på Wrangelön. Detta föranleddes av uppgifter från vittnena Moshinski och Shifrin, som sedermera avskrevs. Vad vi har på dossier är en relativt omfattande korrespondens mellan departementet och ambassaden i Washington, men i fråga om CIA kom vi egentligen inte längre än vad som framgår

1988 hade vi en förfråganbeträffande ett annat påstått fångläger, ON-55. Denna utmynnade i likaledes närslutna handbrev Hagard-Tham 1988-03-30. Inte heller detta särskilt uppseendeväckande.

Härtill kommer att vi under årens lopp genom State haft kontakt med sovjetiska avhoppare, t.ex. Sjevtjenko.

Postadress
103 39 STOCKHOLM

Besöksadress
Gustav Adolfs Torg 1

Telefon
08 - 405 10 00

Telefax
08 - 723 11 76

E-post: ud@foreign.ministry.se
X.400: S=UD; O=Foreign; P=Ministry; A=SIL; C=SE
Telex
105 90 MINFOR S

MD

1997-10-10

Detta torde vara allt av betydelse såvitt amerikanskt underrättelseväsen
angår. Tacksam om ni vidarebefordrar detta till vederbörande
tillsammans med uppgiften att vi, sauf avis contraire, ämnar offentliggöra
om ca tre månader.

CABINET

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET	Ärende:				
Kopia till: Kabs Bitr kabs Pelch Pol 1	Åtgärd: (se regler på blankettkopia)	<i>aa</i> <i>P-</i> <table border="1" style="border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 30px; height: 40px; text-align: center; vertical-align: middle;"><i>P</i></td> <td style="width: 30px; height: 40px; text-align: center; vertical-align: middle;"><i>L</i></td> <td style="width: 30px; height: 40px; text-align: center; vertical-align: middle;"><i>Eut</i></td> </tr> </table>	<i>P</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>Eut</i>
<i>P</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>Eut</i>			

SVENSK WASHINGTON 1978-04-06

CABINET STOCKHOLM

FÖR LUNDAVIK, POL 1, FRÅN BERGQUIST. ANG WALLENBERG.

P R I M O. ^VWOODS UPPKALLADE MIG IGÅR FÖR ATT GE SVAR PÅ DE FRÅGOR SOM DEN 2 FEBRUARI STÄLLDES TILL STATE DEPARTMENT I SAKEN OCH SOM REDOVISADES I HBR 1978-02-02. SVAREN, SOM ÖVERLÄMNADES MUNTligen, VAR UNGEFÄR SOM FÖLJER.

1. STATE DEPARTMENT HAR INTE MÖJLIGHET UTTALA SIG OM MISHINSKIS TROVÄRDIGHET UTAN "DEFER TO THE ISRAELIS".
2. "AVAILABLE EVIDENCE DOES NOT CONFIRM THE EXISTENCE OF A CAMP ON THE ISLAND". VIDARE "WE BELIEVE THAT THERE HAS NOT BEEN ANY AFTER 1960".
3. MAN TRÖR ATT SJIFRINS VITNESMÅL OM WALLENBERG BASERAR SIG PÅ "HEARSAY". MAN TRÖR INTE ATT HAN TRÄFFAT W MEN HAR INGA BEVIS. DÄRAV UTTRYCKET "PARTIALLY INCORRECT".

4. MAN HAR INGA UPPLYSNINGAR OM DEN NÄMNDE AMERIKANSKE OFFICERENS IDENTITET "OR WHEREABOUTS".

S E C U N D O. MAN HAR INGA INVÄNDNINGAR VI KONTAKTAR RABOT OCH KHOKHLOV, MEN SÄGER SIG INTE VETA VAR R FINNS. I NÄSTA ANDETAG NÄMNDE DOCK WOODS ATT NYT HÄROM DAGEN UPPGIVIT - VILKET VI INTE UPPMÄRKSAMMAT - ATT R FÖRHANDLAR MED COLOMBIA UNIVERSITY OM ANSTÄLLNING. VI SKALL FORSKA I DETTA OCH EFTER AMBASSADÖRENS ÅTERKOMST LÅTA NETTELBRANDT TA KONTAKT MED KHOKHLOV.

T E R T I O. SKALL VI SÖKA FÅ SATELLITKARTAN FRÅN DORNANS KONTOR?

Via

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

Ärende:

Kopia till:

Åtgärd: (se regler på blankettkopia)

SID 2

Q U A R T O. NÄR KAN SVAR FÖRVÄNTAS VÅRT BRÅDSKANDE 185?

BORGLUND

SVENSK WASHINGTON

+++++



SWEDISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

1988-03-30

Pol I/kr V Tham/1a

1988-04-21

Ex till:

Kabs

Polch

Bitr Polch

Osvald, Pol I

Tham, Pol I

Bertelman, Pol I

Amb MOSKVA
Nr 62

HEMLIG

Raoul Wallenbergärendet
Hbr Hagard-Tham 1988-02-22

Broder,

Min tidigare omnämnde kontakt återkom idag till mig i frågan om lägret med namnchiffret ON-55. Han hade låtit undersöka med "people around town, including those in Virginia", vilket bör tolkas som en eufemism för CIA. Ingen hade kunnat bekräfta att något läger skulle ha den beteckningen. Vederbörande tillade att efterforskningarna lämnat de sökande helt tomhända.

Jag förstår efter samtal i saken med Anders Åslund att andra kännare av Gulagarkipelagen kunnat lämna enahanda negativa uppgifter. Jag är därför beredd avföra den av Haspel anförtrödda ledtråden som meningslös, vilket väl egentligen inte är ägnat att förvåna.

*Din följande
John H. Hagard*

John HM Hagard

Kanslirådet Vollrath Tham

Utrikesdepartementet

19/02

INKOM UD		
1988-04-18		
AVD.	GR.	MAL
p	2	En I

X 22/4 88

Enkelt	SA
Samtlig	
Ytterligare	

iro

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600 New Hampshire Avenue, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20037
USA

Telephone
(202) 944-5600

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Svensk

Telex
RCA 248347, SVSK UR
WU 89-2724 SVENSK WSH

10/13/97 10:11:56 ; UD Stockholm 1
'97 10/13 09:33 ☎8828031

46 8 7231176->
EMB.SWEDEN RIGA →→ UD

46 8 7231176 PAGE 001
001



SVERIGES AMBASSAD
RIGA

T E L E F A X

Sid 1 (5)

1997-10-13

Handläggare: H Magnusson

a.a./Ho

T J Ä N S T E

UD-EC (Hallqvist)
UD-EI (Lage Olson)

Raoul Wallenberg

Översänder kopia av fax till Susanne Berger och Guy von Dardel.

Magnusson

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MD



EMBASSY OF SWEDEN
RIGA

TELEFAX Page 1 (4)

October 12, 1997

CC: Marvin Makinen
University of Chicago
P.T.
University of Colorado,
Boulder, CO
exp. 97-10-14

TO: Ms. Susanne Berger
CC: Prof Guy von Dardel

ATTN:

FAX No: +1-703-237 0946
+41-22-753 16 19

FROM: Hans Magnusson

RE: Raoul Wallenberg

Your fax of October 6, 1997

Dear Ms. Berger,

Thank you for your fax of October 6. I have just come back from Moscow, where I, together with Martin Hallqvist, handed over an aide-memoire to the Russians. We still have to wait somewhat for the definite response, partly because we did not have time to translate Marvin Makinen's proposal into Russian. This is now being done. What is already clear though, is that Susan Mesinai has the green light to proceed with the review of the 90 or so files, under certain conditions and with a few exceptions, where a question-and-answer method will be applied.

I also talked to Igor Prelin, in the presence of the Russian members of the working group, which did not seem to constrain him. He was rather talkative and repeated more or less what he said in the TV interview. But my conclusion - as well as that of the Russians, is that this is only a relatively plausible, well argued hypothesis, not directly based on any key documents or other evidence. Prelin also admitted this himself. The only document referred to

T E L E F A X Page 2 (4)

was the one relating to a deal between the allied before Nürnberg what should not be brought up. We'll see if we can get hold of this document.

Prelin's claim that more material exists in the Presidential archive and others was not based on any factual evidence but was his supposition, also supported by Sudoplatov, who believed the same. Sudoplatov's book now exists in a second corrected edition. The many mistakes in the first were partly attributed to the fact that he was not allowed to have access to his diaries in the SVR archive.

There doesn't seem to exist more orientirovkas than the ones we have already received (which do not explicitly mention German/American intelligence connections). But this can be pursued. Vonogradov does not think that more can be found in the SMERSH archives, which have been searched.

Prelin did refer to rezidentura material, but did not specify, more than that he had talked to Zoja Voskresenskaya-Rybkina before she died and to the council of veterans of the foreign intelligence. As you know we have handed in requests to SVR on at least 4 occasions.

In Hungary it seems that Tolstoy-Kutuzov was the main source, but this we already more or less knew.

Yes, of course RW was an important prisoner. We have never seriously believed that any key decision in his case could be taken without the knowledge or approval of Stalin.

Prelin could not in any meaningful way specify what he meant when he said that all of RW's reports from Budapest had not been presented by the Swedish side. At least they have been now.

Mironov was the prison director, not a doctor.

Prelin confirmed the version about the discovery of the belongings of RW (although he came home from abroad just after the discovery). He was genuinely surprised at the time, though.

T E L E F A X Page 3 (4)

I don't remember exactly the Russian archive materials concerning Sweden you mention. It is possible I saw them in the MID archive in a very early stage, but it seems to me they contain only general information about the Wallenberg Bank. All samtalsuppteckningar related to the RW case I have read.

The case of fond 451 will not be easy to solve. It is not likely that you will be given direct access to this archive, due to the legislation. If not, we will try to deal with this problem in another way.

The archive of the Moscow Embassy, as well as those of other embassies. The files in these are regularly gone through and old material destroyed or sent home to Stockholm, mainly due to lack of space. You probably won't find materials in Moscow older than 10 years. Practically everything of interest has been forwarded also to the Foreign Ministry. (As far as I know, but the details could be confirmed by Berndt Fredriksson).

Yes, the Jerofejev I talked to had the first name Vladimir (Guy should have the report). I am now trying to get his biography. He's now in hospital.

Yes, we have brought up the case of Danishevsky. I have not had the time though to recheck the details now - it is somewhere in the Working Group reports.

As to what you say about an upcoming important visit to Stockholm I don't want to comment upon this in a fax. I can only say that you seem to have completely misunderstood what was said.

Let Martin Hallqvist and Lage Olson talk once more to Per Anger.


I have not made up my mind yet whether to exchange draft reports with the Russians. We will have a working group meeting (tentatively) on November 12-13. In a way it would be a good thing to have these drafts to discuss, it could be a useful exercise. Of course, we will retain the right to change in our own

T E L E F A X Page 4 (4)

draft at any time up to the date of the printing. The best thing would be, though, if we first had a positive response to our request. In any case, you can make your remarks now.

Well that was all, in brief.

Yours sincerely


Hans Magnusson



SVERIGES AMBASSAD
RIGA

Sid 1 (4)

1997-10-13

Handläggare: H Magnusson

JELGIVNING FRÅN
KRYPTOEXPEDITIONEN:
ENL. ADRESSERING SAMT

UNIK

EMK

ME

Typ	Grupp	Mål
P	2	Eu ²

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET nr 234

Till: EC (Hallqvist)

Kopia: kabs, L Olson (EI), ambassaden Moskva ✓

Delges:

Carl Perceon

exp. 97-10-14

Re Raoul Wallenberg

PRIMO. Efter de samtal Martin Hallqvist och jag hade i Moskva den 9-10 oktober, framförallt lunchsamtalet hos Lars Fredén med K. Kosatjov och M. Skupov från MID, kan man konstatera att det sannolikt var en riktig bedömning att utnyttja presidet Jeltsins förestående besök till att försöka få ryskt gehör för genomförande av de ytterligare åtgärder vi anser vara nödvändiga i utredningen om Raoul Wallenbergs öde. Det framgick att det hos MID:s representanter fanns en vilja att nu visa tillmötesgående och att man från utrikesministeriets sida idkade påtryckningar på säkerhets- resp. inrikesministeriet för att undanröja deras invändningar. Detta hade redan givit resultat, eftersom Kosatjov kunde meddela att önskemålet att gå igenom ett antal persondossierer bifallits, visserligen under vissa villkor och med några undantag. Betr. övriga önskemål får vi vänta på reaktion; när det gäller begäran om avslutande av undersökningen i Vladimir har översättning till ryska av framställan ännu inte hunnit göras.

På en punkt förefaller det inte sannolikt att ryssarna skall kunna ge med sig, nämligen önskemålet om direkttillträde till vissa arkiv, även för oberoende forskare. Här tycks rysk lagstiftning lägga hinder i vägen. Vi får därför överväga om denna fråga kan tas upp på annat sätt (se nedan).

Noteras kan att särskilt FSB:s representanter kände sig något stötta över den i deras tycke ultimativa

tonen i näst sista stycket i vår aide-memoire (om att ansvaret för vägran att tillmötesgå våra önskemål oundvikligen kommer att ligga på ryska sidan, och att detta klart kommer att sägas i rapporten). Dock tror jag det var nyttigt att på denna punkt uttrycka sig tydligt.

SECUNDO. Tentativt kom vi överens om att ha ett arbetsgruppsmöte den 12-13 november (förslagsvis eftermiddag+förmiddag). Vi har dock framhållit till ryska sidan att ett sådant möte blir mer meningsfullt om positivt svar föreligger på våra önskemål och om arbetet på dessa punkter åtminstone till en del kunnat sättas igång.

TERTIO. Martin Hallqvist kom, när vi talades vid efter mötet med ryssarna, in på idén med ett brev från utrikesministern till Primakov i god tid före Jeltsins besök. Jag tror detta är en utmärkt tanke. I brevet skulle man i positiva och vänliga ordalag ta fasta på Primakovs i dennes brev av den 17 juli uttryckta beredskap att fortsätta bistå i utredandet av RW:s öde och hänvisa till den aide-memoire som nu överlämnats. Det kanske också kan understrykas att inte bara Sverige, de anhöriga och alla som är engagerade i frågan utan också Ryssland har allt att vinna på en maximalt öppen attityd. Jag undrar också om man inte i ett sådant brev kan resa frågan om den ryska informations-/sekretesslagstiftningen, som ju de senaste åren har gjort det allt svårare att få tillträde till ryska arkiv, även i frågor som ligger 40-50 år tillbaka i tiden. Material som bara för några år sedan var tillgängligt har nu åter hemligstämplats. Det låter sig givetvis inte göras att rakt på sak kräva ändringar i den ryska lagstiftningen, men man skulle ändå kunna lägga fram problemet på ett allmänt plan och ställa frågan om inte de senaste årens utveckling på detta område går stick i stäv med konsolideringen av demokratin och rättssamhället i Ryssland, och framförallt med strävan att göra upp med försyndelserna i det förflutna, Gulagsystemet etc. Att formulera dessa tankar i skrift, så att de ger avsedd effekt, blir givetvis en grannlaga uppgift.

QUARTO. Frågeställningarna tertio ovan leder också fram till den eviga frågan om i vilken utsträckning vi kan lita på att man från rysk sida inte försöker dölja något. Min egen bedömning är att man inte avsiktligt försöker undanhålla oss dokument och att man i stort sett letat på de platser i arkiven man bör leta på. Såväl MID:s som FSB:s representanter upprepade nu att de alltjämt hade instruktioner från

högsta nivå att söka hela sanningen om RW:s öde. FSB:s arkivchef försäkrade också att han hade obegränsade fullmakter att ta fram de dokument som var relevanta (detta gäller dock inte underrättelsetjänsten SVR:s arkiv).

Å andra sidan finns det personer som den f d chefen för särskilda arkivet Prokopenko (som jag träffade under mitt besök i Moskva) som hävdar att det fortfarande finns enskilda arkivtjänstemän som försöker undanhålla dokument. Han kan inte bevisa att det förhåller sig så men verkar övertygad. Han menar också att det saknas styrning från presidentkansliet. När det gäller presidentarkivet och f d CK:s arkiv har vi ju fått en del dokument och dessutom ett officiellt brev från Jeltsins näre medarbetare Dmitrij Volkogonov, som rapporterar att han personligen gått igenom de mest hemliga akterna i presidentarkivet utan att finna något ytterligare om RW, men Prokopenko menar att inte ens Volkogonov haft möjlighet att se allt material.

Att hantera detta dilemma är inte lätt. Möjligen skulle man överväga att under Jeltsins besök be att denne utser en särskild representant som har till uppgift att gå igenom åtminstone de viktigaste arkiven.

QUINTO. Ytterligare en uppgift är nu att försöka se till att de oberoende experterna, när det gäller arbetsgruppen, finner sig i att arbeta inom den ram vi nu gjort upp i vår aide-memoire (tillkommer gör endast frågor som redan "ligger på bordet" i arbetsgruppen). Givetvis är de fria att företa alla möjliga andra undersökningar, men de kan då kanske inte ta för givet att officiell uppbackning skall ges på varje enskild punkt. Vi har nu en målsättning att försöka bli klara med begärda undersökningar kring halvårsskiftet 1998. Då bör arbetsgruppen finalisera sin rapport och arbetsgruppen som sådan upphöra med sitt arbete (vilket inte innebär att RW-ärendet avslutas!). Vi är överens med ryska sidan om att ytterligare åtgärder blir nödvändiga även efter detta datum, och att också oberoende experter skall kunna påräkna bistånd. Det gäller dock att utarbeta en hanterbar mekanism härför.

Jag vill tillstyrka att de oberoende experterna ges finansiellt bidrag inte bara för återstoden av detta år utan även för 1998.

SEXTO. Med tanke på att den återstående fasen i arbetet kan bli rätt arbetskrävande skulle det vara

värdefullt om en yngre, ryskkunnig handläggare kunde bistå hemma i praktiskt inriktade men tidsödande uppgifter som dokumenthantering, finalisering av rapporten m m.

SEPTIMO. För ambassaden i Moskva. Vore tacksam för assistans med följande åtgärder.

a/ Brev till hälsovårdsminister Dmitrijeva om de psykiatriska klinikerna (efter underlag från S.Mesinai).

b/ I samma fråga, en kontakt med Alexander Jakovlev om möjlig samverkan.

c/ En skriftlig begäran till ordföranden i Medicinska vetenskapsakademien (Pokrovskij) att få ta del av Prof. Mjasnikovs "personliga arkivfond", den hemliga delen.
d/ Från journalisten Bezymenskij försöka erhålla dokumentet om de allierades påstådda hemliga överenskommelse före Nürnbergprocessen.

e/ Att (med Galjas hjälp) försöka få fram biografi för förre sovjetiske diplomaten Vladimir Jerofejev.

f/ Att införskaffa senaste utgåvan (andra upplagan) av Pavel Sudoplatovs bok.

g/ Att till SVR rikta en officiell framställan att få ta del av personakt för Mikhail Tolstoj-Kutuzov, i den del som gäller åren 1943-47. Kopiering ej erforderlig.

OCTAVO. Om nu arbetsgruppsmötet blir av den 12-13 november vore det angeläget att i anslutning därtill försöka få till stånd separata möten med Bakatin, Grusjko, Roginskij. Lämpliga tider: kvällen den 12:e eller morgonen/eftermiddagen den 13:e. Delar av arbetsgruppen bör dessutom träffa Pitovranov samt Kopeljanskij och Solovov. Stefan Gullgren vet ytterligare en person jag vill träffa. Det vore angeläget om dessa möten kan arrangeras åtminstone ett par veckor i förväg.

MAGNUSSON

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SVERIGES AMBASSAD
RIGA

T E L E F A X

Sid 1 (5)

1997-10-14

P2 Eu¹

Handläggare: H Magnusson

a. a. / Ho

T J Ä N S T E

UD-EC (Hallqvist)
UD-EI (Lage Olson)

B R Å D S K A N D E

Raoul Wallenberg

Översänder ytterligare korrespondens i ovan
rubricerade ärende.

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EMBASSY OF SWEDEN
RIGA

T E L E F A X Page 1 (3)

October 11, 1997

cc: Marvin Makinen
University of Chicago
P.t.
University of Colorado,
Boulder, CO
exp. 97-10-14

TO: Ms. Susan Mesinai
ARK Project

ATTN:

FAX No: +1-212-6457495

FROM: Hans Magnusson

RE: Raoul Wallenberg

Your fax dated October 7, 1997

Dear Ms. Mesinai,

Thanks for your fax. I have just come back from Moscow, where Martin Hallqvist and I handed over an aide-memoire to the Russians. We have to wait for the definitive response, partly because Marvin Makinen's proposal could not be translated into Russian in time. But I can already say that you will be given possibility to go through the files we have asked for, under certain conditions (in the presence of FSB/MVD officials) and with a few exceptions, which constitute a state secret. Even in those cases however, there will be a possibility to ask questions and get answers. You are therefore free to go to Moscow as soon as you can; please settle details with Stockholm and the Embassy in Moscow.

As this work will be done on behalf of the Working Group I would like to ask you to focus as much as possible on the task at hand. We have, e.g., not brought up the question of JOINT files up to 1941. Frankly speaking, I think these, though no doubt interesting, are somewhat outside the main focus of

T E L E F A X Page 2 (3)

our investigation. Of course, you can always request access to these on your own.

As to the psychiatric institutions, we mentioned explicitly in the aide-memoire, Serbsky and Kazan (not knowing the names of any other). We do not have the reply yet, but I think you may take informal contacts when you have come to Moscow. It would also be good if you could supply the embassy in Moscow with some written background for your approach (half a page or so) that could be used in contacts with the Minister of Health and Mr. Yakovlev. I also learned that the personal file of Prof. Mjasnikov in the archive of the Academy of Medical Sciences might be of interest.

A working group meeting has tentatively been set to 12-13 November (the only week that is possible).

Your question concerning Kondrashev. We have interviewed him twice (apart from one interview seen on TV). I think we have exhausted this source as to the alleged interrogation in March 1947, and I don't have any plans for the time being to revert to him. Richter's testimony of the "terrible night interrogation", refers to the one on 8 February 1945 (Sverchuk). I think we have penetrated all this quite well. Of course, Kondrashev is generally interesting to talk to. I do not remember the co-prisoners mentioning a colonel called Karoshev - but one or two mentioned colonel Kabulov, whom we have identified as Kobulov (he was Beria's man).

Yes, Gfrorner is interesting, and Björn Lyrvall summarized his files (which contains extensive interrogations, without mentioning the name Raoul Wallenberg) in Swedish. The name Dr Schmidt appears in the file. I have asked how long he stayed in Budapest. Otherwise, I don't think Gfrorner will bring any key evidence in the case of RW.

I also think that Grossheim-Krisko's activities in Riga and before 1944 are of minor interest to us in the working group, although they of course have some historical interest.

Let me also tell you that I talked to Gennadij Sokolov, former editor of APN. I was even warned by

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
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T E L E F A X Page 3 (3)

FSB that he would be unreliable(so it can't be official disinformation), but I have no particular reason to claim that that he is lying when he talks about his conversations to Serov and others and that they have said what Sokolov claims they have said. Obviously he has in his position transcripts as well as in some cases video recordings of the conversations.

All the best and good luck,


Hans Magnusson

PS. Please always state your current fax number in your faxes. Please also confirm the reception of theis fax.DS

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P.01

5(5)

To: Ambassador Hans Magnusson

Embassy of Sweden
Riga, Latvia

From: Susanne Berger
Arlington, VA USA
(703) 237-0946

Nr. of Pages: 1

October 12, 1997

Dear Mr. Magnusson,

Thank you for your fax and the report on your visit to Moscow.

I will not have time to send comments about the recent draft of the Swedish draft report on the findings of the Swedish-Russian Working Group before the November 12/13 meeting. Perhaps we can go over some of the questions by telephone, or we can discuss them when we see each other in Moscow.

2 / As regards my having misunderstood certain aspects of the discussions concerning the upcoming important visit to Stockholm, I can only say I am sorry if I did have the wrong impression. Should you rely in your analysis of such a misunderstanding, however, on Lage Olsen's P.M. regarding the meeting where this issue was discussed, you should be advised that his summary does not adequately reflect the course of conversation.

Look forward to seeing you in Moscow or Stockholm,

Susanne Berger

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SVERIGES AMBASSAD
RIGA

T E L E F A X

Sid 1 (4)

1997-10-14

Handläggare: H Magnusson

T J Ä N S T E

UD-EC (Hallqvist)
UD-EI (Lage Olson)

Raoul Wallenberg

Översänder fax som jag idag mottagit från Susan
Mesnai.

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2(4) PAGE 01



FAX COVER SHEET

DATE October 13, 1997

FAX # 011-371.782-8031 CC: Marvin Mäkinen
TOTAL # OF PAGES (including cover sheet) 3 University of Chicago
p.t. University of
Colorado, Boulder, CO

TO: Ambassador Hans Magnusson exp. 97-10-14
Kv

From: Susan Ellen Mesina

Notes: _____

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PAGE 02

3(4)

October 13, 1997

FACSIMILE TO: Ambassador Hans Magnusson
Swedish Embassy, Riga, Latvia

FROM: Susan Ellen Mesinai
ARK Project/Freedom Channel

2 PAGES

Dear Mr. Magnusson:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your fax and to thank you, Martin Hallqvist, Lage Olson and particularly Stefan Gullgren and those at the Swedish Embassy in Moscow who oversaw the translation of my "need to know" list of prisoners and who have negotiated with you to gain this access. I really thank you because I know this would not have happened without your cooperation and deep support. Now for the hard work.

I am requesting a visa for the month of November, to be sent to the Russian Consulate in New York. I already sent Stefan a copy of my passport August 27th and an agenda for my work load at that time. This will, of course, be more focused now as I understand I will be confining my efforts to the prisoner files, to my informal work in conjunction with Serbsky and to the Working Group Meeting on November 11-13. (For the record, the only other psychiatric facility to which access is requested is Special Hospital Number 5 outside Moscow where I found Victor Hamilton. Stefan has the New York Times article covering that event which gives location and the particulars. The report that Wallenberg was being held in a psychiatric facility in the "Moscow region" tallies with information I received there previously, at least in terms of the categories of 'special prisoners' held there at that time.)

I am assuming that my request to be able to complete my data-gathering on the 1947 incoming prisoners is now linked with Marvin's request in the Aide-Memoire. However, if informally or through the meeting it is agreed by the MVD that I can complete this portion during this trip, I will want to do that since it will enable us to eliminate one portion of the work. In this manner, Marvin and I will be able to process my findings at Chicago so that we will be all the more prepared when we turn around at a later date to complete the cell occupancy study there.

In terms of finances, I now must raise a substantial sum for my trip as I will be also doing research in Stockholm and London. I do have my ticket and room and board for the Moscow portion already under control. I know that Guy is putting forth a request for funding for the three of us (Marvin I understand will not make the meeting) to be paid in advance. I want to say that my particular portion, if agreed to, I would prefer to have on account with Stefan at the Embassy in Moscow — earmarked to pay Tvetlana and Gennadi against receipts. Marvin tells me that in the Vladimir trip he paid Tvetlana \$75 a day full time and Gennadi \$50. We are talking maximum 20 days, since Serbsky provides the translator for the psychiatric work. I do hope that the Swedish Government will make some contribution to this work, and will go on record as such, thus freeing me up to raise other funds. For this money, you will of course receive a full report in writing which I hope you will incorporate in part in your Final Report, as it will

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establish that the issue of eyewitness sightings has been fully addressed.

Finally, thank you for your detailed input regarding the different matters in my recent fax. I am glad to hear that you have already approached the Lt. General regarding Raoul's interrogations -- nor does it surprise me that he yielded very little information. I would like to know at which interrogation he claims to have been present.

Regarding the conditions on my work with the prisoner files -- I of course expected an official to be present and overseeing my work and wrote my "need to know" with that in mind. When you say certain files are off limits because they are State Secrets, I assume you mean Abakumov. If they are including Radek, as specified in my list, I am ONLY interested in the cell occupancy linked with medical records to try to determine where Radek sat when diagnosed with tuberculosis (may be more than one site).

I would like, if at all possible, to have a one-time conversation with Mr. Vinogradov and staff regarding the "Jewish question." It interested me that there was no mention of Wallenberg in the Gfornier interrogations. However, I think we would be well within our rights -- in terms of the acknowledged nature of Wallenberg's humanitarian mission -- to examine the "Jewish question" and issues of rescue and reparations from the Soviet perspective. Again, I'm not trying to get into major espionage secrets but I do want to understand what they were looking for, what they knew, what their sensitivities were. Quite frankly, from a Jewish perspective, (and much criticism comes from that quarter, myself excluded) it is important to be able to weigh the issue of anti-Semitism as it functioned in this. My view, without any real access to data, is that during the critical period (1945-48) anti-Semitism was not a motivating issue in terms of the Soviet detention of Wallenberg. But it would be helpful to me in my research vis a vis the Joint (who did, under other hats, engage in intelligence work) to see it from the Soviet side. For this reason I repeat my request to review those interrogation files listed in relation to the Joint (Adler, Jankowski, Gfornier aka Schmidt, etc., Richter.), or Jewish rescue as construed as "German collaboration." (Hatz, Marek, Maycr & Feller, Krummei, Becher, etc.).

I would refer to the same approach regarding the question of how well the Swedish Legation in Budapest 'represented Soviet interests'. In this case, besides the issue of Grossheim Krisko's testimony, there are simply questions for discussion regarding the messages which the Hungarian government was trying to send to the Soviets through the Swedish Embassy/Per Anger as per substantial testimony from Geza Soos. Were they ever sent? Who received them? What was the Soviet decision or response? Related to this, an interesting fact in J. Gilbert's book, Mission Sans Retour -- V. Langlet had a radio receiver, tuned in to the East, to the advancing Soviet troops. Gellert sent in also receivers from Caserta. Where were the transmitters and what were the responsibilities linked to these different pieces of equipment?

I hope to hear from you or Martin regarding partial funding and will communicate more as the day approaches. Again my thanks.

Susan Hesel

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SVERIGES AMBASSAD
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TELEFAX

Sid 1 (6)

1997-10-15

Handläggare: H Magnusson

T J Ä N S T E

UD-EC (Hallqvist)
UD-EI (L Olson)

ESEK

Delges:

Koltsch

Carl Persson

von Dandel

Amb Moskva

exp. 97-10-16

Lo

Raoul Wallenberg

Översänder fax från Susan Berger som jag mottagit
idag.

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a.o. / Lo

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P.01

2(6) 1/5

To: Ambassador Hans Magnusson

From: Susanne Berger
4793 Williamsburg Blvd
Arlington, VA 22207
(703) 237-0946 (Tel. & Fax)

Date: October 15, 1997

Dear Mr. Magnusson,

Lage Olson called to say that I should write to you concerning my schedule for the trip to Moscow. I will be able to come only for a few days, probably from November 8 - 14.

I have discussed with Susan Mesinai that Monday, November 10 we would spend one day together studying the 90 personal files Susan had requested for review. I also would like to look through some of the interrogations for Grosheim Krisko and I know Susan is interested in them as well. Would it be possible to ask Mr. Vinogradov to make these materials available for Monday, November 10? Realistically, that is all time allows for me on this trip.

I do not know what you have in mind about the question of access to Fond 451 but I would like to make the following suggestion. After the review of the files for various individuals Susan, Guy, Marvin & J are going to sit down and evaluate our findings and based on the information available then we will formulate a request concerning specific material from Fond 451, explaining for each request the reason why, etc. We have to achieve some type of direct access to materials; it is the only way to make any progress.

As you know, Fond 451 is of great interest for many reasons. One issue I would like to discuss with you and with archivists from the Russian side is the collection of captured German records, particularly the captured Abwehr documents. As I have explained before, in 1992 articles appeared in the Canadian press which cited unidentified sources (since then they have been identified as D. Volkogonov and his colleagues) who stated that captured German records - OKW Abwehr (field) cables - make direct mention of Raoul Wallenberg and identify him as having provided information to Abwehr representatives in Budapest. I know we have briefly discussed this before. The interesting thing is that recently these allegations have again surfaced in the Russian press; more importantly, similar references are included in the UD collection of RW (vol. 40; enclosed)

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The document is obviously a bit problematic since it is based solely on memory (of a man who served on a delegation to Germany right after the war which was charged with microfilming captured German records). Nevertheless, it raises a few serious questions. Some of the references he makes are quite interesting, and actually correct (Departments in the RSIA, names of officials, etc.) for the time in question. Should the telegram(s) that he refers to exist on microfilm in German and US or British archives, it's not at all surprising that they have not been discovered or published. At the US National Archives, for instance, the Abwehr material is interspersed on 150 rolls of microfilm. Even detailed and specific requests to archivists in Germany and Great Britain did not yield results due to the fact that what we are looking for here is the proverbial "needle in a haystack." It is a fact, that much of the Abwehr and SD material was confiscated by Soviet troops and it is entirely possible that this collection is much more complete. RW was imprisoned mostly with fellow diplomats and suspected German war criminals. I believe we should find a way to raise the question again whether or not any German material captured by the Russians mentions RW directly. Fond 451 would certainly be able to yield some clues in that question.

In this connection I want to mention that I have been told recently by a Justice Department investigator that the archive in Potsdam recently acquired a trove of German Foreign Office documents, dating from the war. As far as I understand, these documents have not yet been released for review. According to the Justice Department official, who had access to the material in his capacity as an investigator of the Nazi Gold question, the Potsdam material is quite important because it contains so-called country files, including Hungary and Sweden. I will see if I can get more information when I am in Germany in November.

I feel we should pursue the question of RW having been kept as a 'guarantee' during the Nuernberg trials. If there is indeed a document on the secret agreement with the British and the US Allies, it would be good to get a copy. I have recently come across an article published by the Soviet Propaganda Office (Sovinform) in 1951, about the Dulles brothers, entitled "Falsifiers of History". (I will bring a copy) It leaves very little doubt as to how the Soviets perceived both Dulleses at the time and it does not take a great leap of imagination what they must have thought of the Wallenberg family. If they kept such tight tabs on the Dulles family, the same must have been true for the Wallenberg family. You say that Prelin only refers to reports by Rybkina etc, but it is quite logical that the Soviet Embassy Stockholm must have filed important reports. We should again request to see them, especially since we know that RW had direct ties to the Soviet Trade Delegation. Any reports which mention him could give us some valuable clues about how he was perceived and what the reasons might have been to keep him imprisoned.

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I also want to raise the question of the "Gesprächsnotizen" (Samtals-uppteckningar) from 1956 again. You say that you have seen them but you did not say whether or not they are now accessible in the archive or not. I just want to know in general - I obviously do not have time on the upcoming trip to review them.

About Danishevsky - I think it might be good to raise the issue again.

I have read through the notes Nana Svartz made immediately upon her return from Moscow, February 1, 1961. She writes: "Han (Mjasnikov) lämnade rummet och återkom efter c:a 4-5 minuter tillsammans med professor D. (sic) Professor M avlägsnade sig därefter åter. Professor D. satte sig på en stol mitt emot mig. Jag frågade om professor M. talat om vad saken gällde och han bekräftade det." *often skildrad Danishevsky till M. problem with M.*
Not to overstate the point but it does appear that Mjasnikov had been able to convey to Professor Danishevsky the nature of Nana Svartz's request and therefore this indicates that Mjasnikov did understand her, or said differently, did not misunderstand her. Danishevsky had also once visited Malmö where he apparently had kept close tabs on a Professor Petrov. Petrov later was arrested and imprisoned. 1136

In another matter, I was wondering how Mr. Roginsky's project has progressed to study the material turned over by the Russian side in 1991 in the original form and in its context. Is there any kind of report available on his findings? I think it would be important to know what he has been able to observe, how far he has progressed, etc.

Mr. Olson told me that you would need any type of comments to your report no later than 14 from now. Is that the deadline because you wish to hand over the draft to the Russian side or is this the general deadline? I will try to write some points - I think it would be better to discuss this in person. I think the report as such is very impressive - anyone who ever had to produce anything remotely similar knows how much work has gone in to it. So I do not mean to pick it apart - as I said before, it is always easier to complain than to do it better yourself. There are some points where I disagree simply with the phrasing of a passage or the emphasis given one point over another. Again, however, if some fundamental issues cannot be resolved we should discuss what form a dissent opinion might take.

I will pick up the Wennerstrom-Wallenberg question in a separate report, probably early next week. I am trying to put together a chronology of meetings of various participants and at the same time write an analysis of the various accounts that exist so we can all put our heads together to evaluate the problem.

Last but not least I would like to say that I think all of us appreciate very much the offer by the Foreign Office to extend some type of grant in support of our research efforts.

Best wishes from Washington, where we are going through the second summer of the year.

Susanne

5(6) 4/5

MINNESANTECKNINGAR1945 Aug.HOECHST/FRANKFURT/M

Vid samma tillfälle som jag tillfrågades om vissa förhållanden i Sverige av FIAP i USFET bl.a. BOMMER's avsikter med DN under kriget granskat på arkivmateriel från USFET'S AMT i Berlin fick jag tillfälle att gå igenom hela avsnittet om förbindelserna mellan Sverige och Tyskland under kriget. Jag bodde i HOECHST och höll till flera veckor bland "arkivgubbar" från alla allierade. Jag var den enda svensken i gruppen och blev tillfrågad om svenska dokument. (REVIS: Överste John Christie i OSLO "avkändade" mig där sista dagarna jag var kvar i Tyskland hösten 1945 (5. okt 1945) och för med hans hjälp till OSLO. Han kan nog bekräfta mitt "jobb" i arkiven som samlades från hela Kontinenten, mikrofilmades och systematiserades. Fullständiga samlingar i WASHINGTON, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS och LONDON, WAR MUSEUM).

I sök:

Sista dagarna (dec-nov) av år 1944 i Budapest gjordes en överenskommelse mellan WALLEBERG och QW ABWEHR:

(ur minnet) (DOKUMENT)

..... GEGEN 100.000 JUDEN IN UNGARN IN RUHE ZU LASSEN
GRUPPE WALLEBERG NACH DER UBERNAHME BUDAPEST DURCH DIE RUSSEN TRANSPORTBERICHT UND ALLGEMEINE LAGE DER ROTE ARMEE DURCH GEFANGENHEIT DEN DEUTSCHEN ABWEHR ZU UBERMITTELN

Efter reflexion: DA jag första gången läste detta, ansåg jag givetvis att W. (liksom så många andra) handlade med tyskarna i "vertigelsen om att det var rätt.... Händandet helgar medlen....

Jag har dessutom ett klart minne av att en perfekt rationalläggning skildes till förfogande (vad den svenska ambassaden aldrig hade) och i den omvända bankens källare fanns möjligheter att komma över till andra byggnader i närheten där ett sådant gömställe för en radio kunde tänkas vara lämpligt.

Om arkivet och speciellt WALLEBERGS "PERSONALTE" innehåller delande från BUDAPEST till ZENTRALE BLW med varning att "ESHA IV o VI R"

Kuller Skors
Clonno
(GEBSTAPOR)

6(6)

jante SS-FÜHRUNGSHAUPTAMT IX
"AMT ZUR BEREINIGUNG DER JUDENFRAGE"
"REICHSMARSHALL" bl.a. ABSCHNITT BUDAPEST

med alla mögel försöker stoppa W. i hans arbete. AUSWÄRTIGES AMT gör
i minst ett dokument UD STERN genom THOMSEN uppmärksam på att de ("AA")
inte längre kan garantera W (och hans medhjälpare) säkerhet gentemot
"egna" myndigheters göranden (ca oktober 1945).
"tydka"

Slutligen erinrar jag mig fragment av ett dokument som innehåller
rapporter från BUDAPEST till REICHSFÜHRER-44 SICHERHEITSDIENST ("SD")
(Hitlers "privata" underrättelseväsen (- och bödelsväsen)!!
W. skulle antagligen "förevinna" från BUDAPEST. Planer som uppgjorts
i B. skickas till RM för bekräftelse.

Såsom sista möjlighet i samband med att BUDAPEST övergavs skulle
W. "skickas" till fienden. Att hans ötagande för OKW AKWEHR därvid spe-
lade en avgörande roll, bekräftade de sista instruktionerna från Him-
ler själv. (här anser jag att SKORZENY som befann sig i "FÜHRERHAUPT-
QUARTIER" mycket väl skulle kunna bekräfta).

Men som sagt, i WASHINGTON och LONDON finns bevisen och US STATE
DEPT (Stettinius själv 1945 jan-febr) ville låta de första US-trupperna
för den första US-Military-Mission till BUDAPEST ta reda på W. (vilket
som bekant avböjdes av svenska regeringen. Vartför???)

I Washington finns givetvis mycket mera i denna sak, vilket för-
vånar mig, med hänsyn till det magra resultat som visades om W. (i
filmen).

Egen reflexion:

Gentemot ryssarna är det alls ingen lämplig metod att försöka
spela ockryddig. Kan vi redovisa alla fakta om W. (även de negativa)
då blir ryssarna säkerligen mer meddelssamma. Givetvis har de hemu full-
ständigare material i "fallet W" men är som vanligt ytterst svår-
"att få i gång". Men måste på en punkt klart redovisa att man vet
lika mycket som de, annars släpper den inget! Malinowski är dock i dag
den ledande mannen i Moskva och sitter säkert inne med alla informa-
tioner. Han var dock den som tog emot W i B och gav order om vidare
"behandling". Även det tyska dubbelspellet var honom bekant

Egen slutsats: "W lever som nummerfänge (på livstid) utan iden-
titet enl. ryk strafflag!"

287/001

EC

P 2 Eu1

Professor Guy von Dardel
Home: 45 Route de Peney-Dessus;
CH-1242 Satigny Tel & Fax: 41+22-753 1619
Dacha: Rumiére, CH 1874 Champéry
Tel och fax 0041-25-792122

CH - 1242 Satigny 971014

Your reference:
My reference: Martin 971014
Concerns: Vladimir

Ambassadör Martin Hallqvist *ECX*
Pol. avd
Utrikesdepartementet
Box 1621
S-103 23 Stockholm Suede

Raoul Wallenberg

Fax

Käre Martin,

Telges:

Kolozs

Carl Persson

Hallqvist, EC2

Mogrossen, Riga

Olson, El-ESEN

And Moskva

Fredriksson, A-ARK

Bakman, A-ARK

Julin, CAT, EXP

EXP 97-10-23

Jag hade i går ett samtal med Eugène Ekvall, Rådstigen 17. 12243 Enskede, tel. 816664, som jag tidigare kände till från en artikel 21/7 i Svenska Dagbladet. Han visade sig vid detta samtal ha ytterligare en del intressanta upplysningar. Han var en av de första som kom ned till Budapest efter kriget såsom representant för Rädda Barnen i april 1946. Mera i förbigående nämnde han att han ordnat med att ett legationen tillhörigt kassaskåp blivit hemtransporterat. Jag har inte tidigare vetat att något kassaskåp överlevt striderna och de krigförandes plundringar, för att inte tala om KGB:s och andra organisationer intresse för vad som kan finnas i dem. Ekvall visste inte var kassaskåpet kom i från eller om det var tomt eller annars hade för innehåll. Emellertid nämner Valdemar Langlet i sin bok "Verk och dagar i Budapest" att han var tvungen att lämna kvar Svenska Röda Korsets kassaskåp i Budapest, och det är sannolikt att det är detta kassaskåp som Ekvall hänstär på. Med tanke på hur litet som överlevt skulle det vara intressant att försöka spåra upp det, kanske inte lika mycket som beskickningens kassaskåp men ändå! Det är ju så mycket som vi inte vet.

Jag hade i morse ett längre samtal med Susan Mesinai, som rapporterade att hon trodde att UD skulle kunna stå för kostnaderna för novemberresan till Moskva. Vi hade ju också en diskussion om detta för ett par veckor sedan, och Du såg då optimistiskt på möjligheterna. Vi arbetar givetvis också på andra sätt att få våra kostnader täckta men det tar alltid tid och resultatet är osäkert, ofta med begränsningar i hur medlen får användas. *Det är givetvis bra!*
Vidare sänder jag Dig för kännedom två fax från Susanna, som är ett under av effektivitet och kunnande.

Det ena är en redogörelse för våra undersökningar i SÄPO:s arkiv som visade sig, i varje fall med den starkt begränsade tillgång vi hade vid detta tillfälle med endast material som klassats i RW-filen. Hänvisningar antyder dock att det finns andra filer som kan innehålla intressant material, och vi gör nu en framställning om att komma åt detta.

Av speciellt intresse är naturligtvis dokument som berör försöken till utväxling av RW och i första hand då de som gick genom Svingel och som bl.a. finns beskrivna i Carl Perssons bok "Utan omsvep"

P.S. Hans har tidigare varit i kontakt med Holmström

Hälsningar

G. Dardel

2536001

Raoul Wallenberg

24560004

OCT-14-97 11:45 AM BERGER SUSANNE

T03-237-0046

JCA
MH
MF

To whom is this fax?

Regards
Sw. Min. For Affairs

Memo of Conversation: Sven Holtmark, October 8, 1997

I had discussed with Mr Holtmark (a researcher at the Institut for Forsvarestudier in Oslo) some of the Russian documentation in the Raoul Wallenberg case. We returned to some of those questions and then Holtmark wanted to know how much direct research the Swedish-Russian Working Group has been able to conduct in Russian archives. I answered as best I could, stating that there has been very little direct research carried out by researchers associated with the Working Group, with the exception of the Vladimir project and early investigations carried out by Birstein/Roginsky and others. I also mentioned the ongoing work of Memorial but described it only in general terms.

Holtmark stated that first-hand research is essential in a case like RW's and that there can be no substitute for it. I explained the difficulties the Working Group has had and pointed out as well the sensitive nature of the investigation which requires research in traditionally closed archives).

Holtmark explained that he does not understand why no Swedish historian has been commissioned by the Working Group or the Swedish government to carry out research in the case, at least in those archives which are open to outside researchers, like the Foreign Ministry archives. He said that one never knows what can be discovered in such an investigation since it has been his experience that, for instance, communications to and from the (then) Soviet Security Services are often attached to regular administrative correspondence etc. He emphasized that historians (who traditionally do not agree on anything) are unanimous in point: That Russian archivists cannot be trusted on competence or goodwill, for the simple reason that many of them do not get paid on a regular basis, for instance; it is a human response, not an ideological one, Holtmark says. In his experience the answer of an archivist will be (to a request) 'We have nothing on that' in about 95 percent of all cases. Later, through other materials, it invariably proves to be otherwise - there are indeed materials to be found.

Holtmark added that without doubt there can be no 'public credibility' attached to any findings the Swedish-Russian Working Group presents unless a 'direct' review of materials has taken place. I asked him whether he had pointed this out to the Group's Chairman, Hans Magnusson, in some of his contacts. Holtmark stated that he had, although he was not sure how emphatic he had been.

Holtmark speaks fluent Russian and he asked whether or not there has been an analysis (linguistic) on the use of the word *svetitsya* in the respective Vishinsky letter to Abakumov of July 1947. Holtmark states that anyone familiar with Soviet bureaucratic parlance at the time should have realized that this is clearly a standard phrase used at the time to denote "a clearing up of the issue before us", in the bureaucratic sense; in Holtmark's analysis Vishinsky's use of the word clearly denotes an urgent appeal to Abakumov to answer his request and to disclose RW's whereabouts.

I asked Holtmark whether or not he would be willing to summarize his views in an official memo and he promised to do so and to mail it to me.

Till Martin Hallquist

S.B. Oct 9

Helsingfors Matti von Sundel.

1001

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S.

UD-STOCKHOLM 6

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Säpo - akter

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The Raoul Wallenberg File, SAPO
Preliminary Report

I. General

In accordance with the Swedish government's decision of August 21, 1997 to permit review of "material concerned with Raoul Wallenberg", we studied the Raoul Wallenberg (RW) casefile maintained by the Swedish Security Police (SAPO). The review took place at SAPO headquarters (Rikspolisstyrelsen), Pohlhemsgatan 30, during the week of September 15-19, 1997.

The RW file (P 4856) consists of about 4000 pages which are arranged chronologically by year in 30+ folders. There are ten folders which contain newspaper clippings related to the case, covering the period 1945-present. In addition, there are three small boxfolders of general material and two separate folders covering the most recent years in the case. The latter contain documentation obtained from the CIA files on RW, released in December 1993, plus a number of internal memoranda dealing with requests by the Swedish-Russian Working Group to review the RW file. A few short accounts of meetings between Swedish officials and foreign representatives, mostly Russian, to discuss the case are also enclosed. The RW file has an index which includes a register of names and the respectivepagenumber(s). The records of witness testimonies comprise most of the material, with many documents originating from Swedish Foreign Office files.

II. Omissions

The limited time available did not permit an in-depth review of the RW case file. It can be stated with certainty, however, that contrary to official claims the RW dossier is incomplete:

Officially, the RW dossier includes all materials directly or indirectly related to Raoul Wallenberg. According to the existing rules in SAPO, any documentation which in any way touches upon the RW case is to be included in the main file. If an original document is filed in another dossier, a copy is to be provided to the RW case file. Nevertheless, we came across three very obvious gaps.

1. The statements of two prominent witnesses in the case, Dr. Nana Svartz and Carl-Gustav Svingel, are omitted. Their testimonies presumably are found in separate files, maintained by SAPO under the witnesses' own names. This finding is significant because this separation of files poses serious problems for researchers. The index to the RW file lists Svingel's name once (for an entry in 1974), while Svartz's name is completely omitted. There is no crossreference enclosed to other related files. Any investigator unfamiliar with the case would have no way of determining the existence of Svartz's or Svingel's testimony from the review of the RW case file. Neither would the investigator have any idea concerning other possible testimonies of which he is not already aware from other sources, like the file on RW in the Swedish Foreign Office (UD).

2. Also absent are some materials which are contained in the RW file of the UD and which on the UD's Initiative were forwarded to SAPO (UD RW collection; vol. 40; see letter 12.7.1965 et al.). [This material refers to the possible existence of German source material on RW, it alludes to documentation supposedly contained in captured German records on RW's contacts to German officials in Hungary, as well as some information on how German officials perceived RW;] It is unclear where the forwarded UD material was eventually filed in SAPO. A letter by Otto Danielsson* in which he makes refers to the documentation [12.7.1967], was placed in a separate collection with no copy provided to the RW case file; (HK 97/1965). According to SAPO officials collection HK 97/1965 contains 'qualified correspondence'. In 1965, when the document in question was created, this meant that the collection HK 97/1965 was considered to be of 'a higher level of secrecy than the RW dossier' and that access to the collection was restricted within SAPO. From HK 97/1965 Danielsson's letter was later removed to another (private) collection; (A III Wiklund).

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Consequently, one needs to consider the possibility that other material directly related to the RW case was forwarded from UD or other agencies to SAPO of which investigators have no knowledge up to this point since no copy of this material is contained in SAPO's RW dossier.

3. The RW file further lacks any documentation of consultations and discussions conducted by SAPO officials with outside agencies: (except with the UD, which is mostly limited to documentation of witness statements). There are no records of internal memoranda, briefings or requests for information by officials charged with investigating the case. No minutes of meetings, at any level of the agency, are enclosed. The file hardly contains any documents concerned with an analysis of the case itself or of the collected witness testimonies. There are no suggestions for follow-up and no recommendations issued in the case at any time by SAPO's leadership or its investigators. While there is a notebook from 1952 which contains Otto Danielsson's notes and correspondence in the matter, all other years are not enclosed.

III. New Material

Folder 31 of the RW case file contains an envelope with the following inscription (translated): This envelope must not be opened without consent of P & Vinge 31-10-1967. Below this is noted: Opened 1995-10-16 by PO Curt Malmstrom.

The envelope contains a P.M. of October 27, 1965 written by Otto Danielsson*. In the document Danielsson describes his contacts with Carl Gustav Svingel*. In December 1965 Svingel had reported that he had been approached by a representative from the East (East Germany or the Soviet Union) who apparently wished to enter into discussions with the Swedish government over a possible exchange of Soviet agent Stig Wennerstrom. One possible offer for this exchange from the Soviet side appeared to be Raoul Wallenberg. Svingel had turned over this information immediately to the Swedish Police and to the Swedish government. Discussions between highlevel representatives from the Police and the Foreign Office took place throughout 1966 but no concrete steps followed from either side (Soviet or Swedish). Former Rikspolis Chief Carl Persson has described these contacts in his book "Utan Omsvep" (Norstedts, 1990).

No materials about these discussions are contained in the RW files in SAPO or the UD. It is unclear why Otto Danielsson's P.M. from October 1967 was filed in this manner (in a sealed envelope) in SAPO's RW dossier. The document is not referred to in the index to the file. From Carl Persson's account it is known that Danielsson wrote several other P.M. in this matter. At this point one is left to assume that these were filed either in the dossier for Carl Gustav Svingel or that of Stig Wennerstrom. Perhaps a separate file was created for this issue. The only noted entry in the RW file index for Carl Gustav Svingel refers to the year 1974. Otto Danielsson notes a telephone call from Svingel and adds that the file is with RPC (Rikspolis Chef). Danielsson does not state the reason for Svingel's call.

The Otto Danielsson P.M. raises several important questions. (These will be discussed in greater detail in a separate report.) It appears that in Danielsson's assessment a possible explanation for the apparent breakdown of the proposed exchange discussions was a breach of confidentiality on the Swedish side. Failure of the talks have been usually attributed to the vague character of Svingel's testimony and to lack of determination on the part of Swedish Foreign Office officials to pursue the matter. While this still apparently holds true, Danielsson's report adds a number of important details which appear to shift the emphasis. Based on this new information the issue deserves to be fully investigated.

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
IV. Conclusions

Since the RW dossier in SAPO is currently incomplete it is necessary to conduct a thorough review of all files related to the RW case to be certain that no critical information has been missed. While some material is absent from the file which relates directly to the case, the most difficult to track are documents forwarded from other agencies which touch upon the investigation indirectly and which are sensitive (secret). Unless researchers have knowledge of such documentation from other sources, these files cannot be traced. It is certain that today there are various types of materials, directly or indirectly related to the RW case, of various levels of secrecy (classifications), currently available within SAPO's archive outside of the RW dossier.


The insights gained from this preliminary review of SAPO's RW dossier should focus attention back on collections of RW material with other agencies, particularly the one with the UD. This collection shows significant gaps in material which is closely related to the case yet 'indirect', as well as any documentation which is considered 'sensitive', i.e. economic files; files of the Militaryattache; etc.

It also appears that the RW file in SAPO has a somewhat more complete accounting of witness testimonies than is contained in the UD file. The SAPO file should be thoroughly studied with respect to all details of witnesses' reports to be sure that all helpful information has been extracted.

A follow-up 'Request for Access' to various files related to the RW case was filed with SAPO on October 6, 1997.



Dr. Guy von Dardel



Susanne Berger

October 9, 1997

* Otto Danielsson - Police Investigator in charge of the RW case.

* Carl Gustav Svingel - Representative of the Protestant Churches in East Berlin; involved in secret negotiations about prisoner releases/exchanges between East and West during the 1960's and 70's.

1997-10-16

P2Eu¹
285/008

EI/ESEK
Lage Olson
Telefon 08 - 405 3280

Delges:
Haggård, P-L
Magnusson, Riga
Hallqvist, EC 2
Olson, EI-SEK
Amb Moskva

Exp. 97-10-20
/L

Kostnader för arbetsgruppen i Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet

Den arbetsgrupp som i september 1991 tillsattes i Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet av Utrikesdepartementet avser att under 1998 avsluta sitt uppdrag. Innan detta kan ske planeras ett sista ordinarie möte, det 14:e i ordningen, att äga rum i Moskva den 12-13 november 1997. I anslutning till detta möte planeras en del efterforskningsarbete i Moskva och ev. i Vladimir att fullföljas. En planerad vitbok i ärendet, den tredje i ordningen (de två första kom ut år 1957 resp. 1965) kommer därefter att färdigställas under 1998 för publicering på svenska, engelska och ryska. Arbetsgruppens uppdrag upphör därmed formellt. En uppföljning i form av **seminarier** i Moskva och New York om RW-ärendet ca sex månader efter publiceringen av vitboken är **ett förslag** till uppföljning av arbetsgruppens arbete liksom **fortsatt stöd till efterforskningar** i arkiv m.m. Uppföljningsarbetet i sig ligger dock utanför ramen för arbetsgruppens verksamhet.

Av anslagna medel för 1997, sammanlagt 180 000 kronor, återstod i mitten av september ca 45 000 kronor. En räkning för en telefonkonferens den 22 augusti är enligt uppgift ännu inte betald. I denna konferens, som var den första i arbetsgruppens historia, deltog Guy von Dardel (Genève), Marvin Makinen (Chicago, p.t. Boulder, CO), Susan Mesinai (New York, N.Y.) och Susanne Berger (Arlington, VA) samt på UD Hans Magnusson, Martin Hallqvist och Lage Olson. Konferensen varade i knappt två timmar. Till detta kommer ev. återstående utgifter för efterforskningar i Moskva och Vladimir tidigare i år. Av ett utlovat bidrag på 5 000 USD till von Dardel och utomstående experter har

1997-10-16

hittills utbetalats 2 500 USD till Makinen jämte drygt 20 000 kronor för lokala utgifter i Moskva/Vladimir. von Dardel kommer troligen att göra anspråk på viss ersättning längre fram. Slutligen tillkommer utgifter för två resor till Moskva i början av oktober

Följande utgifter för arbetsgruppen kan f.n. förutses:

- | | |
|---|-----------------------|
| 1. Telefonkonferens i augusti och två resor till Moskva i oktober (Magnusson och Hallqvist). | 35 000 kronor |
| 2. Arbetsgruppmöte i Moskva 11-13 november (4 resor för Carl Persson, Magnusson, Hallqvist och Olson). | 60 000 kronor |
| 3. För de utomstående experterna och von Dardel har diskuterats ett bidrag om 10 000 USD (75 000 kronor) för återstående insatser i arbetsgruppen. Förslagsvis bör 2 000 USD utbetalas till von Dardel och Berger före mötet i november för inköp av flygbiljetter m.m. Mesinai beräknas avresa först av de nämnda personerna ca 30 oktober och stanna i Moskva tre-fyra veckor. Förslagsvis bör ett bidrag på 3 000 USD utbetalas till Mesinai av GK New York i början av vecka 43 (Susan Mesinai, 123 Bank Street, New York, N.Y. 10014, tel. (212) 691-6436). Makinen kan ej resa nu till Moskva/Vladimir men torde göra detta senare. Till detta kommer lokala utgifter i Moskva/Vladimir beräknade till 25 000 kronor. | 100 000 kronor |
| 4. Tryckning av vitbok om RW-ärendet (under förutsättning att der rör sig om en bok på ca 250 sidor och en upplaga på 2 000 ex. på svenska och engelska samt 1 000 ex. på ryska) | 100 000 kronor |
| 5. Övrigt (ytterligare några resor till Moskva/Vladimir) | 30 000 kronor |
| Summa: | 325 000 kronor |

1997-10-16


Ovanstående kalkyl innebär att medelsbehovet för sista kvartalet 1997 och kalenderåret 1998 beräknas bli 325 000 kronor, varav 280 000 kronor i nytt anslag. Mellan 60-75 000 kronor av detta torde behöva tas i anspråk under innevarande kalenderår. Ovan nämnda beräkningar är dock något osäkra beroende på att man ännu inte vet i vilken utsträckning ryssarna kommer att tillmötesgå de svenska önskemålen om fortsatta efterforskningar i Moskva/Vladimir.

Anslaget för RW-arbetsgruppen har följande beteckningar:

Finansiering: 105

Verksamhetskod: 25112

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Lage Olson

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P 2 Eu¹

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Delges:
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ag
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ML

Handling ang Nanna Svartz och Wallenberg-ärendet

Vid besök av Gunvor Svartz-Malmberg mottog jag idag bifogad handling. Den utgörs av en handskrivet meddelande i blyertsskrift av Nanna Svartz. Bläckskrift möjligen av A L Myasnikov. Handlingen sannolikt tillkommen under Nanna Svartz andra resa till Moskva 1961 (i mars). Handlingen ingår i Nanna Svartz efterlämnade handlingar.

Vid besöket överenskomms att handlingen överlämnas till Utrikesdepartementet för att ingå i Raoul Wallenberg-dossieren.

Vid samma besök överlämnade också Gunvor Svartz-Malmbergs kopia av en handling upprättad av Nanna Svartz den 1 februari 1961. Som synes innehåller denna handling en delvis annan version av Nanna Svartz möte med Myasnikov än den som senare återgavs. Gunvor Svartz-Malmberg menar att denna handling stämmer bättre överens med vad som faktiskt skedde, eftersom hon fick sig samma version berättad av sin mamma, när hon tog emot henne vid återkomsten från Moskva.


Berndt Fredriksson

(in ein Paar Tagen)
Ich werde folgendes sagen: Ich
habe Ihnen erzählt, dass man in
Schweden seit einigen Monaten
davon überzeugt ist, das W. noch
lebt. Es ist n.a. die Unter-
suchung der Familie W. das dies ^{jetzt} zeigt.
Ich habe Sie gefragt, ob Sie
den Fall kennen und gehört
haben, dass er noch lebt. Sie
haben dann zugewinkt.

Nein. Ich habe Ihnen danach er-
zählt, dass man in Schweden
glaubt, dass er mentalkrank
ist. Sie haben wieder zugewinkt.

Was sagen Sie? Ist diese
Beschreibung gut?

Haben Sie meinen Brief (v. 30/11)
an Herrn L. gelesen?

Den 24 januari 1961 höll jag föredrag i Vetenskaps-
huset, där professor A. Myasnikov var president. Jag inbjöds
av honom att bese hans forskningsinstitut den 27 januari
klockan 10 f.m. Efter att ha besökt laboratorierna och även
vissa sjukavdelningar i Institute of Therapy, Petroverigsky
per. 10, återvände vi till professor M:s mottagningsrum och
diskuterade kongresser, forskning m.m. Efter en stund bad
jag professor M. om ursäkt, att jag drog upp en fråga, so m
låg mig och andra svenskar mycket om hjärtat. Jag frågade
honom, om han kände till fallet Raoul Wallenberg, varvid han
nickade jakande. Jag frågade honom då, om han kunde ge mig
något råd hur jag kunde förfara för att vinna klarhet, var
Raoul Wallenberg befinner sig, och om professor M. visste
något i den saken. Han sade då plötsligt, att han nog kände
till fallet och att patienten var "in sehr schlechtem Zustand".
"Wollen Sie ihn sehen?" Denna fråga gjorde mig konsternerad.
Jag sade därför, beklagligtvis, att kanske inte detta var
så viktigt, men att huvudsaken vore, om han kunde föras hem
i vilket tillstånd han än vore. Professor M. sade då mycket
lågt: "er ist im Mental-Krankenhaus". Jag skall kalla hit
professor Danischewsky och rådgöra med honom". Han lämnade
rummet och återkom efter c:a 4-5 minuter tillsammans med
professor D. Professor M. avlägsnade sig därefter åter.

Professor D. satte sig på en stol mitt emot mig.
Jag frågade om professor M. talat om vad saken gällde och
han bekräftade det. Han frågade mig noga om var Wallenberg
tjänstgjort och bad mig skriva hans namn på ett papper. Jag
skrev då Attaché Raoul Wallenberg. Jag berättade, att hans
mor var min patient och att hon var sömnlös, ytterst nervös
och avmagrad samt att hon talade med nästan alla hon träffade
om sin son Raoul. Hon skulle behöva få ro och få full visshet.
Även om sonen vore än så sjuk, skulle det vara en välgärning
mot henne och f.ö. hela Sverige om han kunde få vårdas i hem-
landet. Jag frågade professor D., om han kunde hjälpa oss,
och han svarade, att han skulle göra allt vad han förmådde.
Jag sade honom, att hela svenska folket skulle bli Sovjet-
unionen oerhört tacksam, om Wallenberg finge föras hem, även
om han vore både fysiskt och psykiskt svårt sjuk. Denna sak,
sade jag, ligger även vår regering varmt om hjärtat och jag
sade mig vara övertygad om att regeringen skulle göra sitt
yttersta för att återkomsten skulle ske i lugn och ~~ro~~ utan

bråk i pressen. Jag sade också, att jag trodde mig kunna inverka på Wallenbergs mor, så att även hon förhölle sig lugn och bleve tacksam ~~gentemot~~ mot Sovjet-Presidiet, som nu genom sina nya undersökningar kanske kunnat identifiera Wallenberg. Jag talde om att jag känner minister Semenov sedan länge och fick genast rådet att vända mig direkt till honom.

Jag frågade professor D., om han ansåg det möjligt, att jag som läkare kunde föra hem Wallenberg. Han ansåg att "Wenn er noch lebendig ist" vore ett sådant tillvägagångssätt ej omöjligt, men det skulle jag tala med Semenov om.

Jag återvände till hotellet. Fick numret till minister Semenov genom att telefonera till Svenska ambassaden. Telefonerade på numret, men fick svaret att Semenov rest till Kairo.

På kvällen hölls bankett. Efter måltiden fick jag plötsligt se Danischewsky, som ^{da} kom emot mig och frågade, om jag träffat Semenov. Jag svarade, att han rest till Kairo och frågade D., om han ansåg att jag kunde skriva till Semenov. Han svarade ja. Efter resonnemang lovade han att jag fick säga i brevet att jag rådgjort med honom och professor M., men att de endast rätt mig att vända mig till Semenov. Jag borde ej säga något om samtalet i övrigt med dem. D. berättade, att professor M. och han diskuterat den fråga, som vårt samtal gällt, sedan jag hade lämnat institutet på f.m. De voro båda av den uppfattningen, att en eventuell överflyttning till Sverige av patienten, wenn er noch lebendig ist, givetvis måste organiseras på diplomatisk väg, vilket jag sade mig helt förstå.

1/2 1961

Nanna Svartz



REGERINGSKANSLIET

TELEFAX

1997-10-20

P2-Eu¹

Sid. 1 (1)

Dnr 152 ✓

Utrikesdepartementet

EI/ESEK

Lage Olson

Telefon 08 - 405 3280

Delges:

Haggård, P-L

exp. 97-10-20 / *Lo*

Generalkonsulatet New York

Lo

Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet

Generalkonsulatet bemyndigas utbetala 3 000 USD till Susan Mesinai, 123 Bank Street, New York, N.Y. 10014, tel. (212) 691-6436. Mesinai är utomstående expert i Raoul Wallenberg-arbetsgruppen och avser att avresa till Moskva ca 30 oktober för fortsatta efterforskningar i RW-ärendet. Beloppet redovisas med avräkningsbesked. Finansiering: 105, Verksamhetskod: 25112 och Kostnadsställe: EC. Mesinai kontaktar GK.

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P 2 Eu 1

October 18, 1997

Dear Mr. Olson,

Thank you very much for forwarding to me the materials concerning the Raoul Wallenberg case last week.

I have enclosed my report on the currently available documentation of the supposed Wennerstrom-Wallenberg exchange offer from 1965-1971 (74?). I am also sending you a copy of the P.M. by Otto Danielsson which is contained in the RW dossier with SAPO. (October 27, 1967.

Best wishes,

Susanne Berger

Delges:

Kabs

von Dardel

Carl Persson

Magnusson, Riga

Hellqvist, Ec 2

Olson, EI/ESEK

Amb Moskva

exp. 97-10-22

u.a. / Lo

The Wennerstrom-Wallenberg Exchange Question, 1965-1971

I. Chronology

(Taken from Rikspolis Chef Carl Persson's book "Utan Omsvep" [Norstedts, 1990], which is based on CP's notes and some of Otto Danielsson's P.M.s in the case); and Svingel's account, which is based on his P.M. from September 1989; a conversation conducted with Marvin Makinen and Guy von Dardel in March 1994 and various press reports).

December 1965

It needs to be emphasized that Svingel in his P.M. from September 1989 does not distinguish between two contactmen, as is done by Carl Persson (CP) as well as Otto Danielsson (OD). Svingel simply refers to 'Östrepresentanten' (representative of the East) throughout. [Referred to below as contactman 1 or 2]

Descriptions of the first meeting between Svingel and the contactman are virtually identical in all accounts.

CP states the contactman amended his question from "Tror ni att svenska regeringen skulle vara intresserad av en utväxling av Wennerström?" (Do you think the Swedish government would be interested in an exchange of Wennerstrom?) to "Tror ni att svenska regeringen skulle vara intresserad av en utväxling av Wallenberg?" [Utan Omsvep, p.130] According to Svingel the contactman simply repeated his first question during that meeting.

In response to the contactman's question whether or not the Swedish government would be interested in an exchange for Wennerstrom Svingel answers "Ge oss Wallenberg" (Give us Wallenberg) and "Var finns Wallenberg?" (Where is Wallenberg?) [Svingel, September 1989]. [Both CP and OD state that Svingel's answer was "Ge oss Wallenberg" eller möjligen (or possibly) "Var finns Wallenberg?"]

According to CP, the contactman 1 then adds: "Wallenberg existerar inte" (Wallenberg does not exist) and Svingel replies "Det säger inte att han är död" (That does not mean that he is dead). X does not reply to this.

[Svingel's memo (and OD's P.M. of August 1966) identifies this exchange as having taken place during the second meeting with contactman 1, not at the first encounter.] More importantly, Svingel states that he received an answer from the contactman to his remark ("Det säger inte att han är död"). The contactman supposedly replied: "Ja, det har ni rätt i." (Yes, in that you are right). [Svingel, September 1989]

Svingel also received a warning from contactman 1: "Koppla bara icke in den högre diplomaten. för då slår allt fel." (Do not connect yourself to higher diplomacy, because then everything will go wrong." [OD's P.M. of August 1966 states that Svingel later received a similar warning from contactman 2]

Comments: It is unclear if Svingel had one or two meetings with Contactman 1 and when the second meeting took place

January 1966

During the first week in January 1966 Svingel has another meeting with an 'Östrepresentant' (Contactman 2: CP/OD), who states that he is coming back to the Wennerstrom question, and that he is authorized to negotiate with Svingel. Svingel supposedly asks: "Var finns Wallenberg?" and the Östrepresentant answers: "Fraga först om interesse från svenska sida." (First inquire about interest from the Swedish side).

After this meeting Svingel turns to the Swedish General Consulate in East Berlin and has a discussion with Consul Sven E. Backlund. Backlund arranges a meeting with Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson. In **February 1966** Svingel meets Nilsson who immediately calls in Kabinettssekreterare Leif Belfrage. Svingel is assigned a contact person for his dealings with the Swedish Foreign Office (Byrachef =) and the whole affair is given the covername 'Jacobsson-Jensen' [Svingel, 1989: OD, 1966]

Comments: It is uncertain if Svingel contacted the Swedish Consulate in East Berlin before the meeting with Contactman 2 or after. The meeting with the Swedish Foreign Minister definitely took place after the meeting with Contactman 2. Also not clear when the 'Jacobsson-Jensen' reference name was assigned to the matter. OD's P.M from August 1966 states that this was done already during Svingel's discussions with the Swedish Consulate in East Berlin in January 1966; Svingel says that it happened after his meeting with Nilsson and Belfrage in February 1966.

[Sometime between February and July 1966 Svingel has another meeting with Contactman 1 or 2 to tell him the results of his discussions with the Foreign Office in Stockholm]

March 1966

On March 15, 1966 Swedish government representatives and Police officials meet to discuss the situation. Present are: Tage Erlander (statsminister); Torsten Nilsson (statsråd/utrikesminister); Herrman Kling (statsråd); Rune Johansson (statsråd); Leif Belfrage (kabinettssekreterare); Dick Hichens-Bergstrom (chef för UD's politiska avdelningen); Otto Danielsson; Carl Persson.

May 1966

Follow-up meetings with Police and Foreign Office (Persson/Belfrage; Persson/Erlander)

July 1966

Svingel has a meeting with a contactman (Contactman 2, acc to OD and CP) in another matter, but asks at the end of the discussion: "Hur ar det med Wallenberg?" (What about Wallenberg?) The contactman's answer: "Jag tror inte att han lever." (I do not believe that he is alive) Svingel then supposedly replied: "Men det sager inte att han ar dod." The Contactman answers only by shrugging his shoulders and then adds: "Ni maste gora erbjudande." (You have to make an offer).

At this point Otto Danielsson stresses in his P.M. of August 1966 that a) Neither one of the two contactmen have stated that Raoul Wallenberg is alive, and that 2) Wallenberg's name was not mentioned as an exchange object for Wennerstrom.

September 1966

Svingel delivers to one of the contactmen (Contactman 2, CP/OD) a message by Otto Danielsson (message by the Swedish government):

"Aterkommer till Ert yttrande - 'Ni maste gora ett erbjudande' - ar jag befullmaktigad att framföra foljande: Det avila Er att komma med närmare precisering av Ert utväxlingsobjekt." (Coming back to your remark 'You have to make an offer'. I am authorized to suggest the following: It is necessary that you provide more precise information concerning the exchange-object.)

The Contactman then asks what Sweden could offer. Svingel answers: "Vi har ju nämnt en person vid vara tidigare samtal." (We have already named a person during our earlier conversation(s)). The contactman then asks for personal data of the person in question. Svingel adds in his P.M. from 1989 that the contactman says: "Om han nu lever jag tror det inte." (Whether he is alive now, I do not believe). [Svingel, September 1989; page 4]

Svingel then asks Backlund and the 'byrachef' for RW's personal data. They are written out but is later decided that they will not be handed over. It is not known who made that decision and on what reasoning the decision was based.

December 1966

Svingel again meets a contactman (Contactman 2,; Cp and OD.). Contactman takes the fact that Swedish Foreign Office refuses to comply with his request of RW's personal data as a sign of Swedish government's lack of interest. He tells Svingel that he knows that the Swedish government will not negotiate. Svingel was apparently not aware of this. Carl Persson's account of this meetings also states that the OR voiced concerns about possible breach of confidentiality on the Swedish side [Utan Omsvcp. page 138]

Shortly after this meeting Svingel confronts Sven Backlund, who tells Svingel that there has been a meeting to discuss the Wennerstrom-Wallenberg question and that he, Backlund, recommended not to take any steps [Svingel, September 1989, page 4]. According to Backlund, no protocol was taken at the meeting.

Comments: It is uncertain to which meeting Backlund refers here and who was present at that meeting. Svingel expresses his disappointment that the 'byrachef' was apparently not the government's real 'forhandlingsombud' (representative in the negotiations).

End of 1967

CP writes that in a letter to Otto Danielsson Svingel states that there is "nothing new."

End of 1968 or beginning of 1969 (unclear)

[Svingel P.M., September 1989] Svingel has another meeting with a contactman (unclear if this is Contactman 1 or 2). The contactman asks Svingel supposedly: "Låt fraga er regering om de ända inte är beredd att förhandla om en benådning av Wennerström mot en utväxling av er man den som ni har interesse av att få fri." (Ask your government whether it is still willing to negotiate about [granting of] clemency for Wennerstrom for an exchange of your man, in whom you have interest to have him released.) Svingel then responds: "Er lebt also?" (sic) The contactman supposedly answers: "Ja, wir verhandeln nicht ueber Tote." (Svingel P.M., September 1989). Svingel passes on this message to the Swedish side (byråchef) but he supposedly does not get an answer.

Comments: This meeting as well as the discussion between Svingel and the contactman is not included in CP's account. It is important to check whether or not any of OD's P.M. after 1966 mention such an exchange. Svingel includes this account in his P.M of September 1989, and later repeats this in various press interviews (see Expressen, der Spiegel and others; 1991-92)

March 1971

According to CP (and OD?), Svingel has his last meeting with Otto Danielsson. The contactman (contactman, CP) supposedly states: "Han ar dod, det vet jag" (He is dead, that I know). This remark is absent from Svingel's account [P.M., September 1989].

May 1971

According to Svingel he last meets the byrachef on May 24, 1971.

II. Otto Danielsson P.M., October 27, 1967

Neither Carl Gustav Svingel nor Carl Persson mention the year 1967. Otto Danielsson's P.M. from October 27, 1967 sheds some light on the events during that year.

Short Summary:

- * The talks between the contactman (unclear if 1 or 2) have stalled due to Swedish government's refusal to comply with the contactman's request to hand over written personal data on RW. The argument apparently used for the refusal was that such information was readily available to the Russian side from other sources.
- * In August 1967 OD sends a message to an address in Berlin, West which had been provided by Svingel. The message stated that the Swedish side was still interested (to pursue the Wennerstrom-Wallenberg question).
- * Svingel's contacts with the contactman have become more difficult. Svingel has problems crossing from East to West (Berlin).
- * The contactman complains to Svingel that he (Svingel) has involved the East German Foreign Ministry. Contactman has been severely criticised by the East German (Foreign Ministry) officials for his involvement in the negotiations and he has also received complaints from the Soviet side.
- * Svingel explains to the contactman that he has only reported to the Swedish Foreign Ministry
- * The contactman states that there has to have been a breach of confidentiality on the Swedish side. A Swedish representative had mentioned the secret discussion during a meeting in the East German Foreign Ministry.
- * Svingel is forced to explain to the "winged" contactman [unclear if this is the same man or a different contact] that he (Svingel) was not the cause of the leak.
- * The "winged" contactman smoothes things over with the East German border police so Svingel would have no more trouble.
- * Swedish Consul General Backlund appears not to have been informed about these continuing negotiations
- * OD points out that only four people (including) Svingel knew of these latest discussions (unclear if OD uses the term utvaxlings - or utvecklingsfasen).

III. Questions and Analysis

Otto Danielsson

1. Who are the four people who knew of the ongoing negotiations in the Wennerstrom-Wallenberg question in 1967 and beyond? It is not clear if OD includes in the four people the contactman or if he is just referring to the Swedish side. OD suggests that it might be possible to identify the source of the leak by checking who has neighbouring summer homes in Sweden.
2. OD's P.M. from October 27, 1967 appears to suggest that knowledge about the contacts in 1967 were confined to a smaller group of individuals than in 1966. What prompted this decision?
3. Where are OD's P.M.s for the time 1965-1971?
4. Did the contacts in 1967 result directly in the meeting Svingel describes at the end of 68/early 69? or did other meetings take place before that date?
5. Do any of OD's P.M. after 1967 mention Svingel's meeting with a contactman during which the contactman supposedly offers a direct exchange of Wennerstrom for Wallenberg (1968/69)?
6. In 1974 OD notes a call from Svingel in his book. Below that he notes "File is with RPC [Rikspolis Chef]". D. does not state what the call is about. Was the matter discussed as late as 1974?

The Swedish government

1. How many meetings took place at the government level to discuss the question?
2. Where is the documentation on this issue from the time in question (1965-1971)?
3. Why did the Swedish government refuse to comply with the request to make available Raoul Wallenberg's personal data in written form? Who made the decision?
4. What happened to Belfrage's letter with RW's personal data? The letter was apparently written but it was not delivered [Lundvik (Swedish Consulate, Berlin) to Hallquist (UD, Stockholm, June 4, 1992)].
5. When asked in 1991 by a Swedish reporter about the Wennerstrom-Wallenberg exchange question, Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson (by then retired) said that the issue had never been discussed. Carl Persson commented on Nilsson's statement with the remark:
"Att I juga sa dar, maste var oerhort ofrsiktigt." [Expressen, February 8, 1992]
Why did Nilsson deny the discussions at a time when Carl Persson's book had already appeared in print?

Carl Gustav Svingel

1. Svingel did not take any notes in the beginning of his contacts with the contactman. (He began in August 1966)

2. In his book Carl Persson appears to say that Svingel's contacts at least were worthy of further exploration. It was his and OD's hope that continued talks with the Soviet side would at the very least yield more information about RW's fate. There was no way to confirm Svingel's account but apparently OD and CP believed him enough to want to continue the contact.

3. CP later has said that Svingel was untrustworthy and that his information could not be believed. No written records exists on how OD evaluated Svingel or his information. In 1967, however OD was apparently willing to pay for some of Svingel's travel expenses. He also promised to see if a diplomatic passport could be secured for Svingel.

4. Why did Svingel not say in 1994 (during the meeting with Makinen and von Dardel) that Wolfgang Vogel had been involved?

5. Svingel stayed on good terms with Vogel throughout the years. At Svingel's wedding in 1992 Vogel served as his 'Best Man'.

6. Svingel does not reveal the identity of the "Soviet" contactman. Belfrage apparently raised the question how communications with Moscow worked. Svingel hinted that the contact came from Moscow, through the Czechs and from there to the Prosecutor's Office in East Berlin [OD, P.M. August 1966].

Wolfgang Vogel

1. Otto Danielsson states that Svingel in October 1967 reveals the name of the contactman to him. Danielsson refers to the "winged" Contactman which could perhaps be a pun on the German word 'Vogel' (= bird). This could then be understood as a thinly veiled reference to Wolfgang Vogel. Danielsson makes no mention of the identity of the second Contactman. In the P.M. from October 27, 1967 it is not clear whether there are one or two Contactmen.

2. Carl Persson has since then confirmed that Contactman X in his account refers to Wolfgang Vogel. Vogel has denied any knowledge of or involvement in Svingel's contacts with Eastern representatives concerning the Wennerstrom-Wallenberg question. He stated in an interview with Expressen in March 1991 that he had direct contact to RW's family in the late 1960's. Nina Lagergren had approached him to investigate the chances of an exchange of Wennerstrom for Raoul Wallenberg. Vogel had supposedly turned to the Soviet Embassy in Berlin, from where the request had gone to Moscow. The answer was, according to Vogel, that RW was dead. Vogel emphasized that he had not seen a possibility to pursue the question further, because there was no firm evidence that RW was still alive at the time.

Vogel gave a slightly different version of his involvement in the Wallenberg case in 1994 during the meeting with Makinen and von Dardel. He stated then that he had asked the State Prosecutor Streit about the Wallenberg case. Streit had then inquired in Moscow and had received the answer that RW was dead.

3. If Vogel was involved in the secret negotiations 1965-1971, why has he refused to admit it? In 1994 (with Makinen and von Dardel) Vogel went so far as to ask Svingel why he had not told him about Svingel's secret contacts in the Wallenberg question. Svingel answered that he had been bound by Swedish government secrecy laws.

IV. Suggested Follow-up

1. Svingel, as well as Carl Persson and Otto Danielsson see as primary reason for the initial failure of the talks the Swedish government's refusal to pursue the matter.

- Why did the Swedish government refuse to hand over the letter with Raoul Wallenberg's personal data?

2. OD's P.M. of October 27, 1967 points to a possible breach of confidentiality from the Swedish side, which was significant enough to jeopardize the discussions.

- Who was responsible for this 'leak' of information?

3. The discussion were apparently resumed in 1967 and lasted well into 1969 (perhaps as long as 1974)

- Why was there no answer given to Svingel's report of contactman's offer in late 1968/early 1969 [time is uncertain]?

General

- * Interview Wolfgang Vogel again

- * Seek documentation from Swedish Foreign Office and other Swedish agencies

- * Find OD's documentation in this matter

- * Determine identity of contactman 2

- * Svingel apparently secured release of four individuals from Soviet prisons in 1967. One of them, a woman, had apparently been held as a numbered prisoner. Identify woman and conditions of her imprisonment

Documentation

1. P.M; Otto Danielsson; 1965-1971; some currently unavailable
2. Carl Persson; personal notes; currently unavailable; "Utan Omsv" (Norstedts, 1990)
3. Carl Gustav Svingel; P.M.; September 1989; personal notes; currently unavailable
4. Swedish Consulate General, East Berlin; correspondence with Swedish Foreign Office; one document
5. Interview with Carl Gustav Svingel and Wolfgang Vogel; Swedish-Russian Working Group, 1994
6. Pressinterviews, Sweden and Germany; Carl Gustav Svingel, 1992.

Chronology of Carl Gustav Svingel's contacts with Swedish representatives

January 1966	Meeting with Sven E. Backlund, Consul General in East Berlin
February 1966	Meeting with Torsten Nilsson, Swedish Foreign Minister
March 15, 1966	Torsten Nilsson, Tage Erlander, Herman Kling, Rune Johansson, Leif Belfrage, Dick Hitchens-Bergstrom, Otto Danielsson, Carl Persson; Meeting to discuss Svingel's reports
May 27, 1966	Carl Persson, Leif Belfrage;
May 31, 1966	Carl Persson, Tage Erlander, ?
September 14, 1966	Letter; Svingel to Danielsson
December 1966 or early 1967	Letter; Svingel to Danielsson?
early 1967	Letter; Svingel to Danielsson
August 1967	Letter from Otto Danielsson (acting as official Swedish representative) to to an address in West Berlin, provided by Svingel
October 27, 1967	Svingel, Danielsson
December 1967 or early 1968	Letter; Svingel to Danielsson; reports that there is nothing new
end of 1968 or early 1969	Svingel communicates with 'byrachefen' about latest contacts
March 17, 1971	Svingel, Danielsson; meeting in Stockholm

(Letters by Backlund?)

Carl Gustav Svingel's meetings with representatives from the East
(Ostreprentanten)

December 1965	Contactman 1
(Early January 1966	Contactman 1?)
Early January 1966	Contactman 2
Early April 1966	Contactman 2
July 1966	Contactman 2
September 1, 1966	Contactman 2
December 1966	Contactman 2
After August 1967	Contactman ?
Late 1968/Early 1969	Contactman ?
?	

Den 27 oktober 1967 sammanträffade undertecknad med G.S. som berättade följande:

At föregående anteckningar främjar, att kontaktmannen begärt att få vissa data om R.W. Sådana data skrivs på sin tid ut, men på högsta nivå beslöts, att dessa data ej skulle lämnas ut, enär man ansåg, att kontaktmannens uppdragsgivare fuller väl visste alla data om R.W.

På försommaren 1967 kom ett brev från G.S till undertecknad, i vilket G.S. bl. a. ~~i vilket~~ berättade att kontaktmannen tagit upp saken och därvid sagt sig förstå, att G.S. huvudmän uppenbartigen inte var intresserade av det framlagda förslaget.

I augusti 1967 avsändes ett kryptiskt ~~meddelande~~ under den adress i W-Berlin som G.S. uppgivit och i meddelandet framfördes, att vi fortfarande var intresserade.

Sedan innan G.S. haft sitt sammanträffande med kontaktmannen, eller i varje fall i samband med detta - dvs vid tiden för brevet avsändande till mig - hade G.S. börjat märka att det om honom beskrivna utredningsarbetet kurrade ~~sig~~ ^{över} sig i det att kontrollerna vid passagen ~~vid~~ ^{över} gränsen till Öst-Berlin tog längre och längre tid.

Sedan så värt meddelande kommit G.S. till handa, hade efter någon tid ett nytt sammanträffande skett mellan G.S. och kontaktmannen, som därvid på nytt sagt sig förstå

(2)

Att det inte blev något av den trevare som påstods
ut. G-S hade då sagt: "Tvärtom! Jag har fått
ett skriftligt meddelande om att man är intres-
serad!"

I samband härmed hade G-S frågat om an-
ledningen till att kärvat till sig i samarbetet.
Kontaktsmannen hade då svarat att "det väl inte var
så underligt då Ni dragit in det Östtyska utrikes-
departementet i saken, eller i varje fall inte hållit
tyst"

Kontaktsmannen berättade vidare att han blivit
uppkallad till ministeriet och fått en väldigt ut-
skällning därför att han misskött saken. Även från
sovjetiskt håll hade han fått uppbära förebrä-
elser.

G-S hade blivit utsatt för ett skarpt förhör
från Kontaktsmannen som frågat vad G-S vänt
sig med sine sonderingar och då G-S ansåg att
han för att förklara sin inställning måste tala
klart, hade han öppenlystligt och
sanningenligt förklarat att han vänt sig
direkt till svenska utrikesministeriet. Kon-
taktsmannen hade då repeterat att det
måste vara genom instruktion från departe-
mentet som saken kommit ut. En svensk
representant hade nämligen vid en överläggning
i Östtyska utrikesdepartementet uttryckt bl.a. förhållande
"Ja, då har vi den där affären med RW och G-S
också"

Vad slags förhållningar som kontaktsmannen
syftade på visste G-S icke. (Man torde väl
här kunna förmoda att det kan ha varit

(3)

SUKABIS handelsförhandlingar som avses.)

Vi borde ha möjligheten att ta reda på när dessa förhandlingar ägt rum och vilka som deltog.

Hur i så fall SUKABIS representant fått reda på saken kan kanske lättast säkras ut genom att tänka på vilka deltagare som har sommarbostäder i närheten av varandra.

G-S var mycket bekyrrad och förargad över att en svensk representant så lättvindigt pratat om saker, med vilkas skadeverkningar han ej är i stånd att överblicka. Om G-S ej lyckats övertyga den "beringade" kontaktsmannen om att fellet inte låg hos G-S, kunde G-S verkansamt allvarigt skadats. Den "beringade" kontaktsmannen lovade att klara upp saken med gränskontrollmyndigheterna, och efter det klargörande samtalet hade inga svårigheter uppstått sig. Bl.a. har G-S efter detta samtal lyckats för 4 utväxlingar i hamn. Den ena gäller en kvinna som många år hållits inspärrad. Denna kvinna berättade för G-S att hennes namn hållits hemligt för vakterna, som dock kände henne under ett nummer. Transporten till Berlin hade omgäts med stor hemlighetsfullhet, i en charterplan, och en KGB generel hade personligen överlämnat henne vid utväxlingen.

G-S hade sig vara fullt övertygad om att den alltjämt lever och att han är den luckade man kommer fram med om vi acceptera anbudet.

G-S har inte omtalat för Generalkonsuln vad som förekommit mellan kontaktsmannen och G-S i annan mån än att G-S på Generalkonsulns fråga "om det var något nytt" förklarade att saken Spruckit.

(4)

G-S. har förtagit denna resa för att närvara vid en konferens som hans organisation arrangerar i Lund. G-S kommer att resa med till Lund lördagen den 28/10 och stannar i Lund till 1/11 67.

Samma dag som G-S. överste från Berlin träffade han den "beringeché" kontaktsmannen som då fick veta att G-S. skulle företaga en resa till Sverige.

Kontaktsmannen som G-S för första gången nämnde vid namn, ville då veta om G-S också skulle besöka Stockholm. Detta bekräftade G-S, och kontaktsmannen ville då veta om G-S skulle söka kontakt i RW-Sw affären. G-S bekräftade detta.
Överste

Enär G-S genom sin organisation ej fått resekostnaderna för sträckan Lund-Stockholm ersatta, har jag ersatt honom med 500:- kronor för täckande av resekostnad och tillägg i Stockholm, hotell m.m.

Stockholm den 27/10 1967

Otto Danielson

G-S har fortfarande betygsmär med sitt tjänstepass. Ett diplomatpass vore honom till stor hjälp.

Jag lovar att understödja denna hans önskan om jag fick något tillfälle på brästa ort.

Jag sade åt G-S beträffande den sista utredningsföreläggelsen att det blott var 4 män - han själv inräknad som hönde till detta steg. Jag poängterade att om saken nu kommer ut måste det vara på grund av någon av dessa 4 män. G-S förklarade att han säkerligen blir inbjuden för frågor av generalkonsuln, men att blott skulle sitta med en axel lagledning och att han ansåg att saken spekuleras.

* Unders. utredningsföreläggelsen är utredningsföreläggelsen (to be checked)



REGERINGSKANSLIET

TELEFAX

Sid. 1 (1)

1997-10-21

Dnr 145 ✓

P 2 ECU I

Utrikesdepartementet

EI/ESEK

Lage Olson

Telefon 08 - 405 3280

Delges:

Haggård, P-L

Exp. 97-10-21

Ambassaden Washington

Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet

Ambassaden bemyndigas utbetala 2 000 USD till Susanne Berger, 4793 Williamsburg Blvd, Arlington, VA 22207, tel. (703) 237-0946 . Berger är utomstående expert i Raoul Wallenberg-arbetsgruppen och avser avresa till Moskva i början av november för fortsatta efterforskningar i RW-ärendet. Beloppet redovisas med avräkningsbesked. Finansiering: 105, verksamhetskod: 25112 och kostnadsställe: EC. Berger kontaktar ambassaden.

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Exp. 97-10-21

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RAOUL WALLENBERG

DRAFT REPORT OF THE SWEDISH-RUSSIAN WORKING GROUP

Contents

To Lape Olson
Swedish Foreign Ministry
Stockholm

FROM: Susan Mesmer

These are my proof reading and
historical notes only,

Preface

Ever since his abduction by Soviet troops in Budapest in January 1945, Raoul Wallenberg's life's work and fate have captured the imagination of many people all over the world. Largely because of this, he still attracts as much attention as he ever did.

The fate that befell Raoul Wallenberg became the biggest and most protracted individual case dealt with by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The length of time it has taken is of course extremely regrettable, but no more than fitting considering the strong commitment involved. We owe it, quite simply, to the memory of Raoul Wallenberg and his heroic efforts in Budapest. Nor should the efforts of his colleagues be forgotten.

Recent political developments in Russia have enabled us to enlist the help of the Russian authorities in our search for the true fate of the Swedish diplomat. We had high hopes of gaining full enlightenment with the help of the new, open and more veracious Russia. We have received considerable co-operation. Unfortunately, we still do not have a complete, legally tenable account of Raoul Wallenberg's fate or the reason for his arrest, despite the tremendous effort made by everyone involved. Documents appear to have been destroyed, key persons have died or do not remember. It is not therefore possible to close the Raoul Wallenberg file, although it is our hope that this account will contribute further towards increasing our knowledge about him.

In a speech in the Swedish Parliament to commemorate the 50th anniversary of Raoul Wallenberg's abduction from Budapest, I sought to describe his person on the basis of three key words - action, passion and (self-evident) commitment.

We are all aware of his achievements. Together with his colleagues, Raoul Wallenberg saved thousands of lives in Budapest. With little time at his disposal, he wasted none of it. The need to act grew unceasingly and took complete hold on him. He realised the risk of delay, the damage done by not acting in time. Timely preventive action is essentially a matter of respect for life and human dignity. With this in mind, he and his colleagues drafted a plan during the last weeks in Budapest for the future and rehabilitation of the Jewish people left in Hungary. In other words, in the midst of the intolerably harsh rescue work, and the chaos of the final battle, he was making plans for survival and the future.

*Call for
Resolution*

*Question of
"R. Construction"*

Passion and fellow feeling are needed for action and achieving results. Raoul Wallenberg possessed both in abundance. Despite the abhorrent events in Budapest, his quick-fire humour brought pleasure to his fellow humans and fired them to great exploits.

Moreover, his self-evident commitment was Raoul Wallenberg's invisible companion. He did not ask what should be done. He did not need a decision-making process in the face of evil. His unerring inner moral compass indicated the path that he should take.

Raoul Wallenberg thus set an example, showing that action is possible and necessary. We need not always be prepared or take a formal decision to do what is right. He showed that we are all capable of meeting a challenge.

Jan Eliasson

1. INTRODUCTION

This report describes the findings of the Swedish-Russian Working Group on Raoul Wallenberg, which was commissioned to investigate his fate in September 1991. They are mainly but not exclusively based on what has emerged from Russian sources. The aim was to reach full enlightenment concerning the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. However, although the Russian records in particular were thoroughly searched, no legally tenable proof has been found, and there is no question of this being the final report. Nor is it comprehensive. As far as can be judged, work remains to be done in Russia and further investigation is required in other countries (See Chapter XIV).

Nonetheless, it is reasonable to report on what has been accomplished over as long a period as six years. On the basis of discovered documents and recorded testimony, the arguments put forward about Raoul Wallenberg's fate must be described as probable but inconclusive more or less probable hypotheses. It is to be hoped that they will focus attention on the unresolved issues. Given the absence of completely reliable evidence, the character of the report differed unavoidably from the 1957 White Paper, which was based on legally tenable testimony.

This is not a joint Swedish-Russian report. Each group has written its own account, as this was deemed the most practicable in view of the lengthy discussions that have taken place. Nevertheless, Russian comment was sought and largely taken into account, as were Swedish views on the

unless I
misunderstand,
the "legally
tenable testimony"
is oral testimony
as affidavit.

Something
must be said
which clarifies
to the press or average

reader what constitutes conclusive, or a
paper trail etc. versus oral - need to verify

Russian manuscript. Only this introduction is common to both texts, together with the description of the way the work was planned and carried out.

From the start, the Working Group decided on an open approach, so that much that follows is already known. For example, most of the Russian documents that were discovered have already been published. This was not without negative consequences, particularly in that many of the people interviewed were unable to separate their own experiences from what they read in newspapers or published papers. On the other hand, it would have been difficult to justify classifying the information as secret over a long period of time. Nor did the Working Group wish to create an impression of exaggerated secrecy. However, some documents are mentioned for the first time, and are listed in a separate appendix together with the results of a large number of interviews with former members of the Soviet security organisation.

A great deal has been written about Raoul Wallenberg over the years. Private enquiries take up the greatest amount of space in the records of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Ministry issued White Papers in 1957 and 1965 and, in 1982, published about 90 per cent of the documents in the Wallenberg files for the 1944 -1969 period. A large number of papers have also been released this year, including all those covering the period up to 1970. Many books have been published.

by the CIA A substantial number of official American documents on Raoul Wallenberg were released in 1994 and are listed here because of their relevance in this context. Although the facts are well known, it was also thought appropriate to include a short recapitulation of Raoul Wallenberg's achievements in Budapest in this report.

The Working group would like to extend warm thanks everyone who helped in the acquisition of material about Raoul Wallenberg. The Swedish members direct their thanks primarily to the Russian members of the working group, as well as the numerous officials working in Russian archives who have taken great pains with this inquiry. It should be stressed that searching records is a time-consuming process in itself. Moreover, these key people have had a very heavy workload in the past few years, especially because the search took place during a very intensive and revolutionary period in

Russian politics. It, in turn, had brought about the requisite conditions which made this kind of work at all possible. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that several inquiries were taking place simultaneously, each aiming to solve historical enigmas and often with the same archive experts in the main roles. This was another reason for the delay in the work.

It is no exaggeration to say that access to the inquiry into Raoul Wallenberg pioneered access to Russian records. Unique insights were made and many Russian archives' officials have felt it a point of honour to make a thorough contribution to our work.

Our thanks should also go to all those people in different countries, official representatives, private individuals and journalists alike, who have contributed to the inquiry in various ways. Members of the Memorial Group in Moscow, including Arseniy Roginskiy, Nikita Petrov and Gennady Kuzovkin, have all given invaluable assistance. Sven G Holtsmark, of the Norwegian Defence College Institute, has contributed with valuable comments and references to Wallenberg documents in the records of the Russian Foreign Ministry.

We hope that the publication and dissemination of this report in Swedish, Russian and English may perhaps lead to further progress or the discovery of new information. Chapter XIV contains recommendations concerning follow-up.

II PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING THE WORK

The joint Swedish-Russian working group began work in September 1991, about a month after the unsuccessful August coup. The background is as follows. By 1989, the advent of perestroika and the policy of glasnost brought about more open reporting in Russian mass media on the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. His photograph appeared on Soviet television and resulted in a large number of witnesses coming forward from inside the Soviet Union. Many were former military personnel who had met Wallenberg in January 1945 at the time of the invasion of Budapest.

Particular
thanks to
Maurice Holsten
Susan Masina
of the ARK
Project

Susanne Berger
working in
connection
w/ Dr. Guy
von Dardel
Rus's half
brother

who besides
VALACH
?

It was also growing easier to discuss the case in an unbiased manner with official Soviet representatives, although they mainly kept to the 1957 version, i.e., that Raoul Wallenberg died of a heart attack in Lubyanka Prison on 17 July 1947, as reported in prison doctor Smoltsov's report to Minister of Security Abakumov.

High-ranking officials of the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the KGB received representatives of the ^{in Dardel} Wallenberg family and the Wallenberg Committee in ^{of Stockholm} October 1989, handing over several items that once belonged to Raoul Wallenberg. They including his passport, diary (containing, *inter alia*, an interesting list of addresses in Budapest), banknotes of various denominations and a prison registration card. The Soviet officials claimed that they had recently found them in a basement archives of the KGB when refurbishment took place. The Swedish visitors were also shown the original Smoltsov report.

Specifically his
status as
prisoner of war
This is
important

An interesting development took place in 1990, when the opportunity arose for an international commission under Professor Guy von Dardel, Raoul Wallenberg's stepbrother, to look through the card filing system and files of some foreign inmates at the Vladimir Prison. Cards of interest were video filmed and systemized. Although no card was found relating to Raoul Wallenberg, it was possible to confirm that the testimony of several witnesses, mainly from the 1950s, had been largely correct with regard to details about their cells and dates of imprisonment. ^{In addition,}

The researchers were allowed to copy 1,400 cards of eye witnesses, foreign prisoners, brothers, who match RW's description in part for a future in-depth analysis.

Several contacts between Swedish and Soviet authorities took place in 1990 and early 1991. The then head of the KGB, Kryuchkov, received the Swedish ambassador, Ö Berner, and undertook to release all the KGB employees with some knowledge of the matter from their pledge of secrecy.

At a meeting with the Swedish ambassador in the ^SSpring 1991, the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the KGB proposed setting up a joint working group comprising official representatives from both countries. The purpose would be to obtain more information about Raoul Wallenberg based on specific and carefully formulated questions.

After the coup of 19 - 21 August, events moved rapidly. The new KGB chief, Bakatin, met Swedish officials a few days after his appointment, and was

able to hand over new documents which had probably been found much earlier. He gave instructions to intensify the investigation and we reached agreement on the constitution of the joint working group. Work on the Russian side later received the support of a decree from the President of the Soviet Union and a directive from the executives of the relevant authorities. The Russian President, ^{Boris Yeltsin} later reaffirmed these instructions.

The Russian representatives consisted of officials from the Foreign Ministry (from the Second European desk and Records), the KGB and the organisations which succeeded it, MB and FSK/FSB, the Ministry for the Interior and Defence Ministry: Sergei Zhuravlov, Vladimir Sokolov, Viktor Tatarintsev, Konstatin Kosatchov (MID), Vladimir Vinogradov and Andrei Ziborov (FSB), Velery Filippov (Defence Ministry) and Konstatin Nikishkin (Ministry of the Interior). Periodically, other officials also took part, together with Nikolai Arzannikov, an "independent" representative from the Russian Federal Assembly and the Memorial Group.

Best to
put name
of individuals
with their
correct
ministry

Close contact was also maintained with General Dimitri Volkogonov, former colleague of President Yeltsin, Rudolf Pichoja, head of the Russian archives service and Anatoly Prokopenko, former head of the ^(GAB?) Special Archives.

The Swedish group comprised officials from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Hansa Magnusson, Martin Hallqvist, Björn Lyrvall and Lage Olson) and the Swedish Embassy in Moscow; also Professor Guy von Dardel and, as a consultant, Carl Persson, former National Police Commissioner. In addition, Dr Marvin D Makinen, USA, has participated at most meetings as expert. From the beginning, Sweden reserved the right to call in independent experts and the contributions from Susan Mesina and Susanne Berger should receive special mention. ^{of the ARK Project}

The idea of allowing the Soviet/Russian public prosecution authority to take on the case was discussed several times. The first this happened it was noted that the KGB possessed the appropriate investigative expertise and that the crime in question was statute-barred. Other considerations were discussed later on, but it was decided that little or no advantage would be gained from another mode of procedure. The possibility was also discussed whether the inquiry should be wholly or partly taken over by some of the committees established after 1991 for the rehabilitation of victims of

What
"crime"
the one done to
Raul or
Raul's
crime/
charges/
sentences
which should be
defined for the
reader -
?

if the
case
or
lead
it
out

*Yakovlev
in English*

repression or human rights issues. This was also shelved for various reasons. Nevertheless, the working group received support from Sergei Kovalyov's Committee for Human Rights and Alexander Jakoblev's Committee for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Repression. Raoul Wallenberg's fate was of course taken up at every high level bilateral contact. The joint declaration signed by President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Carl Bildt in February 1993 stated that they would work to reach full clarity in the case. Moreover, both the President of the USA and the Federal Republic of Germany have shown their commitment, as has the new Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan and leading Israeli representatives.

Since its inception six years ago, the Working Group has held a total of 14 formal meetings. A large number of informal meetings in small groups has also taken place.

*(give Russian
initials)*

The Working Group agreed from the start that three principal lines of inquiry would be pursued. First, relevant Russian records would be examined. Papers from Swedish records were also made available to the Russian side, and in due course we received access to other records, including American archives. Second, several former officials from the Soviet Security Service were to be found and interviewed. The interviews took place jointly in a small group. In addition, talks with other key persons such as former officials and politicians, were held, mainly by the Swedish representatives. The third line of inquiry consisted of reporting at meetings of the working group on the results of interviews and record searches, the analysis of various hypotheses and drawing up guidelines for future work.

TP

A large proportion of the work was carried out on the basis of specific questions and witnesses' testimony submitted from the Swedish side. Bearing in mind the particular allegations sometimes made in public debate, it should be emphasised that this work was pursued in a completely unbiased manner. No evidence, hypothesis or suggestion was discarded in advance. Some testimony was set aside only after thorough examination. In principle, the inquiry was based on the testimony of witnesses and other information covering the entire period from 1944 until about 1990. Because of the Soviet claim that Raoul Wallenberg died in 1947, special care was taken in examining material relating to the 1945-1957 period, with particular attention paid to 1947. The years 1956 and 1957 were also examined closely, as this was when the Soviet Government took up a new position regarding the fate of the Swedish diplomat.

*I remember
Mr. Vozzradov
met me the
following
autumn
at the Nov.
1994 meeting -*

1945-1947

1947 - what happened then

1947-1957

Police considerations

*SHOULD
SPELL
OUT THAT
THEY OVERTURNED
THE VISHINSKY
CLAIM OF AUG. 1947*

The inquiry was not restricted to examining papers and other information about Raoul Wallenberg. We also endeavoured to obtain material about his driver, Wilmos Langfelder, and fellow inmates, chiefly Willy Roedel, who was his cellmate for the longest period of time, together with those people who testified in the late 1940s and early 1950s about Raoul Wallenberg's sojourn in Soviet prisons and camps. In addition, documents about the Swiss diplomats whom the Russians also arrested in Budapest in 1945 have proved to be an interesting analogy.

- Examining the records

Records were examined during a period of dramatic change in the former Soviet archives system, both with regard to access and organisation. In some cases, names changed and organisations altered more than once.. The archives listed below were given special scrutiny, as a rule mainly by Russian archives officials. With few exceptions, foreigners were not generally given free access to examine Russian archives - which should be borne in mind when considering the Working Group's report. Moreover, the regulations for gaining admittance have been gradually tightened up. However, permission was granted for Swedish investigators to study original files, and they were also in touch with independent Russian archive experts with access to the records. In the case of records held outside Moscow, both the KGB/FSB and MVD wrote repeatedly to all local authorities, prisons and camps requesting that they made a thorough search of their records. In the case of Raoul Wallenberg and Wilmos Langfelder, researchers were charged with looking not only for their correctly spelled names but for similar and possibly wrongly-spelled variations.

The following are relevant archives, giving their present designations.

1. The Russian State Records (*Gosudarstvennaja archivnaja sluzhba Rossii*). Responsible for several government archives.
2. Centre for Modern Documentation (*Tsentr sovremennoj dokumentatsii, RTsSD*). Formerly the Central Committee archives, it contains material from the Communist Party Secretariat and departments of the Central Committee for the post-1953 period. Some older material is also held there.

3. Russian Centre for the Storage and Study of Contemporary Historical Documents (*Rossijskij tsentr chranenija i izutjenja dokumentov novejszej istorii, RTsChIDNI*). Previously the archives of the Central Party, with archival groups from the Communist Party Central Committee - secretariat, departments, personal material from prominent communists, international communist movement, government defence committee etc., for the period from the Russian revolution until 1953.

4. Archives of the Russian President, formerly known as the Kremlin Archives. The most important material from the two above-mentioned archives has been transferred here. It also contains top secret material in sealed envelopes which was search by the Russian side (D Volkogonov) at the request of the Swedish group. Apart from being told that these envelopes did not contain anything about Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish group has not been informed about their contents

5. Russian Central State Archives (*Tsentralnyj gosudarstvennyj archiv Rf, TsGA*) contain material from the Council of the Peoples' Commissars, Council of Ministers, social organisations, central ministries, including the NKVD, NKGB etc, but only such material that the organisations considered suitable to release.

6. Central deposit of historical document collections (*Tsentr chranenija istoriko-dokumentalnych kollekcij*). This contains prize material taken from Germany, including German confiscations from France, Austria, Holland and other countries during the Second World War. In addition, it contains the records of the Prisoners of War Board and about repatriation cases. It also contained material from the operative committee records nr 451 at the NKVD/MVD:s executive committee for questions concerning war prisoners and internees (see report in Appendix A).

7. Russian foreign policy records, i.e., records and material from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the post-1937 period.

8. Central records of the Ministry of Defence.

9. Ministry of the Interior (MVD) Centre for the rehabilitation of victims of political terror and archive information. This also holds the central records of the ministry including those of the NKVD and MVD with subordinate departments. The Ministry is also responsible for operative card index registers containing details of every person subjected to criminal investigation in the Soviet Union, all regional MVD records and the card index registers for individual camps and prisons.

10. National Army records. These include records of the National Army Executive which was responsible for moving prisoners of war, and of individual units.

11. Federal security service archives (FSB), i.e., the records of the former KGB and subsidiary records, and are located at several places in Russia.

12. Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) records. Very little material is claimed to have been found there.

The Swedish group also inquired about the indictments against the former NKVD chief L. Beria and Minister of State Security V.S. Abakumov at the time of their arrest and later execution. According to the Russian group, no information about Wallenberg was found among these papers.

In the collection of papers made available to the public following the publication of this report, archive material was divided into four sections for the sake of simplicity. This represents more closely the time of acquisition of the documents (chiefly in 1991).

- A. Former KGB records
- B. Former Central Committee records
- C. Central records of the Ministry of Defence
- D. Records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Lists of documents examined from the former KGB records, Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Defence are found in Appendix 1 The most important of them are reproduced in this report. In all, some 200 documents were obtained from the Russian side. The Americans have also submitted a considerable number of documents (see Chapter VI). Searches were also made in

Have they?
I have —
Hear Senator
Levin but
as a whole
my govt. has
done nothing.

Considerable number of documents were
declassified and made available from
American archives thanks to the
persistent efforts of Senator Carl Levin. //

Hungarian and British records, the former through the kind assistance of Peter Beltay. Little of interest was found in the archives of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A large proportion of the Hungarian Security Service records appear to have been destroyed or are inaccessible.

However, some material was acquired from unofficial sources. British records also held very little of interest. The Wallenberg files at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs were of course a constant source of reference. Moreover, Carl Persson has examined the Swedish security police records. A large proportion of its contents (inquiries, hearing of testimony) is also found in the archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Wartime records, the National Archives and Swedish military intelligence records were also examined.

It should be pointed out that some foreign archives may still contain unreleased documents which would bring more light to bear on the actions and fate of Raoul Wallenberg.

Declassified
You have to
note that
British
classification
is until
the year
2045,

CAPTION
THIS.
You are
shifting
from
General
History/
policy
archives
to
Prison
Records.

The following should also be pointed out concerning Russian records. A number of documents and files that should exist have not been found. This includes some KGB documents which should have been drawn up in the post-1945 years and in the 1950s. There was no note on file stating that they had been destroyed, which was normal procedure but several signs that this had happened.

Personal files are opened for each prisoner after his arrest and imprisonment. So-called investigation or inquiry files are opened first after judgment is passed. Some prisoners were never sentenced, Raoul Wallenberg among them, so that there is no investigation file for them. Many of the most important war prisoners first received a sentence in 1950-51, often to 25 years imprisonment. Not only is Raoul Wallenberg's personal file missing but those of his fellow prisoners as well, although they should have been kept indefinitely. It is known that they once existed.

The more operative files (written during the course of the investigation) once extant would undoubtedly have been very interesting, but this kind of material was not saved for very long. Furthermore, it should be remembered that some cases were dealt with by telephone, particularly at the highest political level.

decisions were committed orally
or orders were given
orally.

This statement strikes me as
false or a "leap" of faith. For sure there
isn't this in it.

The reality is
that no
country is
going to
expose its
operative files
to anyone from
outside (A) and only
with appropriate
security clearance (B).
NOTE - Mr. Vinogradov,

the usual phrase is "we have as extensive as possible" - not "we have as extensive as possible" - not "we have as extensive as possible"

U.S.S.R. HANET define the cou

The best preserved records appear to be those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They comprise some dozen archive groups belonging to the then fifth European department (Scandinavia), the Foreign Secretary and relevant Deputy Foreign Ministers. They were also examined by the Swedish group, with the exception of the separately-held coded telegrams. ^{for which no} permission was granted to examine them. However, according to the records section of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the telegrams contained nothing of interest to the case. The Russian group also studied the Ministry of Foreign Affairs records relating to Hungary, Rumania and the work of the Allied Control Commission. but . . . (?)

At the same time, some documents were preserved which should have been destroyed according to archive regulations. ^{These} were found in unexpected places, sometimes accidentally. The records were thus not always perfect although most often in good order. (see an example)

References to Raoul Wallenberg and Langfelder in some KGB documents - solely the entries in some kind of registration ledger - had been eradicated with a black felt pen. This procedure was unique and only found in two other cases. Modern techniques have made the text legible again except where some form of mechanical erasure also occurred.

This is forensic
Separate from
this part of
discussion

Raoul Wallenberg's fingerprints were passed to the Russian group for checking although with little hope of success. The very extensive card index of fingerprints at the Ministry of the Interior is however built upon the imprints from all ten digits. Each imprint has to be checked separately, an extremely time-consuming and almost impossible task. On the other hand, the fingerprints can be easily used to identify so-called 'numbered' prisoners.

Is this forensic
also?

The Swedish side asked to search the relevant central archives together with independent experts in order to compare copies that had been obtained with the originals in the context of the archives. This request was only met insofar that the original papers have been examined. On the other hand, a large number of personal and investigative files concerning Raoul Wallenberg's fellow prisoners were made available from KGB records and all the relevant original files in the records of the MID.

Further comments concerning records are given in Chapter X, which deals with the way in which the Soviet authorities handled matters.

- Interviews

Although the highest degree of importance must be attached to documentary proof in an investigation of this kind, the ^{Working} group made considerable efforts to seek out people who had formerly served in the Soviet security organisation or with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As a result, probably almost everyone has been identified who was in direct contact with Raoul Wallenberg. Some 40 former MGB/KGB officials were interviewed altogether, and talks were held with a number of former diplomats, politicians and key members of the Central Committee.

Nearly everyone in the first category were interviewed as a group, at which representatives for the former KGB, the Swedish Embassy in Moscow and, sometimes, a member of the Russian Parliament also participated. A dozen key persons of interest were identified already at the first meeting of the Working group, but several other former security officers were identified during the course of the work, through discovered documents or information from one of the people interviewed. The high ranking security officials who were directly responsible for Raoul Wallenberg's case and the responsible politicians were already dead by the time the inquiry began. Several other people of interest also died during the course of the inquiry, before they could be heard. It should also be mentioned that several former KGB chiefs or their deputies refused to meet representatives of the Working group, their pretext being that they had no new information of interest to offer.

Those who gave evidence included officers who had taken part in the conquest of Budapest, officers and other investigators at Smersh and MGB between 1946-46 and 1946-50, prison staff at the Lefortovo, Lubyanka, Butyrka and Vladimir prisons, former officials of the Scandinavian section and records section of the KGB until the 1960s, some of the former highest ranking chiefs of the KGB and International section of the Central Committee and even some former KGB officers no longer living in Russia. Talks were also held with former Foreign Ministry officials, particularly those who had served in Molotov's secretariat.

when and where

Kaganovitch?
Bulgakov?
Molotov?

Renewed talks took place with a couple of the surviving German fellow prisoners of Raoul Wallenberg. In addition, a number of people from various parts of the former Soviet Union have testified about Raoul Wallenberg.

Most of the interviews were taped and then transcribed as part of the minutes of the interview. These will not be made public. Nor, with few exceptions, will the names of the interviewed persons be revealed. Most agreed to the talk on the express condition that they remained anonymous. On the other hand, this report will of course contain details of all items of interest that emerged during the talks.

As will be seen later, the interviews produced a number of varied and somewhat conflicting versions, which makes evaluation very difficult and they must therefore be treated with caution.

In several forthcoming chapters the information is classified according to whether it originates from records or an oral source. Here and there this has the effect of making the report difficult to read and grasp, but the weight carried by the two types of sources was deemed to vary and should therefore be treated separately.

III. POLITICAL BACKGROUND - The USSR 1944-1957

As a contribution to the better understanding of the line of reasoning in the report on Raoul Wallenberg's arrest, and the way in which the Soviet authorities dealt with it, the following brief outline traces the development of political constellations among Soviet leaders, and those of the security organisation in particular, from the end of the Second World War until 1957 ~~in the first place~~, when the so-called Gromyko memorandum was handed to the Swedish Ambassador in Moscow.

The most significant political body during the war years was not the Politbureau, which met relatively seldom, but the State Defence Committee, led by Stalin. This committee took all the crucial decisions about the conduct of the war. From the start its members included Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov and Beria. Bulganin and Abakumov were later additions. Next to

Stalin, Molotov had the strongest position, which he retained for some of the post-war years. In a recently published book, Alexander Yakovlev, a former member of the Politbureau, stated that Molotov could order arrests and executions during the war and subsequent years. He sanctioned the arrest of many Soviet and foreign citizens as late as in 1949.

Headed by
Abakumov.

The powerful security organisation under Beria was split in three in April 1943; the NKVD (with Beria still its chief), the NKGB (headed by Merkulov) and the counter espionage organisation later known as Smersh and placed under military general staff. As a result of these changes, Abakumov, as chief of Smersh, was no longer subordinate to Beria or Merkulov, thus reducing Beria's formal power as head of the NKVD. Nevertheless, he continued to exercise considerable influence through Merkulov and his first deputy, Bogdan Kobulov, one of Beria's henchmen. Another of Beria's men, Dekanozov became Deputy Foreign Minister in 1944. Beria also possessed considerable power from having been a member of the State Defence Committee from the outset and its Vice Chairman from 1944.

Beria handed over his post as head of the NKVD to his deputy, Kruglov, in January 1945. The NKVD and NKGB were renamed MVD and MGB respectively in March the same year, as part of the transition from a system of commissariats to ministries. During that year and for some years to come, Beria was also mainly responsible for the project to produce the first Soviet atomic bomb. He still supervised the police and intelligence establishments, however, as Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Beria and Malenkov also became full members of the Politbureau in 1945, making Beria the third most powerful person in the country.

You should
link
Abakumov
to Raoul
by establishing
that RW
was
arrested
by SMERSH
under special
Request to Bulganin...

Abakumov succeeded Merkulov as Minister of Security, i.e., head of the MGB, in the summer of 1946. Some months earlier, Smersh ^{was} ~~had been~~ dissolved and integrated into the MGB. This could be regarded at least in part as an effect of Stalin's efforts to curb Beria's influence over the intelligence service. We know that Abakumov later had an almost permanent assignment to collect incriminating information about Beria. The relationship between Beria and Abakumov was not entirely clearcut, and mainly perceived as filled with conflict and competitiveness. However, as Khrushchev pointed out, Abakumov hardly ever undertook anything

per Abakumov
January 1945

important without first ensuring Beria's support, although this could not have been the case in the 1945-51 period. Neither substantiate or leave out

As an effective counterfoil to the recently established CIA, Stalin decided to merge MGB and GRU military intelligence in the autumn of 1947 to form the Information Committee (KI), which even came to incorporate the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Molotov was its first head, followed by Vyshinsky; with Fedotov as deputy head. However, all GRU personnel were withdrawn from KI the following year, and Abakumov launched an unsuccessful campaign to obtain control over the rest of the organisation, which was dissolved in 1951.

Molotov's position was undermined from 1948, when Stalin ordered the arrest of his Jewish wife. Officially, Molotov remained second in the hierarchy even in 1949, but was forced to resign as Foreign Minister and was replaced initially by Vyshinsky, who had been one of his deputies, then by Gromyko in —

Beria still retained some supervision over the security services in the early 1950s, but Abakumov often reported directly to Stalin, by-passing Beria.

Abakumov's turn came in June 1951 however. He was arrested, accused of having known about but kept secret a Jewish bourgeois plot linked to the CIA. The exact reason for Abakumov's arrest was of course known only to Stalin. In any case, this was the prelude to the great rigged trials in Eastern Europe and the so-called Doctors' Plot in the winter of 1952-53. These trials had a strong element of anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism.

Beria ignored Abakumov's plea for help from prison but suffered a setback himself when Stalin appointed Ignatiev as Abakumov's successor. By 1952, the increasingly paranoid Stalin began to suspect everyone, including Beria. Khrushchev encouraged ^{who} him in his intrigues against Beria ^{Stalin} and ^{had} also started to place his protégés in the security services, including Ignatiev, the new chief of the MBV.

After Stalin's death in 1953, the MVD and MGB merged under Beria's leadership, and Ignatiev was dismissed. Kruglov, Serov and Kobulov became the first Deputy Ministers for Security. The following year, after Khrushchev had arrested and executed Beria (summer 1953), Kruglov became head of the new MVD but was replaced shortly afterwards by Khrushchev's man, Serov, when the KGB was established. From then on,

Is this
JOINT
related?
It must be.
Reference arrest
Sentence of
R. VOGLER,
Tungoram
Rep from the
USA/CIA,
1949 -
Reference
Tungoram
US Board -
link to bmt.

CHARGES
against Beria?

extraneous
to the RW
case

the security services were under more rigorous party control than hitherto. Abakumov was executed in December the same year after a trial at which he was mainly accused of fabricating the Leningrad affair (when Zhdanov and his faction were eliminated). The accusation was really intended for Malenkov, whom Khrushchev was trying to outmanoeuvre with the aid of Bulganin and the KGB under Serov.

in the

The Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956 meant that Khrushchev made his well-known general attack against Stalinist repression as well as the Anti-Party Group, i.e., Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov and Shepilov, who opposed a far-reaching revision of Stalin's policy. However, Molotov

continued as Foreign Minister until June 1956. This meant that he and the KGB chief, Serov, were in control during the first phase of drafting the new Soviet position on the Wallenberg case which followed the visit of Erlander and Hedlund at the end of March-April. They had handed over some very convincing evidence from the German and other former war prisoners.

Molotov remained head of the Presidium (i.e. Politbureau) and Deputy Prime Minister even after Shepilov succeeded him as Foreign Minister.

Khrushchev's decisive success, however, came in June 1957. Although in the majority at the Presidium, Molotov and his group had no support in the Central Committee. Khrushchev exploited this. With the help of the army and KGB, he quickly summoned the Central Committee to a meeting which resulted in the Molotov group being forced to stand down.

How is
this
relevant
to the case
of the
documents?

IV. SOVIET SECURITY SERVICES 1945-1947

The military Counter Intelligence agency, Smersh ("Smert' sjiplomam" - death to spies) played a key role in the arrest of Raoul Wallenberg and the first phase of his imprisonment in Moscow. Smersh was set up mainly to collect information about morale in the ^{enemy's} army and war industry and the situation in the occupied territories. A Smersh unit accompanied all advancing Soviet troops and combed occupied areas for war criminals, spies or simply for anyone thought to possess interesting information. In Hungary alone, at least 100,000 people ~~certainly~~ passed through the Smersh machinery.

Colonel Kartashov was head of the Second Department of the Third Main Directorate of Smersh, and responsible for Raoul Wallenberg's case. He was

① didn't
SMERSH
infiltrate in
advance of
Soviet-
occupation

② didn't
they remove
(arrest/detain)
key figures
in the

opposition leadership -
military, diplomatic
counter intelligence

I can give you many specific examples
(besides Raoul)

probably the security officer under Smersh chief Abakumov who knew most about Raoul Wallenberg, and in any case had the main responsibility for him. Kartashov died in 1979. His successor is alive and was interviewed in 1991. Abakumov, together with several of his closest colleagues, was executed in 1954. His chief bodyguard is still alive, however, and has provided some interesting information.

Kartashov had several heads of section working under him, together with authorised operatives (low-ranking security officials) who took care of the routine interrogation of prisoners of war. Several of the operatives simultaneously acted as interpreters. They had the task of asking certain questions and could also handle individual cases, although responsibility for investigations was at a higher level or the Department for Special Affairs. The latter was otherwise specially responsible for Abwehr and Gestapo prisoners and for preparing Soviet participation in the Nuremberg process. A summons to interrogation was recorded in a special ledger, giving the name of the chief interrogator and containing a receipt signed by the prisoner. However, it appears that the most senior chiefs sometimes wrote the name of a subordinate or interpreter in the ledger. This was the case especially when the Minister of Security himself led an interrogation. Normally, minutes were taken, although not infrequently an order was given to leave them incomplete.

what division
was
Koppanyausk?
?

The working group managed to interview several rank and file members of Kartashov's department. They included the two best interpreters into German who were usually assigned to sensitive cases, such as interpreting for the Minister of Security Abakumov when he was in charge of an interrogation. Some details emerged connected to Raoul Wallenberg but nothing decisive enough to solve the mystery. The interpreter/authorised operative who, according to the ledger, interrogated Raoul Wallenberg, claimed not to remember any such interrogation. Several of those whom the working group interviewed clearly remembered many of the circumstances, but their recollections became vaguer the closer we approached the essential issue. However, the group interviewed one interpreter called in from another department, who claimed to have participated in an interrogation of Raoul Wallenberg in the spring of 1947.

Any statement
regarding
the
subject
matter?

Even so -
don't they
remember
the topic

One of the main reasons for the inability of researchers to obtain more substance from these interviews appears to be due the rigid working discipline that prevailed; everyone was urged to keep strictly to their own tasks and not show interest in their colleagues' work. Traces are still discernible of this spirit of Stalinist times and their strict loyalty to the security service.

Is this FITIN?
FITIN/OSIPOV
are also
important

With the disbanding of Smersh in 1946, Kartashov's department transferred to the MGB, still under Abakumov, where it became Department 4 of the Third Division. The following year, cases involving important foreign prisoners of war were gradually transferred to the Inquiries Department of the MGB/KGB Second Division (counter espionage), where they remained. The Working Group has talked to some officials who had some contact with Raoul Wallenberg while working in the department in the 1950s. None was fully conversant with his fate, however, which would have been known only to the absolute top-level chiefs, although even at this level the knowledge could gradually have been lost.

This does not
line with the
declassified
documents
(1991) altho
it may be
true.

Smersh/MGB also maintained rigorous secrecy towards outsiders and the foreign ministry in particular. Not until the end of 1946 did they receive private confirmation of Raoul Wallenberg's detention (although Molotov may have personally known about it from the start). According to available information, the intelligence service dealing with foreign affairs (First Division -PGU) does not appear to have been involved in the arrest of Raoul Wallenberg. Nevertheless, there are strong suspicions that it could, and should, have supplied information that contributed to the decision to arrest him, mainly from the "residentura" in Stockholm and probably from agents in Budapest as well. Written applications to SVR resulted in the answer that no such material exists in their records. There are also some who maintain that the PGU endeavoured to persuade Smersh/MGB (Abakumov) to hand over Raoul Wallenberg in order to recruit him in some way.

Sounds too
general - or
iffy - I
would
mention
Kollantay
and perhaps
Tolstoy-
Kutuzov.

Abakumov had four deputy ministers, one of whom was interviewed in 1991 when he was over 90 years old. Unfortunately, military counterespionage (i.e., surveillance of the armed forces) had been his responsibility so there was little he could contribute to the Raoul Wallenberg case. He also stressed that Kartashov's section reported direct to Abakumov and not through intermediaries.

This isn't quite true. Numbered prisoners in Vladimir were not yet sentenced. Became named prisoners with sentencing - e.g. MERKIS.

Then as later, important war prisoners went through an investigative phase, mainly at the Lubianka, Lefortovo (a notorious interrogation prison) and Butyrka prisons in Moscow. Prisoners were housed in the Vladimir prison outside Moscow only after sentencing. The majority of the more important war prisoners were first sentenced in 1950-51. By then, it had been decided that no war prisoner would be held unless sentenced. Some of the prison guards and medical personnel from the above prisons were interviewed, although unfortunately none of higher rank. Only one remembered Raoul Wallenberg with any certainty. Security was also rigorous in the prison and ~~the~~ each employee had carefully restricted tasks, making it impossible for him to acquire a full picture of a prisoner, his identity or his situation. Lubianka was the most important prison but at the same time had the mildest regime. Prison director Mironov was under the direct and personal command of Abakumov, reporting only to him on everything concerning Lubianka Prison.

important decided see the
prison murder
knew, because
Raoul Johnson
son and Susan
able for their
n. # of
the Japan
personal and
turning who
were value
and not
sentence
ign I could
ure gave
to some a lot

Conditions in Lefortovo Prison were distinctly worse and even foreign prisoners appear to have been subject to at least some mental torture including noise (voices in the loudspeakers), lights and, according to some prisoners, the possible use of drugs as well. Individual cases of physical torture cannot be excluded (it was common practice on Russian prisoners) but was not the rule. The system of spies and microphones in the cells appears to have been common everywhere.

The system of designating the most important prisoners by a number only was primarily designed to protect their identity from the prison staff. Stalin's son, Vasily, was one such prisoner and the regulations were exceptionally rigorous for them. Guards were strictly forbidden to talk to them. However, between 1945-47 Raoul Wallenberg was imprisoned in his own name although otherwise surrounded by a high degree of secrecy.

V. RAOUL WALLENBERG IN BUDAPEST

The primary task of the Swedish-Russian working group was not to scrutinise Raoul Wallenberg's work in Budapest in detail except where it was significant for his later fate. Very little has emerged that was not previously

known. This is not to say that a future search in some records may well throw further light on the events in Budapest. Nevertheless, it is important to the report as a whole to recapitulate briefly the course of events in Budapest and the background to Wallenberg's assignment.

- Background to Raoul Wallenberg's assignment

President Roosevelt decided to set up the War Refugee Board (WRB) in January 1944. It became part of the presidential Executive Office, run by ministers of the Treasury, War Office and ^{State Dept} Foreign Affairs. John Pehle was its first executive director. The aim of the Board was to combat Nazi efforts to exterminate ethnic groups on grounds of race, religion or political conviction. In other words, to attempt to save as many threatened people as possible, especially the Jews, from the occupied territories in Europe. The Americans contacted several governments and organisations, including the Swedish Trade Union Confederation, requesting help in obtaining more information about the refugee situation and in organising the rescue procedure. The project to rescue the Jews of Hungary was one of half a dozen similar operations, although it became one of the most spectacular. The World Jewish Congress (WJC) was also involved and proposed to the Chief Rabbi in Stockholm, Dr. Marcus Ehrenpreis, that he look for a suitable person to lead the campaign to rescue the Hungarian Jews. However, Kalman Lauer was the person who suggested Raoul Wallenberg. He was the Hungarian Jewish director of the Central European Trading Company Inc. where R W worked as the company's foreign trade representative. Raoul Wallenberg had already visited Hungary and other countries once or twice in this capacity (using a diplomatic passport). Although sceptical at first, Ehrenpreis was later convinced of his suitability.

It was the
only one
not based
in a neutral
country
and relying
so heavily
on a
non-
American.

Herschel V. Johnson, the US minister to Sweden, and Iver Olsen, special representative of the War Refugee Board at the American Legation in Stockholm and of the Office for Strategic Services (precursor of the CIA) assured themselves of Raoul Wallenberg's suitability and then gained the acceptance of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the arrangements for his working in Budapest. They included providing Wallenberg with a diplomatic passport and rank of First Secretary at the Swedish Legation in Budapest, with the assignment of saving the Hungarian Jews. ~~Wallenberg would not receive specific instructions from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs~~

The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs urged the War Refugee Board to provide specific directives for Wallenberg's mission.

but from the ^{War} ~~World Refugee Board~~. The WRB and JOINT (Jewish Joint Distribution Committee) would provide him with the necessary financial resources via an account with Stockholms Enskilda Bank.

Raoul Wallenberg was given general guidelines rather than detailed instructions from the WRB. They included financial arrangements, a description of various escape routes from Hungary and a list of contacts in the Budapest area. Raoul Wallenberg was not to act openly in the name of the WRB, but could if necessary state that he was in direct communication with Stockholm where a WRB representative was placed.

Wallenberg wrote to Erik Boheman, Under Secretary of State, on 19 June stating that he had received the approval of the board of the Central European Trading Company Inc., the Pacific Trading Company (a Wallenberg-owned company) and Jacob Wallenberg, to place himself at the disposal of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The latter information implies that Raoul Wallenberg had some direct or indirect assignment for the Wallenberg Group at the time although it has not been possible to ascertain its nature or duration. However that may be, Raoul Wallenberg indicated in his letter that he would not be able to take on any business assignment while serving in Budapest. On 21 June and 6 July, the Ministry informed the legation in Budapest that Wallenberg was to be attached to the legation in order to "follow developments in the Jewish question and report to Stockholm", and to propose "suitable and realisable humanitarian initiative as well as requisite measures for post-war assistance." He was to "report in the usual manner as a secretary at the mission." It was also emphasised that while there, Wallenberg would be working under the head of mission. Raoul Wallenberg left Stockholm on 6 July 1944, arriving in Budapest on 9 July.

Operations begin

When he arrived, the Swedish Legation in Budapest was already issuing provisional passports and certificates to Jews with links to Sweden. The workload was heavy and Minister Ivan Danielsson's request for reinforcements coincided with the negotiations between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the War Refugee Board and the WJC. By early July, the deportation of Jews from the countryside was already completed, although the majority of Jews in Budapest had not yet been touched.

Important Detail:

RW was given certain unconventional privileges in order to accomplish his rescue mission.

Another important item you may wish to omit!

RW's mission was also shaped in part by the "anti-Germans" Hungarians in Stockholm - including VILMOS BOHM and Andor Gellert. This is the non-Jewish side of the Hungarian shaping of the mission, as does SOOS, HESZAROS

at GANE a mission, as does SOOS, HESZAROS

Other attempts had been made to save the Hungarian Jews. Probably the most spectacular was the negotiations between the JOINT representative, Joel Brand, and Adolf Eichman, to spare a million East European Jews in exchange for 10,000 trucks. Nothing came of the affair, however, because of the British and Russians. In point of fact, the Americans and British would have agreed to delaying tactics to stall deportations to Auschwitz, but deputy foreign minister Vyshinsky, informed the Allies in June 1944 that the Soviet Government did not feel that negotiating with the Germans on the Jewish question was at all desirable. This remained their attitude throughout the war and they applied it to various proposals for a separate peace.

No!

Himmler's
Rep -
Becher is
AMT VI
Eichmann
IV - They
compete.
Becher is
SS
Commercial
attache.
Becher is
"EAMP"
Eichmann/
Mueller are
more
"looting."

Wealthy Jews, such as the Weiss family, succeeding in buying a free passage by negotiating direct with Himmler's SS. ~~Eichmann's colleague~~ Kurt Becher, had special responsibility for the Manfred Weiss concern and met Raoul Wallenberg who later employed many former employees of the concern in his rescue organisation. He employed him

which to the best of my knowledge is NOT Manfred Weiss

Soon after his arrival, Raoul Wallenberg quickly organised his relief work under the leadership of the head of the legation, financed by the WRB (in reality JOINT) and funds raised in Hungary as well as a one-off contribution from President Roosevelt's ~~secret~~ discretionary funds. A special Department at the legation headed by Raoul Wallenberg did the work, with mainly Jewish volunteers who numbered over 300 in the last months of the operation. Raoul Wallenberg had the idea from the start of using 'protective' passports to complement the earlier provisional passports, visa certificates and Swedish Red Cross letters of protection. The number of Jews furnished with 'protective' passports grew constantly, far beyond the relatively limited group with some link with Sweden. The total number of Jews in houses under the protection of the Swedish Legation gradually rose to between 15 - 20,000 persons. In all, at least 50,000 Hungarian Jews were rescued by foreign missions and the International Red Cross, with Raoul Wallenberg rescuing at least half of them. over 100,000 documents RW as saving 100,000

TUNGSPAM
He worked with
Bitt
+ Harold
were
M-L
at the
text
been
by
the
fami

It is well known that, as the situation worsened, Raoul Wallenberg was forced to negotiate directly with Eichmann and the worst of the Hungarian fascists. His use of bribes was therefore inescapable on a number of occasions.

(in Polity, neither came thru when
and as they should)

Raoul Wallenberg wrote ten reports to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the Hungarian Jews' situation, the last dated 12 December. They were sent by diplomatic bag to the ministry in Stockholm which forwarded them to Iver Olsen at the American Legation. British documents have indicated that the United Kingdom was also well ^{informed} ~~information~~ about Wallenberg's actions and they received copies of his reports. Wallenberg had of course a large number of documents in Budapest dealing with the rescue operations which, if not destroyed, probably fell into Russian hands. Raoul Wallenberg's correspondence with Stockholm was carefully detailed in the list of despatches that were saved, and totalled 13 in the second half of 1944. The last to Stockholm was dated 4 December. His final report must therefore have been carried by someone travelling to Stockholm. The legation could also communicate with the Ministry by telegram (coded and plain text).

It was
obligatory to
share WRB
reports
between the
three
allies —

Despite his inhuman burden of work in the late autumn, Raoul Wallenberg began in November to discuss with close colleagues setting up a network to help rehabilitate deported persons at the end of the war. It was planned to use WRB funds for this rescue action as well.. This rescue plan was enlarged even further in December, with the idea of launching a large international action along the lines of the Nansen Plan. Raoul Wallenberg even drew up a plan for an organisation which, under Hungarian government supervision, would help the deportees with reconstruction work and find them employment. Raoul Wallenberg had a copy of this plan with him when he travelled to the Soviet military headquarters in Debrecen.

Per
Anger
with
Boris
L
ya

No!
Wallenberg's
personal funds,
with okay
from Marcus
G. - money
from the Soviet
still in his
account in
Stockholm,
some money
from the
Hungarian
government,
which he
hoped to
present
in
Debrecen -
hence his
trip to the
HCC

Protective power assignment

The fact that that the Swedish Legation in Budapest had undertaken to protect Soviet interests was another factor relevant to relations with the Soviet Union and Raoul Wallenberg's capture. On 20 June 1941, the Swedish Minister in Moscow, Vilhelm Assarsson, was summoned to meet the Soviet deputy foreign minister, Lozovsky. He requested that Sweden safeguard Soviet interests in Germany, Hungary and Slovakia and asked for an immediate reply, which he assumed would be positive. The following day the Swedish Government decided to agree to the request and informed Moscow straight away. On 15 July the Soviet Foreign Ministry asked the

P.O.W. - wife, a very
interesting selection

Swedish Legation in Budapest to take over 'for safekeeping' all property belonging to Soviet diplomatic, consular and trade representatives.

(7)

Denmark
Belgium
Holland
Iran
Argentina
Italy (one
of the 2
governments)
Finland

The Swedish Legation in Budapest looked after the interests of two other countries as well, this being the responsibility of Section B. The head of mission had ultimate responsibility but attaché Lars Berg was the head of section. The Russian unit began in earnest on 18 October 1944 after employing a Russian speaker known as Thomsen (or Grossheim-Krisko). He was assisted by a few other staff members of Russian origin. Although claiming to be Norwegian by birth, Thomsen had in fact been born in Rostov in Russia, although this did not come to light until he had spent six years in Soviet prison camps.

The main task of the Russian unit was to issue letters of protection and certificates in Russian and to translate signposts into Russian. The latter were used when the Soviet Army advanced into Budapest. Between 18 October and 1 December 1944 some 14 protective letters were issued to Soviet citizens. Many were refused, however, as they were normally Russian emigrants. B Section also ran a prisoner-of-war hospital for wounded Soviet soldiers. Michail Tolstoy-Kutuzov was directly responsible for this. The fully functioning prisoner-of-war hospital was handed over to the Russians in January 1945. After it was plundered by Arrow Cross followers on Christmas Eve 1944, work at B Section ground almost to a halt.

You should
let them
know that
Thomsen
was arrested
in Budapest,
where taken.

Did Raoul Wallenberg visit Stockholm in the autumn of 1944?

The alleged visit of Raoul Wallenberg to Stockholm in the autumn of 1944 is shrouded in mystery. Giving a talk at a Wallenberg hearing in Stockholm 1981, Marcus Wallenberg said that he last saw Raoul Wallenberg at lunch in his (Marcus') home while on a visit from the diplomatic mission in Budapest. Not everyone attending the talk realised how sensational this was. Baroness Kemeny-Fuchs, wife of the last Hungarian Foreign Minister before Budapest fell into Russians hands is another source. She said recently that Raoul Wallenberg assured her that he had spoken with Mme Kollontay, the then Soviet ambassador to Stockholm, about "you and the child". The Baroness had helped Raoul Wallenberg and he may therefore have wished to let the Russians know so that they would treat her well. This information also

~~Fact~~ He
had made a
commitment
to Kemeny
to get him
stationed in
Stockholm as
Ambassador.
Per Angel has verified that they
daugled this carrot

in Jewish rescue

presupposes that Raoul Wallenberg visited Stockholm in 1944, or at least had had a telephone conversation with Mme Kollontay. Finally, shortly before his death in 1995, Kurt Becher, a member of the SS, said that he heard that Raoul Wallenberg attempted to arrange a flight to Sweden in the late autumn of 1944 in a German plane, but that he tried to dissuade him from doing so. Becher died before he could be asked whether the journey really took place. Finally, A British document should be mentioned which contained the information that the Swedish diplomat was in any case expected to visit Stockholm at the end of September 1944.

Americans
also - RW
was supposed
to go at the
end of August
but for
went instead

No trace has been found of Raoul Wallenberg having visited Stockholm. It seems most unlikely that he would not get in touch with his mother, stepbrother and stepsister if he had been there. Nor is there any record of his having contacted the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. His colleagues in Budapest have never mentioned any such journey. No record of landing permits and the like has been found. Marcus Wallenberg may also have expressed himself somewhat imprecisely and perhaps referred to a lunch with Raoul Wallenberg following an earlier trip to Hungary. Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out that the journey did take place, and the use of a regular German courier plane would explain the very brevity of the visit. But for what purpose and why was it kept secret? Almost the only possible time for such a visit was between 20-23 November, where there is in fact a blank space in Raoul Wallenberg's diary, or possibly a week later.

EITHER
LEAVE THIS
OUT OR
DEAL WITH
THE
IMPLICATIONS
(this refers to
the whole section)

VI. AMERICAN PAPERS ON RAOUL WALLENBERG - WAS HE AN UNDERCOVER AGENT for OSS?

A large number of American documents concerning Raoul Wallenberg were released in 1994 and handed to the Swedish side. Originating mainly from the State Department, OSS and CIA, a number of the OSS and CIA documents came from the National Archives and the Roosevelt Library. State Department papers dealt mainly with the American follow-up of various witnesses' testimony and related newspaper articles. A few other American documents from various sources became available in 1995 and 1996.

The question of whether Raoul Wallenberg undertook some form of intelligence work for the OSS has received most press coverage.

OLSEN

~~financial~~ responsibility
also for
missions in
Balkans,
placement
radios
with Balkan
Resistance;
movements
of gold -
control +
use thereof
to accomplish
certain
ends;
"obsession"
of Wallenberg
although this
was being
already
done by
others in the
US Legation.
He was not
involved in
black-listing,
that was
somebody
else.

Considerable interest has been evinced in the fact that Iver Olsen represented not only the WRB and the US Treasury Department but the OSS as well. As OSS representative in Stockholm, his three assignments were: financial responsibility for OSS missions in Sweden, to interview refugees arriving in Sweden and to obtain intelligence reports from and send agents to Norway and the Baltic states. As the Treasury Department representative, Olsen was also involved in black-listing Swedish companies which collaborated with Nazi Germany. An internal CIA document from 1955 indicates that when asked whether he had ever had operational contact with Raoul Wallenberg or used him operationally, Olsen repeatedly and categorically denied this. Only in his capacity as WRB representative had he been in touch with Raoul Wallenberg. "Olsen was extremely emphatic on this point."

(The WRB was born overnight and therefore relied on OSS network to be effective)

At the same time, it is a fact that the WRB and OSS worked together closely. Experience gained from the latter was employed when the WRB was launched. WRB reports were regularly forward to the OSS. WRB communications were classified as secret, its representatives and contacts in enemy territory designated agents and provided with "cover". However, none of the WRB dealings with Raoul Wallenberg reveals any direct links involving intelligence activities.

I guess
the last
part -
OLSEN
had a
cover because
he was OSS

Another CIA memorandum dated December 1955 is equally definite. "A thorough search of our files and contact with former OSS employees show that Raoul Wallenberg was never employed in any capacity by the American intelligence service".

McClellan
has no
code
name
neither
does Hirsch

However, other documents arouse minor doubts over this conclusion. A CIA paper from 1990 summarised the organisation's knowledge of Raoul Wallenberg's indirect connections with the OSS and was the first official acknowledgement that Iver Olsen had also worked for the OSS. Nonetheless, it drew the same conclusion about Raoul Wallenberg as first document. Two alternative courses of action for the American government were then proposed; 1/ To say nothing beyond what had already been said in previous official statements. Anything more would embarrass Wallenberg's supporters and family by suggesting that Raoul Wallenberg may have been undertaking intelligence-related assignments despite Olsen's statement in

1955. 2/ To initiate unofficial contact with the Soviet Union and be more forthcoming about Iver Olsen. The main advantage of this would perhaps be to discover how the Russians came to suspect Raoul Wallenberg. The author doubted whether much would be gained from the latter alternative.

An quotation from the same paper stated unequivocally, "Strange as it may seem to the present generation of intelligence officers, the document (from 1955) confirms Olsen's belief that he worked simultaneously for three government organisations... that his contact with Wallenberg had nothing to do with undercover activities but took place under the auspices of the WRB."

A decoded OSS telegram, dated 1 July 1944, commented on information from "Garbo" (code name for WRB) about Wallenberg's assignment, and noted that due to the subject's personal background (i.e., Raoul Wallenberg) it could be supposed that his usefulness "for our activities" was in doubt. "However, we assume that you have consulted 799 (code number for Iver Olsen) on this matter and considered whether there was any chance of utilising the assignment to our benefit". It is not clear to whom the telegram was addressed. Although indicating that at least the idea of using Raoul Wallenberg for intelligence purposes had been considered, it appeared as though officials did not believe that it would be meaningful.

A cryptic CIA document, dated 23 November 1954, about Hungarian contacts in Sweden and Finland, noted under the heading GEIGER, Kalman (Kalman Lauer?) that as director of the Central European Commercial Company, he had assisted the "informant" to infiltrate Raoul Wallenberg (first name wrongly spelt) into Hungary during the Second World War as an OSS agent. The context in which this document was drawn up is unknown.

An OSS document about the WRB, dated March 1944, stated that the State Department had already agreed to the "overall plan". It further indicated that the reason for OSS participation in the matter was to some extent a guarantee for rapid and effective communications, which was advantageous to the organisation.

Another OSS document dated March 1944, sent instructions from the WRB to Iver Olsen implying their agreement to one of his proposals. This which

you are
ignoring
the point
that this sup-
and means
"the Wallenberg"
mission"
a "Swedish
initiative"...

There is a
Geiger
family in
Sweden
you should
call them.

would be a preliminary, explorative action in cooperation between "agencies" which could be extended into new (geographical) areas.

The War
Dept. is a
very important
component

While hardly sensational, it is at least possible to draw the conclusion from the documents that the WRB cooperated closely with the OSS and State Department, and that the WRB used OSS channels of communication.

OWN UP:
"The whole
affair was
administered
by the Swedes."
This is Per's
problem and
he should
speak

Raoul Wallenberg is mentioned in a coded OSS message, dated 7 November 1944, dealing with the Hungarian resistance man, Geza Soos. According to it, Soos could be contacted only through Per Anger at the Swedish Legation in Budapest. Raoul Wallenberg was said to be in the picture if Anger was not in Budapest. It also stated that Soos had a schedule of Swedish signals and that Nagy, formerly a secretary at the Hungarian legation, should get in touch with Captain Thernberg in Stockholm about the schedule. (This can be described as a list of radio contacts with agents in the field. However, the Swedish Legation in Budapest did not have any radio equipment).

Source:
Harriman
Moscow Papers;
Library of
Congress

This signals schedule was also mentioned in another document, a note dated 14 December 1944, from the British Embassy in Moscow to deputy foreign minister Dekanazov. The note informed the Russians that several men from of Hungarian resistance under Geza Soos had landed at an airfield in Italy. They represented the MFM resistance movement organised on the instructions of Admiral Horthy. The MFM wanted to coordinate its action against the Germans with the advance of the Red Army. Soos was said to have with him a schedule of signals and codes in order to communicate with ^{Moscow} Budapest, and maintained that six hours after receiving a message, the MFM would be able to take control of all public buildings.

An OSS document of 30 December also tells us that Soos asked for a message to be forward to the Soviet Union. It mentioned, *inter alia*, that on 23 October the MFM passed a message to the Swedish Legation in Budapest in its capacity as representative of Soviet interests in Hungary. Soos wanted to hear from Moscow how the resistance should act and the kind of treatment Hungarian military units could expect to receive if they went over to the Russians. The message also included the frightening information that almost the entire military leadership of the MFM had been arrested by the Gestapo immediately after a secret visit of a Soviet liaison officer to

Budapest to meet MFM representatives for a few weeks in November. It is easy to draw the conclusion - a parallel to events in Poland - that the Soviet Union was unlikely to be interested in the resistance movement playing a prominent part when not under its own control.

How else could the conspiratorial message above be construed? First of all, we know that the Swedish Legation, and Per Anger in particular, were in touch with the Hungarian resistance. This was quite natural in view of the situation and the Russians' imminent final offensive; on the contrary, it would have been a dereliction of duty not to have such contacts. We also know from Captain Thernberg's memoirs (he served in the Swedish military intelligence service C Bureau and Technical Office), that Swedish military intelligence had succeeded in establishing illegal radio links with Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, Hungary and the Baltic. The links with Hungary had certainly been established with the assistance of Nagy, and Gellert, former secretary and counsellor respectively at the Hungarian Legation in Stockholm, who had been in touch with the Allied diplomatic missions in the Swedish capital. It is in this context that the schedule of signals. However, Raoul Wallenberg ~~definitely~~ did not play a prominent part in this connection.

It is interesting to note the naively frank approach of the British and Americans (and, indeed, Soos) towards Moscow, which thereby received information about the part played by the Swedish legation. It is possible that this was exaggerated in the Soviet capital although we have not found any document to prove it.

A cipher telegram from the Allied Headquarters in Italy dated ^{February 6} ~~May~~ 1945, ~~probably~~ originating from Brigadier General Bonner Key of the OSS, stated that he had asked the Soviet military authorities in Budapest for information about the fate of Raoul Wallenberg and the Swiss diplomats, Max Meier and Harald Feller. It also noted that the Soviet authorities could have convincing evidence that Feller, and possibly Meier and Raoul Wallenberg as well, had cooperated with the Nazis.

Who?
Individuals
being hidden?
Groups and
also what
name - there
are many
with sometimes
competing
interests

Motive?
Gellert's radios
came from
Oslo via
London.
Placement
is noted - does
not indicate the
Swedish Legation
but does not
exclude Raoul.
Raoul did
have radio
access -
Receiver -
for West.
According
to Gilbert
Langlet had a
radio to pick up
Soviet broadcasts -
radio from
approaching Army.

Conclusions

No definite conclusion can be drawn from the above which indicates Raoul Wallenberg was involved in any undercover assignment for the OSS, even though the organisation had probably considered the idea. There is no authoritative paper to tell us that this was the case, while the ambiguous documents need to be interpreted with extreme caution; they may well be grounded on the misunderstandings of individual officials. On the other hand, it is clear that the OSS was apprised of Raoul Wallenberg's reports from Budapest and may have found some value in them although they were intended in the first instance for the WRB. It is also clear that the OSS and WRB cooperated closely with each other and that Iver Olsen primarily represented the OSS while his other assignments were mainly to give him 'cover'. According to the CIA, Olsen sometimes mixed his OSS duties with his WRB activities. ~~It is also likely that some of the OSS agents also perceived Raoul Wallenberg as an agent.~~ On the other hand, the CIA has nowhere found material to indicate that Raoul Wallenberg was aware of Olsen's links with the OSS. (It is another matter that the Russian certainly suspected him of spying for the USA, based on what they knew about the Swedish diplomat's links with Olsen. More on this below.) Some unreleased CIA papers and other documents appear to exist, however, which may cast further light on these matters. It should also be remembered that some of the papers made available contained blocked out sections. It is clearly a matter of concern to obtain all available papers, even from the Americans.

Again the
bad news is
their link
with the
military.
This does
not make
RW a "spy"
but does
put him in
jeopardy.

VII. RAOUL WALLENBERG'S CAPTURE AND ARREST IN BUDAPEST

A. Documentation

The first mention in a Soviet document about the activities of the Swedish Legation in Budapest was in October 1944. The head of the Political Section of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, von Post, wrote to Chernyshov, counsellor at the Soviet Embassy, telling him about the legation's efforts to rescue the Jews and the issue of protective passes. Wallenberg was not mentioned by name. Reporting home, Chernyshov wrote that he did not

reply to von Post's question about Moscow's interest in what Sweden was doing to help the Jews in Hungary.

The next item in the archives of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is naturally the Note from the Swedish Embassy in Moscow dated 31 December 1944. This contained a list of the members of our legation in Budapest and Sweden's request to receive Soviet protection when the Red Army encountered them. A copy of the Note is also held at the Ministry of Defence. The same day, Foreign Minister Dekanozov passed this information to General Antonov at the general staff so that he could give instructions to the front line command.

A cipher telegram dated 2 January 1945 from Major General Slavin, assistant to the chief of the Red Army general staff, to the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Front commanders Malinovsky and Tolbuchin, ordered them to give protection when they encounter the besieged Swedish diplomatic mission in Budapest, to have gone underground. They were then to inform the general staff. Raoul Wallenberg was mentioned among the other names. This telegram also noted that army commanders should be informed. Similar orders sent to a number of subordinate units have also been found.

A report has been recovered addressed to the chief of the 30th Army Corps which contained the information that Raoul Wallenberg had voluntarily called on the Soviet side on 13 January.

The Russians ^{liberated} captured 16 Benczur Street (the location of the International Red Cross transport unit) on 13 January. They found Raoul Wallenberg there, probably on 14 January. A Dimitrenko of the 151st Rifle Division reported to the head of the political section of the 7th Army Guards, that Raoul Wallenberg and his driver had been encountered at 16 Benczur Street, that he had handed over a telegram written in German and requested that it be passed to Stockholm. A note on Dimitrenko's report reads: "18= to Afonin: do not send the telegram anywhere for the time being".

What did the telegram say?

Any relation to General?

On 14 January, Kupriyanov of the 7th Army Guards ordered the 30th Rifle Corps to accompany Raoul Wallenberg straight away, with due attention to his security and comfort, from the 151st Rifle Division, where he then was, to Major General Afonin, commander of the 18th Rifle Corps. Furthermore,

Raoul Wallenberg was not to have any contact with the outside world. The telegram also contained a hand-written note stating: "Detained on 13 January at Benczur Street; other embassy officials said to be in the western part of the city; he refused to leave the front after explaining that he was responsible for the protection of 7000 Swedish citizens in the eastern part."

Zacharov, chief of staff of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, telegraphed on 15 January 1945 to the chief of general staff, Antonov, and the chief of staff of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, informing them that Raoul Wallenberg had been encountered at Benczur Street while the rest of the legation were in the western part of the city. Raoul Wallenberg and his property were under guard.

These reports were the basis of the message from deputy foreign minister Dekanozov to the Swedish Embassy in Moscow on 16 January stating that Raoul Wallenberg had been found and was in the care of the Russian troops in Budapest.

Papers in the Defence Ministry archives include a warrant for the arrest of Wallenberg, signed by Deputy Defence Minister Bulganin on 17 January, addressed to Malinovsky, chief of the 2nd Ukrainian Front and copied to Abakumov, head of Smersh (App.3). Bulganin ordered that Raoul Wallenberg be taken to Moscow and stated that the requisite instructions had been passed to Smersh, the counter espionage organisation. No reason was given for the arrest. Zacharov wrote a message on the warrant to a comrade Povetkin to the effect that he and comrade Korelev organise the journey to Moscow.

The same day, i.e., 17 January, Bulganin issued another arrest warrant (App.4). This was for the Swiss diplomats Max Meier and Harald Feller and the Slovakian envoy Jan Spishak, also encountered in Budapest. They were to be sent to Moscow "in the same way as Wallenberg", and Smersh was to carry out the order. On 20 January, Zacharov asked for instructions concerning not only Feller and Meier but the Swedish lecturer and Red Cross delegate Valdemar Langlet and his wife. No reply to the enquiry about Langlet has been recovered.

Wanted to know
name of family
accompanying
persons -

They weren't
sent the same
way -

Their Swiss
debts show
them as persons

Know.
Archives, Swiss Intelligence

A Smersh report dated 22 January 1945 contained a list of diplomatic addresses in Budapest drawn up by Major Petrovsky, assistant to the chief of the Smersh second division, 2nd Ukrainian Front, and addressed to the chief of the Smersh operational division at the same headquarters in Budapest. It stated that the list was based on information from, inter alia, the apprehended (or detained = zaderzjan in Russian) secretary from the Swedish legation, Wallenberg.

A report dated 23 January on Smersh arrests of "agents from the opposite side" at the 2nd Ukrainian Front between 1-20 January, stated that it included three representatives of the diplomatic corps, two of whom were from the Swedish legation in Budapest. However, it emerged that only one was Swedish (the other was probably Thomsen/Grossheim-Krisko, or Langfelder).

A message to Deputy Defence Minister Bulganin from the abovementioned Zacharov reported that the arrested Raoul Wallenberg had been sent to Moscow on 25 January and that Zenkov was leading the convoy (App.5).

Other messages indicated that Raoul Wallenberg was ^{formally} arrested on 19 January and the Swiss diplomats on 10 and 16 February respectively. The prison registration card from Lubianka Prison records Raoul Wallenberg's arrival there on 6 February, the same day as his driver, W Langfelder (App.6).

Two other NKVD reports exist about the Swedish legation (without any new facts emerging) as well as a copy of a Note from Minister Danielsson denying press reports that members of the Swedish Legation had been badly treated by Soviet troops. The reports of Swedish Legation employees have otherwise indicated that the legation had been subject to extensive and repeated looting. This was also confirmed in an internal MID memorandum from Vetrov to Dekanozov dated 24 May 1945.

No other material from this period has been found in the archives. It is not unlikely that some intelligence reports from Budapest have been removed at some time.

B. Oral information and comments

The question
of "protective
custody"
should be
addressed

1st attempt -
car
confiscated

Meaning?
use in Soviet
system?

As a source, the oral information about Raoul Wallenberg's last weeks in Budapest and the experiences of the other members of the Swedish Legation until their repatriation in March was considerably more varied than the brief documents mentioned above. The following information may be of interest.

Russian military reports

The chief of the 2nd Battalion, 581st Rifles Regiment, Shkred, stated that his subordinates once stopped a car containing two foreigners who proved to be Raoul Wallenberg and his driver. Shkred gave orders for them to be accompanied to staff headquarters but the two passengers refused to leave the car until machine guns were aimed at them.

The political chief of the same regiment, Chapovskiy, informed Dmitriev, formerly of MVD, who kindly placed material at the disposal of the working group, that instructions had been issued that the Swedish diplomat was to be treated humanely and not be interrogated. His immunity was to be respected and he should receive assistance on his journey to senior staff quarters.

The evidence of other officers in the same regiment indicate that Raoul Wallenberg was taken to staff quarters on 14 January. He spoke to the regimental commander, Golub, and requested to meet Marshal Malinovsky. One of Golub's colleagues was ordered to ensure that Raoul Wallenberg was sent to senior staff quarters, from where a captain from Smersh had arrived. Raoul Wallenberg was taken to colonel Kisliitsa, chief of Smersh at the 151st Division. He was accompanied this time by a Jakov Valach, political officer with the 151st Division. The latter had been told a few days after 14 January that two members of the Swedish Legation had called at the regimental staff quarters. Valach was sent to accompany Raoul Wallenberg and Langfelder to division staff quarters where the divisional commander, Podshivaylov received Raoul Wallenberg at his request. Raoul Wallenberg gave a fairly detailed account of his activities and stated that the Soviet military leaders in Budapest wanted to discuss measures for rescuing the ghetto. He carried with him a bulky briefcase containing important

There were 3 efforts on RW's part
① He goes out, car gets confiscated, comes back on foot
② He goes to the spa in Varosheget Park where Valach met him
③ He leaves with Demshenko

documents that he was prepared to hand over to the military commanders. According to Valach, Raoul Wallenberg appeared trustworthy, although the front troops were very suspicious, trained to see spies everywhere. The following day, i.e., 15 or 16 January, officers from the 7th Army Guards and 2nd Ukrainian Front arrived to fetch Raoul Wallenberg and Langfelder. A colonel then stressed that nobody was to say anything about Raoul Wallenberg.

He stressed this already on the 15th

According to information given to Helén Carlbäck-Isotala, Mikhail Danilash, a staff intelligence official at the 30th Rifle Corps, spoke to Raoul Wallenberg some time between 8 - 14 January in the building where he was held. Raoul Wallenberg complained that his official car had been taken from him and demanded to see Marshal Malinovsky. Danilash also stated that some mention was made at staff quarters that Molotov had ordered Raoul Wallenberg to be brought to him.

A witness claimed that Raoul Wallenberg was seen in a car together with Major Demchenko (who stated that he encountered Raoul Wallenberg as early as 13 or 14 January) and two soldiers on 17 January en route to Debrecen. Demchenko, who was Assistant Political Chief at the regiment, has not been traced.

- Statements from Raoul Wallenberg's colleagues

NOT POSSIBLE -
1st contact was
at Benczur st
as all documents
indicate - earliest
is the 13th

Dr György Gergely, Third Secretary, worked with Raoul Wallenberg. He stated in April 1946 that Raoul Wallenberg was under Soviet surveillance from 12 January onwards and accompanied by Soviet officers. Raoul Wallenberg was well treated and endeavoured to get in touch with Marshal Malinovsky in Debrecen. He intended to negotiate issues involving the return of Jewish property. Gergely wanted to go with him but Raoul Wallenberg refused his offer. On his departure, the Swedish diplomatic took three suitcases, a rucksack and a large amount of money with him.. Before leaving Budapest, he handed over 300,000 pengöe to Gergely to pay for the upkeep of the Jewish welfare shelters.

WRONG DATE
He met
Gergely on
the 17th

at Tatra-utca with Demchenko

waitp - Cross check
with other testimonies like
Mueller... LEVAI notes this
inaccuracy -

only
momentary -

Bela Revai alleged that on his departure on 17 January, Raoul Wallenberg said that they would first go to "Stadtwald" (Warosliget) and then on to the Soviet headquarters in Debrecen.

Peto?
Langlet
who made it
safely to
Debrecen?

Laszlo Sulner, a Hungarian colleague of Raoul Wallenberg, stated that when Raoul Wallenberg accompanied by Russian officers at some of the Swedish houses on 17 January, he spoke about his post-war plans. However, the Russians did not share his ideas about this humanitarian action. When the Russians began to plunder the international ghetto on 20 January, one of Raoul Wallenberg's colleagues who spoke Russian well (probably Thomsen) tried to contact the Russian command. He was taken to the NKVD, after which a Soviet officer came to the legation and pointed out that if a person's identity could not be confirmed he would be promptly shot as a German spy. Thomsen himself claimed that he was interrogated for the first time on 21 January but that his name was missing from the list of legation staff that the Soviet military authorities had received. Another officer stated that Raoul Wallenberg was not taken to Malinovsky but arrested.. On the other hand, Waldemar Langlet of the Red Cross was received by the new Hungarian government in Debrecen.

Language
awkward.

The staff of the Swedish Legation who were repatriated in March-April 1945 described fairly fully the events of these days in Budapest in the special reports written by Lars B:son Berg and Per Anger for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and in their books. No oral questions about just Raoul Wallenberg do not appear to have been noted. In a telegram to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in April 1945, after the Swedish diplomats in Budapest had passed through Moscow on their way home, Söderblom stated that he felt it imperative that Anger ^{WRITE} wrote a detailed report and informed the Foreign Minister about what had happened. Stockholm did not, however, ask for a written report and Anger and other colleagues from the legation assumed that the Russians were looking after Raoul Wallenberg as he was travelling to Debrecen.

Per Anger wrote, inter alia, that the members of the Legation who remained on the Buda side were on the whole treated correctly by the Russians, despite the absence of identity papers in Russian. It was distinctly worse on the Pest side. Different Soviet units, and NKVD/Smersh too, were stationed on the Buda and Pest sides; the former under the command of Marshal

Tolbuchin (3rd Ukrainian Front), the latter under Marshal Malinovsky (2nd Ukrainian Front). Soviet suspicions against the Swedish action to rescue the Jews were never actively expressed in Buda, while the Swedes in Pest were subject to rigorous interrogation.

Berg has described how, after a while, the Russians began arresting former (non-Swedish?) colleagues at the Legation, one after the other. Those working with Raoul Wallenberg and employees at B Section were specially selected. Most were released after a time, while others did not return (Berg does not say who); as far as is known, only Thomsen was taken to Moscow. We know definitely that Berg, Tolstoy-Kutuzov and Thomsen were interrogated by the Russians. The only interrogation records found were for the latter, kept on his file in the FSB archives. The references here to Raoul Wallenberg were made more in passing. SS man Kurt Becher stated in 1995 that he was questioned about Raoul Wallenberg by Smersh/NKVD in Budapest in 1945. No trace of these interviews have been found in the Russian archives. (That's because it was done in Budapest - according to VINOGRADOV -)

- Soviet actions

The Soviet military leaders remained very suspicious towards the activities taking place in the name of the Swedish Legation, not least towards all the protective passports and other documents that were in circulation. Their confidence was partly restored when the Legation announced that all protective passports issued before a certain date (1 February?) would henceforth be invalid unless reconfirmed by the mission. Be that as it may, the military leaders soon demanded that the Legation and the Red Cross wind up their activities and that the Swedish subjects should leave the country. Only the Allied missions were allowed to remain.

The war historian Galitsky, who occasionally served as a member of the working group, has given an account of the situation at the front line during the Second World War. Every detainee with some connection to the front was taken to military intelligence. Detailed instructions existed to this effect. Sometimes, detainees were interrogated by the special propaganda unit as well. Some were later taken to Smersh custody for interrogation. They were then often sent to prisoner-of-war camps at the front while detainees of special interest were taken to Moscow. The most interesting of these ended

relations with the USSR and in spite of Dr. Peter Zurcher's efforts to meet with Soviet authorities through the "Foreign Interests Sector" was told that Soviet presence as representative of the AEC made that unnecessary - therefore that argument was dissolved. (The Swiss represented the Americans and the British).

~~14~~
December 45-
Early 46
CHECK

meaning?

← This is really not true. The Soviets kept the Allies out, the Swiss had no diplomatic relations with the USSR and in spite of Dr. Peter Zurcher's efforts to meet with Soviet authorities through the "Foreign Interests Sector" was told that Soviet presence as representative of the AEC made that unnecessary - therefore that argument was dissolved. (The Swiss represented the Americans and the British).

up in the hands of Smersh and a so-called register file was opened. Each and everyone was interrogated according to a special list of questions and the most interesting among them kept in prison despite their prisoner-of-war status.

With the Soviet capture of Budapest, the rear area of the front line was cleared, i.e., all men capable of bearing arms were rounded up and checked. According to the records of the Ukrainian front, some 100,000 men were later released after such checks.

they had
TOLSTOY
for
years!!

Smersh had very little foothold in Budapest before the Soviet liberation. They appear to have begun collecting information in the winter of 1944-45 while Soviet troops were advancing. Furthermore, only Smersh had been instructed to take Raoul Wallenberg into custody, to arrest and remove him to Moscow. It is true that the MGB's fourth administration under Pavel Sudoplatov sent agents behind the German front line, but nothing has emerged to show that they had been active in Budapest. As mentioned earlier, there is no evidence that the regular foreign intelligence branch of the NKGB had any part in the arrest of Raoul Wallenberg.

- What part did Tolstoy-Kutuzov's play?

Considerable uncertainty surrounds the rôle played by Mikhail Tolstoy-Kutuzov. Was he already a Soviet agent before the Red Army entered Budapest? Did he choose, or was coerced into cooperating with Smersh after the Russians took control of the city? His wartime activities before his employment at the Swedish Legation are somewhat shrouded in mystery. According to Sudoplatov, Tolstoy was recruited into the intelligence service early in the 1920s. Berg reported Tolstoy's comment on meeting him again in February 1945, in the office of General Chernyshov, the Soviet commander of the city. Tolstoy had already been appointed head of the bureau to which all foreigners in the city had to report hereafter. According to Tolstoy, the Russians had not at first accepted his story of working at the prisoner-of-war hospital. He had been arrested and questioned several times, but treated well. The Russians had ordered him to tell them everything about the work and private lives of Berg and Raoul Wallenberg. Tolstoy had then given a detailed account of the Legation's efforts to protect Soviet interests (see also the chapter below dealing with reasons for Raoul

Wallenberg's arrest). We also know that a report was previously to be found in KGB records in which Tolstoy described the work of senior members of the Swedish mission. This was destroyed in 1959, however, according to a note in the records. Following an enquiry, SVR stated that Tolstoy was arrested by Smersh and supplied some information about the staff of Swedish Legation. The minutes of the interrogation were not found in SVR records, only a paper stating that it had taken place. In view of Tolstoy's later activities (including his efforts some years later to convince Minister Danielsson that Raoul Wallenberg had in fact been killed in Budapest), we can establish that he cooperated fully with Moscow from the time of his employment by the city commander. It is not hard to believe that the outcome of his evidence in Budapest would benefit Raoul Wallenberg.

You have
an obligation
to include
my OSS
document
of March
1945 -
and P.S. -
I know
the source.

Who really gave the order to arrest Raoul Wallenberg?

Raoul Wallenberg was arrested on the order of Deputy Defence minister Bulganin. Abakumov was also Deputy Defence Minister direct under Stalin, the Supreme Commander. Normally, however, Abakumov did not give direct orders to front line commanders.)

Proof?
Is this an
analogy -
I would like
to see this
document

In discovered documents concerning the Swiss diplomats Meier and Feller, it appears that the order must have originated direct from Stalin, and that the latter were to be sent to Moscow, "as in the case of Raoul Wallenberg".

Thus, it was Stalin's decision to arrest some of the diplomats of neutral countries remaining in Budapest and have them sent to Moscow for questioning. A memorandum from Abakumov to Molotov dated 6 December 1945 stated: "Smersh arrested Feller and Meier in Budapest on 4 March (an incorrect date) in accordance with Stalin's instructions "(App.7).

- Statements from Raoul Wallenberg's fellow prisoners

The accounts of war prisoners who were in Lubianka and Lefortovo prisons between 1945-47 supply a number of the 'missing links' for the period from 17 January - 6 February and are to be found in the White Paper published in 1957.

1945 → March 1947?

Gustav Richter said that after Raoul Wallenberg and Langfelder reported to the Soviet military authorities they were sent from one instance ⁷⁴ to the other and finally arrested. Willy Bergemann is said to have told Erhard Hille that Raoul Wallenberg wanted to negotiate with the Russians for improved conditions for the Jewish population and to secure the diplomatic area from further shooting. However, the military staff whom he met explained that they were unable to give these kind of orders and advised him to apply direct to Marshal Malinovsky. He and Langfelder were then arrested by the NKVD. Ernst Huber speaks of the incident when their car was stopped and the tyres cut to shreds by Soviet soldiers.

They went
out of town,
were detained
when they
tried to go
back to
Budapest
were
arrested -
then held
in NKVD/
Budapest

All sources agree that Raoul Wallenberg and Langfelder were then taken by train to Moscow via Rumania. Huber gives most details. For a brief period, they both were confined in a temporary NKVD prison in Budapest. An officer and four soldiers guarded them during the train journey. They were allowed to get off the train for a while during a stop at Jasi Station (Rumania) and to visit the Luther restaurant. Both in Budapest and in Moscow it was explained that they should not regard themselves as prisoners, but in protective custody. They were shown the underground system in Moscow and had walked on foot to the Lubyanka Prison. In a conversation the year before last, Richter stated that Raoul Wallenberg was writing a detective novel during the trip to Moscow. *py*

VII. REASONS FOR RAOUL WALLENBERG'S ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT

A. Introduction

Nothing certain is known about the true and complete reasons behind Raoul Wallenberg's arrest. We can gain a fairly good picture of the underlying motivation, however, from the small amount of direct evidence and the slightly larger quantity of indirect information available. But without full documentary proof it is not easy to strike the right balance between the substance of the various reasons. Finally, the possibility of disinformation should not be excluded regarding one or two of the motives that have been have been disseminated over the years.

As previously mentioned, Lars G:son Berg, attaché at the Swedish Legation in Budapest 1944-45, has described how the Russians questioned several non-Swedish employees on their return home about the work of the mission and Swedish diplomatic staff. They were accused of espionage, and issuing false documents and protective papers for non-Jewish Hungarians, some of whom were fascists; further, that the mission had not had control over the humanitarian activities nor been sufficiently active in safeguarding Soviet interests in Hungary. Raoul Wallenberg and Berg were identified as German spy chiefs. The Soviet side maintained that it was "impossible" that Raoul Wallenberg would risk his life to save the Hungarian Jews. According to Tolstoy's remarks to Berg, Smersh had also shown interest in whether Sweden represented American or British interests in any way in Hungary. Although the main theory was that the Swedish Legation was involved in German espionage against the Soviet Union, there were also early indications of the suspicion that they were spying for the Americans and/or British. Although the Soviet Union was an ally of the USA and Great Britain, Stalin was already deeply suspicious of these countries.

In an emotional outburst once in 1979, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zemskov told the Swedish Ambassador in Moscow that Raoul Wallenberg had spied for the USA which the Americans had privately admitted.

AGAINST WHOM? Germany or Russia or both?

Indications from the Soviet side had reached thus far before the activities of the working group began.

B. Documentary sources

Some guidance on the reasons for the Russian interest in Raoul Wallenberg can be found in the Smersh and MGB interrogation of Grossheim-Krisko (alias Thomsen). The interrogation report dated 26 May 1947 (App.8) shows that Thomsen confirmed previous evidence that the Swedish Legation had employed fascists (supposedly Italians, Hungarians and a White Russian émigré). Thomsen also mentioned cases of Jews who sold their protective passports, although without the mission's knowledge. He further claimed that "as far as is known" the mission never accepted bribes to draw up documents and that he did not want to admit that he had collected information about the Soviet Union.

Social Democrats, to be exact - plus some fascists

So outside of the report, all you gotta do is deal with Per Anger's Anglo-American OSS/SOE contacts because he's the one.

However, in a previous interrogation in March 1945 (App.9), Thomsen alleged that protective passports were issued to people fleeing from the Soviet powers, and to others in hiding because of their "criminal activities". He also claimed that the embassy had given protection to anti-Soviet emigrants, very wealthy fascists and business-owners. Protective documents had been provided to over 5,000 people in the former category. Minister Danielsson and Lars Berg had been in touch with the German Embassy and negotiated by telephone the matter of protective documents for people who had come to the embassy. The interrogation leader then asked whether the Swedish mission's activities had been hostile to the Soviet state. Thomsen answered "yes". He made no direct accusations against Raoul Wallenberg. The discrepancies noted in Thomsen's statements emphasize the importance of treating them with great caution.

Interrogation reports found in FSB archives did not appear to have direct links to Raoul Wallenberg and the Swedish mission in Budapest, except that they showed that Raoul Wallenberg had also been questioned by the leading interrogator. The reports included several interrogation sessions with a member of the German Abwehr, G, accused of spying and having contact with the Anglo-American intelligence centre in Turkey via JOINT in Budapest. Asked whether he knew Thomsen, G replied that he did not. On the other hand, he was well acquainted with Joel Brand, the head of JOINT in Budapest. The JOINT office in Budapest was said to be the home of the American intelligence service. Moreover, Budapest was something of a transit point for the supply of espionage material and agents from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary to Istanbul. G stated that Jewish nationalists had invited the American authorities to use the JOINT organization in 1940, as a network for mass espionage in exchange for USA's support in setting up an independent state in Palestina. A member of the JOINT staff had, however, offered German agents access to some of the JOINT's offices in return for the Germans releasing 2-5000 Jews a month. According to G, Himmler rejected this proposal. Nevertheless, the Germans succeeded in controlling a large amount of the post to JOINT. G was said to have worked for this organization in Budapest and received money from it, at least until 1943. These activities then came under threat from Gustav Richter, German police attaché (Gestapo) in Bucharest. The following passage is contained in G's interrogation report: "It was established in Budapest that employees of the Turkish, Swedish missions, etc., worked for the Anglo-American

This is a
mistake -
Joel Brand
Kastner et
al are from
the WAAD
(Committee).
They went to
the Joint or
the British
Agency for
Jews -
Head of
the JOINT
was
GOROG,
also BISS.

as Dr. Schmidt, he lasted until Dec 44 -
see RW's calendar

intelligence services or as couriers." Interrogated early in 1949, G was not asked about Raoul Wallenberg although questioned a number of times by the person who, according to the interrogation records, had twice interrogated the Swedish diplomat. Finally, it is interesting to note that in 1949 G told an Italian fellow prisoner that he knew about Wallenberg from Budapest.

A Smersh report dated February 1945 (App. 10) stated as follows: "... instead of protecting the interests of the Soviet Union and Hungary, the Swedish Embassy and Swedish Red Cross take the enemies of the Soviet Union and Hungarian people under their protection, providing them with places of refuge and sanctuary." Several other accusations were also directed towards individual members of the Swedish Legation (Raoul Wallenberg was not mentioned).

In April 1956 a draft from foreign minister Molotov and KGB chief Serov which was rejected by the Central Committee, Raoul Wallenberg's death was blamed wholly on Abakumov. It also mentioned that the latter had accused Raoul Wallenberg of spying for Germany (which was not included in the Gromyko memorandum handed to Rolf Sohlman, Swedish Ambassador in Moscow, on 6 February 1957).

An analogy with the fate of the arrested Swiss diplomats provides some indication. As mentioned earlier, it appears that Stalin personally ordered the arrest of diplomats in Budapest from neutral countries. However, the Swiss met a happier fate than Raoul Wallenberg. Abakumov wrote a memorandum to Molotov on 6 December 1945 (App. 11), based on a Smersh interrogation (seemingly more of a conversation than a regular interrogation). It referred in fairly positive terms to the activities of Feller and Meier in Budapest, pointing out that both had explained "that they did not deal in politics or intelligence work." (Talking to a Swedish diplomat in 1947, Feller declared that the Russians said during his arrest ~~that~~ that it was not because he was undesirable but rather that he was a possible object for barter). Molotov decided (after consulting Stalin) to release the Swiss in exchange for Russian internees in Switzerland. The conclusion need not be drawn from the above quotation that Raoul Wallenberg was running an intelligence operation, rather that at least in 1945 the Soviet side was

Meier and
Feller worked
with RW
on the
Nansen
PLAN -
a private
initiative...

the question
of Jewish assets
is implicit

- especially given the fate
that awaited Feller when he returned
to Switzerland (accused of massive looting).

probably convinced that he was doing so. It should also be noted that Feller was not asked any questions concerning Raoul Wallenberg.

The Slovakian envoy, Spishak, was handed over to Czechoslovakia at their request in February 1947, to stand trial in Prague. *for _____?*

The documentary information so far submitted is very meagre and elucidates little concerning the reasons for Raoul Wallenberg's arrest, especially as the material does not appear to pay much attention to the Swedish diplomat.

On the other hand, a great many more or less loosely-based theories were generated during oral interviews or in some other way.

C. Oral sources and comments

These vary but stem mainly from former employees of the Soviet security services.

A Soviet military historian and archives expert earlier associated with the working group pointed out the least specific reason for arresting Raoul Wallenberg, which was that everyone of any interest to military counter espionage was arrested in the wake of the Red Army offensive. As a consequence, all the German as well as the Swiss diplomats were arrested. Enormous numbers of people were held and investigated behind the front in the Budapest area. Very little was needed to arouse suspicion. For example, a former KGB employee pointed out that the Smersh officials were not particularly well qualified and suffered from a high degree of "spy-mania". As soon as a prisoner-of-war had stayed in the British occupation zone, for example, he was accused of spying for Great Britain (Raoul Wallenberg had many official contacts with the Germans). It is clear from various Smersh and MGB interrogation reports that their interests were all-embracing; prisoners were "vacuumed" for information. In Raoul Wallenberg's case, however, we should take into account that an explicit order for his arrest had come from a high level in Moscow. In other words, there must have existed specific grounds for arresting him. It is by no means certain that the apparent underlying reasons for the interrogation of Thomsen and other members of

the legation in Budapest were the primary ones. Moreover, the interrogations paid very little attention to Raoul Wallenberg. Even so, apart from Thomsen, he was the only one sent to Moscow, Thomsen excepted.

The following are the principal, conceivable reasons suggested for the arrest of Raoul Wallenberg.

Again, you must look at the question of assets from a Soviet perspective. There is a "Safe Haven" component to RW's work which is extremely important to understanding his modus operandi and the Nansen Plan, etc.

1. Raoul Wallenberg was employed by the War Refugee Board to rescue the Jews from the Nazis in Hungary. However, the predominate picture of the WRB in the eyes of Moscow was of it being an international network of more or less underground links and intelligence work. The Soviet Union this would have regarded this as being synonymous with a spy network, especially as the WRB cooperated closely with the OSS. The Russians probably found it difficult to believe (as indicated in the interrogation of Berg, above) that humanitarian motives were sufficient for setting up the WRB and for Raoul Wallenberg's assignment.
2. All communication between Raoul Wallenberg and Washington went through Olsen, who represented both the WRB and the American intelligence organization, OSS, in Stockholm. Olsen had been fairly successful in rescuing NOT ONLY JEWS - OTHERS FLEEING SOVIETS from the Baltic states and had attracted the attention of the Soviet Union. He had also been involved in negotiating with Himmler's representatives over the release of Latvian Jews in exchange for money. The communist press endeavoured to discredit him. Furthermore, Olsen's agents had penetrated the Baltic states. Without doubt, Moscow was aware of Raoul Wallenberg's contacts with Olsen and the latter's OSS affiliations. Accordingly, they must have strongly suspected that Raoul Wallenberg was also working for the OSS.
3. Raoul Wallenberg was compelled to bribe Nazi functionaries in Hungary with the aim of rescuing the Jews, at the request of the WRB. The Soviet Union were certainly aware of this as well.
4. Raoul Wallenberg also rescued some officers from the Netherlands who were in hiding in Hungary and in contact with British Intelligence. In addition, American and British papers indicate that the Swedish Legation in Budapest was at least in touch with the Hungarian resistance and that

#1
RW rescued prominent ~~Soviet~~ Social Democrats per request of Bohm. This is a NO/NA! for the Soviets,

#2 With due respect you must come to grips with the question of SEPARATE PEACE via RW!

Moscow was aware of this (although this could hardly have been the principal reason).

5. The Swedish diplomat also received funds for his assignment from JOINT. Their representatives took part in many of the negotiations with the Nazis in order to rescue Jews from extermination. The Soviet Union was certainly aware of this. The interest of their security service in JOINT can be seen in the interrogation of G above. In the post-war period, JOINT grew in the eyes of the Soviet leaders to be an "all-world Zionist power" supporting a "global Zionist plot". A great many Jews and non-Jews were arrested and sentenced on the charge of having contacts with JOINT, both in the Soviet Union and Eastern European satellite states.

There are several variations on the theme of espionage. Thomsen maintained that Smersh officers in Budapest tried to get him to confess that the Swedish mission was preparing to create an anti-Soviet spy centre during the coming Soviet occupation.

Sudoplatov maintained that General Belkin, chief of the Smersh Front Committee towards the end of the war, told him some time in the 1950s, that Raoul Wallenberg's contacts with German intelligence were widely known. Belkin had also said that all Smersh establishments received basic data in 1945 showing Raoul Wallenberg to be an "established asset" for German, American and British intelligence services. He had also indicated that Moscow planned to exploit Raoul Wallenberg's alleged cooperation with the Abwehr to persuade him and his family to cooperate.

A former employee of the Soviet intelligence service claimed to have seen an agent's report on file dealing with Raoul Wallenberg's contacts with the Gestapo and Abwehr. On the other hand, he could not recall any details of contacts with American intelligence.

If nowhere else, Raoul Wallenberg's contacts in Budapest were very clear from the information contained in his pocket diary that the Russians confiscated on his arrest. Besides, the Russians were also told about Raoul Wallenberg's plans for assistance and reconstruction projects primarily for the Jewish population. The security service must have regarded them with

Stalin's "JOINT"
is the Bal
Joint Again
Brand/
Kastner are
NOT the
JOINT. The
JOINT is
far more
sophisticated
than that
and a real
threat to
its self-
sufficiency
in Eastern
Europe
and its
effect on
EMIGRATION.
This is
another
No! No!

I think you should note that all of his meetings with
German and Hungarian officials - police, intel, etc -
COULD relate to an aspect of his rescue mission.
EXCEPT MESZAROS

who
use
they
Sm
to know
what
division
function

suspicion and they definitely did not fit in with what the Soviet had in mind for Hungary.

For a long time, centrally placed officials in the Central Committee's maintained that Raoul Wallenberg's arrest was due primarily to the belief that he had organised intelligence operations on behalf of the Americans. He was perceived to be one of some ten American agents in Hungary and his humanitarian activities were regarded merely as cover. In Moscow's opinion, Stockholm, with Iver Olsen in a key role, was an important centre for American intelligence activities directed against the Soviet Union. Moreover, Swedish intelligence was regarded as contributing material for these activities.

IT WAS,
THEY WERE,
BUT RAOUL?

6. Raoul Wallenberg represented the Wallenberg family. It may have been difficult for the Soviet Union to grasp fully the relations between Raoul Wallenberg and Jacob and Marcus Wallenberg respectively. Be that as it may, Moscow was probably interested in the family's business dealings and contacts. Their intelligence officers in Stockholm, particularly the legendary Rybkin couple, were certainly given the task of obtaining as much information as possible. Their attitude to the Wallenberg family was probably not entirely straightforward. The excellent relations on the one hand between Mme. Kollantay and Marcus Wallenberg played a key role in discussions in 1944 on a peace agreement between the Soviet Union and Finland. Mme Kollantay even went so far as to say that she would like to see Marcus Wallenberg as Swedish Minister in Moscow. The Wallenberg-owned SKF concern supplied ball bearings to the Soviet aircraft industry. On the other hand, we find a more ideologically negative attitude to the foremost representative of capitalism in Sweden. This is perhaps most clearly expressed in the 1951 edition of a major Soviet encyclopaedia in which the Wallenberg family were stated to be active supporters of German fascism, wicked enemies of the working class who were attempting to subordinate Sweden to American imperialism. Moscow must have known about Jacob Wallenberg's and Enskilda Bank's efforts to save German company assets from confiscation by the Allies as well as Wallenberg mediation of German feelers for a separate peace. The Soviet Union was generally extremely anxious to share in the assets of German companies. Perhaps they also expected Raoul Wallenberg to possess interesting information about the Nazi plunder of Jewish wealth, currency smuggling etc. It is quite clear that

7. You leave out the very important component of "what he knew." As an "observer" he was definitely documenting war criminals, the occupying/being soon to be occupied had other interests in mind of recruiting police attaches for instance, regardless of Raoul's background to set-

Raoul Wallenberg was aware of what had happened in Hungary in this area. (The question of whether Raoul Wallenberg had earlier been involved in Jacob Wallenberg's negotiations on German company assets has not been settled).

It is possible that Raoul Wallenberg's contacts with high-level Nazis in Budapest, particularly Adolf Eichman and Kurt Becher, in the various negotiations for a separate peace, aroused Russian suspicions of the part he played in this context. Bernt Schiller made this his main theory in his book "Why the Russians captured Raoul Wallenberg". He contended that Wallenberg was arrested in the belief that his rescue action was part of an anti-Soviet international political plot by the Nazis and capitalist powers aiming at unilateral capitulation in the west. There may well have been Russian suspicions along these lines, but it is difficult to find proof that this was the main reason for the arrest of Raoul Wallenberg. Neither Budapest nor Raoul Wallenberg could have been considered the centre of the spider's web in this context. Moreover, the Allies kept Moscow fairly well informed over the various negotiations that aimed to buy back the Jews, and which the Germans (Himmler) at least also believed might increase chances for a separate peace. In addition, the Soviet was well provided with information from its own agents, particularly those in the British intelligence service. The negotiations between Joel Brand and the Nazis for the release of a million Jews in exchange for 10,000 trucks came to nothing because, inter alia, Vyshinsky vetoed the plan in June 1944, i.e. before Raoul Wallenberg's arrival in Budapest. However, the fact that the Russians were partly informed did not necessarily mean that their suspicions were eliminated.

7. The motive described above is assumed to be mainly associated with the Soviet interest in obtaining as much information on important issues as possible from Raoul Wallenberg. In view of this, it is perplexing that Raoul Wallenberg was questioned so seldom (judging from the interrogation reports). After the first, fairly long session one or two days after his arrival in Moscow, Raoul Wallenberg was only questioned on four occasions and only once for more than two hours. The latter interrogation, which took place in March 1947, was described as being more of a "control session" by an interpreter who claimed that he was present. According to a fellow prisoner, it was after this session that Raoul Wallenberg claimed to have been told by the interrogation leader that he was a political case and would never receive

It was -
By August,
Rumania
Bulgaria
were occupied.
Poland was
too complicated.
Hungary's
related
occupation
made a lot of
networks
possible,
already in
place, able
to continue in
some fashion
during the
Occupation

up an immediate pro-East Security network. RW's
information on "crimes against humanity" stood in the way
of their assuming continuity. Information he would
have brought to NURNBERG

a sentence. Thus, obtaining information from Raoul Wallenberg did not appear to be a matter of priority after his arrest. Nor were the other prisoners from Budapest questioned closely about Raoul Wallenberg. This brings us to another principal theory, that Stalin intended to use the Swedish diplomat for one or more specific purposes. *collateral?*

The close contacts of the Wallenbergs and Raoul Wallenberg with influential western political and economic circles must have appeared attractive to Stalin, provided that Raoul Wallenberg's cooperation could be obtained. Sudoplatov, for example, maintained that Stalin and Molotov wanted to blackmail the Wallenberg family, and through Raoul Wallenberg, make use of these connections to obtain advantageous agreements with the West, even to acquire international capital for reconstruction. (An example of a similar argument put forward by Soviet leaders, although in reverse, is found in Molotov's memorandum to the Central Committee dated 2 April 1956). However, the weakness of this theory is Moscow's refusal to acknowledge that Raoul Wallenberg had been taken to Moscow at all. On the other hand, perhaps the plan depended on Raoul Wallenberg himself being prepared to play a positive part in its realisation.

*Raoul Wallenberg
Korogge-
didn't work,
His uncle
committed
suicide.*

The Jewish question is in some respects another variation on the same theme. In 1944 and early 1945, Stalin wanted to exploit this issue as a bargaining point in order to obtain international capital, especially Jewish, for the reconstruction of the Soviet Union and to influence events in the Middle East. Beria urged Solomon Mikhoels, chairman of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee of the Soviet Bureau of Information (founded by Stalin in 1943), to establish widespread contacts with American Jews with the aim of encouraging them to invest in the Soviet Union. Stalin also met visiting American senators and discussed the possibility of setting up an autonomous Jewish republic in the Crimea. Sudoplatov claimed that he had been assigned to ^{CONVEY} ^{TO} plant this idea in Averell Harriman, the American ambassador. Raoul Wallenberg's network of contacts in Hungary could well have been of interest in this context.

Stalin soon abandoned the idea of a Jewish republic in the Crimea (in fact, he was never serious about the idea). Instead, from the latter half of 1946 in particular, Stalin concentrated on penetrating the Zionist movement and the future Jewish state in Palestine. Vyshinsky, with Molotov's agreement, wrote

an article under a pseudonym emphasizing the necessity of creating a democratic Jewish state on British Mandate Territory. Stalin also permitted a large number of Eastern European Jews to emigrate to Palestina. Shortly after in 1948, Stalin launched an anti-Semitic campaign which included the murder of Mikhoels and the Jewish deputy foreign minister, S.A. Lozovsky, gradually culminating in the rigged trials in Eastern Europe in the early 1950s. Although Stalin's anti-Semitism was perhaps more an instrument than a conviction, it could hardly have been advantageous for Raoul Wallenberg to be the chief symbol of rescuing the Jews from the Nazis during the initial stages of this campaign.

The well known former Soviet intelligence officer, Pitovranov, a high-ranking MGB official already in 1946-47, put forward as his hypothesis that the Soviet leaders had ulterior financial motives because of the Wallenberg family's financial contacts and also because of Stalin's Middle East policy, which was initially geared to creating a counter balance to a strongly unified Arab block. In his view, Moscow possibly knew too little about Raoul Wallenberg at first but retained him in order to discover more and to decide how to make best use of him.

The idea of recruitment - in the broadest sense - cannot be wholly dismissed; far too many people with insight into security service methods at the time have suggested this as a reasonable hypothesis. Attempts to recruit war prisoners were fairly commonplace. It was, however, unlikely that they would try to recruit Raoul Wallenberg as a regular agent. In his recently published memoirs, Fitin head of the Scandinavian section of PGU from 1945-46, alleged that he and his superior officer tried in vain to persuade Abakumov to hand over Raoul Wallenberg to the PGU for recruitment. This might have brought about Raoul Wallenberg's release. According to oral information received, Sudoplatov has claimed that Fitin also wrote to Molotov in his capacity as head of the Soviet Bureau of Information, asking to take over Raoul Wallenberg from counter espionage. Abakumov is said to have replied that Smersh could recruit him themselves, but only after he had confessed to being a spy. Raoul Wallenberg would not necessarily tell his fellow prisoners about any attempt made to recruit him.

Per Anzer
make a very
valid
point -
Russia's
letter of
credit
from the
Swedes
(Wallenberg
bank?)
cancelled
payments
upon
picking up
Raoul
-
trying to
put Raoul
into the
equation.

This is BIG news to me.
Fitin was, I thought, in
charge of "repatriation" - a
Euphemism for who goes free and
who doesn't and I'm excited to hear that
per
in
Nagran.

Finally, the Russians may have had some ulterior motive for using Raoul Wallenberg in an exchange, as they did with the Swiss diplomats. This could naturally have been combined with a number of other reasons.

CAPTION:

* * * * *
It may be worth recapitulating the comments of Raoul Wallenberg's fellow prisoners regarding the accusations directed against him and Langfelder (see the 1957 White Paper).

Gustav Richter stated that Raoul Wallenberg told him about the interrogation leader's accusations of espionage and observed that he came from a family of Swedish capitalists.

Karl Supprian also reported that because of information from Willy Roedels, Raoul Wallenberg was accused of spying. Ernst Ludwig Wallenstein, Willy Bergemann and W. Mohnke said the same (adding "on behalf of the Germans").

Erhard Hille heard from Loyda, who shared a cell with Raoul Wallenberg, that the interrogation leader could not believe that a wealthy Swedish capitalist like Raoul Wallenberg would work to safeguard Soviet interests in Budapest.

Ernst Huber shared a cell with Langfelder, who at the time said that he and Raoul Wallenberg were accused of spying for the Americans or, possibly, the British.

Following this review of possible motives, it is perhaps appropriate to try to formulate a more coherent and credible theory on what may have taken place. Perhaps no complete version of the underlying considerations has ever existed, or put into print. It is more than likely that various items of intelligence combined with Stalin's plans in particular, led to the arrest and detention of Raoul Wallenberg.

It should perhaps be emphasized that the reasons given here about motivation may be somewhat too circumstantial and therefore misleading. Perhaps a few, not necessarily particularly profound motives may have sufficed in reality. Compared with the other big issues involving the final

stages of the war, Stalin and the other leaders probably did not spare more than a passing thought to Raoul Wallenberg. In any case, the arguments below should be treated with some reservation.

The foundations were certainly laid with reports from Mme Kollontay and the intelligence agency in Stockholm on the affairs of Jacob and Marcus Wallenberg, the importance of the Wallenberg family to the Swedish economy and politics and their excellent international contacts. Very probably, Moscow had also received reports about Raoul Wallenberg's assignment in Budapest. The head of the political section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs informed the Soviet embassy counsellor in Stockholm on 20 October 1944 about the efforts of the Swedish Legation in Budapest to rescue the Jews. Wallenberg's name was certainly not mentioned, but Moscow naturally knew about him and was also aware of the identity of his employer and the part played by Iver Olsen. Possibly Moscow was convinced that Raoul Wallenberg undertook intelligence work on behalf of the Americans already in the autumn of 1944, but this has not been clarified. The Soviet Union was also made aware by means of the information provided by the Allies about various negotiations in Budapest to buy the Jews free as well as Swedish Legation contacts with the Hungarian resistance movement. On 31 December, the Soviet Foreign Ministry received a request from the Swedish Embassy in Moscow asking that the Red Army take members of the Swedish Legation in Budapest under their protection.

The decision to arrest Raoul Wallenberg and, possibly, the Swiss diplomats as well was taken at the highest level, perhaps by the Defence Council, at some time between 13 and 14 January. These were the days on which orders were given forbidding Raoul Wallenberg contact with the outside world. Perhaps the instructions to isolate him were given while awaiting a high-level decision. Nevertheless, on the basis of information from army units in Budapest, Dekanozov managed to inform the Swedes on 16 January that Raoul Wallenberg had been found and taken into custody. This was probably a pure slip; Dekanozov was known to react quickly and firmly, but had perhaps not been informed about top-level plans. Bulganin first sent an arrest warrant to Budapest on 17 January. After that, Moscow put the lid on, even though Mme Kollontay was still calmly assuring Raoul Wallenberg's mother and Foreign Minister Gunther's wife in February that Raoul

Again,
try
military.

Consider
this report ←
pro forma,
nothing
substantive
and
therefore not a
"slip." It is a response to a request from one
source to protect legation personnel.

→ NKVD -
Relation to Tolstoy

Meaning?

Wallenberg was in good shape but that it was advisable for the Swedes to keep calm. In principle, Mme Kollontay was only repeating Dekanozov's remarks to the Swedish Legation at a time when both the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and MID were waiting in good faith for news.

Apart from Stalin, there is reason to suspect that Molotov may have advocated strongly that Raoul Wallenberg should be sent to Moscow. Although the Foreign Ministers' papers give the impression that Molotov had no knowledge of Raoul Wallenberg at all before 1947, it appears more likely to assume that he was in the picture from the start, particularly in view of the involvement of both Bulganin and Abakumov and the fact that a foreign diplomat was involved. Moreover, Molotov received a copy of Dekanozov's message on 16 January. Molotov sometimes summoned Abakumov to him, and it was to him that Abakumov turned concerning the fate of the Swiss diplomats. Molotov was also involved in Stalin's decision in the late spring of 1947, based on Abakumov's suggestion, to eliminate Oggins, an American citizen imprisoned in a Soviet camp.

As far as can be judged, the Russians were convinced in 1945 that Raoul Wallenberg had undercover assignments, was certainly acting on behalf of the Germans, and strongly suspected him of cooperating with American intelligence as well. It is also certain that Stalin and Molotov were convinced that the Jewish rescue action was only a cover for his espionage. Colleagues of Abakumov have emphasized that Stalin suffered from spy-mania. Because the Swiss diplomats also worked actively to rescue the Jews, albeit less spectacularly, a shadow fell over them as well.

This was perhaps sufficient for Stalin to arrest and imprison the diplomats from neutral countries even if this was naturally contrary to international law.

At one point, some effort was made to find evidence linking Raoul Wallenberg to espionage. As discussed above, however, Stalin had political and, perhaps, economic reasons for retaining Raoul Wallenberg in Moscow. He may have wanted to use him in some exchange, as happened with the Swiss (this is further discussed below). Some greater political goals may well have been involved, perhaps less clearly defined in the beginning and never fully clarified. It is known that some prisoners were held more or less without any steps being taken because no instructions about them were received from Stalin.

*Stalin also
had a
mania
about
diplomats -
whom he
purged in the
30s
Kollontay
brought
of
survivors
of the 2nd
cops.*

IX. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING RAOUL WALLENBERG'S
IMPRISONMENT IN MOSCOW BETWEEN 1945-47

A. Archive records

The information that German war prisoners provided about the time Raoul Wallenberg spent in the Lubyanka and Lefortova prisons between 1945-47 was confirmed in papers found in archives. However, extensive efforts had been made to eradicate traces of his stay in prison. References to him in interrogation or transfer records were thickly inked out and some personal files have not been found. It has since been ascertained that the ink used to paint over his name was manufactured after 1948. However, once or twice the names of Raoul Wallenberg and Langfelder were missed in the records and left untouched. Using modern technology, the inked-out texts have been restored, except where mechanical destruction also occurred. No investigation file for Raoul Wallenberg has been recovered. If, as is claimed, he never received a sentence, no such file would have been opened.

Again, this
might not
be true. Perhaps
I don't
understand
what you
mean.

According to Russian experts, the fact that his belongings were not confiscated is a clear indication that he was never sentenced. The same applies to his driver, Langfelder. Nor has a personal file been found for his last fellow inmate, Roedel, although papers which would originally have been part of a personal file have been found in files of correspondence between various authorities etc.

No inked sections have been found in the original registration ledgers that were examined after July 1947. The original documents have been examined. It has not been possible to confirm the information that Raoul Wallenberg was also seen in Butyrka prison. On the other hand, this prison's card index for the 1940s and 1950s ~~was~~ largely destroyed.

has been
reported to
be

The following is known about Raoul Wallenberg's time in prison, based on documents that are now available.

A registration card has been found indicating that Raoul Wallenberg arrived at the Lubyanka Prison on 6 February 1945. It was claimed to have been found in 1989 among Raoul Wallenberg's personal belongings in the KGB basement, i.e., not in the archives. He was registered as a war prisoner and the date of his arrest was given as 19 January. Langfelder arrived on the

Ernst Ludwig Wallenstein: At the end of 1945/46, Raoul Wallenberg intended to write a letter of protest but was not entirely sure to whom it should be addressed. By tapping on the prison walls, Wallenstein and Raoul Wallenberg discovered that French was the most suitable language in which to write personally to Stalin. The letter was written and forwarded through the prison guard (Wallenstein knew from his own experience that letters of this kind were usually forwarded).

Willy Bergemann: Raoul Wallenberg (in Lefortovo) repeatedly asked the commissar to tell him his fate. He had then been comforted with the excuse that a ^{Allied} conference was being held in Moscow in March 1947 to decide what should be done with the prisoners. Comment: the background to the interrogation leader's comments was probably the peace conference held in Paris in 1946. This resulted the peace agreement of February 1947 with Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. There then remained the practical issues to be solved regarding repatriation and prisoners of war. Some war prisoners were released in this context, individually and in large groups. Presumably this was the process that Raoul Wallenberg described as a "conference about prisoners of war".

PRISONER OF
WAR
conference

also in
Paris
POWs and
reparations
were the
themes

These were
separate
conferences;
the mistakes
for the
Balkans
Finland
was one;
the Paris
POW/reparations
discussion
and the
Moscow POW/
reparations.

Bernhard Rensinghoff: Raoul Wallenberg wrote a letter in French referring to his diplomatic status and requesting an interview. The letter was addressed to Stalin in the summer 1946, requesting that he be given the opportunity to communicate with the Swedish Embassy in Moscow.

Just before he and Roedel were moved from Lefortovo, Raoul Wallenberg was taken for questioning. (No report exists for this session. Only after 11 March, when he was once again in Lubianka Prison, was the Swedish diplomat again questioned). After the session mentioned by Rensinghoff, Raoul Wallenberg said that the commissar had told him that he was clearly a "political case". If he considered himself innocent, the onus to prove it was on him. The best proof of his guilt was the fact that neither the Swedish Embassy in Moscow nor the Swedish Government had done anything on his behalf. Raoul Wallenberg had asked the commissar leading the interrogation to be put in direct touch with the Swedish Embassy in Moscow or the Red Cross, or in any case to be allowed to write to them. The commissar refused, telling him that "nobody takes any notice of you". "If the Swedish Government or Embassy had been at all interested, they would have been in

CARES ABOUT

Kopeliansky has denied questioning Raoul Wallenberg. He alleged that a high-ranking official, possibly Abakumov, signed the interrogation report in his (Kopeliansky's) name although conducting the interrogation himself.

If this were the case, Abakumov must have had an interpreter, and among his security service colleagues Kopeliansky was considered to be the best interpreter into German (further details of this given below).

A note in the register shows that Raoul Wallenberg was transferred from Lefortovo to Lubianka on 1 March 1947, and placed in cell 7 together with W. Roedel. Langfelder was not transferred until 23 July. The final recorded interrogation took place afterwards on 11 March 1947 between 14.15 and 16.00, led by Kuzmishin, mentioned above.

A reservation should be made at this point that Raoul Wallenberg may have been questioned more often than is shown in the interrogation report.

B. Oral statements

The German and other war prisoners provided interesting information about their stay in prison already in the 1950s. An account of this is given in the White Paper of 1957.

Gustav Richter: Early in February 1945, Raoul Wallenberg wrote a letter in German addressed to the prisoner director, protesting against the treatment he received and his detention. Raoul Wallenberg also requested that as a Swedish citizen and diplomat he be put in touch with the Swedish Embassy in Moscow. His petition was handed to the sergeant on duty on the ground floor of Lubianka Prison.

Heinz-Helmut von Hinckeldey: As a Swedish diplomat, Raoul Wallenberg made several strong protests against his detention. As diplomat of a neutral country, it was alleged that he demanded to be put in touch with a representative of the Swedish Embassy in Moscow. When questioned, he was said to have refused to reply and referred to his diplomatic status.

and that
Hatz +
Kitchman
were
exchanged
cell to cell...
Hatz, Hungarian
mobster, broke
in 1945, was
involved in
Swedish exchange
discussion and
is spoken on
efforts, Kitchman
German military
a broke Swedish
and Finland -
should check
for possible
radio
connections.

Russian and was taught English in return. After Raoul Wallenberg was transferred elsewhere, Loyda and Roedel were imprisoned together with Wilmosz Langfelder, who introduced himself as Raoul Wallenberg's fellow helper. He, too, was convinced that their detention was a mistake. (Loyda's memory was incorrect on this point. Roedel was moved to Lefortovo at the same time as Raoul Wallenberg).

During an interrogation at Lubianka Prison, the leader asked Loyda with whom he had shared a cell. "Two diplomats", he had answered. The interrogation leader replied that Raoul Wallenberg was not a diplomat but a Swede who helped rich Jews in Hungary.

Loyda stated that the MGB later forced him to sign an assurance that he would not mention to anyone what he had seen or heard during his stay in prison. Otherwise, he would be very severely punished.

Interviews with former security services' officials

The working group interviewed a number of former employees from Smersh, MGB, Lefortovo and Lubianka Prisons, and obtained some details of more or less indirect interest in forming a picture of Raoul Wallenberg's experiences in Moscow between 1945-47.

According to one of Kartashov's colleagues, whichever colleague was available at the time was used to obtain the first information from a newly-arrived prisoner. The head of department/section then decided who would deal with the case. Specially important cases were passed to the investigative section. Kartashov could only have worked through an interpreter, and the only possible choice was Kopeliansky. It was further claimed that Kartashov was not very knowledgeable about international issues or western espionage.

One interrogation leader held the view that only a narrow circle would have had contact with a person such as Raoul Wallenberg, as his role was clearly "decided by someone at the top". That a diplomat from a country not at war with the Soviet Union was imprisoned would have been kept very secret.

The order goes
 • Loyda - Roedel - VL
 • VL goes out and is replaced by RW
 • RW + WR are sent to Lefortovo.

contact a long time ago". Comment: This could be seen as a rather devastating and disastrous comment on the Swedish Embassy's lack of commitment, and of Söderblom in particular. On the other hand, it should be noted that only a month later, Vyshinsky noted that Sweden had approached the Soviet Union on a number of occasions about Raoul Wallenberg.

On another occasion, Raoul Wallenberg mentioned asking an interrogation official whether or not he was to be sentenced. He was told that "for political reasons you will never be sentenced".

In recent years, the working group have had the opportunity of talking to Gustav Richter again. This time, Richter briefly described the environment during Raoul Wallenberg's first weeks in Lubianka. Sometimes, a blond officer of Scandinavian appearance speaking excellent German sometimes came to the cell to survey the situation. Once, Raoul Wallenberg was taken for questioning around midnight and was returned to the cell about six o'clock in the morning, looking pale. The interrogation leader had been the blonde officer and Raoul Wallenberg said that he was a "dreadful man". He was referring to Sverchuk.

Following the fall of the Berlin wall, it became possible to interview Jan Loyda for the first time as he lived in the former DDR. This took place on two occasions. Only third-hand information had previously been available about him.

Loyda told how in March/April 1945 Raoul Wallenberg was moved to the same cell as he and Willy Roedel (Counsellor at the German Legation in Bucharest). Raoul Wallenberg explained that he had come to Moscow to negotiate with the Soviet authorities about Soviet shooting at Swedish Legation property, inter alia, and to obtain protection for the Jews. (Loyda was somewhat unclear about the way in which Raoul Wallenberg expressed himself on this point). Raoul Wallenberg regarded his capture as an inexplicable mistake. During the six to eight weeks that the three of them shared a cell, Raoul Wallenberg was convinced that the mistake would be cleared up and the planned negotiations would begin. No interrogation took place during this period. Raoul Wallenberg was in good health and exercised regularly and often used to sing. He made a sketch of a victory monument to the honour of the Red Army (sic). Loyda gave Raoul Wallenberg lessons in

The ^Working ^Group did not manage to get any further in their talks with K. It should be added that this man did not remember questioning Gustav Richter either, although he had done so according to the interrogation report. It was also interesting to note K's very strong reaction on seeing a photograph of Roedel; he even grew white of face and tongue-tied. (According to the report, K questioned Roedel on 18 July 1946, the day after the alleged interrogation of Raoul Wallenberg).

K questioned the man from the Abwehr mentioned earlier, known as G. As proof that he had not dealt with the Raoul Wallenberg case, he pointed out that he had not asked a single question about Raoul Wallenberg while interrogating G. On another occasion, K stated that G did not mention Raoul Wallenberg's name a single time. K's memory appeared to be very clear on this point. The interrogation with G took place in 1949 and later, i.e., at a time when K surely knew what had happened to Raoul Wallenberg.

At the time in question, Pitovranov had only heard from Utechin, ^A Deputy Head of ^Section, that "there was a very important and complicated case, Raoul Wallenberg". Utechin was also one of the leaders of counter espionage at the front and would certainly have been more in the know. Reports must have been sent ^{directly} to Stalin in such an important case as this. The reason why Raoul Wallenberg was interrogated so seldom surely depended on Stalin's order to the MGB not to do anything without special instructions. Perhaps Stalin had something particular in mind for Raoul Wallenberg which he did not mention to anyone else? This theory would fit in well with the fact that Raoul Wallenberg was considered a political case and would never receive a sentence. Raoul Wallenberg was kept under special conditions and treated well, according to P.

Kondrashov, an official at the MGB's 2nd Main Directorate, was sometimes called to other sections as well as several times to Abakumov as well, although mainly to translate papers. He very seldom took part in interrogations. However, some time in ^Spring 1947, an officer unknown to him ordered him to interpret at the interrogation of a prisoner dressed in a suit at the Lubyanka prison. It was some kind of control session, going through information already obtained and involved papers containing lists found when the prisoner was arrested. The interrogation took place calmly in daylight and lasted about 1½ to 2 hours (confirmed in the report, which

any examples
to give an
idea of how
rare or
calibre person?
VERY
INTERESTING
WHOSE TESTIMONY
IS THIS?
And was he
alone?

The MGB leaders' designation "particularly important prisoner" given to Raoul Wallenberg was used for intelligence officials, diplomats etc.

A prison guard remembered Raoul Wallenberg from Lubianka (1946 or 1947) and that he was in cell 116 or 117. He regarded Raoul Wallenberg as German and remembered that he was seldom called for questioning.

Two investigators from the section dealing with particularly important cases, whose special task was to prepare for the Nuremberg Process, said that they should have known about the Raoul Wallenberg case at that time but did not in fact do so. However, like many of those interviewed, they pointed out the two authorised interpreters/operators most fluent in German who would therefore have been involved in the most important cases. Others pointed out some other interpreters. One of the two best interpreters mentioned above claimed to have first heard about Raoul Wallenberg in 1947 and believed that it must have been his colleague who interpreted at the interrogations (later confirmed by the interrogation report). He emphasized that both Abakumov and Kartashov preferred to use his colleague.

The ^{Working} group interviewed Kopeliansky, who had been singled out several times. He was alleged to have questioned a great many German intelligence officers. He, too, had heard about a Swede arrested on the order of Voroshilov and held in prison under a number (not his own name). He could not, however, recollect whether he had questioned, or participated as interpreter, in interrogating Wallenberg, and was not able to understand the notes in the interrogation report. He thought that some chief had questioned

Raoul Wallenberg but had signed his name instead on the report. All the chiefs needed an interpreter, so someone else must have been summoned; it was also possible that a Swedish-speaking official from intelligence was brought in instead. On one occasion, K agreed that he may have participated as interpreter but could not remember having done so. He had a vague memory of a prisoner dressed as a civilian. On another occasion, K recalled the course of events could have been as follows: A chief order^{ed} K to have a prisoner brought in. K was to sit down for a while and invite him to share some tea and sandwiches, ask him how he was and make some small talk for a while. K did not need to interest himself further as he, the chief, would take care of the prisoner....

one might
consider the
possibility
of using
Swedish
interpreters
in July
1946 without
necessarily
knowing
who the
parties were.
Both RW +
VL spoke
Swedish.

A. Documentation

Detailed reports of Soviet authorities' handling of the case in the 1940s and 50s are contained in the internal memoranda of the Foreign Ministry which was handed over to the Swedish side. The following quotations emanate from just such a memorandum from 1952 (App.13).

The Soviet authorities began dealing directly with the case on 31 December 1944, when the Swedish Minister in Moscow, R Söderblom, handed a Note to the Soviet Foreign Ministry (MID). It contained the names of members of the Swedish mission in Budapest and stated that they were threatened with forced evacuation by the local authorities. Söderblom sought Soviet assistance for the Swedes when they encountered them.

The same day, Deputy Foreign Minister Dekanozov informed the chief of general staff, Antonov, and asked him for appropriate instructions to the front command. Accordingly, the commanders of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Front troops received a coded telegram on 2 January 1945. They were instructed to place any member of the mission whom they encountered under the protection of the Red Army and to inform the general staff.

Chapter V describes the orders issued in January.

Dekanozov's letter of Söderblom dated 16 January should be recalled here. Interestingly, copies were immediately sent to Molotov, Vyshinsky and several departments at the Foreign Ministry. The archive copy contains a note written on it "... Wallenberg's file" (in Russian: "delo Vallenberga").

It should be noted that, as mentioned earlier, an internal MID memorandum stated that Alexandra Kollontay had informed Raoul Wallenberg's mother, Maj von Dardel, in February 1945 that her son was in the safekeeping of the Soviet Union. The MID paper does not indicate how she obtained the information, nor her explanation to the authorities at home in May 1947, when the Foreign Ministry became aware of what she had said. The only item on record is that Mme Kollontay received approval for her draft reply to a question from Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts Tidning (Gothenburg Trade and Shipping News), to the effect that she had nothing to add to the official Soviet reply.

o does this refer
to the pressure
to move to
SOPRON or to
local Arrow
cross violations
of extra-
territoriality?

noted that on 11 March questioning lasted from 14.15 to 16.00). The leading interrogator was Kuzmishin whom colleagues claimed spoke poor German. (Only one maintained that Kuzmishin spoke fluent German). According to Kondrashov, no report was made of the proceedings.

very few new and definite facts have emerged in recent years about Raoul Wallenberg's imprisonment between 1945-47, even if "the other side", i.e., the security service, has now shed more light on the period. The most obvious aspect of the emerging picture is that the treatment meted out to Raoul Wallenberg during the first two years was not noticeably different to that of his fellow prisoners. It began to change between February and March 1947 for reasons that remain shrouded in mystery.

X. HOW DID THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES DEAL WITH THE WALLENBERG CASE?

Since September 1991, the Soviet/Russian side have handed over a large number of documents which have a direct or indirect bearing on Raoul Wallenberg's fate. A number of them also illustrate the actions of the Soviet authorities from January 1945 until, primarily, 1957. In latter years, however, the choice of papers from recent years has probably become more selective, although some of those released illustrate events after 1957 as well. It should be pointed out that the documents by no means provide the whole truth. As far as can be judged, a great many are missing, particularly from the former KGB records. Furthermore, a considerable amount of contact between authorities may have taken place over the telephone. In addition, it can be said that some documents contained an adjusted version of events. Attempts to suppress the real truth run through many of the papers. It should also be pointed out the authorities involved were the ones which prepared the cases, i.e., the Foreign Ministry (MID) and KGB. The Central Committee and Politbureau had no hand in preparatory work. They dealt with questions put before them and made decisions that were based on proposals submitted by the authorities.

Very little material was released before September 1991, but it is apparent from papers handed over in recent years that the material had been sifted through particularly during 1989-90.

long term
isolation w/
Rozdil and
in Cell #7
Lubyanka is
different
than frequent
exchange
of prisoners/
cell mates.

(Merkulov) replied that they were not in possession of any information about the Swedish diplomat (who was in the hands of Smersh *at that very time* just then).

During the rest of 1945 and 1946, Sweden then made a number of approaches and official calls to enquire about Raoul Wallenberg's fate. Further evidence was handed over at some of these meetings, giving details of more evidence, giving the names of Soviet military personnel alleged to have escorted Raoul Wallenberg out of Budapest on 17 January 1945, and also that he had been sighted in prisons in Moscow. The first definite testimony in the latter category came from Edward af Sandeberg on his return home in the spring 1946. He said, inter alia, that a German he had met in Butyrka prison had encountered Raoul Wallenberg in other Moscow prisons. The Foreign Ministry (MID) passed the questions to Abakumov, chief of the Smersh military counter espionage, and to the Ministry of the Interior (MVD) which then forwarded them to the head of the MGB records, explaining that Raoul Wallenberg was not to be found in the MBD camps. No reply was received from Smersh or the MGB despite several reminders from the MID, including one dated 3 February 1946. The MID asked Abakumov for a speedy reply as it was needed for a top-level presentation. An internal MGB document dated 12 August 1946 indicates that the enquiry was passed to the MID's Third Main Directorate. Kuzmishin was one of the names mentioned.

Who?

- Swedish minister calls on Stalin

Stalin received Ambassador Söderblom on 13 June 1946. The Soviet leader should have received a memorandum beforehand, giving the background and other details of the case. No such document has been found, however, nor any Soviet notes on the conversation or later instructions from Stalin. This lack of documentation on Stalin's conversations does not appear to be uncommon. After being typed, they were returned to his own secretariat. A footnote to the above MID memorandum stated that "according to information from Swedish sources," Stalin received Söderblom on 13 June 1946, and promised to order a search for Raoul Wallenberg. The only other person present was ~~Deputy Foreign Minister~~ ^{Minister} S. Lozovsky. Shortly afterwards Lozovsky became head of the Bureau of Information but was later murdered on Stalin's orders, together with Solomon Michoels, chairman of the Jewish Anti-fascist Committee. According to Söderblom's own report (App.14),

INTERESTING!
P.S. - Was there
contact between
Kollontay &
Maznikow?

It should be mentioned here that Emmy Lorentzon, who was Kollontay's confidante in Stockholm for many years, had a conversation with representatives for the Swedish Embassy in Moscow in 1988, while living in a home for the aged. She said that on returning to Moscow, Kollontay began researching into Raoul Wallenberg's whereabouts. She was soon told to stop and in 1948 was told that the Swedish diplomat had died of illness in prison in 1947. Lorentzon was not able to provide any other information.

- Swedish enquiries 1945-46

Söderblom proposed at an early stage that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs should confirm Raoul Wallenberg's diplomatic status to the Soviet Union, and provide him with an official assignment in Debrecen. The Swedish Ministry does not appear to have reacted to this proposal. The Swedish approach to Moscow in March 1945 concerned all embassy personnel in Budapest. Söderblom reported to Stockholm on 19 April: "I am afraid that with the best will in the world the Russians will be unable to discover what happened possible, in the event of his having been involved in a fatal car accident or murdered ... that Raoul Wallenberg has disappeared without a trace". Two days later, Söderblom received a very definite request from Stockholm: "You are hereby firmly instructed to call on Dekanozov".

Söderblom first sent a letter to deputy foreign minister Dekanozov on 24 April 1945, some time after ^{the post} all the staff ~~except Raoul Wallenberg~~ had left the mission in Budapest and returned to Sweden via Moscow. He asked the Soviet side to take urgent action to find Raoul Wallenberg. The Soviet internal memorandum noted that as he handed over the letter, Söderblom remarked that "Possibly he (Raoul Wallenberg) has been in some kind of accident". The Swedes heard this from Jews arriving in Bucharest from Budapest, but even Langlet said something to that effect, "In replying to Dekanozov's question, Söderblom presumed that Raoul Wallenberg may have died in a car accident". Söderblom said this despite the announcement by the selfsame Dekanozov on 16 January that Raoul Wallenberg was in Soviet hands. It is unavoidable that the Russians had Söderblom's assumption in mind when they replied in ^{to the Swedish Govt.} August 1945.
A memorandum from Vishinsky

This, and a couple of further enquiries resulted in a letter from the MID (then NKID) to the NKGB asking for news about Raoul Wallenberg so that they could reply to the Swedish Government. On 8 August 1945, the NKGB

Wallenberg would also be sent home if found. Abramov also asked Söderblom to procure the return of the Makarova girl to her father. This could be interpreted as a very gentle hint about an exchange. Such a hint can also be read into the Soviet notes on the conversation, although another interpretation is more likely. Makarova was a 17 year old girl who had fled to Sweden. The Soviet Embassy in Stockholm began sending demarchés about her on 17 January 1945, i.e., the day that Raoul Wallenberg disappeared from Budapest.

It is worth noting the meeting that took place between the Swedish Minister, Häggblöf, and Novikov, a member of the MID college, on 30 January 1947. Novikov pointed out that Soviet enquiries had been going on for a long time but had not been successful. However, it should not be forgotten that "Raoul Wallenberg landed in the arms of the Red Army during a period of fierce fighting in Hungary when anything could have happened, such as Raoul Wallenberg's escape, enemy air attacks etc". According to Häggblöf, Novikov further mentioned that there were certainly camps in the USSR which had not yet complied with the order to look for Raoul Wallenberg. He later asked Häggblöf to disregard this remark.

Coming from
Novikov,
that's an
interesting
remark!

MID hears that Raoul Wallenberg is in Moscow

Early in 1947, the security service had still not replied to the Foreign Ministry's enquiries. However, in a report of a conversation (with Barck-Holst) dated December 1946, Sysoyev of the 5th European Section wrote, "Some time ago Burashnikov, head of Section 2 of Smersh, spoke on the telephone to Chebotarev (MID), mentioning that it would be desirable if Vyshinsky telephoned to Abakumov on this matter." This must be considered the first clear indication in an MID document that Raoul Wallenberg might be in the Soviet Union. (A record of the conversation submitted to Abakumov).

This contradicts
the concept
of an earlier
involvement
by Molotov.

Fedotov of the MGB spoke to Novikov in February 1947, telling him that Raoul Wallenberg was held by the MGB. Fedotov promised to let Molotov know the reasons for Raoul Wallenberg's arrest (zaderzjka), and to submit proposals for further action on the matter.

A report of Novikov's conversation with Fedotov was included in a memorandum from Vetrov to Molotov. Vetrov reproduced Novikov's original

Stalin made a note of Raoul Wallenberg's name and pointed out that the Soviet side had ordered the protection of the Swedes. Although Söderblom referred to Dekanozov's announcement of 16 January 1945, he expressed his personal conviction that Raoul Wallenberg had fallen victim to an accident or been kidnapped. He said that he accepted that the Soviet authorities had no information on Raoul Wallenberg's fate but that he would very much like an official statement that all possible steps were being taken to find him. Once again, Söderblom had spoken of his belief that Wallenberg had died in Hungary. It is not far-fetched to believe that these statements made it easier for the Russians to reply as they did in August 1947.

Lozovsky received the Swedish counsellor, Ulf Barck-Holst on 13 December 1946, who enquired about the results of the investigations promised by Stalin. Lozovsky claimed to have had nothing to do with it. Nevertheless, details of the conversation were sent to Abakumov, with a request from Molotov and Dekanozov for a report and presentation.

- Russian exchange proposals?

An interesting conversation took place on 12 December 1946 when the ~~Chargé d'Affaires~~ Ulf Barck-Holst called on the head of the Fifth European Department of the MID, Sysoyev. Ulf Barck-Holst interpreted Sysoyev's method of counterattacking by taking up the case of Soviet defectors in Sweden as being the real problem in Swedish-Soviet relations as a possible ^{HINT found} proposal for an exchange. There is little direct support for this interpretation in the Soviet notes on the conversation (App.15). Nevertheless, this is not to say that the idea was not mooted. An exchange was the means by which the Swiss diplomats were released. ^{at about that time} However, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs did not receive confirmation that Raoul Wallenberg was generally being held in Moscow until two months later, even though the first intimation of this came before Sysoyev's conversation with Barck-Holst....

Some six months earlier, on 30 April, Söderblom reported talking to Abramov, a MID official. Abramov let slip the comment that Mr af Sandeberg (the first to testify about Raoul Wallenberg) had been found and was probably back home by now. This could be conceived as a hint that Raoul Wallenberg is still alive... However, Abramov may have mentioned Sandeberg's return home just to make it appear credible that Raoul

The Swedes knew by the fall of 1945 at the latest as they informed Dan Achenbach where RW was and that his papers had been taken. This occurred at an economic warfare conference

→ and that they didn't expect him ever to return...

INTERESTING

Abakumov to "report on the substance of the case and propose its settlement." The expression in Russian is "liquidation" which can be interpreted in two ways, alluding to the case as well as the person. Opinion differs about Vyshinsky's intentions, which are further discussed below. Molotov wrote on the memorandum on 18 May 1947, "To Abakumov. Please report to me." (Molotov was deputy prime minister at the time).

The next important document was a letter from Deputy Foreign Minister Vyshinsky direct to Abakumov, dated 7 July 1947 (App.19). Vyshinsky referred to an enquiry from the US trade minister, Henry Wallace, and also specifically mentioned that the Swedish Embassy in Moscow had been informed that Raoul Wallenberg had been taken into safekeeping by the Soviet military authorities in Budapest on 16 January 1945. He emphasized that the Swedes had pursued the matter intensively ever since, approaching the MID a number of times "for some kind of answer at least". Then came the following key sentence, "In order to solve the question of a reply (to the Swedes) and its contents, it would be important to receive information about the place where Wallenberg was taken into the protection of the Soviet military forces, his whereabouts at the present time, the places to which he was moved and whether any fighting or bombing occurred at these places, whether Wallenberg had freedom of movement or was under constant surveillance and whether at this point in time he was in contact with or met members of the Swedish Embassy in Vienna (sic) or other foreigners." The letter ended with the request that Abakumov write and send a report on these matters.

When considering the contents of the letter, it should be borne in mind that Vyshinsky knew at that stage that Raoul Wallenberg was being held in a Soviet prison. He urged Abakumov to provide background material for a reply that would endeavour to convince the Swedes that Raoul Wallenberg disappeared in Budapest - which was strongly hinted at in the official reply a month later. This gave a fateful content to the letter - it meant in practice that the question of Raoul Wallenberg's future had to be resolved (earlier Vyshinsky had put forward the proposal to settle the case) in a manner that would not undermine the credibility of the version under preparation. Vyshinsky thereby assumed that it was out of the question to acknowledge officially the presence of Raoul Wallenberg in an MGB prison. Clearly, further informal contact had taken place between the MID and MGB, which is

remarks to Hägglöf, i.e., that Raoul Wallenberg may have died already in Hungary. Novikov replaced this in the draft copy with handwritten information obtained from Fedotov (App.16). He also asked Vetrov to rewrite the letter in one copy only and to hand it personally to Podtserov, head of Molotov's office. When rewriting the memorandum, Vetrov was not to use his own secretary but should get it done at the office of Deputy Foreign Minister Vyshinsky. This indicates that Fedotov's information received very cautious treatment and was probably shown only to a very small circle.

who therefore knew?

Fedotov's verbal statement was also referred to in an agenda for Vyshinsky which Vetrov prepared on 2 April 1947. The records do not show whether the promised presentation of the case to Molotov ever took place. Probably not. Vetrov told Vyshinsky in a memorandum of 2 April 1947 that Fedotov was working on the issue but had not yet presented it. Clearly, the MGB (Abakumov) did not know how to deal with Raoul Wallenberg.

Kolesnikov, head of the Soviet Red Cross, received a letter from Folke Bernadotte about Raoul Wallenberg in May 1947. As a result, Kolesnikov passed the enquiry to Vyshinsky as well as to the MVD Main Directorate for prisoners of war and internees. Their representative, Kobulov (also Beria's confidant), asked the MID what they knew on the matter on 11 June. The reply was given by telephone the following day. (Kobulov's inquiry could be interesting as it perhaps indicates that Beria and his closest colleague were not well informed about Raoul Wallenberg. It is more likely, however, that they wanted to know how to formulate a reply).

- Vyshinsky wants the Raoul Wallenberg case settled

Following Vetrov's memorandum of 2 April 1947, Vyshinsky wrote a memorandum to Molotov on 13 May (App.18). He noted that since 24 April 1945 Sweden had made eight written and five verbal approaches about Raoul Wallenberg. Vyshinsky also attached importance to the questions asked in the Swedish Parliament on the subject as well as what he described as a press campaign in Sweden. He further mentioned that the MID had repeatedly asked in vain for information from Smersh and MGB. The exception to this was a promise from Fedotov of the MGB to talk personally to Molotov about the case and propose further measures to be taken. Vyshinsky would therefore ask Molotov to prevail upon/instruct

during 1993-1994, ~~both~~ ^{in hopes of recovering the letter} personally looked through more than two thousand sealed envelopes where for a long time it was hoped the letter would be recovered. One of the envelopes was found to contain, *inter alia*, the decisive document relating to the Katyn Forest massacre. However, the search met with little success. Both Volkogonov and Pichoja have announced that the letter was not in the archives.

The exact contents of the letter can therefore only be speculated upon. However, it comprised Vyshinsky's response to Molotov's endorsed request for a report on the fate of Raoul Wallenberg which would serve as the basis for a reply to the Swedes. One hypothesis is that Abakumov told Molotov that something serious, such as death (independent of the circumstances) had occurred. Another that cannot be entirely discounted is that Abakumov announced what they intended to do with Raoul Wallenberg. Yet another version, favoured by high-ranking KGB representatives ~~but which must be considered somewhat less probable~~, is that Abakumov asked Molotov for instructions on what he should do with Raoul Wallenberg.

The extreme importance and sensitivity of the communication can be seen from the fact that Molotov had not told Vyshinsky about its contents even after five days (22 July) and that it has not ^{been} found. If the letter only contained a reply to Vyshinsky's questions ^{it is} difficult to see any reason for treating the letter differently to other papers. Furthermore, according to a former official at Molotov's office, it was not uncommon for Molotov not to keep Vyshinsky fully informed; they had a strained relationship.

- Sweden informed

Nothing more happened until 9 August, according to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs records. Vyshinsky then sent a brief message to Molotov referring to Sohlman's approach to ^{Deputy Foreign Minister} Malik on 12 June. He suggested that a reply to the point at issue might be appropriate. Vyshinsky enclosed a draft reply, making the point that it contained "the draft of which you are aware with an additional paragraph relating to the conversation between Novikov and Hägglöf on 30 January of this year." Vyshinsky was referring to the passage in which Novikov indicated that Raoul Wallenberg fell into Red Army hands during fierce fighting in Hungary and anything could have happened: flight, enemy air attacks and so on. (Hägglöf replied that

not reflected in the records - or did V quite simply have prior knowledge of what was in store for Raoul Wallenberg?

1947
Sohlman met the MID official, Vetrov on 16 July. Once again, the Soviet side anticipated what was to come. As his personal comment, Vetrov wanted to point out that fighting had been particularly bitter around Budapest towards the end of January 1945. There were several indications that Raoul Wallenberg had died although no proof had yet been found.

Vyshinsky sent a brief reminder to Abakumov on 22 July 1947, asking him to expedite his reply to the above letter, on the grounds that "the matter has been activated in Sweden". (A petition signed by a number of Swedish organisations was handed to the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm on 15 July).

The bottom left-hand corner of this letter contains one of the most important notes found in the entire archive material that the Russians handed. The head of the Scandinavian section of the MID had written on 23 July 1947: "Ab. (Abakumov) replied on 17/7 1947 in a personal letter to Molotov under reference number 3044/a".

occasions,
The memorandum, referred to on a number of times, also pointed out that a note on one of the accompanying reports mentioned the receipt of a letter from Abakumov to Molotov in the latter's secretariat. The letter was addressed to Molotov in his capacity as Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

1947
A copy of the KGB register of outgoing letters indicated that the letter was dispatched on 17 July 1947. It also showed that it had been composed at the MGB Third Main Directorate, where Kartashov's section was earlier placed. The actual letter has not been found, however. The Russian explanation for this is that the letter was personal and particularly sensitive in character.

One of the main tasks of the working group has of course been to try to find Abakumov's letter. Every conceivable MID and KGB archive has been searched. In addition, inquiries were instituted at the President's archives where very top secret material is kept. Contact there was with Pichoja, the former head of the Russian records system, and General Volkogonov who,

New and more reliable evidence about Raoul Wallenberg's imprisonment began appearing in 1951 and thereafter. One of the first came from the Italian diplomat Claudio de Mohr. This resulted in the Swedish Foreign Minister, Undén, handing a Note to the Soviet ambassador Rodionov on 1 February 1952 which included a request for the return of Raoul Wallenberg to Sweden.

When asked to comment, the Minister of State Security, S D Ignatiev, replied to Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko on 26 February that the MGB did not consider it appropriate to change in any way the nature of the reply given to the Swedes in Vyshinsky's note of 18 August 1947 (App. 23). (Abakumov had been arrested by this time).

It should be noted that...

Three weeks later, Vyshinsky, ^{AD} the newly appointed Foreign Minister, sent a memorandum (App. 24) directly to Stalin, giving the history of the case but without revealing anything other than the facts already mentioned in the Foreign Ministry's document. It may well be asked why Vyshinsky did not explain more clearly what had happened to Raoul Wallenberg in an internal top secret paper. It is likely that he was aware of the truth at this stage (although it is not ~~of course~~ possible to be sure). According to Russian experts, it was not uncommon to maintain a fiction even in internal top secret documents of this nature, i.e., the official rather than the real version was used, if the latter was felt to be extremely secret and conspiratorial. The truth was also within the remit of the KGB and it was not therefore appropriate for Vyshinsky to reveal it. It should be noticed that Vyshinsky's memorandum even drew Stalin's attention to the Hungarian court judgement against members of the Arrow Cross in 1948. Vyshinsky fully agreed with the MGB recommendation not to alter the reply of 1947. Following Politbureau approval, the reply then handed to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in April also stated that the Soviet authorities had no further information about Raoul Wallenberg beyond that given in 1947.

SWEDISH?

Although Sweden made another approach in May of the same year, it was decided not to respond at all unless a renewed Swedish enquiry was made, in which case a verbal reply would be made referring to the reply given in April. However, after the approach in May, the Scandinavian section of the MID (mentioned several times in this text) drew up an exhaustive memorandum on the case. This resulted in Vyshinsky writing another

while not discounting anything he still hoped for the best).

Molotov noted his agreement to Vyshinsky's proposal, making minor changes to the text.

Vyshinsky sent a personal note to Sohlman (App.22) on 18 August 1947, containing the first official Soviet reply about Raoul Wallenberg. He maintained that the result of careful investigation had established that "Wallenberg is not in the Soviet Union and is unknown to us". Vyshinsky could certainly not deny that the MID received a brief message on 14 January 1945 "based on indirect information from one of the commanders in Budapest that Wallenberg had been found. But it had proved impossible to verify this information due to the fierce fighting taking place in the city. The officer who sent the message had not been found, nor had Raoul Wallenberg been found in a 'prisoner-of-war and internment camp', to quote the note. (Raoul Wallenberg was in a prison). He then referred to the earlier hypothesis that Raoul Wallenberg may have fallen prey to the fighting. "This leaves only the supposition that Wallenberg died during the battle in the city of Budapest or that he was captured by the Arrow Cross".

It should be observed that Vyshinsky did not say outright that Raoul Wallenberg had never been in the Soviet Union, only that he was not there and that he was unknown, i.e., at that time. The wording was typical for the Soviet, bordering on a lie. It should be specially pointed out that Vyshinsky's note was made known to the whole of the Soviet leadership.

Very little happened in the Raoul Wallenberg case for the next five years and far fewer approaches were made to Moscow than between 1945 and 1947. However, one odd occurrence should receive comment. A former member of the Arrow Cross was sentenced to death by a Hungarian court in 1948 for killing Wallenberg in Buda just before his departure to meet Marshal Malinovsky in Debrecen. The MID memorandum above reported the sentence without further comment other than that Swedish newspapers had dismissed the story completely.

- New testimony and Swedish approaches

2 interesting things about Dezhnev's Miklos - one is the Court's description of Raoul as a kind humanitarian -

i.e. no reference to espionage.

The second is that, if true, the event in which Muller is present when D.D.M. shows the photograph would only add to Raoul's own colleagues fears/beliefs that he was hunted down & killed by the Arrow Cross in Hungary, a cover for the Swedes. Ditto Kossuth broadcast.

document found in MID records, dated December 1955 (App. 27). It concerned a letter to the head of the Scandinavian Department of the MID about a proposed report to the Central Committee on Raoul Wallenberg. It mentioned a paragraph in the proposed report, which was enclosed but has not now been found, should be altered so that "the absence of information about Wallenberg is explained by his having been in the Soviet Union under a different name from the first post-war days until his death. This had been successfully established through meticulous control of the information received from the Swedes".

- Erlander and Hedlund in Moscow: the presentation of new, irrefutable testimony

The moment was drawing closer when the Soviet attitude to the Wallenberg case started to change. Prime Minister Erlander and Minister of the Interior Hedlund intended to visit Moscow at the end of March 1956. The Russians realised that Wallenberg would be high on the agenda. Molotov sent a memorandum to the Central Committee on 29 February 1956 noting that Erlander had informed the Soviet ambassador in Stockholm that the question would be raised, "so that the Swedish bourgeois opposition would have no cause to blame the Government for their lack of energetic measures". It is unlikely that Erlander expressed himself in this way (the Swedish notes on Erlander's talk with Rodionov no longer exist). Molotov pointed out that Raoul Wallenberg belonged to the largest Swedish monopolistic family and repeated the then official version. He found it good tactics for the Soviet ambassador in Stockholm to make it clear to Undén that the Soviet side had nothing to add to their earlier "comprehensive and definite statement". The Soviet Foreign Minister appeared to believe that such a step would indicate to the Swedish Government that little would come from a new approach.

In his meeting with Ambassador Rodionov on 10 March, Undén commented on the eventual role played by Beria and the state security organisation in Raoul Wallenberg's fate and their possible concealment of some of the facts *from* ~~to~~ top level officials at the Foreign Ministry. Undén put this forward as a hypothesis after Rodionov pointed out that the Soviet would have no reason to retain a person in whom the Swedish government was so interested. The

memorandum to Stalin in which he stated that "Raoul Wallenberg is alleged to have saved Jews in Hungary". Once again it is surprising that Vyshinsky does not give the true version even in an internal memorandum.

Both of the above quotations were formulated by the Politbureau and submitted afterwards only to Molotov and Vyshinsky.

released as
a result of
the
Khrushchev-
Adenauer
treaty??

The two Swedish approaches reported above were based on new, reliable testimony from witnesses ^{from} and resulted in ~~two~~ reports being sent to Stalin. The Soviet side regarded them with some degree of seriousness.

The Soviet reaction to further Swedish approaches in 1953 and 1954 was to reject them firmly. Although Stalin had died, Molotov and Vyshinsky were still at their posts. The head of the KGB from 1954 was I.A. Serov.

It should be noted that on 13 October 1953 Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko asked KGB chief Serov for details on when and under what circumstances Raoul Wallenberg had died (App.26). This was because a new presentation in the form of a memorandum was again being prepared for the Central Committee. Some weeks later Serov replied that the KGB had nothing to ~~say~~ add to the statement made on 3 March 1952. It is questionable whether Gromyko was ~~generally~~ allowed to know more about Raoul Wallenberg's fate.

Bulganin's
remark on
the
Bulganin
arrest
order!

Sweden made further efforts to find out the truth in 1955, including a visit by Swedish ambassador Sohlman to meet Bulganin while President Voroshilov received a delegation of Swedish parliamentarians. The Soviet attitude was growing somewhat less dismissive - Voroshilov spoke of extensive investigations throughout the country. Sohlman told Bulganin that he was completely convinced that if found, Raoul Wallenberg would be returned to Sweden immediately. Bulganin complained that he had nothing new to say and noted that both individuals and groups disappear in a war. According to Sohlman's report, Bulganin also mentioned that Raoul Wallenberg would be allowed to return home if he was found. Bulganin had made the case his business in the government and with the notes made by Vyshinsky and others.

Clearly some investigation, or at least discussion, took place at this time about providing Sweden with some new information. An interesting KGB

document found in MID records, dated December 1955 (App. 27). It concerned a letter to the head of the Scandinavian Department of the MID about a proposed report to the Central Committee on Raoul Wallenberg. It mentioned a paragraph in the proposed report, which was enclosed but has not now been found, should be altered so that "the absence of information about Wallenberg is explained by his having been in the Soviet Union under a different name from the first post-war days until his death. This had been successfully established through meticulous control of the information received from the Swedes".

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Soviet interpretation of this was that the Swedes would be satisfied with a reply in which Beria was blamed for Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance. The Soviet notes on the conversation differ in this respect from the Swedish (App. 28 and 29). Deliberately or otherwise, Rodionov appears to have distorted Undén's remarks.

The Swedish Embassy received a note from the MID as late as 19 March, reiterating that Raoul Wallenberg was not in the Soviet Union and that earlier statements were definitive and comprehensive.

During ^{visit} Prime Minister Erlander's testimonies from German and other prisoners of war were handed over showing indisputably that Raoul Wallenberg was in the Lubianka and Lefortovo Prisons at least between 1945 and 1947. Molotov sent the material to the Central Committee, advising them that the Foreign Ministry would make proposals (for action) within a couple of days.

- New Soviet version prepared

Molotov's new memorandum to the Central Committee on 2 April gave details of previous official Soviet replies to Sweden. After calling attention to the new testimony, Molotov noted Erlander's and Hedlund's comments that the Wallenberg issue was such an irritating element in Soviet-Swedish relations that it could have a negative effect on them. "Erlander persistently asked us to find a solution to this situation in order to settle the matter". Molotov seized on this and, typically, presumed that Erlander had in mind the considerable influence exerted by the Wallenberg family in Sweden as one of the biggest Swedish monopolists, and that the Wallenberg issue could be exploited in consequence in some Swedish circles to the detriment of Swedish-Soviet relations, particularly prior to the parliamentary elections that autumn.

In these circumstances, it was suggested to the Central Committee that before Erlander's departure, ^{URF} Molotov should tell Hedlund that the Soviet had nothing new to add over and above their previous reply. Nevertheless, instructions were given to the requisite organisations to examine and verify the testimony handed over, with the intention of letting the Swedish Government know the outcome.

The Politbureau agreed, and the KGB and Ministry of the Interior were instructed to examine the material and make proposals for a reply within two weeks. The joint Swedish-Soviet communiqué following the visit contained some words about Raoul Wallenberg and was published in Pravda, which meant that it could be read in every prison camp and prison in the Soviet Union. *(Is this when Gopiberg had his fight with the guard at VLADIMIR?)*

While this was taking place, a passing mention should be made of a letter received at the MID from Sjiriagin in the Charkov oblast, probably inspired by the Pravda communiqué about the Swedish prime minister's visit.

The exact contents of Sjiriagin letter are not known as it was not found in either the MID or KGB records. Nor, unfortunately, has he been traced despite the considerable efforts of the Working Group to find him. It must have contained something interesting, as an MID head of section brought it to the notice of the KGB (App.30), pointing out that it contained facts about the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg. It warned that Sjiriagin misdirected zeal in helping in the search for Raoul Wallenberg could lead to the information spreading, even to the Swedish Embassy. It was therefore proposed that the KGB use its channels to advise Sjiriagin cautiously not to spread his knowledge about, not even to family or friends.

Molotov received a message on 16 April from head of section Gribanov, referring to the task of drafting a proposed reply to Sweden within two weeks. KGB chief Serov had announced that the KGB had drafted a proposal (the Interior Ministry had clearly not been involved). Serov asked for an appointment with Molotov at a suitable time in order to present it in person.

No documentary evidence of this presentation has been found. The high level at which the matter was dealt with by the heads of both organisations the sensitivity and extreme degree of secrecy surrounding the real truth. The result of their deliberations can be seen in a joint memorandum dated 28 April, together with appendices and various rough drafts, addressed to the Central Committee (App. 31).

The actual memorandum referred to the evidence of several war prisoners of war that was contained in the material submitted by Sweden, and noted that the information "largely" tallied with the actual circumstances surrounding Wallenberg's arrest and imprisonment in the Soviet Union.

NO SUCH WORD

In view of the importance of regularising the Wallenberg issue, and the fact that Sweden never ceased bringing the matter up, Molotov and Serov felt it would be appropriate to "inform the Swedish Government about Wallenberg, although not straight away." The parliamentary elections in September was an important consideration and it would ^{be} tactically more suitable to extend research into the Wallenberg case, giving a final answer two or three months after the election. Molotov's and Serov's plan contained the following elements.

will insist to conduct a
The Soviet ambassador in Stockholm should speak personally to Foreign Minister Undén in early May, asking for the specific clarification of some testimony, photographs of Raoul Wallenberg (sic) etc. This was calculated to make the Swedes regard the request as proof of the Soviet authorities' thorough examination of the submitted material. - The wording used allows the conclusion to be drawn that no extensive research was in fact taking place.

Still according to the memorandum, it would be possible in a couple of months time, in July, to let the embassy in Stockholm inform the Swedes about the careful scrutiny the submitted material was undergoing, that people were being heard who were possibly involved in the circumstances referred to in the material and that the Swedish government would be informed of the outcome.

As stated earlier, it was suggested that the final information should be provided two to three months after the parliamentary elections.

The appendices to the memorandum containing the above proposals were later approved by the Politbureau (or Presidium as it was then called). It should be noted that this document had the highest top secret classification of all the documents from the former CK records. It belonged to the "special file", which meant that those with access to the paper had to return it to the Presidium office within 24 hours.

The first Soviet enquiry to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs was in May and concerned the Austrian war prisoner Scheuer/Schlüter who spent some time in the same cell as Raoul Wallenberg and who was suspected of cooperating with the prison management.

However, the third appendix to Molotov's and Serov's memorandum to the Central Committee was the most remarkable. Dated the end of April, it already contained a draft of the final reply which was delivered to Sweden in due course. It stated that the Soviet had undertaken a thorough examination of the evidence submitted. Moreover, a search had been made of records of the counter espionage committee and former commander ^{who and} (of what?). Some people had been questioned and Raoul Wallenberg's whereabouts between 1945-47 had been successfully established.

Furthermore, it also stated that Wallenberg had been removed from Budapest to Moscow on Abakumov's instructions, that the Government had not been informed of his arrest there which was contrary to Soviet legislation, and that Abakumov accused him of spying on behalf of the Germans against the Soviet Union and their allies in the war against Hitler's Germany. An examination of the records of the "former commander for counter espionage" had established that Raoul Wallenberg had been held in Lefortovo Prison on the personal orders of Abakumov, under special conditions so that the prison staff was unaware of his name. "Raoul Wallenberg died in the prison hospital (i.e., Lefortovo) in July 1947, and his body taken for cremation".

Butyrka?

It then stated that, to avoid responsibility, Abakumov destroyed direct documentary evidence which, *inter alia*, was apparent from Raoul Wallenberg's interrogation file being missing (on the other hand, no mention was made of his personal file). The reference to the interrogation file was illogical. Such a file was only opened when a prisoner was sentenced.

as long as he was interrogated, there is an interrogation file

Finally, it related that Abakumov had been tried & executed ~~what had happened to Abakumov~~ and expressed sympathy with the Swedish Government and Raoul Wallenberg's family.

It is not clear why this version did not meet with Politbureau approval, possibly because Lubianka Prison was not mentioned (several witnesses

had spoken of time Raoul Wallenberg spent in Lubianka Prison) and because of the reason given for his arrest. The MID and KGB were then assigned the task of presenting the final proposals ~~instead~~, by early October at the latest. It should be recalled that Molotov and Serov already knew what had happened to Raoul Wallenberg - what mattered now was to fabricate a version for the benefit of the Swedes. A former KGB official who had some connection with the case stated that in 1956 they were looking for a version "that was half true".

The document did not make it entirely clear whether any real research took place in April or later, or whether Molotov and Serov knew the whole truth from the start, but there are many indications that there was barely any necessity for extensive research. More of this in Chapter B (oral information).

En passant, an MID memorandum dated 5 April 1956 referred to the testimony of a Finnish subject, Mäntynen: "According to information from the USSR Ministry of the Interior and the KGB, Mäntynen did not meet Raoul Wallenberg while imprisoned in the USSR between 1948-1955 and was therefore unable to provide Swedish representatives with any material about Raoul Wallenberg worthy of any attention at all."

The question here - unlikely to be answered - is of course how the word "meet" should be interpreted. Did it mean that Mäntynen did not encounter Raoul Wallenberg because he was imprisoned elsewhere, or because he was dead?

The MID Foreign Minister Shepilov) and the KGB presented a new draft reply on 22 October 1956. It now stated that "no document" had been found concerning Raoul Wallenberg's stay in the Soviet Union and that the inmate was not known to the prison staff under his correct name. However, questioning had established that following his arrest, Raoul Wallenberg was taken to Moscow on Abukamov's orders and imprisoned in "Lefortovo and Butyrka Prisons". Further, It stated that Raoul Wallenberg died suddenly on 17 July 1947 (the first occasion that this date was mentioned) and his body cremated. It also mentioned that incorrect answers in response to MID enquires had been given on Abakumov's instructions.

The question arises about the sudden mention of Butyrka Prison. ^{one} None of the more reliable witnesses mentioned that Raoul Wallenberg stayed there. According to ^{often used as} a Russian expert, Butyrka was a euphemism for Lubyanka Prison, which was still surrounded by a high degree of secrecy in 1956.

This draft did not find favour either. Deputy Foreign Minister Semyonov wrote in his own handwriting, "This is not good enough (as a reply)". No reason was given.

In chronological order, the next item is a presentation in memorandum form dated 30 December 1956 from Tugarinov, ^{Deputy} Chief of the MID Information Committee, to Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko. Tugarinov expressed some thoughts on the Wallenberg case - and their connection with the question of the future development of Soviet-Swedish relations. He dwelt particularly on political pressure in Sweden regarding Raoul Wallenberg, indicating that several Swedish representatives had emphasised the desire of the Swedish Government for an exhaustive and definitive reply, even if Raoul Wallenberg were no longer alive. He recalled Undén's talk with the Soviet ambassador in Stockholm, letting it be understood that Sweden would be satisfied with a reply referring to Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance as "Beria's work". As mentioned earlier, this was an ^{over} ~~over~~ interpretation of Undén's remarks.

Tugarinov also mentioned that the Swedish Government was considering publication of a White Paper. He concluded that the unresolved case would thenceforth be used in various Swedish circles to kindle anti-Soviet campaigns. A reply had to be made to avoid serious damage to bilateral relations.

It further stated that:

-these relations had deteriorated substantially as a result of the events in Hungary (a sufficiently important reason for not replying in October),

- the anti-Soviet campaign would probably diminish within two-three months when the situation in Hungary had become more normal,

Does this mean that Bethlen's death in Butyrka was a "Euphemism" for Lubyanka? Why would B's Kartatzecha be destroyed if it was only a "Euphemism"? I think it would be more to the point to consider B as Molotov's prison - a lot of diplomats - a la Sudhaplutar and others, ... in keeping with what you are saying.

Spell out the Hungarian Revolution etc

- leading Swedish Government representatives had said that good neighbourly relations could certainly be re-established towards the end of 1957. (Swedish Government representatives did not reason in such terms).

According to Tugarinov, a delay of several more months before replying would be exploited in "reactionary circles" to mar any incipient improvement in relations.

An early reply would cause a brief stir but scarcely any further consequence apart from the removal of a serious obstacle to improved relations.

His final argument was that a speedy reply would facilitate the work of the new Soviet ambassador in Stockholm.

- Gromyko's memorandum

The advice was followed. Deputy Foreign Minister Zacharov sent a revised draft to his chief, Shepilov, on 7 January 1957, prepared with the help of KGB colleagues. He pointed out, however, that the head of the KGB had not yet seen it.

A week later, a new draft reply went to the Central Committee, signed by Shepilov and Serov. With some minor adjustments, it was similar to the final reply that came to be known as the Gromyko memorandum. It differed only in that it was felt appropriate to omit a passage describing the search through the records, viz., "including records at Lefortovo and Lubianka Prisons and the Vladimir Prison".

The Politbureau improved the draft at a meeting on 2 February. Thereafter, Bulganin, Molotov, Shepilov and Serov were given the task of finally editing the text.

The final text was approved at a new meeting of the Central Committee Presidium on 5 February. It became known as the Gromyko Memorandum and was handed to Ambassador Sohlman on 6 February (App. 34).

In retrospect, after having access to Russian records, the following points in the Gromyko Memorandum were particularly noteworthy.

- It stated that no facts had been discovered about Raoul Wallenberg's stay in the Soviet Union, despite careful investigation of various archives and after hearing the testimony of many people who may have been aware of the circumstances mentioned in the submitted evidence. It also emerged that none of those questioned knew of a person called Wallenberg (which is of course remarkable in view of what we know today).

" Only during an examination of documents at some of the prisoners' aid organisations in Lubyanka Prison medical department that a paper was discovered "which is reasonable to assume refers to Raoul Wallenberg". This is the so-called Smoltsov report. The archives contained nothing to show when this document was found or whether it was really discovered in the medical department at Lubyanka Prison. There was no reference to it in any draft prior to January 1957.

We should also bear in mind Molotov's proposals to the Central Committee in April 1956. There was reference to a two-week search which, if it ever took place, resulted in a draft with different contents. Moreover, Molotov and Serov drew up the first draft themselves. The question arises whether the dismissal of Molotov that autumn resulted in a renewed search being instigated. This point is not made clear.

-The memorandum stated that further proof was found and that Smoltsov died on 7 May 1953. "In the light of this, we should draw the conclusion that Wallenberg died in July 1947."

MEANING? or put in quote

-Wallenberg's imprisonment and the incorrect information passed to the MID over a number of years was the result of Abakumov's criminal activities.

The final version contained no accusations of espionage, probably because the Russians would have found it difficult to prove. There was also the risk of it leading to long drawn-out discussions with Sweden, thereby counteracting the desire to settle the matter.

This early point to the 1948 Hungarian Court document - RW was "rehabilitated" very early in the game but also made dead in Hungary à la Vishinsky Memorandum.

Vishinsky Memorandum.

The caution with which the Soviet side drew its conclusions about Raoul Wallenberg's fate is striking. More about this follows below.

The Swedish reaction was handed over on 19 February. Considerable surprise and incredulity were expressed over the claim that the Smoltsov report was only documentary evidence that had been unearthed. In addition, the Swedish side requested that any new material found should be passed to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The Soviet reaction to this and later approaches, was that the information handed over was all that had been discovered and that no other material existed. The reply was given following a decision by the Central Committee.

- Langfelder's fate

→ INQUIRY (?)

A report on Langfelder's whereabouts was received from the Soviet Embassy in Hungary on 7 May 1957, originating from the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. The Hungarian report referred to information in the Swedish press and the international press in particular, about Langfelder. It stated that Langfelder's relatives understandably waited for news about his fate.

Ten days later, Lunyev, Deputy KGB chief, suggested to the MID a way in which to reply to the Hungarian report. He felt that it would be appropriate to take heed of the information concerning Raoul Wallenberg that had been passed to the Swedes. As in the MID instructions later issued to the Soviet ambassador in Hungary, the proposal noted that former KGB chiefs had probably destroyed Langfelder's and Raoul Wallenberg's records and that they had succeeded in determining that Langfelder's death had occurred on 2 March 1948. Lunyev's draft was dated 12 June while the MID instructions were first sent to Ambassador Andropov in Budapest on 17 September. In contrast to the KGB draft, the instructions (App. 36) mentioned that a note on Langfelder's death was found among the lists of inmates at Lubianka. This is the only archive record which mentions anything about Langfelder's fate.

- Later evidence

handwritten
note to file
and not an
official
death
certificate -
not Lubianka
because not
in emergency
registry?

HOW? WHERE?

I WANT
TO SEE
THIS

The Swedish side handed over new evidence in February 1959 indicating that Raoul Wallenberg had been in Vladimir Prison after 1947. A request was included for new research to be carried out in the Soviet Union.

1957 Foreign minister Gromyko and KGB chief Shelepin noted in a memorandum to the Central Committee that all information about Raoul Wallenberg was contained in the memorandum of 6 February 1947, and that renewed inquiries had not confirmed the new evidence mentioned in the Swedish Note. The reply sent with the approval of the Central Committee Presidium, also pointed out that no new facts had emerged.

It has not been possible to ascertain how the inquiry was conducted.

In June 1959, the Soviet side held that the new evidence had triggered a renewed campaign in Sweden, ^{this} but was felt to be inspired by some anti-Soviet circles for the purpose of creating an unfavourable atmosphere in advance of Khrushchev's visit to Scandinavia. A memorandum from Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov to the Central Committee dated 18 June 1959 proposed that a reminder be sent to the Swedish Ambassador in Moscow about the "the fully established fact that Raoul Wallenberg died in 1947, as indicated in the memorandum of 6 February 1957". Kuznetsov thus chose to ignore completely the vague terms in which the Gromyko ^{Memorandum} was couched. He further suggested calling attention to the fact that the new evidence was a complete "fabrication" and was of the opinion that such a statement very largely deprived the Swedes of any cause to make further approaches.

It is worth noting the next conversation between Khrushchev and Sohlman on 25 February 1961. Sohlman obtained an audience in order to hand over a letter about Raoul Wallenberg from Prime Minister Erlander. Khrushchev countered immediately by asking, "Mr Ambassador, can you explain to me the circumstances under which Charles XII attacked Peter the Great?" He then asserted that the Swedish Government had repeatedly received replies about the "Wallenberg case", and asked what it was that made them keep coming back to the matter. Khrushchev refused to read the letter, saying that the Foreign Minister would do that. He pointed out irritably that nothing new had occurred and that the Swedish Government was pursuing an unfriendly line. Nevertheless, Sohlman requested the right to ask again that the facts of

the case be investigated. After a long harangue, however, Khrushchev firmly stated that he had given an exhaustive and final answer.

- Nanna Swartz's information

Prime Minister Erlander's letter contained information from Professor Nanna Swartz, who stated that it had been confirmed in conversation with Professor Miasnikov that Raoul Wallenberg was in a mental hospital in Moscow. Khrushchev's permission was sought to allow Dr Swartz to travel immediately to the Soviet capital and, together with her colleagues there, solve the question of sending Raoul Wallenberg home etc.

in the
Moscow
Region

How did the Soviet authorities handle this? An internal MID memorandum dated 23 March 1961 and addressed to ~~Deputy Foreign Minister~~ Kuznetsov shows that the KGB were asked to investigate and had reached the conclusion that it "did not correspond with reality". For safety's sake, Khrushchev's very definite rejection of Erlander's request was cited. As far as the MID was concerned, the matter was thus over and done with. No further reply need be given and if the Swedes raised the matter again, reference need only be made to Khrushchev's statement. By this means Dr Swartz's letter addressed directly to ~~Deputy Foreign Minister~~ Semyonov was left without action.

Dr. Swartz'
claims

fact

Despite several approaches arising from Nanna Swartz's evidence, nothing happened for the next three years except that Dr Miasnikov wrote a letter to her insisting that she had misunderstood him. Prior to Khrushchev's visit to Sweden in June 1964, Ambassador Jarring discussed the matter with Kovalyov, the MID chief for Scandinavia. Professor Swartz's evidence had not yet been made public, and Jarring proposed two alternative approaches in connection with the visit:

- 1) Khrushchev expresses himself so that he leaves an impression that the future was still hopeful with regard to the prospect of another investigation.
- 2) Well ahead of the visit, Khrushchev would make an announcement that the two foreign ministers had discussed the matter and the Soviet side had thereby promised to study the issue again.

Jarring emphasised that the proposals should be regarded as inspired by the desire to contribute towards a successful visit. However, Kovalyov replied that the Raoul Wallenberg case should be regarded as concluded. As far as the Soviet was concerned, they preferred that Sweden also declare in advance of the visit that the question was closed. Jarring stressed that this was ruled out, not least because of Professor Swartz' testimony.

The Swedish proposals were designed to strike the matter from the agenda of the meeting and he added that a Soviet inquiry could very well lead to the same result as in 1957. *who? Jarring?*

Jarring's visit resulted in a suggestion from Gromyko to the Central Committee that the MID should reply orally to the Swedish Ambassador to the effect that they rejected the Swedish attempt to raise the matter of Raoul Wallenberg again.

This reply referred to the Gromyko Memorandum of 1957 and pointed out that the statement that Raoul Wallenberg was alive after 1947 was either based on a misunderstanding or reflected the efforts of some circles to complicate relations between the Soviet Union and Sweden. It was also stressed that Raoul Wallenberg had not and could not be either in a medical institution or prison after 1947. The Soviet side was in no doubt that Raoul Wallenberg died in Lubyanka Prison on 17 July 1947. Finally, it concluded that relations would only be damaged if the question was raised again.

The Swedish side, however, continued its efforts to shed light on Nanna Swartz' testimony. Efforts were ~~also~~ made to arrange meetings between Jarring *and* Miasnikov and between Professor Swartz and the Soviet doctor, and in February 1965 Erlander asked for a further inquiry.

The MID and KGB therefore proposed that the Central Committee agree to arrange the first meeting and this took place on 11 May 1965, before the reply to Erlander's letter (drafted on 29 April) was handed over in Stockholm. The reply stated that every document in the case had been carefully examined but that this did not alter the fact that Raoul Wallenberg died in July 1947. The information concerning Dr Miasnikov's statement was based on a misunderstanding and that Miasnikov himself definitely denied that he

had said anything. It was regrettable that Sweden had brought up the matter once more.

Jarring's talk with Miasnikov resulted in the latter unwillingly agreeing to meet Professor Swartz, and this took place on 10 July 1965. The outcome of this was that each maintained his/her own version (further details follow in chapter XII).

- New evidence from Kalinski and Kaplan result in Swedish approaches

Very little happened in Swedish-Soviet relations regarding the case until 1979 when the Swedish side again raised the matter, this time on the basis of Kalinski's evidence. A Polish Jew who had spent a number of years in Soviet prisons and camps, including the Vladimir Prison, Abraham Kalinski later succeeded in emigrating abroad.

According to Kalinski, Raoul Wallenberg was imprisoned in the Soviet Union at least until 1975. Deputy Foreign Minister Maltsev wrote a memorandum to the Central Committee on 22 January 1979 stating that it would be appropriate to confirm to the Swedes the substance of the views developed earlier. Further, an announcement could be made that a supplementary investigation had shown that the new evidence did not correspond with reality. KGB chief Andropov agreed. The draft reply also referred to the review of documents carried out in August 1965. Prime Minister Ola Ullsten made a further approach on the basis of evidence from Jan Kaplan, a Soviet citizen (through the intermediary of Kalinski). A memorandum from Gromyko to the Central Committee dated 7 September, noted irritably that a further approach had been made, notwithstanding the Soviet reply in January.

It stated that Kaplan was serving a prison sentence and that notwithstanding its "personal" character, the contents of Ullsten's demarché had already been published in the Swedish press and "exploited for hostile purposes in the election campaign". Gromyko felt that the reply should state that the Raoul Wallenberg case was exhausted. Nevertheless, the Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm replied that all the evidence had been carefully reviewed. At the same time it was regrettable that the Swedish Government preferred to question Soviet sincerity rather than reject fabrication and speculation.

[Wallenberg swap
should go here]

DATE?

Exchange with Bergling?

More spectacularly, Sweden made informal soundings in Moscow with regard to the Soviet attitude to a possible exchange of Raoul Wallenberg for Stig Bergling (a suggestion originating from Bergling himself). However, the Soviet side showed no interest in the suggestion. In this context, a contact from the KGB laid down that the fact of Raoul Wallenberg's death remained unaltered although it was regrettable that there were no further documents, probably because records had been destroyed.

Prime Minister Yngve Carlsson's visit to Moscow in 1986 resulted in another approach which, after due Politbureau consideration, gave rise only to a reply that, as stated in 1957, 1965 and 1979, renewed search showed that Raoul Wallenberg had died in July 1947 "probably ("as far as can be judged") as a result of a myocardial infarction".

- Recent years

We have now almost reached the present day, i.e., 1989/90, when it became possible to obtain new material from the Soviet, which became manifested first and foremost during the visit of the Wallenberg Committee in October 1989, when Raoul Wallenberg's belongings were handed over.

It had originally been intended to show only the original Smoltsov report. However, on 22 September, some weeks before the Committee's visit but after the invitation had been issued, Raoul Wallenberg's diplomatic passport, cigarette case, prison register card, foreign currency and diary were discovered in the basement of the KGB headquarters at Lubianka Prison.

The KGB claimed that the belongings had been discovered during a refurbishment of the KGB archives, begun in 1989. The wooden shelves were to be replaced with metal ones. At the same time, the opportunity was taken to examine the files stored there, as part of the recently begun restoration. Following a review of active files, the turn came for the storage

space where office material and out-of-date objects were kept. This was in a chaotic state and the aim was to clear it up. When clearing the top shelves, a parcel fell down from among the files and broken boxes kept there. If it had not been for a cigarette case (a powder compact in reality) that fell out of the parcel, no notice would have been taken. There were still traces of the glue that had held the parcel together at one time. On closer inspection of the contents, the passport in Raoul Wallenberg's name was found and recognised by the archivist. The objects were repacked and handed over to a senior official.

It was of course against regulations to store things in this way. After hearing the oral evidence of employees who worked in KGB records between the 1950s and 1970s, it is difficult to give credence to this version. The files usually contain a note if belongings are held somewhere else.

- The question of the missing documents

So far, the report has demonstrated ~~that~~ the unique manner in ~~many~~ respects in which the Raoul Wallenberg case was handled and contrary to current regulations. This was especially the case with regard to documents and other questions relating to the archives.

If the documents were really destroyed, when did it happen and on whose orders? This can only be a matter of guesswork. No record has been found of their destruction, so that the following discussion remains somewhat speculative.

The first hypothesis, that Abakumov ordered the documents to be destroyed in 1947, almost presupposes that he conspired against Stalin and tried to hide from him what happened to Raoul Wallenberg in July. The ~~Working~~ Group consider it unlikely that Abakumov would act independently and go behind Stalin's back, although some of the older officials in the ~~Security~~ Service do not entirely rule out the supposition. (They also point to the sinister role Beria may have played). If, as we assume, Stalin was in the picture and gave instructions about the case, there was no real need to remove the documents. Keeping Raoul Wallenberg's fate a secret from Sweden did not require the destruction of internal Soviet documents.

However, it is possible that Stalin deemed the case to be so sensitive that he ordered the removal of some documentary evidence.

Quite apart from this, it may well be that at the time of his arrest in 1951, or in premonition, Abakumov ordered the destruction of these and other documents which could be used against him. According to the former head of the Russian archive system, this could be explained by the somewhat chaotic preliminary investigation of Abakumov in which the prosecution sought compromising material against him. Cases such as Raoul Wallenberg's and others damaging to Soviet foreign relations could have been used against both Abakumov and his closest colleagues, irrespective of whether any instructions had been received from Stalin. This may be the reason for removing some of the documents. ~~However, it is difficult to make this train of thought sound convincing. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the Raoul Wallenberg case was significant enough to cause Abakumov any concern. Nonetheless, some weeding took place in the records at this time.~~

A former head of the special archives (about war prisoners) stated that older employees recalled that during Beria's period in power and shortly thereafter, "strong-looking fellows" came to weed the files. And with the appointment of each new head of the KGB, more weeding took place.

Other Russian experts see little reason to destroy any important records prior to 1953 (the year Stalin died) and claim not to have heard that it took place. Our attention is instead drawn to the period between 1954-1956, ¹⁹⁵⁶

Khrushchev ordered the central records ^{be} and partially weeded at the time of the revelations about Stalin's personality cult. A security service officer claimed that he often found that documents went missing. It is very likely that the KGB took this opportunity to destroy other compromising files. It is well known that Khrushchev ordered the destruction of many (but not all) the documents dealing with the Katyn Forest massacre. Documents about Raoul Wallenberg may have been destroyed, especially during April-May 1956, on the orders of KGB chief Serov and Molotov's consent. These were the decisive weeks during which a new Soviet approach needed to be drawn up, and Molotov in particular had strong personal interest in ensuring that documents relating to his own part in the affair ~~do~~ not come to light. It should be noted that the missing papers came almost exclusively from the KGB

while the files of the Foreign Ministry appear to be intact, apart from the crucial letter of 17 July 1947 from Abakumov to Molotov .

The above notwithstanding, the Swedes are naturally not easily convinced that there is no decisive document preserved somewhere.

B. Oral information

The way the Soviet authorities dealt with the Raoul Wallenberg case came to light in the interviews that took place between the Working Group and, on the whole, with former KGB and other officials. They shed further light on events during the important period between 1956-57. But first follows an account of events that occurred after 17 July 1947.

One of the two interpreters/authorised operators mentioned earlier in this report stated that he first heard about Raoul Wallenberg some time in 1947 (he had earlier been very involved in the Nuremberg Process). This was when head of section Kulezhov (under Kartashov) drew up a list and diagram indicating the prisoners who had been cellmates of Raoul Wallenberg. Every detail of their cell numbers etc., was noted on the diagram so that their paths need not cross those of other prisoners who did not know about Raoul Wallenberg.

The case created quite a stir at that time. Kulezhov gave a parcel to the informant mentioned above, telling him to hand it over personally to Gertsovsky, head of MGB archives. On the parcel was written: "Material relating to the arrested No.7; not to be opened without permission from the head of MGB ". The parcel contained some papers and personal documents (but no personal file) concerning Raoul Wallenberg. The informant knew that the "arrested No.7" represented Raoul Wallenberg. Even so, we know that he was not held as a numbered prisoner but under his own name. Furthermore, the numbered prisoner No.7 has been identified as a Russian. Thus, the words "arrested no.7" were used on this occasion as a temporary description. It has not been possible to determine the exact circumstances. A note was made in the personal files of Raoul Wallenberg's and Langfelder's cellmates stating that they had shared cells with a specially important

(Luckily they didn't have a computer)

Could be the papers he brought from Budapest

¹¹
prisoner. Thereafter, they were mainly kept isolated from other prisoners until about 1954.

The Finnish diplomat Frey sent a particularly interesting report to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the ~~A~~ autumn of 1956 after talking to Vladimirov (KGB), a counsellor at the Soviet Embassy. Vladimirov alleged that the Soviet wanted to wait before giving a clear report ~~on~~ Raoul Wallenberg until the new Soviet ambassador had arrived in Stockholm. This would give him something favourable to say when he assumed his duties. Vladimirov also said that he would appreciate receiving some new arguments from Sweden, i.e., arguments for the great importance attached to the solution of the question. Perhaps it would be possible to have informal discussions with the Swedes about the proposed Russian reply prior to its official presentation. The Swedish reply through Frey was that Sweden was hardly in a position to enter into any advance discussions about the Soviet reply. ON

When questioned about this some years ago, Vladimir^{ov} explained that the discussions were proposed because Moscow had difficulty in deciding exactly how to word the reply to the Swedish Government. The MID and PGU branch (foreign intelligence service) of the KGB, to which Vladimirov^{ov} belonged, ~~was~~ ^{were} not fully in the picture concerning Raoul Wallenberg's fate. Moscow was uncertain about how much the Swedes knew. They therefore took their time in formulating a suitable text which would at least serve as a half-truth. According to Vladimir^{ov}, they (MID and PGU?) had the impression that the KGB counter espionage kept back or destroyed important papers when a more energetic search began in April 1956. In any case, the documents were more likely to have been destroyed at that time than under Beria and Abakumov. Gribanov, chief of the Second Main Directorate, had been a key figure. Vladimir^{ov} did not know how and when the Smoltsov report was found.

It is appropriate to mention here discussions on the Wallenberg case between Finnish and Soviet diplomats, which took place in Ankara in the Spring^S Summer of 1956. However, no significant results were achieved, and the only Soviet document that has been found contained scanty information.

Over the years a number of comments have been made about the reply given in 1957. Farafonov, head of the Scandinavian section of the MID, told a Swedish embassy official in 1979 that the 1956 files had been searched with a fine toothcomb but the Smoltsov report was the only clue to have been found. He also pointed out that Sweden had never asked to see the original report (which is true, perhaps because of the unsatisfactoriness of the reply as a whole and that it was deemed very easy for the Soviet to construct a false report).

The same month a special KGB contact hinted to an embassy official that the 1957 reply was possibly less categorical than had been maintained officially. He firmly contended, however, that no other document existed because the archives had been destroyed.

"dirty business"

A feature common to the information provided by former KGB colleagues, of whom only one had direct dealings with the Raoul Wallenberg case, was their conviction that Raoul Wallenberg had died and their disbelief that his death was due to natural causes.

An official in the KGB Scandinavian section during the 1950s, 60s and 70s, known as K., stated that the section had considered it improbable that Raoul Wallenberg just died in prison because he was so young. In the event of death occurring, it was normal practice to go through and summarise the person's file. It had not happened in this case. It also appeared to be forbidden to hand out the file. The memoranda written about the case never contained the full truth, and no oral summary was ever made. This official worked in a section that was involved in drafting memoranda of this kind. It also collected material from other sections which perhaps had more dealings with Raoul Wallenberg. The prepared draft replies followed earlier stereotypes. Nobody was allowed access to any material that touched on the reasons for his arrest or death. Departmental heads probably had access to such papers. Not before 1956 was there any serious effort to collect more material and take an interest in details. Even so, the decisive documents were not made available to ordinary officials.

Some time in 1956 another KGB official was ordered to investigate hospital records at Lefortovo (and Butyrka or Lubianka; his memory was not clear on this point), to discover whether Raoul Wallenberg had suffered from some

illness. The prison was told to produce the records for the years before and after 1947. It appeared that Raoul Wallenberg had sought medical help on two or three occasions, but for trifles such as toothache and a cold. Raoul Wallenberg's name did not appear anywhere in the records after 1947. A report of the facts was made to the official's chief. Following a top-level discussion, he was told to draft a reply together with the records section, which he did. This stated that Raoul Wallenberg had died of pneumonia (It was not customary to state the real cause of death, especially when somebody was executed). The same official also recalled that a reply concerning Langfelder was drawn up somewhat later. He never saw any file relating to Raoul Wallenberg. A colleague of his in the records section with whom he worked (never) claimed that it would have been difficult to extract records. He recalled a large volume containing evidence from German prisoners of war but never received any instructions to look through it. He had no knowledge of the Smoltsov report. "It must have turned up later." The heads of the KGB were certainly aware of the true course of events and the order ^{to} search the hospital records was made with the aim of finding the most acceptable form of concealing the real truth.

any
den
Re?

too many
negatives
w/ing
sentence -
hard to
follow

A representative of the FSB questioned the colleague in records section mentioned above. Although his memory was somewhat hazy, he recollected that while no file remained on Raoul Wallenberg, there was a folder containing various papers and personal belongings, including a cigarette case and passport. None of the papers contained any direct information on what had happened to him. There had not been any separate file on Langfelder, just a few papers about him in Raoul Wallenberg's folder. He had handed over this folder to his successor in 1963.

WHAT??

Another official who had worked in the KGB records since 1965 was also questioned. On one occasion he was told to go through all documents concerning Raoul Wallenberg since 1945. He had rediscovered the interrogation reports with the name inked out, some internal correspondence of no great interest and the Smoltsov report.

SAYS WHO?
WANT TO
SEE =

- Preparations for a mock trial in Hungary, 1953

there had
already
been
previous
arrests even
suspected
along these
lines but
without
reference to
RW.

A singular feature of the Wallenberg case, unconfirmed in any of the rediscovered Soviet documents but confirmed by several witnesses and Hungarian security service (AVO) records, was the preparations for a new mock trial to take place in the autumn of 1952 and spring of 1953, this time in Hungary. The purpose was to show that JOINT was a cover organisation for extensive American terrorist and espionage activities aimed at the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Democracies. A subsidiary objective was also to introduce evidence that Raoul Wallenberg was murdered in Budapest in January 1945 at the instigation of JOINT. The process was to substantiate the farsightedness of American intelligence that, well before the end of the Second World War, was planning in detail future espionage against the Soviet Union (compare Thomsen's statement, mentioned earlier). The preparations for this process were thus a continuation of similar trials that took place in Czechoslovakia and in a couple of other People's Democracies. They should be seen in the light of Stalin's accusations against Jewish doctors in Moscow, the so-called Doctors' Plot (in which the doctors were accused of belonging to an espionage and terrorist group with close links to JOINT).

So he says...
Is there
proof from
AVO for
anywhere?

The chief witness had been in touch with the Swedish Embassy in Vienna in 1957. He was Dr. Lazlo Benedek, a well known Jewish doctor in Budapest, formerly medical adviser to JOINT and supervisor of the Jewish Hospital in Budapest. His very revealing evidence described how interrogations went hand-in-hand with ill-treatment and were conducted under the close and continuous supervision of Soviet security officers. There is good reason, therefore, to give a fairly complete of his story.

This is rather
problematic -
as ~~Langlet~~
Langlet doesn't
fit the
profile for
such
responsibilities

The background to the interrogation was that when leading officials in the American intelligence service became convinced that Germany would shortly be defeated, they had begun preparing a network of agents based in Budapest and directed towards the Soviet Union in good time before fighting had ceased. A neutral state was, however, necessary for the implementation of the plan and cooperation with Sweden had been ensured. The first agents in Budapest had been recruited by Dr. Valdemar Langlet, Reader in Swedish and chief representative of the Swedish Red Cross in Hungary. He had been considered suitable to be the temporary head of intelligence activities until an American officer could take over.

This is
pure
show trial
disinformation
and should
be identified
as such.

Under interrogation, Benedek was urged to account for his connections with Sweden (he was in receipt of a Swedish protective pass in 1944) and charged with receiving instructions from and submitting espionage reports to Langlet on the orders of JOINT in New York as well as recruiting new agents. The material had been sent to the USA via Sweden. After Langlet's departure from Budapest, Benedek was to report to an American Colonel MacClain. Strictly speaking, there was no coherent account of the charges and mainly leading questions were put to him.

WHO?

After 10 March (some days after the death of Stalin), a new major in the Hungarian security service took over the interrogation and the Soviet advisers disappeared. Benedek would now confess to complicity in instigating the murder of Raoul Wallenberg on the grounds that Raoul Wallenberg was on the track of some dirty business. Paul Szalai (member of the Arrow Cross who actually helped Raoul Wallenberg) was supposed to have been assigned to murder Raoul Wallenberg between 15 - 17 January. The interrogation leader never claimed that Raoul Wallenberg was spying for the USA. He was described as an imperialistic agent and base person who had received large sums of money from the State Department. Although suspected of espionage, Raoul Wallenberg was not openly accused of being a spy as it would have been difficult to propound the theory of his murder by JOINT while at the same time leading their intelligence activities. Clearly, it was more important to the Russians to prove that Raoul Wallenberg was murdered in January 1945 than that he was a spy.

GOOD
POINT!

WHO?

Hungary
in

Early in August 1953 a Soviet colonel appeared to announce that the process was to be cancelled. In Khrushchev's account of the 20th Party Congress in 1956, it appears that as long as he was alive, Stalin probably supervised this process personally.

Confirmation of Benedek's evidence came in 1984 when Karoly Remenyi, a defecting Jewish AVO official, stated that in January 1953 he was given a special assignment, to make an analysis of certain investigative material prior to a Zionist trial that was being planned. It is not clear how Wallenberg was to be used at the trial, Remenyi also interrogated a dozen people who had known Wallenberg in Budapest in 1944-1945, including Benedek. He was able to name the Soviet advisers although they were probably cover names and not their real ones. One of the advisors showed copies of the

Does this refer
to RW's
interrogations
in Hungary

minutes from the interrogation in Hungary about Raoul Wallenberg's activities there.

XI. What happened to Raoul Wallenberg in July 1947?

I. Documentation

The only paper from the Soviet/Russian archives containing any definite information about Raoul Wallenberg is the Smoltsov report (App.37). Signed by Smoltsov, chief medical officer at Lubianka Prison, and addressed to the Minister of Security Abakumov, it referred to a prisoner called "Walenberg" who died in the night of 17 July 1947, "probably as a result of a heart attack".

The report stated that Raoul Wallenberg was known "to you" (Abakumov) and, pursuant to instructions from Abakumov to have "Walenberg" personally under his care, sought approval to make an autopsy with a view to establishing the cause of death.

A notation diagonally across the bottom left-hand corner of the report says: "Have personally notified the Minister. Order issued to cremate the corpse without postmortem examination. (signed) 17.7. Smoltsov."

The Gromyko memorandum pointed out that "a certain former leader of the State Security organisation provided the Soviet Foreign Ministry with incorrect information over a number of years".

This is incorrect, as the document shows. The Foreign Ministry received nothing at all from the MGB before February 1947, only to be informed that Raoul Wallenberg was in MGB safekeeping. It is moreover astonishing that in 1956, nobody knew of Raoul Wallenberg although most security officials were still alive who had been in touch with, or even responsible for, him. Once again, the ^{MOST} only reasonable explanation ^{IS} must be that no proper search had been carried out for the simple reason that it was unnecessary; at least a narrow circle of leaders were fully aware of what had happened.

The Swedes noted immediately that the Gromyko Memorandum was by no means categorical and that consequently some uncertainty marred the conclusions it contained. There were two possible explanations; either the way it was formulated was due to a lack of documentation because

The second is that ~~from~~ the problem caused by the RW case in Swedish/Soviet relations had been "liquidated" by rounding up and silencing the witnesses (which did not occur between April and July 1947) and

everything had been destroyed, or the Russians were uncertain as to whether the Swedes had more testimony from witnesses up their sleeve. Molotov specifically asked Hedlund in March 1956 about period covered by the evidence from the German prisoners of war and later noted it himself in the material he submitted. Hedlund had replied that they extended over 1947 or 1948.

The previous chapter contains some of the variations of the Gromyko memorandum were noted in the margins of the preliminary drafts. However, in all the versions the blame for Raoul Wallenberg's imprisonment and death was placed on Abakumov.

An internal memorandum dated 28 April 1956, from Foreign Minister Molotov and KGB chief Serov to the Central Committee noted that the testimony from witnesses handed over by the Swedes was correct about the real situation regarding Raoul Wallenberg's arrest and stay in Soviet prisons. Molotov and Serov therefore felt that the Swedes "should be told about Raoul Wallenberg's fate". A draft exists from April 1956 of another version of the Gromyko memorandum in which Raoul Wallenberg was supposed to have died in a hospital cell in Lefortovo Prison (although Lefortovo was not specifically named in the sentence).

should
be told
SOMETHING
about RW's
fate - i.e.
given a
bone to
chew on
so it could
be put to
rest.

Foreign Minister Shepilov sent a memorandum enclosing a draft reply to Sweden to the Central Committee in October 1956. This maintained that Raoul Wallenberg was held at Lefortovo and Butyrka (sic) and that he hastily/suddenly died on 17 July 1947 "in prison" and the body cremated. It further stated that the source of the information came from several persons who may have been associated with the circumstances mentioned in the Swedish material.

It should also be recollected that Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko wrote to the KGB chief in 1954 asking about the date and circumstances of Raoul Wallenberg's death. He was told that it was not suitable to deviate from the reply used since 1947.

The Swedish White Paper of 1957 reported on the evidence of several of Raoul Wallenberg's fellow prisoners regarding their interrogation in the

evening of 22 July 1947, followed by their being consigned to isolation (see below). Confirmation that several of the interrogations took place was found in notes in the prisoners' personal files. The interrogations lasted 20-30 minutes on average. One or two lasted longer and were primarily those carried out by Kartashov and Kuzmishin. In addition, Langfelder was questioned by Kartashov for several hours on 23 July. It has not been possible to establish the name of the interpreter. No written report of the interrogations exists.

A ledger listing the belongings/valuables of the prisoners is very interesting. The note concerning Raoul Wallenberg was inked out but restored, and listed his belongings that were transferred when he moved from Lefortovo to Lubyanka in February-March 1947. No mention is made of what happened to them later. The space for this was left empty, which is unique. The ledger indicates what happened later to the belongings of all the other prisoners listed there.

No other written evidence has been found to show what could have happened to Raoul Wallenberg in July 1947.

A list of prisoners who died in Butyrka Prison in 1947 has been preserved, but Raoul Wallenberg's name is not on it. The Donskoy Crematorium was the only one in Moscow at the time, did not register the individual names of victims of the repression. Prisoners who died in Lubyanka Prison were normally sent to the graveyard at Suchanov Prison, but Raoul Wallenberg's name has not been found in any register there.

II. Oral information and comment

Irrespective of the way one chooses to interpret the information available about Raoul Wallenberg in and around the month of July 1947, there can only be full agreement on the fact that important decisions were taken at that time about his fate or, alternatively, that something serious took place. This is made clear in the documents, oral evidence that has been reported and in the account given in Chapter X on the way in which the Soviet authorities dealt with the case.

Further
No paper
trail under
home RW -
doesn't mean
belongings
didn't go
with him.

No mention
of emergency
register
at Lubyanka

All the Russian experts interviewed assumed that Raoul Wallenberg died in July 1947. Most considered that his death was not due to natural causes but was induced in some way. A few did not discount that he may have died a natural death. If not dead, there remains only one fairly reasonable hypothesis; that he was "hidden away" in a Soviet prison or concentration camp.

In the past decade a number of Soviet diplomats with presumed links with intelligence have hinted or asserted in confidential talks with Swedish colleagues that in actual fact Raoul Wallenberg was executed. This theory, and others, have also been put forward in interviews. It has not been possible to find any proof.

- Smoltsov report - analysis and comment

As the only document with something definite to say about Raoul Wallenberg's fate, the Smoltsov report may be worth further analysis and comment.

First of all, it should be mentioned that a representative of the Working Group from the Russian Security Ministry talked to the son of the prison doctor, Viktor Aleksandrevitch Smoltsov (who refused to meet the interview group on the grounds that he had nothing further to add to the details given below).

The son was 23 years old in 1947 and already employed in the Security Service. He stated that one evening in July 1947, his father was unexpectedly called to his work. This was unusual considering that he suffered from heart disease, did not therefore work full-time and was preparing to retire. His father did not return until the following morning and then said that a Swede had died in the MGB inner prison (Lubianka). This story has to be treated in the same way as every other oral communication. It comprises a version which is not proof in itself.

In an effort to determine the authenticity of the Smoltsov report, it was decided early on to have experts analyse the handwriting and perform a chemical investigation. The Russian side undertook these analyses at an institute of forensic expertise at the Soviet Ministry of Justice (Appendix 39). Their conclusion regarding the technical analysis was that the report may

Not true.
Two prominent KGB defectors interpret "liquidatsia" to refer to the problem and state that the standard procedure for this would be to disappear him.

a Swede?
or an important prisoner?

Comment that while holding to the July 1947 date, made of death causes with emphasis of late on his being "shot."

have been written at the time mentioned, i.e., 17 July 1947. It was not possible to determine by means of a chemical analysis (of ink and paper) the exact point of time that the report was created because there is no method for determining the absolute age of a document on the basis of changes due to age in the material.

An analysis of the handwriting (App.40) was made by comparing two other documents said to have been written by Smoltsov, and the Russian experts concluded that the same person had written the texts. The differences in the speed of the writing and structure were said to be due to the greater care given to the report which was written more slowly than the more carelessly and faster written comparisons.

The National Laboratory of Forensic Science undertook the Swedish analysis (Appendix 41). From their observations, they concluded that the report and comparative material were undoubtedly written by the same person. They pointed out, however, that there was no absolute guarantee that the comparative material (a curriculum vitae and a formula from 1940) had really been written by Smoltsov. A new investigation that included the analysis of a medical certificate also confirmed and consolidated the National Laboratory's earlier observations. It partly strengthened their earlier evaluation of the significance of some of the similarities as an indication of identity.

To sum up, it was concluded that the observations indicated that the same person had written the Smoltsov report and the comparative documents. The National Laboratory also noted that the Russian method of handwriting analysis differed somewhat from Western European, and particularly the Anglo-Saxon, approach. The greatest difference lay in that the Russian method allowed a more categorical conclusion to be drawn than the Swedish.

A reservation in the National Laboratory's final report concerned a newspaper article about the discovery of a forgery unit on the premises of the former Central Committee. The ink and paper found there were carefully dated according to their various years of origin. The National Laboratory also assumed that the staff had had access to people who were proficient in imitating other people's handwriting.

The National Laboratory was not able to carry out a particularly comprehensive technical analysis (Appendix 42) but based it principally on the Soviet investigation. Some samples of writing in ink were taken and saved for future analysis as the present method of age-determination was not felt to be sufficiently advanced. Nevertheless, the Soviet observations were deemed reasonable. The National Laboratory reached a slightly different conclusion regarding the fibrous composition of the paper but found the Soviet conclusions fully reasonable and not refuted by their own investigation. Thus, although there is much to indicate that Smoltsov was the author of the report, it cannot be scientifically proven ~~at~~ one hundred percent. In the Swedish view, the possibility of a forgery cannot be entirely discounted. It should also be recalled that Smoltsov died in 1953.

A number of other issues should be considered concerning the Smoltsov report. The first is the likelihood of a prison doctor writing this kind of report direct to the Minister of State Security. According to security officials of the period, the normal procedure would have been for the director of Lubianka Prison, Miranov, to report to Abakumov. Smoltsov was far too subordinate. On the other hand, most of the people whom the group interviewed did not discount that Abakumov could have personally assigned Smoltsov to keep an eye on Raoul Wallenberg and report to him immediately anything happened. What does this kind of assignment tell us about the treatment Raoul Wallenberg received?

It was clearly not a normal situation. If Raoul Wallenberg was in good health and well-treated, as several of his fellow prisoners stressed, there would be no need for a special arrangement of this kind. According to a heart specialist who was consulted, there is a million to one chance that a healthy 35 year-old without a family history of the disease would suddenly die of a heart attack (or cardiac infarction as the report described it). Even in the event of such a death occurring, the prison doctor would not need to ask for instructions, but could decide for himself whether to perform a post-mortem examination, which was the normal procedure.

One theory is that Smoltsov immediately suspected that Raoul Wallenberg's death - if this was then he died - was not due to natural causes and therefore asked Abakumov for instructions on how to deal with the body. It presupposes that Raoul Wallenberg was either poisoned or received such

You have
not raised
the valid
point of
the
language
for
heart attack
in the
Smoltsov
document
being a
later term -

raised by
ARK Project translator + analyst - B. Yozhin
and by Dr. Mann W. Makinen and others.

harsh treatment for a time that he died. In this case, the wording of the report may in some way be genuine, i.e., written by Smoltsov and reflecting his superficial observations even if he suspected that there was more to it than met the eye. If, on the other hand, Raoul Wallenberg had been shot by a firing squad the report would have been composed differently. In that case, Smoltsov would probably have been ordered to write the report as a cover up, for use as required, i.e., to have ready in case the official version, published later, did not hold up. Cardiac infarction was otherwise one of the causes of death frequently used to conceal unnatural death, i.e. death by execution or ill-treatment. Finally, the report may have been fabricated at a later date. The wrong spelling of Wallenberg's name possibly tells against this theory, although the idea of a deliberate spelling mistake cannot be ruled out, for the purpose of adding to the credibility of the document. If this were so, the report could of course conceal anything and everything, including even Raoul Wallenberg living in isolation somewhere in the Gulag system.

Leaves open possibility of a true report. GAZZ does a very thorough analysis of what's wrong with the Smoltsov Document.

Let us return for a while to the Gromyko memorandum of 1957. As emphasised above, the Soviet side was remarkably cautious about the Smoltsov report. Were they genuinely unsure of the value of the report as evidence or were they afraid that the Swedes had more information up their sleeve with which to refute this version? Is it likely that the report was fabricated in 1956 (Smoltsov died in 1953)? If so, would they not have arranged to put forward much more convincing evidence of Raoul Wallenberg's death, drafted according to all the formal rules. It would have provided greater opportunity to put an end to the whole case. However, there was still the risk that Sweden could refute this with evidence which they had not yet submitted - from one of Raoul Wallenberg's fellow prisoners, for example, which could disprove even this evidence. It was therefore better to present a slightly vaguer version from which retreat was possible. It has in fact been satisfactorily proved that the reply they wanted to give Sweden in February 1957 was not the whole truth but, at best, a "half truth that would do". Their uncertainty about the tenability of the reply is notably evident in their attempt to hold advance discussions with Swedish representatives about drafting the reply.

Little credence can be given to the interpretation that those who drafted the memorandum were unaware of whether Smoltsov's note was genuine or



Dear Mr. Magnusson. I think you should ask yourself what truth is worse than death, that the Russians find it easier to put him to rest as dead. If really dead, what's the big deal about showing his death certificate? Why is this case so much worse than

FOOD FOR THOUGHT

dictated by Abakumov, and that they wanted a line of retreat if it was later proved that Raoul Wallenberg was executed or hidden away. Molotov, Bulganin, Serov etc., certainly knew what had happened. To someone like Molotov, who certainly had a hand in the dark deeds of 1945-47, it may have appeared simpler, though risky, to confess to Raoul Wallenberg's execution, if this were the truth.



In an internal memorandum dated 8 February 1957, Arne S. Lundberg, the then Under Secretary of State, wrote that it was unlikely that Smoltsov (who was personally responsible for Raoul Wallenberg) would not have received an order to destroy this evidence as well (i.e. the Smoltsov report) if it were true that other evidence had also been destroyed. A reply could have been written the way it was, even if Raoul Wallenberg had been lost or was in a very poor condition. The death certificate was issued to put an end to the matter. As Lundberg pointed out, it was curious that there was no reference to any witness, nor was one ever found. The Smoltsov report could claim to contain everything the Russians desired; it explained how, when and where Raoul Wallenberg died and laid the blame on Abakumov. The result was both ideal and educational. The document might be suspected of being falsified, and the reason for this was partly educational and partly a need to explain the long delay. Lundberg also felt that the Russians could easily have provided absolutely definitive information, had they wished. If they had lost Raoul Wallenberg or he was in a poor state, they may well have reasoned as follows: if the Swedes turned up evidence that Raoul Wallenberg was alive after July 1947, we can always get away with some reference to the vague reply. The thought arises here that Lundberg's theory of the Russians having perhaps lost Wallenberg must have seemed a possibility in 1957 but hardly so today.

The truth
could have
been stated
(?)

but not
legal -
no perjury

WHY NOT?

Even if the Smoltsov report ^{was} ~~was~~ not forged in ~~1950/57~~, it is in any case unclear exactly where, how and when it was found. The Gromyko memorandum mentioned the prison medical service's records at Lubyanka Prison. No such records exist, or have existed, according to the FSB deputy Head of archives and member of the Working Group. On the other hand, special registration journals existed for registering prisoners who visited a doctor. The prison medical service material was included as part of the prison records and most of the material relating to the prisoners was kept in their personal files. The former Foreign Ministry official mentioned below

I think the answer may lie in Hitler's prominence. These were prize captives human trophies never meant to be returned to the world. Fortunately, Himmler stepped in - seeing them as helpful collateral in a separate peace or surrender negotiation - and removed them from the Stalin scenario. There is no "Himmler" so what happened to them + who had jurisdiction over them? As easily as you say Molotov executed, someone else could conceal for him

once said that at the time of the 1956 inquiry, he suggested taking a look at the medical service records where they later found the report in material left behind by the prison doctor, Smoltsov. However, it is not clear exactly where and how it was found. A KGB official assigned to searching prison records in 1956 for evidence that Raoul Wallenberg suffered from some illness, has said that he did not find any Smoltsov report. "It must have got there later on", he said.

The head of the Foreign Ministry archive thought that theoretically the Smoltsov report could have come from the so-called 'extraordinary events file' which has a limited archive life. The report may have come from this file and been saved since the time of the investigation. The Lubianka Prison's extraordinary events file for 1947 has in fact survived and was searched without encountering anything remarkable for the month of July.

The FSB also state that since 1956 the Smoltsov report has been kept as an individual document in a file containing correspondence on the Raoul Wallenberg case.

- Differing versions of Raoul Wallenberg's fate in July 1947

Once again it should be pointed out that the oral versions of Raoul Wallenberg's fate given below have no value at all as evidence and that several of them rule out each other. Nevertheless they must be accounted for. A former Foreign Ministry official, now deceased, had closely followed the Raoul Wallenberg case ~~closely~~ since 1946. He surmised that Raoul Wallenberg succumbed to hardship and inhuman treatment - mental and physical strain - to which he was certainly subjected. In his view, Molotov and Vyshinsky tried to establish what happened, and he preferred to lay the blame on both Beria and Abakumov, who deceived Stalin. This tendency to protect Stalin was noticeable in several of the older officials whom the Working Group encountered.

One of the older security service officials who maintained that Raoul Wallenberg died on 17 July 1947, appeared to think that his death was an accident. This had greatly alarmed Abakumov in view of Stalin's reaction, particularly if the latter had special plans for Raoul Wallenberg. In the

The only remarkable event in July & August was the attempted suicide of a woman prisoner on July 18th

K said it was a "dirty business" - That's no accident -

consider

diffuse

official's view, this could have been why Abakumov reported through Molotov, to ~~defuse~~ the impact. Abakumov could not have taken the decision to order an execution; only Stalin was able to do so. However, the execution theory conflicted with his view of the circumstances, for example, the small number of times interrogation took place; an execution should have been preceded by more intensive interrogation (author's note: the logic of this is not entirely clear). If Abakumov received his orders from Stalin he would definitely not report back through Molotov. The security official could not see any logical reason for executing Raoul Wallenberg.

The most common theory about Raoul Wallenberg's fate is that he was shot. Firm but imprecise evidence to this effect came some years ago from a person called Sasovsky, who was in a prison camp near Moscow in the early 1950s. On one occasion, the camp commander was drunk and talked about taking part in the shooting of Tatars from the Crimea, Poles and others. Three years earlier (the conversation took place in 1950 or early 1951) he had also participated in the shooting of a "Jewish prikhvostnya (swine?)" from Sweden. This took place at "Kommunarka" near Moscow and the man was buried in the woods there.

A check of the camp commander showed that he had in fact served at the prison camp at that time. Kommunarka was a place used for mass executions, particularly in 1936 as well as later when NKVD personnel in particular were executed there. The question arises, however, whether a single prisoner of Raoul Wallenberg's calibre would have been taken there. If so, the Lubyanka register should have contained a note of it. An execution inside the Lubyanka Prison would have been more convenient to arrange. However, one of Abakumov's deputy ministers has confirmed that executions occurred at a place close to Moscow.

Alexander Yakovlev has mentioned a Politbureau meeting in the autumn of 1989 when Kryutchkov reported on the Raoul Wallenberg case in the light of the discovery of his belongings. They discussed whether the items should be returned to the family or not. Kryutchkov's report followed the official Soviet version from 1957, based on the Smoltsov report. Yakovlev gained the impression that most members of the Politbureau had their doubts about this version. After the meeting, he stood together with Kryutchkov for a while and asked straight out what had actually happened. Kryutchkov replied that

You execute those who won't divulge, won't be recruited & you have no further use for them. Limited interrogation implies he's primarily there for collateral access "piece for influence" where appropriate, possibly even extortion... Such a person you do not kill unless he is a major trouble maker. Raoul was too smart for that.

This leaves the issue of ABUSE and/or

"WITNESS PROTECTION" — two different reasons to cancel a trail, or a mixture of both.

Raoul Wallenberg was shot in 1947 but that no document had been kept, nor was there any direct witness still alive.

This version agrees generally with the statement of the former KGB official Kondrashov quoted above. Some months after Kuzmishin's interrogation in March 1947, he contacted a colleague in the investigation department, asked what had happened to the person he had interrogated and was told that he had been shot. When asked the reason for this, his colleague had said that there was reason enough, implying contacts with several intelligence services. Kondrashov had not understood that Raoul Wallenberg was the person in question until later the same year. This type of transparency was in itself contrary to the security service's high level of secrecy and rigid discipline. On the other hand, Kondrashov was already highly placed and known as a brilliant analyst.

this makes
him useful
unless he
engaged in
serious
military
crimes
against
the
USSR - in
which case
he would be
shot under
sentence from
military
tribunal -

when
recruitment
was out of
the
question

A person in the service of the KGB in the 1950s and 60s made the following statement. He had talked with two colleagues from the Second Main Directorate in 1960/61. One Nedosekin by name, was responsible for Swedish issues. N appeared to be in a bad temper and when asked why, replied that the Swedes were again asking questions about Raoul Wallenberg. They would get the same answer as before, he said; there were no new facts. Our informant then asked what had actually happened to Raoul Wallenberg: N replied in a low voice that he had been shot as a German Abwehr agent, but no information was available about it. All the documents had been destroyed. Asked why the Swedes should not be told, N replied that there was nothing to say as there was nothing on paper. Yelisej Sinichyn worked in the Scandinavian section of the foreign intelligence service in the years following the Second World War. In his recently published memoirs, he wrote that in the autumn 1947 his chief, Fitin, learned that Raoul Wallenberg had been shot.

A former intelligence officer who defected to the West, claimed to have worked in intelligence archives in the late 1940s and alleged that he saw a file on Raoul Wallenberg which was created at the time of his death. He recalled that Raoul Wallenberg died in 1946 or 1947, possibly as a result of a heart attack but not from natural causes. The heart attack had instead been induced by various forms of mental torture (including sound and light) and medical experiment. The reports of cell spies and microphones hidden

in the cells were detailed in this operative file, but no compromising information about Raoul Wallenberg's activities had been unearthed. According to this source, it was possible that Sudoplatov's special unit may have been involved, including the so-called Mayranovsky laboratory. A toxicological research unit working for the Minister of State Security, it was also usually assigned to organise the execution of particularly important victims using, *inter alia*, specially prepared poisons. In some ways this theory strengthens the view that the Smoltsov report could be genuine, even if Smoltsov certainly suspected that not everything was above board. Mayranovsky carried out his assignments under the utmost secrecy.

The defected KGB officer, Gordievsky, ruled out that Raoul Wallenberg was alive after 1947 and alleged that he had heard about his having been executed. The interrogation leader's remark to Raoul Wallenberg in March 1947 that he was a political case and would never be sentenced was a very sinister forewarning. It indicated that an execution was imminent. On the other hand, he would not rule out that Abakumov and Molotov had conspired without Stalin's knowledge.

Sudoplatov himself also asserted that Raoul Wallenberg could have been killed in Mayranovsky's laboratory, which worked closely with the Lubianka Prison. He would have been liquidated for refusing to cooperate. Sudoplatov learned that a sealed packet of documents dealing with the laboratory's activities was removed by colleagues from the Central Committee and Malenkov's assistant, Suchanov, in 1953. A relative to Sudoplatov ~~who~~ worked as a secretary for Suchanov.

The interview group spoke to Suchanov who believed that Sudoplatov had confused material about the Mayranovsky laboratory, which he claimed to know nothing about, with other documents. He had, however, received documents from the arrested Beria's office and material from intelligence, but had not been able to look through it all personally. However, other witnesses have claimed that they had also heard about the part played by Suchanov concerning material from the Mayranovsky laboratory, and pointed out the very prominent role Malenkov played even after Beria's downfall. According to Suchanov, Raoul Wallenberg was annihilated in 1947 and the truth would never be elicited.

Yet another interesting version originated from a high-ranking KGB official in the early 1990s ^{WHO} assigns the chief role to Beria. It should be pointed out

Is everyone
without
sentence
executed?
I don't
think so.
Besides,
execution
is a
sentence.
With a
certain
tribunal
involved -
usually
and if
not has
to come
from the
absolute
top -
(See page
110)

however, that this source later emphasised that this was merely his personal theory. He maintained that Beria ordered Raoul Wallenberg to be killed in 1947. The background to his arrest and imprisonment was Beria's initial plan to create the myth of a "Jewish conspiracy", similar to the one which resulted in the persecutions in the late 1950s. Beria needed Wallenberg in order to fabricate the conspiracies which he would later represent to Stalin as genuine and originating from the confessions of the Swedish diplomat. In actual fact, the interrogation reports shown to Stalin were false. The dictator is alleged to have become suspicious and this resulted in putting an end to Raoul Wallenberg. Beria then undertook the extraordinary measures which are substantiated, i.e., that Wallenberg's fellow prisoners were isolated, papers destroyed etc.

What are the views of the two very trusted interpreters/operators authorised by Smersh/MGB? One felt it that it was very likely that Raoul Wallenberg was executed in July 1947. The interview group was of the opinion that he probably ~~he~~ knew more but preferred to be economical with information. He probably thought that the case was obvious even without any further details. The other interpreter claimed that he believed Raoul Wallenberg may have been executed although it was also possible that he died of natural death. On one occasion he let slip that he could not/was not able to participate in such a "wicked deed". Asked what he meant by the phrase, he replied that Raoul Wallenberg dying in prison after saving so many people was a wicked deed.

"dirty business"

A colleague of Kartashov stated that some time in the 1970s he met the latter in the street and asked what had happened to Raoul Wallenberg. Kartashov's somewhat aggressive reply was, "Do you really need to know about it?"

An interesting account came from an official who first worked in the Scandinavian department of the MGB and then at the KGB Second Main Directorate (counter espionage) in the 1950s. He said that the employees were convinced that Raoul Wallenberg was no longer alive. An early inquiry was carried out in various camps and prisons and it was noted that Raoul Wallenberg was not there. Nevertheless, it was known that he had been in prison earlier, that there had also been documents and that he was dead. However, officials at this level did not have access to any papers on what

really happened. Only a narrow circle of chiefs would know that. The version in circulation was that Raoul Wallenberg had been accused of something and then killed. It was extremely doubtful that he just died. He was a young man and under ordinary circumstances his death would not need to be surrounded by such secrecy.

According to the same official, there would not have been any reason for the then heads of the MGB to hide Raoul Wallenberg away and turn him into an "iron mask". Abakumov and others were so convinced that they would go unpunished to make it an unlikely hypothesis. If no longer necessary, Raoul Wallenberg need only be liquidated. Before the war a person who was executed were often described as "sentenced to ten years without correspondence rights". After the war, however, it was never in doubt that people said to be deceased really were dead.

Together with several others, the same person pointed out that by 1947 Raoul Wallenberg had spent two and a half years in prison. It may not have been in the leaders' interests to reveal that he had spent such a long time there while all the while disavowing his presence in Moscow. Moreover, Raoul Wallenberg refused to cooperate, which also emerged from the evidence of his fellow prisoners. In other words, it would have been embarrassing, even dangerous, to inform Sweden suddenly that Raoul Wallenberg had been in a Soviet prison the whole time. What satisfactory explanation could be found? Furthermore, his story would have created a scandal. It was therefore essential to remove the problem (cf. the internal correspondence). Placing Raoul Wallenberg in another prison or camp was virtually the same as sooner or later revealing his existence. It is true that there were the investigation prisons and the Vladimir Prison, for example, where prisoners could be kept well isolated, but even there some contact with others occurred.

- Langfelder's and Roedel's deaths

The fates of Wilmos Langfelder, his driver, and Willy Roedel, his cellmate of longest standing are extremely interesting in trying to understand the events surrounding Raoul Wallenberg's death in July 1947. All we know about Langfelder was found in a letter dated 12 June 1957 from the KGB to the Foreign Ministry. It contained a proposed reply to a question about him

Pelkonen was put in a solitary cell on the ground floor of Lefortovo Prison, threw himself from a window sill onto the stone floor and cracked his skull."

"Huber was questioned by high-ranking NKVD officials from the Ministry of the Interior on 27 July 1947, the same day as Pelkonen. The interpreter was a uniformed colonel while the actual leading interrogator was a civilian. From what Huber told me, I suppose that the civilian could have been General Karbulov (his correct name was Kobulov),.... who was presumably the NKVD representative for General Petrov, the head of the war prisoners' unit.... The leading interrogator asked Huber who his fellow prisoners were in Lubianka in 1945." (The leader was after Langfelder and Raoul Wallenberg).

Ernst Huber: "I was questioned again in Lubianka Prison. They took me for questioning once more at 6 pm in late July 1947. I was not taken to the ordinary interrogation room but to one on the third floor. The leading interrogator was a young, blond giant in civilian clothes. The interpreter had the rank of major. The leader first asked whom I had been with in Lubianka and Lefortovo Prisons." (Later on the interrogation concerned what Langfelder had told him about Raoul Wallenberg, after which he was isolated until April 1948).

A somewhat perplexing fact is that all these fellow prisoners gave 27 July as the date on which they were questioned (or, in one case, 28th). It is admittedly not easy to recall a correct date (documented as 22nd), but they all (misremembered) in the same way!

We know from the prisoners' statements and personal files that the authorities then arranged to isolate the small group who were former cellmates of Raoul Wallenberg and Langfelder. Later, they were brought together mainly in groups of two or three. It should also be noted that Hille and Loyda, who were in Krasnogorsk when the interrogation took place, were returned to Moscow and later placed together with their former cellmates. Several of them continued to be held in strict isolation even after they were transferred to Vladimir Prison between 1951-53.

Taken together, these combined circumstances, i.e., the denial of Raoul Wallenberg's presence in the Soviet Union, the assertion of his probable

WHO?
this word
doesn't
exist but
the point is
very
INTERESTING.

death in Hungary, the interrogation of his fellow cellmates and their resultant isolation, information blocked out over in registration ledgers, the absence of notes on where Wallenberg's effects were sent, oral information about a parcel of material about Wallenberg handed to the head of the MGB archives in 1947, the deaths of Roedel and Langfelder some months later, appear to point fairly clearly in one direction. However, these circumstances are not the same as legally valid proof (documentation) of the death of Raoul Wallenberg in July 1947.

What we do know accords in principle with the hypothesis that, for example, a decision was taken to hold Raoul Wallenberg in isolation somewhere. If the authorities took such precautions with his fellow prisoners and clearly tried at some point to eliminate most documentary traces of his prison stay, it would have been highly illogical and risky to place Wallenberg in some camp or prison where he might come into contact with other prisoners. If this were the case, it would have been a diabolical plan to turn Raoul Wallenberg into some kind of flying Dutchman who appeared here and there, which is the impression gained from much of the evidence. The more logical course would have been to place Raoul Wallenberg in total isolation or perhaps in a closed psychiatric institution, even though this could not be described as a hermetically sealed environment. The argument alters somewhat if it is assumed that there was no cause in 1947 for the MGB to fear the release of foreign war prisoners in the foreseeable future. But this was hardly the case as some of these prisoners were beginning to be released in 1947, some even in 1946.

Finally, we must be aware that as the years passed it became increasingly difficult to keep secret Raoul Wallenberg's continued imprisonment. This was to a certain extent true following the publication of the Swedish-Soviet communiqué in 1956. It became much more so after 1988 when the Soviet and, later, Russian mass media dealt comprehensively with the matter and revolutionary changes had taken place in the Soviet Union.

XII. EVIDENCE ON THE POST-JULY 1947 PERIOD

- Method of inquiry

They point towards well thought out effort to "put him away" using the myth of his death as a shield. This started in Hungary, but continued in USSR. The same "genius" was orchestrating it - the question is WHO? and WHY?

Also - I would like to tell you that who is very bright but NO KNOWLEDGE of the outside world. I object to this statement because I can show you how the strongest supporters of RW conform to a pattern of movement using Vladimir as main base, a 25 year sentence, with medical interludes + possible style.

This is but until the

Also - I would like to

tell you that

who is very bright but NO KNOWLEDGE of the outside world

ACT?

A major part of the work of the Russo-Swedish Working Group has involved following up evidence relating to the period after the official date given by the Soviet for his death. During the past 50 years, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs has collected more than 25,000 pages of records and a card index containing over 30,000 names of people and places of interest. A large number of documents contains the chronicles of prisoners returning from the Soviet Union. Ministry officials have interviewed homecoming prisoners, often in close liaison with the Swedish security police.

Resources are clearly insufficient for undertaking a detailed on-the-spot investigation in Russia of all the evidence that has been recorded over the years. Much of the evidence is more or less detailed and credible. Many witnesses - not only from the post-1947 period - have earlier proved to be jokers or mythomaniacs whose evidence was worthless. A selection was therefore made of evidence deemed to contain more than average substance and credibility. A summary was compiled and handed over to the Russian side of the Working Group (about which more anon). The central Russian authorities in Moscow, and especially the MVD, wrote to all the local and regional record offices and prisons asking for verification. This procedure was repeated a couple of times and has above all involved checking all card index registers and the personal and prison files of prisoners who gave evidence but are now dead. No trace of Raoul Wallenberg has yet been found in this material relating to the post-July 1947 period.

Perhaps the report might inspire greater confidence if the Swedish and Russian sides had jointly gone through all the card indices and archives of the camps and prisons from which evidence has come. Apart from the lack of resources mentioned above, this would not have been a guarantee that the end result would have been better. If there is mistrust concerning the sincerity of the Russian side, it would still have been possible even in this case to claim that interesting archive material had been removed before the joint investigation began. Whatever the case, it was judged that if the truth about Raoul Wallenberg has been preserved it must be found in the central archives, on the grounds that he was a very important prisoner. However, there may well be other opinions on this matter..

- Name and number prisoners

You are
confirming
yourself
to his
name -
MISTAKE #1,
also special
prisoners
have a
different
track
records
now removed
circa 1980s

While it is established that Raoul Wallenberg was registered under his own name in Moscow between 1945-47, it is not entirely impossible that he could have been held under a different name or number later on. If the former, it would be extremely complicated and time-consuming to try to establish where he was held. It is generally somewhat unclear to what extent the method was used of giving prisoners different names.

Number prisoners have existed to a limited degree, particularly in Moscow prisons and in the Vladimir. It should be made clear, however that providing a prisoner with another name or number is not enough to keep his existence secret. His isolation has to be completely effective. It has also been pointed out that these methods were used mainly to keep a prisoner's identity secret from the prison staff.

- Vladimir Prison particularly interesting

Special attention was paid to the Vladimir Prison, because many of Raoul Wallenberg's cellmates were transferred there after being sentenced. The chances were fairly good of holding prisoners isolated and a considerable amount of evidence about Raoul Wallenberg was collected from there, although almost all of it was secondhand.

The evidence deriving from Vladimir was the reason for Sweden's request in 1959 that the Soviet urgently investigate whether Raoul Wallenberg had been held there. Two Swedish judges were invited to study the information from Vladimir. Their report, published in 1960, stated somewhat cautiously: 'In our view, the present inquiry must under Swedish law find that Wallenberg was probably alive and held at the Vladimir Prison at least in the early 1950s, although there is no conclusive proof in this respect.' They would not commit themselves any further. However, the evidence of the prisoners of war in Moscow between 1945-47 was established as being fully valid in a law court.

Vladimir Prison was first subjected to scrutiny in 1990, by an international commission under professor Guy von Dardel, mentioned earlier in the introduction. A large number of index cards were inspected and video filmed,

particularly the cards about foreigners and known Russian witnesses. It was concluded that on the whole the evidence had been correct in the matter of dates and cell numbers relating to the witnesses' own prison stays and those of their fellow inmates. It was interesting to note that the Soviet side had never thoroughly investigated the Vladimir Prison to ascertain whether Raoul Wallenberg may have been held there.

Perhaps
they
knew

In the case of prisoners known only by numbers, the card index went only as far as number 33. A full identification was possible of the numbered cards that were actually found with three exceptions. Two of these were arrested, however, in 1941 (an Estonian and a Georgian) and the third was a Hungarian born in 1910. A handful of cards in the numbered series was missing and we have no sure way of knowing whether there have ever been any cards with higher numbers than 33 but which have been removed. The staff at Vladimir Prison were also interviewed, including the former prison medical officer, Butova, who became known through Kalinski's evidence. Another person who worked as hospital orderly identified Raoul Wallenberg from a photograph as a prisoner in an isolation cell.

now identified
and of
interest,
by the
way

V.I. Larina was the hospital orderly at Vladimir Prison 2. She was interviewed during a visit to Vladimir in December 1993, and later on as well. Larina stated that she did not know the names of the prisoners while she worked there. Nor did she have access to any information about them. Her only contact with them was when she temporarily accompanied a medical team into the cells. She spoke of a prisoner kept in isolation on the third floor in cell 49, in "korpus 2". The prisoner was about 170 centimetres in height, with dark hair and a narrow face. He had been in prison since the end of the 1940s and early 1950s. She remembered the prisoner specially as he spoke Russian with a typical accent and she supposed that he was foreign (not German). The prisoner was also rather particular and had complained, for example, that the soup was cold. On seeing photographs of Raoul Wallenberg, Larina immediately said that they depicted the prisoner in question. At our most recent contact with Larina, she firmly adhered to her story. (You left out OSMAN - as proof she knows what she's talking about)

five times
since

She
cleaned
she served
food
sounded to
me like on
a regular
basis.
She said
the
prisoner
was
held for
a long
time

A former prison guard at Vladimir stated in 1992 that a foreign, non-German prisoner, not unlike a picture of Raoul Wallenberg, had been held isolated in the prison for a long time.

about 5 years. Corresponds to Gorbidenise's claim as reported by Muller.

NO
WAY
She
knew
Raoul
Wallenberg
as
other
quite
well
OSMAN
said
that
prisoner
was
called
SHAN
was
best
of

The following was deemed to be interesting evidence from Vladimir Prison.

- Horst Theodor Mulle, born in Essen in 1911, journalist, in Vladimir Prison between 24 February - 22 September 1956. Mulle shared a cell with a Georgian, Gogoberidze, who told him at the time of the publication of the communiqué about Erlander visiting the Soviet Union, that when he was in prison hospital he had heard other prisoners mention Raoul Wallenberg who was held in the prison isolation cell. The personal files of both these men have been examined but without finding anything to confirm the information.

- Otto Schögg, born in Vienna in 1921, reported to the Swedish Consulate in Zurich in 1956 that he was in the Vladimir prison hospital between 16 April - 28 May 1955, where he met Raoul Wallenberg. In later interviews, Schögg stated that he had come from Vorkuta to Vladimir in 1952 or 1953 and that he had met Wallenberg in January or February 1955. The Swede had said that he had been in prison since 1945, first in Moscow, probably at the Lubianka Prison. His transfer to Vladimir must have taken place some time in 1949/50. Schögg was uncertain about the date, however, and said that it could have been in 1948 or 1951. Schögg's file did not contain any information about Raoul Wallenberg.

- Jusif Terelya was interviewed in Canada in 1987 and stated that he had seen Wallenberg in Vladimir Prison about 10 April 1970. Terelya shared a cell with Ogurtsev. Once these two had asked a guard for a bedside table from a cell (no.25) where Raoul Wallenberg is claimed to have stayed. There were two inscriptions on the table, that of "Sweden" and "Raoul Wallenberg" and an address, and that of "Miranda Martina" and an address. According to Terelya, Wallenberg had been moved at the end of January 1985, from no. 43, a second-floor cell in 'korpus 2' to cell no. 53 on the third floor. However, in an interview in 1947, Ogurtsev said that Terelya was unreliable and that during Ogurtsev's 15 years in Soviet prisons he had never heard of Raoul Wallenberg. In a later interview, he described Terelya as trustworthy although with a weak memory for details. Terelya's information was repeated by the Latvian, Rozkalns, who claimed to have heard it direct from Terelya in a Soviet prison camp. Rozkalns said that the cell number was 32 and maintained that Raoul Wallenberg was there under the name of a forester from Katyn.

*This is
mixed up
I think
big jump
from
Vladimir
to Pelm.*

V. Shakalys told the Swedish police in 1980 that he shared a cell in Vladimir in 1964 with the above forester whose name was Menshagin. The latter had stated that he had personally met Wallenberg in prison but that the Swede had died 1954-55.

You should
note that
Kruminsh
sat with
all the
important
prisoners -
Powers,
Makinen,
Wynne...
These were
exchanged.
The
Swede
wasn't...

While in Vladimir Prison in 1962, Makinen heard from Z Kruminsh that the latter had met a Swede in prison who had been arrested for intelligence activities; later, when in a prison camp, Makinen was told by V. Vorobey that Kruminsh had been a cellmate of a Swedish prisoner called "van den Berg".

Other evidence from Vladimir has also been scrutinised, without it being possible to confirm any information relating to Raoul Wallenberg.

This year (1997), an additional search was made of the card index and ~~relevant personal and interrogation files~~ in Vladimir Prison

We are thus still unable to exclude the fact that Raoul Wallenberg may have been held in Vladimir Prison. If he nevertheless had not been there, what is the explanation for the evidence of witnesses from there? One can only wonder. In the first place, Raoul Wallenberg was by this time well known in the prison; several of the prisoners there had run across Raoul Wallenberg in Moscow between 1945-47 and talked about him (although none of his fellow prisoners from the Moscow prisons have said that he was in the Vladimir). Other prisoners had heard about him in other ways.

Thomsen/Grossheim-Krisko, mentioned earlier and a former employee of the Swedish Legation in Budapest, described himself legation secretary during tapping sessions in the Vladimir - another possible source of incorrect evidence.

In 1991, two members of Memorial who had participated in the investigation of Vladimir made the important observation that everyone who was held there had come to the prison after they had received their sentence.

- Evidence of Kalinski - Kaplan - Melnichuk - Kuprijanov

A released Polish prisoner, A. Kalinski aroused considerable attention at the end of the 1970s and early 1980s. Confirmed as having been an inmate of the Vladimir Prison, Kalinski claimed to have last seen Raoul Wallenberg in

1959. He also procured the evidence of Jan Kaplan, a Soviet Jew, Butova, prison medical officer at Vladimir Prison and the Soviet general, Gennadij Kuprianov. According to Kalinski, Kaplan had seen a Swede in the hospital at Butyrka and this emerged in a letter from a relative of Kaplan in the Soviet to another in the USA. Kaplan is said to have tried to smuggle out a letter about Raoul Wallenberg and in so doing was put in prison once more. This was mentioned in a letter from Kaplan's wife to Anna Bilder, a daughter living in Israel.

Kalinski handed over the letter to the relative in the USA to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, cut into small pieces (sic). The remainder of the postmark contained latin letters; it could not therefore have been sent from the Soviet (although theoretically it could first have been smuggled to the west and posted from there. However, the postmark was stamped over the Soviet postage stamp). Probably Kalinski himself wrote the letter from Butova. The letter to Anna Bilder was also probably faked by Kalinski in collusion with Kaplan's daughter.

According to the Russian representatives of the working group, Kaplan was questioned while in prison. He denied that information of having met Raoul Wallenberg came from him. Kaplan had never even been imprisoned at Butyrka. His wife had categorically denied knowing about such a meeting or that her husband had said anything. Nor had she sent anything along these lines to her daughter. The KGB's view of Kaplan's alleged meeting was that the information was spread in order to obtain an earlier release. While talking to him in prison, he had himself linked the question of a public denial with an early release.

V.N. Melnichuk visited the Swedish Embassy in Belgrade in 1989. He said that he was visiting Kaplan on the day (1976 or 1977) when Kaplan's daughter (Anna Bilder) telephoned her father from Israel and said that Raoul Wallenberg had been alive in the mid 1970s. Melnichuk and Kaplan had known each other since their Gulag days. Melnichuk had promised Kaplan in 1976 or 1977 that he would at the first opportunity confirm to the Swedish authorities that what he had told his daughter on the telephone about Wallenberg was the truth. Melnichuk returned to the Embassy after a couple of weeks spent in the Ukraine. On that occasion he said that he

wanted to apply to Canada for asylum. A later search for Melnichuk, inter alia, in Canada has not been successful.

*Kuprianov was
himself a
prisoner, thanks
to Andropov!!!*

Kalinski reproduced General Kuprianov's information in a Russian emigrant newspaper in late January 1979 and in the Swedish press later that Spring. Kuprianov was said to have come across Raoul Wallenberg while transporting prisoners in the Soviet Union in the 1950s. Kalinski also stated that after publication of this information, Kuprianov had died from the effects of being tortured by the KGB. He also referred to Kuprianov's diary from his time in prison, said to have been smuggled out to West Germany.

Kuprianov's son, two daughters and second wife were interviewed in 1995. It emerged that the General had never had any problems with the KGB since his release in 1956. He died of a heart attack on 28 February 1979. His diary had been in his wife's possession throughout. It was examined and contains nothing about Raoul Wallenberg (although we do not know if we had access to a complete version). On the other hand, Kuprianov mentioned Kalinski with whom he shared a cell at one period. Kuprianov was fully convinced that Kalinski was a cell spy.

A CIA document from 1979 expressed very strong doubts about Kalinski's credibility. However, he often provided correct information about places and times. This means that it is not possible to reject categorically everything he says.

- Svartz -Mjasnikov

The evidence is still contradictory concerning Professor Nanna Svartz's report from 1961 of her conversation with Professor Mjasnikov in which he said that he knew Raoul Wallenberg who was in a mental hospital. It has not been possible to determine unequivocally which version is correct - Professor Svartz or Professor Mjasnikov's denial. In talks after her visit to Moscow, Svartz appeared convinced of the veracity of her version and could not be shaken even if her accounts of the conversation varied somewhat with regard to the exact wording used. (If Svartz's information was nonetheless based on a misunderstanding, how was this possible? It has emerged lately that Mjasnikov had a habit of nodding agreement to the person he was listening to. Moreover, linguistic problems and

misunderstandings arising from them cannot be excluded (Mjasnikov may, for example, have meant that it might be so that Raoul Wallenberg was in a psychiatric clinic); both may well have understood each other in medical matters but, according to Ambassador Jarring, Mjasnikov was far from fluent in German. Nanna Svartz was somewhat more fluent in German. It has not been possible to clarify this episode - one statement contradicts the other.

It should be added that an inquiry was carried out to determine whether Raoul Wallenberg was ever at the Serbski Institute. Based on a profile of his personality, it assumed that he had possibly been given a cover name. ~~The result was negative.~~

- Swingel - an exchange proposal?

One of the more mysterious elements in the long history of Raoul Wallenberg's fate was information that came from Carl-Gustaf Swingel, a Swedish businessman living in Berlin. It was understood that the Russians might be prepared to exchange Raoul Wallenberg for the spy Wennerström. There were repeated contact over a two to three year period between Swingel and the KGB representative at the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin. However, Swingel's account of these conversations were so vague that it was not possible to draw any definite conclusion. For example, it was not stated that Raoul Wallenberg was alive - rather the contrary, and it was alleged that the Soviet side wanted some offer from Sweden, a concrete exchange proposal that never materialised. The Swedish Government was not prepared to participate in any exchange and the talks with Swingel were therefore broken off. No indication has been found on the Russian side to confirm this story, and the KGB agent in question is said to have died. Nevertheless, the talks in question may well have taken place and could be some form of Russian game.

- Other evidence

The evidence of several other witnesses has also been followed up. Some examples follow:-

- Antonas Bogdanas from Latvia alleged that he met Raoul Wallenberg at Norilsk some time between 1945-51. Both were to be sent in 1951 to a special prison (psychiatric clinic) in Kazan, where Wallenberg was to receive

This search has not been finished - we only went to 1947

You have to emphasize Otto Danielsson's overall work on this case and his pursuit of this for 7 years rather than Swingel

This is a Teletype "from" and rather you leave it out

... unless he told you something different than he told us.

treatment for megalomania after claiming to be a Swedish diplomat.

Admittance to the clinic and its records have been refused so far.

- Theodore von Dufving, German officer, born 1907, told the Embassy in Bonn in 1982, and later to representatives of the working group that while in a transit camp (Kotlas or Kirov) in 1949, on his way into Vorkuta, he heard about a Swedish diplomat who was in the camp accompanied by a special guard. Some days later, von Dufving managed to meet the Swede who told him that "he had been imprisoned because of a big mistake".

- Aurel von Jüchen, born 1902, dead 1991, was a Protestant priest and prisoner in Vorkuta 1948-early 1950s. According to Helmut Schneider, von Jüchen knew that Wallenberg was in Vorkuta. His wife has said that her husband had not been in direct touch with Raoul Wallenberg but had often mentioned prison comrades who had met him.

- Dr Menachem Melzer, born 1907, was a physician. In an interview with a Swedish policeman in 1974, he stated that he probably met Raoul Wallenberg in May-June 1948 (or 1949) in Chalmer-Ju, north of Vorkuta, when he examined those interned at a work camp. A man called Raoul had said that he was Swedish. There was another Swede in the camp as well.

- Jefim Moshinski was said to be from Odessa. He emigrated to Israel after his release. He stated that around 1950 he was in a penal camp at Wrangelön together with Avraham Shifrin and Raoul Wallenberg. Moshinski showed the Swedish Embassy in Tel Aviv two letters from , Irkutsk, dated 1975 and 1976 respectively which mentioned that Wallenberg was in a psychiatric hospital. Shifrin emigrated to Israel in 1970 and told the Embassy that he was certain that the two letters were false. As late as 1962, however, he told a Senate Committee in Washington that there was a large prison camp at Wrangelön.

*Two
a
probable
in
a
letter
you
leave
it out*

- Rudolf Alexander Hedrich-Winter von Schwab, born 1919, told the Swedish Embassy in Vienna in 1964 that he met Raoul Wallenberg in a hospital cell in a special prison at Verchne-Uralsk on 5 December 1952 (von Schwab's birthday). A Finnish artillery officer, Harald Hjeld, and Arvid Anderson, said to be Swedish, were also in the prison. Von Schwab had also met a Dr Jakobson (from Talinn) in Magnitogorsk in 1953. Jakobson had then mentioned meeting Wallenberg during an operation. Von Schwab had again

Wallenberg in an exchange although probably some top-level political issues should be considered. It is also very likely that Stalin did not want to make up his mind straight away and issued no instructions. Alternatively, the MGB were possibly uncertain of how to interpret Stalin's intentions and Abakumov & Co were therefore forced to bide their time. Stalin was not the person to be given a reminder. That was inconceivable.

At the same time the Foreign Ministry was under growing pressure from the repeated approaches made by Sweden. Abakumov and MGB were urged to speed up their reply. By the end of 1946 it was clear to the officials concerned - a very narrow circle - that Raoul Wallenberg was in fact in MGB hands. This marked the start of the discussion on whether to tell Sweden that all things considered Raoul Wallenberg must have died in the final fighting around Budapest. The internal MID documents give the impression that not even Molotov had previously known whether Raoul Wallenberg was in the Soviet Union - with the exception of Dekanozov's notice dated 16 January 1945. Once again, this seems highly unlikely. In the first place, the arrested person was a foreign diplomat. Secondly, Molotov's position was still very strong and we know that Abakumov turned to him in the case of the Swiss diplomats. Besides, Stalin's inner circle must have had some inkling about an important case like this. Obviously, Molotov kept his knowledge to him self and did not share it with his colleagues. Nevertheless, it is unlikely, that the arguments in this chapter would have been materially different even if Molotov had not known about the case prior to 1947.

Spring 1947 saw preparations intensifying for a settlement of the case. The MGB planned to present a report to Molotov showing the reasons for the arrest and proposing the measures to be taken. One such report was delayed for several months although we do not know why. They were probably waiting for Stalin's decision, or at least for some sign from him. By May, Vyshinsky at least had grown tired of nothing happening, thus preventing him from replying to the Swedes. He therefore asked Molotov to instruct Abakumov to give his report or propose how the case should be settled. And Molotov ordered Abakumov to produce a report. In a letter to Abakumov written early in July, Vyshinsky made a suggestion about how a report, and thus the reply to Sweden should look. Everything was in place for a reply stating that Raoul Wallenberg had allegedly died in Budapest. In practice, this also meant that that in one way or another Raoul Wallenberg

This shows
him only
in Budapest

Destruction:
when the Sws
were taken,
Everyone
knew the
Sovets had
them, they
wanted it
known.

RW's
capture
was
covered
up -

There was
very little
intention to
return him -

same as Kossuth

had to be eliminated. We do not know whether Abakumov's letter to Molotov on 17 July contained the information that this had been done. It is evident that some decision was made, particularly in view of the interrogation of Raoul Wallenberg's cellmates, their subsequent isolation and the deaths of Roedel and Langfelder within the next few months.

Why was it impossible to acknowledge the presence of Raoul Wallenberg in the Soviet Union and then hand him over to Sweden? What compelled another decision to be taken over his fate? In the first place, Stalin probably could not be bothered with Raoul Wallenberg and his humanitarian efforts; this was the time when Stalin was intensifying his anti-Semitic campaign.

Secondly, would have been highly embarrassing to tell the Swedes at this stage that, yes, Raoul Wallenberg has been in one of our prisons the whole time. Anything Raoul Wallenberg himself said upon his release would have been extremely revealing, showing clearly that there had been no question of a mistake or oversight. It would have been impossible, for example, to announce that after searching high and low he had been found in some distant prison camp. And according to his fellow prisoners, Raoul Wallenberg did not appear to want to cooperate; he refused to make any statement when interrogated and referred to his diplomatic status. They did not appear to be getting anywhere with him. If one can believe the evidence of the interpreter, the one exception appears to have been the interrogation held in March 1947 which appears to have been calm and impartial.

Raoul Wallenberg's fate was in all probability thereby sealed. Molotov and Abakumov were certainly involved and we presume that Stalin was also fully in the picture. The alternative is almost inconceivable although theoretically cannot be ruled out, i.e., that Stalin was not informed and a conspiracy against him was afoot. We know that Stalin was at least aware of Raoul Wallenberg's arrest and that the Swedes were constantly asking about him.

The precise circumstances surrounding the Swedish diplomat's fate remained known to a very small circle. This can be seen in the question Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko asked KGB chief Serov in 1954 when he wondered when and under what circumstances Raoul Wallenberg had died. Serov did not want to enlighten him.

This is why I repeatedly bring up the question of Abakumov's "armed against the State". I have seen it defined in terms of foreign assets, hidden bank accounts. I am asking if Abakumov saw Wallenberg as the key to the bank - or the banker which he was.

EXCELLENT QUESTION

No! If he died in 1947, it was before Stalin's vote (USSR) was a significant factor in bringing the State of Israel (1948). His anti-Semitic bumper came afterwards, around the time he picked up a partner from Austria.

met the Swedish diplomat in Verchne-Uralsk in September 1953- Wallenberg confirmed then that he spent two months in Magnitogorsk after his operation and that he had met Dr Jakobson. Wallenberg had also said that he was first operated on and received medical care after the death of Stalin.

- Boguslaw Baj, a Polish citizen, visited the Embassy in Warsaw in 1988 and 1992 to give evidence. Information has also been obtained from his Polish prison comrades, Jerzy Cichoki, Josef Kowalski and Josef Markujevski.

Boguslaw Baj fought in the Polish underground home front army until July 1944. Captured by the Soviet military counter espionage in January 1945, he was sent to various camps and prisons, including Lubianka and, finally, Tashkent. He was taken to Bratsk in 1949 where prisoners were building a bridge over Angara. One day (1950) a prison transport arrived in the camp containing 160 prisoners. Baj spoke to a man who had been in Lubianka who had news of the Polish General Okulitski, who had twice been on trial and condemned to death (this information was not generally known). According to Baj, Raoul Wallenberg was invited to talk to General Serov in Budapest (Sergo was said not to have been in Budapest). He was not allowed to ^{meet} him, however, and he was arrested on suspicion of being a spy. He is said to have then been sent to Kiev and later to Kresta Prison in Leningrad. He is said to have been transferred to Lubianka in 1947 and sentenced to 25 years forced labour in special regime camps. He was sent to Tashkent in 1949 but arrived in Bratsk after only a couple of weeks. In June or July 1950 (1951, according to Cichoki) about 300 prisoners were rounded up and transported to Magadan. Both Raoul Wallenberg and Kowalski were among the group. They travelled in the same carriage to Vanino Bay where Wallenberg fell ill and was sent to the prison hospital. Kowalski continued to Magadan and returned to Poland in 1956. Baj and Kowalski met again in 1989 at a reunion for soldiers in the Polish home front army.

Further research into some of the evidence may still be necessary, particularly into the Polish evidence reported here. The same is true of the possibility of Raoul Wallenberg having been placed in a closed psychiatric institution. It is in the nature of things that without any firm proof of what

effort have been made to systematize this evidence and verify it.

Spent no
reported
by Iron
Cottler
RW held
with Poles
in the 80s -
in a ~~camp~~
pension
between
Moscow +
Leningrad

happened to Raoul Wallenberg, it is no easy thing to bring this kind of investigation to a close.

XIII. CONCLUDING ARGUMENTS

It may be appropriate at this stage to attempt a more coherent concluding argument, based on available information. Three possible hypotheses are involved although, once again, it must be emphasised again that the uncertainty factor is very great. The first is that Raoul Wallenberg died in July 1947, very probably not of natural causes. The second, that he was "hidden away" or isolated somewhere, possibly under a concealed identity (another name) where he was unable to make contact with other prisoners. Without our being in possession of any decisive document or decision, a third hypothesis cannot be completely ruled out, i.e., that Raoul Wallenberg was sent to some camp/prison or psychiatric clinic which did not involve total isolation. Logically, this appears unlikely, but on the other hand there are quite a few witnesses. Even if only a few of them are taken seriously sufficient remain to motivate our continuing efforts. The following arguments can be said to hold for the two first hypotheses while it is more difficult to construct any logical consideration for the third.

Do you mean
P.O.B.
or "camp
of silence"?

Our point of departure is that ^{Bulgarian} Stalin ordered, or at least agreed to, the arrest of Raoul Wallenberg. This implies that his subordinates would hardly dare to take a decision on their own or act independently to seal the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. An earlier chapter described the original possible reasons for arresting him. But the decision to arrest him need not necessarily have been based on such diverse or profound analyses as those we have mentioned. The reasons may not have remained valid throughout. On the contrary, they may well have altered. In the early days of his imprisonment, at the time of Raoul Wallenberg was interrogated in spring 1945, accusations of espionage seemed to predominate although he did not appear to be more in the limelight than other members of the Swedish Legation, ~~except that he~~ ^{apart from Thomsen} was the only one sent to Moscow. Later on, it grew clearer that Stalin, or at least the Soviet leaders, had a special purpose in holding on to the Swedish diplomat. He was very seldom interrogated and then only fairly briefly. The leading interrogator is said to have told him in spring 1947 that his was a political case and that he would therefore never be sentenced. The original idea behind this may have been to use Raoul

They all
went to
Moscow.
He's the
only one
not to
come out - S

What does this mean - a "political case?" We need some analogous examples to understand this model better.

Molotov and Serov prepared to reply in spring 1956 to a new approach from Sweden, supported by sine very convincing evidence from a number of war prisoners. Molotov himself wrote to the Central Committee that they could not reject it, that it largely tallied with the real circumstances relating to Raoul Wallenberg's imprisonment (carrying the implication that Molotov must have possessed fairly detailed information) and that it "was just as well that the Swedes are told about Raoul Wallenberg's fate". Of course, this last sentence did not mean that the whole truth should be told. This internal document was addressed to the country's political leaders and classified top secret. It would have been fairly difficult to pretend that Raoul Wallenberg's fate was completely different to the one in fact reported, with variations, in different drafts between 1956-57. Political conditions had changed to those prevailing when Vyshinsky wrote his barely truthful memoranda to Stalin in 1952. Now it was a matter of finding a more or less appropriate version which, above all, did not cast too great a cloud over Molotov or the then KGB for that matter. The proposal that Molotov and Serov reached at the end of April was very similar to the final reply given in February 1957.

I doubt if
my KGB
friends
would
agree with
you.

The long-drawn out procedure which they proposed was of course chiefly intended to create the impression that a thorough and serious investigation had taken place. We should also bear in mind that after the 20th Party Congress in February, Molotov must have felt his position was shaky. If, for example, he was in any way to blame for Raoul Wallenberg's execution, Khrushchev could have used it against him. This may have been another reason for his interest in delaying his reply, in the hope that his own position would grow stronger in the meanwhile. He also had a strong interest in laying the blame on somebody else, and Abakumov was the ideal scapegoat in this respect. Molotov would only have worsened his chances of saving himself if he had laid any blame on Stalin. Furthermore, it would have weakened his own position in the current struggle for power as it would in practice have implied that he was in support of de-Stalinisation. The ground was already tottering under his feet. It is out of the question that Molotov would have been interested in confessing to the Swedes that he had lied. Perhaps Khrushchev realised that this was what had happened but felt that the reply that was sent in due course conformed better to Soviet interests. It was in the interests of all the leaders to blame Abakumov. Implicating Beria as well would have risked implicating themselves to too great an extent. Khrushchev was probably not yet prepared to bring accusations against both

I think
the documents
released to
US build a
strong and
consistent
case that
Abakumov
is to
blame,
possibly
also in
relation to
Beria for
reasons
outside the
documents released.

I know that Molotov was adamant
about the Wallenberg's sons vis-a-vis Fascist Germany, even as he
voiced everything that angered Stalin but he was a YES-MAN
with a Jewish wife - and everyone knows that

Molotov and Bulganin over the Raoul Wallenberg case. Apart from Molotov, the others who participated in drafting the final reply were Bulganin, Shepilov and Serov.

Probably 1956 was also the year in which the crucial KGB documents and Abakumov's letter to Molotov were removed. For some reason the MID archives escaped being purged. Perhaps the papers there were not considered sufficiently incriminating, or else Molotov did not have an opportunity to deal with the matter before his departure that summer.

Although this argument appears convincing, it is not on a par with absolute proof. A definite conclusion necessitates that the evidence is beyond any reasonable doubt, i.e., that there is a convincing answer to all the outstanding questions. The idea that Raoul Wallenberg was effectively hidden away (with or without a concealed identity) cannot yet be completely dismissed.. Although we know that Stalin had few, if any, moral scruples, it would have been exceptional to order the execution of a diplomat from a neutral country. It might have appeared simpler to hold him isolated.

Nevertheless it must be asked whether it had not been possible for the Soviet leaders to acknowledge this in 1956-57 and, if he was still alive, to free Raoul Wallenberg? We can only speculate over this, particularly as Molotov wrote in his report to the Central Committee Presidium in April that he found it appropriate to inform the Swedes about Wallenberg's fate."

The third alternative, that Raoul Wallenberg really had been in camps and prisons where he was in contact with other foreign prisoners (hence their evidence), cannot be completely dismissed as long as there is no conclusive proof to the contrary. In principle, we have no right *a priori* to give less credence to the evidence of these witnesses than to other oral testimony. The special camps that the Poles described are on the borderline of probability.

It therefore remains to be seen whether any of the evidence from the post 1947 period can be documented or otherwise confirmed. If it proves impossible, what reasons can there be for it (apart from the pure mendacity of witnesses)? First of all, Raoul Wallenberg was known and discussed among some foreign prisoners in the 1950s, which could have given rise to

I think one
should take
the
systematic
destruction
of all
remnants
of a Free
Poland

alot more seriously. This was the backbone of Eastern
European resistance, intelligence gathering and
alot more than that... with a direct tie in to
the Anglo-American Allies -

INTERESTING

secondhand and sometimes twisted information. He became particularly well known after the communique about Erlander's visit to Russia was published in Pravda and Izvestija and posted up in every camp and prisons. Secondly, Raoul Wallenberg may have been mistaken for other Swedes (or people with Swedish nationality from Finland or Estonia), as was the case in the Vladimir Prison with Grossheim-Krisk, a former employee at the Swedish Legation in Budapest. Thirdly, it has been noted that there were other prisoners called Wallenberg in the Gulag system, for example, a Rudolf Wallenberg, who died in Vorkuta. Fourth, it is known that well known Russian prisoners were also said to have been sighted here and there even though they had been executed. This was the case, for example, with the author Osip Mandelshtam. The information may be based on rumours or legends, or even be part of KGB disinformation activities.

XIV. FOLLOWING UP THE REPORT

The reason for the Working Group not wishing to describe this as the final report is the lack of certain, tenable proof of Raoul Wallenberg's fate and that so many important questions are left unanswered.

This in turn means that the door must be kept open for new discoveries in the archives or by some other means. Thus, information items which have not yet been fully examined (see list in Chapter XV), and new items of some substance need to be scrutinised. This can be done without continued action of the Russo-Swedish Working Group as such. Both the Swedish and Russian sides have agreed to follow up important clues even in the future and, to a reasonable degree, assist those who want to make a further examination. An example of this is the very time-consuming inquiries into the political abuse of psychiatry and the practice of placing political prisoners, including foreigners, at psychiatric clinics which was undertaken by the Russian President's Commission for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Repression. An investigation of psychiatric clinics and that in Kazan in particular, about which a person has given evidence, could be carried out in cooperation with the Commission. Further investigation of the Ivanovo and Vorkuta prisons is also necessary under appropriate forms and in cooperation with Russian experts. Additional research into the circumstances surrounding the destruction of documents must also be considered as a matter of some urgency.

Moscow
person
more
important
initially -
stranger
altho
Kazan could be true

*Adapted
Statement*

To a large extent, official Swedish records of interest concerning Raoul Wallenberg have recently be released. No papers stamped top secret remain to shed further light over his fate.

As far as the Russian side is concerned, all records relating to Raoul Wallenberg, including coded telegrams in Foreign Ministry archives should be made accessible, i.e., not just those which become public when this report is published. Files concerning Raoul Wallenberg's fellow prisoners (all of whom are named in the 1957 White Book, and Grossheim-Krisko) should be made available to researchers. Every effort must be made to obtain any papers still in the various archives, including that of the secret service).

especially

If they have not already done so, the American, British and Israeli ^{*Canadian*} Governments should be asked to release all material relating Raoul Wallenberg (at least papers from the 1940s and 1950s). ~~Even the Stasi~~ records in Germany may contain something of interest.

To enable continued research to be as effective as possible, the working group wishes to propose that a Russian presidential commission is set up. Alternatively, that the present commission under Alexander ^{*Yakovlev*} is expanded and given greater authority. It must be in Russia's own interest to reveal all the secrets of the Gulag system. A subsidiary task should be to establish whether Raoul Wallenberg was held somewhere under a number or another name.

The willingness of the Canadian Government to assist in further research has been noted with great satisfaction. The Israeli Government has also appointed a special representative who is prepared to participate in such research.

In addition, the ^{*Working Group*} is of the opinion that the Swedish and Russian sides should jointly convene an international conference or seminar to discuss possible follow-up measures based on this report and all available documentation.

We also strongly hope that the publication of this account will help stimulate further suggestions or discoveries, particularly in the Russian archives. Even

research in other nation's archives may generate information which needs to be followed up in Russia.

XV. OUTSTANDING UNRESOLVED ISSUES

As the account above shows, the ^{Working} group has not succeeded in finding satisfactory answers to a large number of questions. Our arguments have been largely based on hypotheses. To make it easier in the future, it would be invaluable to find complete answers to the following questions.

1. Whose decision was it to arrest Raoul Wallenberg and send him to Moscow, and exactly when was this decision made? Did Stalin personally take this decision, as we have assumed? Why was no other Swedish diplomat in Budapest arrested?

2. What were the underlying reasons for the decision and for Raoul Wallenberg's detention in prison? Did the reasons for this alter as time passed? Why was so little attention paid to Raoul Wallenberg in the interrogation of Grossheim-Krisko and in other Smersh documents?

3. Did the Soviet side attempt to indicate their interest in an exchange in 1946?

On what basis, false or true, did the Soviets try to recruit him,

4. What happened on 17 July 1947? If Raoul Wallenberg died then, how did it happen? If he was executed, who took the decision? If so, where is he buried?

5. When and where was the Smoltsov report found, and by whom?

6. How did the report come to be written?

7. What did Abakumov write in his letter to Molotov dated 17 July 1947? Where is the letter?

8. Did Roedel die of natural causes in the autumn 1947, and what are the circumstances relating to Langfelder's alleged death in March 1948?

What was the content of his interrogations?

*Get Michael
to story -
Kutuzov*

9. Was Raoul Wallenberg in Stockholm in the ^{late} autumn 1944? Did he then speak to Mme Kollontay? *To whom else did he speak and what were the purposes of this trip?*

10. If, as our interviews have shown, Raoul Wallenberg's belongings were kept in a file in the care of a KGB archives official during the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s, it is surely highly improbable that they could be found on a basement shelf in 1989? What happened to Raoul Wallenberg's other belongings, i.e., his rucksacks (possibly two in number)?

11. Why was the note "arrested no.7" written on the material that was handed over to the head of KGB archives, Gertsosky, in 1947?

12. Who gave the order in 1956 to Vladimirov, diplomat and KGB man in Helsingfors, to explore through Finnish Foreign Ministry channels the possibility of private discussions with Sweden before submitting a reply in 1957? Where is this instruction kept now? In SVR archives?

13. Why were not more internal KGB papers preserved, at least from the 1956-57 period? When and on whose orders were these papers destroyed?

14. What was in the letter that Sjiriagin from Charkov wrote in the spring 1956 that caused the MID to worry about the information spreading? How can this information be obtained today?

15. How much was known in Moscow in 1944-45 about Raoul Wallenberg's contacts with Iver Olsen, the Wallenberg family's financial transactions with Germany and what were their views on them? *How much was known about his relationship with the SOINT?*

16. Was Moscow at all aware of the Wallenberg group's eventual agreement with the USA to attempt to counteract the use of the billion ~~3~~ kronor ~~or~~ *translation question* credit for the Soviet Union after October 1946? Did this have any significance for what later happened to Raoul Wallenberg?

17. Exactly when were the references to Raoul Wallenberg and Langfelder painted over in the KGB journals?

18. Why did the Soviet not give a completely honest reply in 1957?

Questions related to the Smoltsov document -

They went with him until he died or they disintegrated.

VERY GOOD but not mentioned in the text

Author: INTERNET:makinen@eprendor.uchicago.edu/ at INTERNET
Date: 1997-10-23 04.27
Priority: Normal
TO: Lage (UD) Olson at (Pk)UD-3
CC: Martin (UD) Hallqvist at (Pk)UD-3
Subject: Vladimir work, etc.

296/007
-10- 23

P 2 E¹

Lage and Martin:

I thought that it might be helpful to inform you that there is a possibility that I could conduct the Vladimir work in the early part of December. That is, in the event that the discussions with the Russian Foreign Ministry become successful and possible dates must be suggested, early December, 1997, or then late March, 1998, would be possibilities according to my present schedule. (Under this I must state also that my wifes's father, who is 92 years of age, has been very ill and a change in his status may force me to reconsider these dates.)

Q.A.
✓

I am communicating this information to you because if there is a chance that Susan Mesinai's presence in Moscow could even to some extent overlap with the work in Vladimir, this arrangement would probably be best of all. That is she could postpone her arrival in Moscow by 1-2 weeks, participate in the meeting, and begin examination of the files afterwards. This could take her into December which might then overlap with Vladimir card analysis. At that time she could then continue the card analysis that she had begun.

Marvin Makinen

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MA




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
R 18 W-berg

aa



Ambassadör Jan Lundvik

UD-EC



Samtal med Valerij Boldin.

Broder,

Under mitt senaste möte i Moskva samtalade jag den 18 oktober på ambassaden med Valerij Boldin, den siste chefen för CK-generalsekreterarens allmänna avdelning under Gorbatjov och därmed främste "sigillbevarare", dvs bl a ansvarig för att förvara partiets och Sovjetunionens känsligaste hemligheter och att i lämpliga doser hålla generalsekreteraren informerad om aktuella ärenden. Boldin var som bekant inblandad i augustikuppen 1991, beskylldes för att i dennas slutskede ha förstört en del dokument i sitt kassaskåp och har sedan dess fört en undanskymd tillvaro. Han utkom för några år sedan med sina memoarer, "Vospominanija", i vilka han inte minst uttalar sig mycket negativt om Gorbatjov och bl a berättar att Gorbatjov fick en fullständig föredragning om Raoul Wallenbergs öde. I ett samtal jag hade med Boldin efter utgivningen av denna bok uppmanade mig Boldin, som är en mycket tillknäppt och gåtfull figur, att fråga Gorbatjov om jag ville veta vad som hänt Raoul Wallenberg.

För ett par månader sedan refererade Boldin i en intervju i tidskriften "Soversjenno Sekretno" uppgifter han fått i tredje hand om att Stalins

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kassaskåp, när det efter hans död öppnades av de andra politbyråmedlemmarna, bland mycket annat befanns innehålla protokoll över förhör av den svenske diplomaten. Med anledning härav bad jag om ett nytt sammanträffande.

Jag sade inledningsvis att vi på svensk sida (ambassadör Hirdman) faktiskt försökt tala med Gorbatjov om Wallenbergs öde men att denne svarat undvikande. Boldin, som denna gång visade sig vara inte fullt så sluten som sist, sade sig inte kunna förstå varför Gorbatjov inte ville ta bladet från munnen. Kanske "skämdes" han över att tidigare ha besökt Sverige utan att avslöja allt han visste, eller så hade han glömt.

Boldin menade att den verkliga sanningen bara var känd av ett par-tre personer, och så hade det varit länge. När jag förde den besvärliga dokumentfrågan på tal och noterade att det "avgörande" dokumentet aldrig påträffats, trots att vi bl a låtit föranstalta om en genomgång av de topphemliga förslutna kuverten i presidentarkivet, uppgav Boldin att frågan om Wallenbergs öde fick hänföras till en ännu hemligare kategori, och att det kanske inte fanns något dokument alls som avslöjade hela sanningen. Han hade visserligen inte läst alla kuvert själv - "ju fler hemligheter man kände till, desto större bekymmer fick man". Han påstod också att Molotov, som så mycket stått i fokus för vår utredning avseende såväl 1947 som 1956, knappast spelat någon huvudroll, utan att frågan givetvis helt och hållet avgjorts av Stalin.

Boldin sade sig komma att avslöja hela sanningen i en kommande nyutgåva av memoarerna (kanske om tre månader), men jag fick intrycket att han ännu tvekade något, bl a beroende på Gorbatjovs tigrande. Om vad som verkligen hänt Raoul Wallenberg klargjorde han nu inte mer än att i förbigående använda uttrycket "förintelse", och detta med avseende på året 1947.


Sagesmännen till uppgiften om vad som påträffats i Stalins kassaskåp, varav den senaste var förre vice utrikesministern Ilitjev, var båda döda.

Även om Boldin genom sitt besked höjer spänningen, vill jag ändå utfärda en varning mot för höga

förväntningar. För det första kan det mycket väl röra sig om den mer eller mindre välgrundade KGB-legend som går ut på att Wallenberg 1947 sköts (vi har ju fått den från flera KGB-källor, och även från Aleksander Jakovlev, med referens till förre KGB-chefen Krjutjkov). För det andra kommer hans "avslöjande", även om det inte kan viftas bort, knappast att ha något avgörande värde om det inte stöds av genuina dokument eller andra bevis. Vad som också gjorde mig en aning reserverad var att Boldin frågade om jag inte kunde undersöka om det fanns intresse att ge ut hans bok i Sverige.

Tills vidare får vi vänta och se.

Detta handbrev bör tills vidare endast delges till kabinettsssekreteraren och ambassadör Hirdman (för vilken jag återberättat samtalet).


Hans Magnusson

Delgavs

i okt 99

p

REGERINGSKANSLIET
Utrikesdepartementet

Arbetspapper

1997-10-27

A-ARK
Berndt Fredriksson
Telefon 08 - 405 54 44

Delges:
M Hallqvist, EC
Lage Olson, ESEK

P 2 E4'

Delges:

Kals
von Dardel
Carl Pernow
Magnusson, Riga
Hallqvist, EC
Olson, EI / ESEK
Amb Moskva

exp- 97-10-28

Raoul Wallenberg

Wilhelm Carlgren har haft vänligheten att fästa min uppmärksamhet på följande. I den på svenska nyligen utkomna biografen över Aleksandra Kollontaj av Arkadij Vaksberg nämns på sidan 301 att Wallenberg giftmördades. Till yttermera visso namnges de personer som skulle ha utfört dådet. Detta är ju en historia som också återgavs i Sudoplatovs memoarer, men då nämndes inga namn så vitt jag minns. Ett spår värt att följa upp?

Vänlig hälsning

Berndt

Berndt Fredriksson


A. A. /

Arkadij Vaksberg

Aleksandra Kollontaj

Översättning från ryskan av

Hans Björkegren



NORSTEDTS

ende, och för att kunna genomföra sitt uppdrag måste Raoul stå i kontakt både med officiella tyska representanter i Ungern liksom med nazistisk underrättelsetjänst.

I dag är det möjligt att rekonstruera det logiska och psykologiska sambandet mellan vissa fakta, som skenbart saknade beröringspunkter. Just då hade Stalin spelat ut "det judiska kortet". För att locka judiskt storkapital till det krigshärjade landet hade han släppt ut ett falskt rykte om att en judisk republik skulle upprättas på Krim, och på olika sätt flirtade han med utländska kretsar som var beredda att nappa på den kroken. Informationerna om Wallenbergarnas mäktiga inflytande på svensk politik gav Stalin, Beria och andra som planlade operationen äregiriga förhoppningar om att de genom Raoul, som de såg som en tänkbar arvtagare till dynastin, skulle kunna påverka svenska myndigheter, banker och inflytelserika judiska kretsar både i USA och andra länder. Kollontaj hade ingenting med själva värvningsaktionen att skaffa, men hennes entusiastiska rapporter var en av källorna till Stalins plan.

Trots sin skenbara vettlöshet var Lubjankaplanen ganska ordinarie. I varje fall skilde den sig föga från likartade företag, som gång på gång gett resultat. Om man kunnat få mycket framstående skandinaviska politiker som Sveriges socialminister Gustav Möller och dennes hustru journalisten Else Kleen liksom kända författare, aktörer, konstnärer och vetenskapsmän att gå Moskvas ärenden — varför skulle en diplomat från en bankirfamilj då undgå det ödet? Man beslöt att först bearbeta Raoul med smicker och vädja till hans ädelmod och humanitet för att, om det inte fick någon effekt, övergå till hot och utpressning. Man hotade med att han skulle "avslöjas" som dubbelagent (han hade förhandlat med det tyska underrättelseväsendet), men när det klumpiga värvningsförsöket misslyckades blev det genom en ödets tragiska ironi två judiska bödlar som i ett sovjetiskt fängelse avrättade denne man som räddat tiotusentals judar. Överste Grigorij Majranovskij, en så kallad professor i medicin, och överstelöjtnant Dmitrij Kopeljanskij injicerade det dödade giftet i Raouls kropp.

Utan att känna till vad som skedde i Budapest tog Kollontaj itu med sina memoarer. Redan den första, hårt beskurna versionen skicka-

To: Mrs. Irene S.B.Anderson
Counsellor
Fax: 36-13522807
SVED NAGYKOVENSEG
1146 Budapest XIV
Tel: 352-28-04
From: Mrs. Prokofieva L.A.
Russia, Moscow 113191,
Samarinskaya st., 1-5,158
Tel: 952-98-75

INK. AMB. BUDAPEST		
D. 97	16/363	
10	10	16
AVD.	OR	VAL.
R	18	Wallqvist

Budapest 1997-10-27
Överlämnas av Ambassaden i Budapes
till Ambassadör Martin Hallqvist,
UD-EC-3.

Госпожа Андресон,

Убедительно прошу Вас, пожалуйста, верните все мои факсы и все мои фотографии. Я поняла, что моя биография и мои фотографии Вас абсолютно не интересуют после нашего телефонного разговора 15 октября в 12 часов 15 минут. Я в этом окончательно убедилась.

Верните мне, пожалуйста, все и немедленно. Ваше субъективное мнение обо мне, меня, совершенно, не интересует. Вы допустили непростительную, грубую и страшную ошибку, что полностью доверились г-ну Ниебауму. Я требую от Вас не собирать сплетен и сведений обо мне у г-на Ниебаума и г-на Майера. Моя личная жизнь с г-ном Ниебаумом не должна Вас интересовать и интриговать. Это не имеет никакого отношения к моему покойному отцу и ко мне тоже, а к Вам тем более.

Это моя ошибка, что я к Вам привела г-на Ниебаума в Посольство, а Ваша ошибка в том, что Вы его выслушивали и доверяли ему, а не мне! Г-н Ниебаум меня заверил по телефону, что он будет меня компрометировать в Ваших глазах любыми средствами!!! Я его угрозы не испугалась, надеясь, что он получит достойный ответ от дипломата в его грязной заинтересованности в моем вопросе, но Вы проявили к нему непонятную для меня доброжелательность. Г-н Ниебаум был удивлен, что Вы, занимаетесь делом Рауля Валленберга и не знаете даже, где находится город Воркута в России, и воспользовались картой. И второе, после нашего визита к Вам 8 августа он мне заявил, что я должна буду Вас отблагодарить. Я с ним согласилась, что я, непременно, это сделаю, купив для Вас памятный подарок о нашей встрече. Но г-н Ниебаум мне рассмеялся в лицо и сказал мне, что нужно будет Вам заплатить. Поверьте мне! Я сразу отпарировала ему, не дав возможности Вас оскорбить, и ответила, что дипломатам не платят, а только благодарят! И позвольте Вам напомнить, что в моем деле нет места для спонсорства и дипломатии. Вас должны были интересовать только факты моего рождения, а не моя совместная жизнь с г-ном Ниебаумом. Моя частная и личная жизнь никого не должна интересовать.

Вы не пригласили для нашей встречи русского переводчика, а воспользовались услугами г-на Ниебаума. Почему? Но визит к г-ну Лондваллу 15 сентября меня обрадовал: он вел беседу только со мной, но не с г-ном Ниебаумом! Г-н Лондвалл спросил меня: "Кто с Вами?", указывая на г-на Ниебаума. Я не успела ответить г-ну Лондваллу, как г-н Ниебаум заявил, что он мой спонсор. Но я сказала, что это мой друг. Может быть, он Вам так

представился, и Вас это устраивает, а я категорически против г-на Ниебаума. Да, и еще, г-н Ниебаум не получил моей телеграммы от 4 октября с.г. Он был предупрежден и отказался от получения моей телеграммы (квитанцию я имею). Но мне г-н Ниебаум и г-н Майер угрожали физической расправой, но я полагаю, Вы за меня заступаться не будете.

Я требую от Вас моих отношений с г-ном Ниебаумом не касаться и моей личной жизни тоже, это не в Вашей компетенции! Меня интересует только мой покойный отец и моя покойная мать. Все остальное мне не интересно!


Г-н Ниебаум был счастлив, что меня два раза не приняли в Посольстве Швеции в Москве, и что он только мог добиться и заинтересовать Вас лично встречей со мной. Я от него это слышала многократно! Он меня упрекал, что я ему не благодарна за это! Если бы не он, со мной никто вообще не стал бы разговаривать в Посольстве Швеции о моем вопросе. Почему у него такая уверенность в этом?

Телеграммы, которые я отправляла г-ну Ниебауму, это итог наших восьмилетних отношений. А Вас лично я ставила в известность, отправляя Вам копии, давая Вам понять, что г-н Ниебаум не имеет больше права на мою личную жизнь, и на перспективу моего вопроса о моем отце он тоже не имеет права. Он рассчитывал на денежное вознаграждение от семьи Валленбергов. Вы это тоже не оценили по достоинству и не поняли меня правильно, что я против всех незаконных посягательств на семью моего покойного отца. Я честно защищала и буду защищать интересы семьи моего покойного отца.

Надеюсь, что, просмотрев мои фотографии, которые я Вам отправила, Вы убедились, какая я блестящая и умная женщина. (Я имею в виду праздничные фотографии). И уверяю Вас, я достойная дама хорошего общества и получаю достойные комплименты от достойных людей в достойном обществе! Так Вы и здесь даже не сделали правильного акцента, что восемь лет г-н Ниебаум искусно водил меня за нос, уверяя раболепно, что он меня безумно любит! Для этого надо иметь таланты Казановы, а я ему за это отвечала физической и духовной преданностью и терпением.

Все Ваши личные симпатии к г-ну Ниебауму пусть останутся при Вас. На этом все. То, что Вас г-н Ниебаум ввел в заблуждение, о чем я сожалею, но не обижаюсь на Вас, потому что Вы - женщина-дипломат.

Людмила Прокофьева



P.S.

В одном из моих факсов допущена незначительная ошибка, на которую я обратила внимание. Мы были в Румынии с г-ном Ниебаумом в начале октября 1996 г., а не в сентябре. Я имею датированные фотографии о нашей поездке в Румынию.



REGERINGSKANSLIET

Stockholm, 28 October 1997

Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Enheten för Central- och Östeuropa
Martin Hallqvist
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amb Moskva

: H. Magnusson
amb Riga

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dep 971028
ah

Genast för Lars Grundberg och ambassadören

Jag vill förvissa mig om att du sett Magnussons tjänste den 22 oktober där han säger sig bestämt mena att wallenbergärendet bör beröras med Jeltsin personligen.

Jag kan inte annat än instämma i den bedömningen.

Vi arbetar nu hårt med ärendet, både här och i Moskva. Magnusson och jag var i Moskva som du vet för kort tid sedan och 12-13 november har vi arbetsgruppsmöte i Moskva. På rysk sida tycks man äntligen ha ökat takten i arbetet just med tanke på det förestående besöket och i förlängningen, publicering av vitboken och avslutning av själva arbetsgruppens arbete.

I aide-memoire sade vi bland annat att vi till och med kunde tvingas lasta ryska sidan för att framgångarna i arbetet gett begränsat resultat. Om vi då inte alls har med RW-ärendet på den slutgiltiga dagordning för samtalet med Jeltsin som ryssarna får tillgång till i förväg, utan i stället har det uppsatt på dagordningen för samtalet mellan utrikesministrarna, framstår det ju -med all respekt- som om vi inte gav ärendet Wallenberg högsta prioritet. Alltså finns det risk för att man på rysk sida slappnar av igen i arbetet. Och vi förlorar vår trovärdighet.

Vad säger man till familjen, och vad säger man till världspressen efteråt? Risken finns att det kommer att heta att igen har svenska regeringen missat ett gyllene tillfälle, kanske det sista.

Om frågan inte kommer upp på dagordningen, borde den ändå beröras med Jeltsin, och ryssarna få veta om vår avsikt så snart som möjligt.

Martin Hallqvist

Kop t:

kabs

L. Olson, EI-ESEK

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1997-10-29

Aamb's Stefan Gullgren

(EC)

P	2	Eu ¹
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UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

För: EC (Hallqvist)

Kopia: Ch EC, EI (Olson), rekryfax amb Riga ✓

Re Raoul Wallenberg - inför nästa arbetsgruppsmöte

1. Vid telefonsamtal Gullgren-Kosatjov igår framfördes det svenska förslaget om ett RW-arbetsgruppsmöte i Moskva e.m 12 och f.m. 13 november. Kosatjov bad att få återkomma efter kontakt med övriga företrädare på rysk sida men förutsåg preliminärt inga problem med dessa datum som ju hade diskuterats redan i samband med Hallqvists och Magnussons besök 9-10 oktober.

Gullgren efterfrågade även den ryska sidans reaktion på den aide-mémoire om den svenska synen på det fortsatta undersökningsarbetet som överlämnats 9 oktober. Från svensk sida var vi angelägna om att få ta del av de ryska synpunkterna redan **före** arbetsgruppsmötet. Kosatjov förklarade sig införstådd härmed och lovade att göra vad han kunde för att påskynda processen på rysk sida.

2. Efter telefonkontakt med von Dardel häromdagen har vi nu i note till MID begärt visering för von Dardel (7-30 nov, hämtas i Genève) och Berger (7-30, hämtas i Washington). Vi förstår att Makinen ej kommer att kunna delta i arbetsgruppsmötet.

3. Mesinai torde anlända till helgen och har uttryckt förhoppningen att kunna inleda sina undersökningar på måndag 3 november, vilket vi redan tidigare framfört till den ryska sidan. Gullgren upprepade detta önskemål under gårdagens samtal med

Kosatjov, som lovade kontakta Nikisjkin och Vinogradov i frågan och därefter återkomma.

4. Beträffande arbetsgruppsmötet förklarade Kosatjov i gårdagens samtal att man troligen skulle komma att få problem med att ordna tolkning ryska-svenska. Skupov, som var den enda vid MID som kunde komma ifråga, arbetade nu på heltid med att förbereda Jeltins Sverige-besök. På Kosatjovs fråga förklarade Gullgren att Magnus Dahnberg för sin del skulle komma att vara upptagen med svenska språk-dagar vid ambassaden de aktuella datumen. Gullgren trodde dock att den svenska sidan, om ingen annan lösning stod till buds, skulle vara beredd att föra samtalen med tolkning ryska-engelska.

5. Tacksam i sinom tid erfara den svenska sidans sammansättning under arbetsgruppsmötet samt ankomst- och avresetider. Från ambassaden sida kommer Gullgren att delta.

HIRDMAN

9 2 E u 7
INK UD

1997-10-31

30

To: Lage Olson

0046 8 4053280 (Tel)
0046 8 723 1176 (Fax)UL/EI/ESEK
✓From: Susanne Berger
1 703 237 0946

October 29, 1997

1 Page

Informant tit. per
telefon 1997-10-30
all möter i Moskva
12-13 november 1997
shall tillas enligt senaste
meddelande från ombudsman
den.

Dear Mr. Olson,

Could you let me know whether or not there will be a meeting of the
Working Group November 12/13?

As far as I understand it, Susan has decided to go to Moscow later
in November, preferably at a time when Marvin will also be there,
which means some time after November 28. It would make some sense
to have the meeting at that time instead, when all of us can be
together, instead of now. But - I was under the impression that
the dates of November 12/13 were fixed and I booked my travel
accordingly. I have purchased my ticket and I cannot get a
refund. If there is no meeting on November 12/13 there is very little
reason for me to go to Moscow, especially if we then would all go
at the end of November/early December. I could read through the ^{again}
prisoner interrogations but I would not want to look at the files
of individual prisoners without Susan being there as well, since she
is the one who ordered the files. So, to make a long story short,
it all hinges upon the question about a definite decision from the
Russian side concerning November 12/13. If there is no meeting
I will have to apply to you for a refund for my ticket. I still have
until Friday, October 31 to arrange my flight from Washington to
Hannover (the Hannover/Moscow portion has already been finalized).

Could you let me know as soon as possible? Thank you!

Best wishes,

Susanne



REGERINGSKANSLIET

Arkivexemplar

Protokoll

1997-10-30

P 2 Eu'

Utrikesdepartementet

P-L

Ulrika Haggård

Resa till Moskva i Wallenbergärendet

DS K Regeringskansliet medger att professor Guy von Dardel, ledamot i arbetsgruppen med uppdrag att studera utestående frågor i efterforskningen av Raoul Wallenberg, får resa till Moskva den 12-13 november 1997 i samband med ett arbetsgruppsmöte.

Kostnaderna, som beräknas uppgå till ca 14 000 kr, skall belasta tredje huvudtitelns anslag A 5. Utredningar m.m. för budgetåret 1995/96 (kostnadsställe 4215, finansiering 105, verksamhet 25112).

Beslutet har fattats av expeditionschefen Dag Klackenborg.

Utdrag till

Exp. 97-11-06 { Guy von Dardel
L. Olson
UD-P-L
Coll: uh



REGERINGSKANSLIET

P 2 Eu'
Arkivexemplar

Protokoll

1997-10-30

Utrikesdepartementet

P-L

Ulrika Haggård

Resa till Moskva i Wallenbergärendet

DS K Regeringskansliet medger att ledamöterna i Arbetsgruppen med uppgift att studera utestående frågor i efterforskningen av Raoul Wallenberg, f.d. rikspolischefen Carl Persson, ambassadören Hans Magnusson, Riga, ambassadören Martin Hallqvist och ambassadrådet Lage Olson får besöka Moskva den 12-13 november 1997 i samband med ett arbetsgruppsmöte.

Kostnaderna, som beräknas uppgå till ca 60 000 kr, skall belasta tredje huvudtitelns anslag A 5. Utredningar m.m. för budgetåret 1995/96 (kostnadsställe 4215, finansiering 105, verksamhet 25112).

Beslutet har fattats av expediteschefen Dag Klackenberg.

Utdrag till

97-11-06
uh { Carl Persson
Hans Magnusson
Martin Hallqvist
Lage Olson
UD-P-L

Coll: uh



SVERIGES AMBASSAD
BUDAPEST

1997-10-29

Kop LG
Orig MH

Ambassadör Martin Hallqvist
Utrikesdepartementet

LO" w

(EC)

302/001
1997-10-31

P 2 Eu¹

Wallenberg

1 bil.

Broder,

Själv kan jag inte bedöma värdehalten i bifogade artikel ur Magyar Nemzet 1997-08-29 om Wallenberg och de nya forskningsresultaten men tror att Du bör läsa den.

*Hjärtliga hälsningar
Din trogna från Lundvall*
Sören Lundvall

Delges:

Kates
von Dardel
Carl Persson
Magnusson, Riga
Hallqvist, EC 2
Olson, EI-ESEK
Wallenberg-Föreningen
Amb. Moskva

exp 97-11-17

Lo

a.a. / to

Ur **Magyar Nemzet** den 29 augusti 1997

Människoräddning är den viktigaste frihetskampen

Wallenbergs minne

Det är svårt att beröra den människoräddande svenske diplomatens, Raoul Wallenbergs verksamhet utan att falla i upprepningsfällan. I slutet av andra världskriget räddade han livet på 15000 ungerska medborgare, de flesta av judiskt ursprung, och fastän hans dåtida ansträngningar som krävde övermänsklig djärvhets och entusiasm idag med kristallklar tydlighet tecknas framför oss, döljs hans öde på ett tragiskt sätt i dimma efter det att han i januari 1945 förts bort av sovjetiska soldater. För inte så länge sedan firade vi 85-årsdagen av hans födelse. Som alltid, år från år, skapade det i slutet av 80-talet upprättade Raoul Wallenbergsällskapet de värdiga ramarna för firandet. Det är denna civila organisation för mänskliga rättigheter som inte bara främjar förverkligandet av Wallenbergs målsättningar, utan också ser till att den svenske diplomatens levnadsverk även i fortsättningen skall förbli ett gott exempel.

- Vilka frågor föranleder Wallenbergs födelsedag? Har hans djärva uppträdande för mer än ett halvt sekel sedan något budskap att ge än i våra dagar? - frågar vi György Kaiser, ordförande för Wallenbergsällskapet.

Nationens sänkta huvud gäller den som räddade livet på mer än 15000 ungerska medborgare vid en tid när man på ras-, rasistiska grunder tog livet av mer än 600 000 ungerska medborgare. Han räddade dem inte för att de var judar, utan för att deras liv var i fara. Och detta gjorde en ung svensk man från en rik familj, som dittills för en utomstående syntes ha levt en playboys liv. Han åtog sig att komma till Ungern och här fick han verkligen veta hur stor uppgiften och samtidigt ansvaret, var, och han upptäckte även omfattningen av den risk han tog. Han hade haft möjlighet att dra sig tillbaka, men han åtog sig ändå mer än han förväntades göra. Han deltog direkt och personligen i räddningsaktionerna och med sin utmärkta organisationsförmåga kunde han vid sin sida rada upp sådana partners, som självständigt och fritt också var kapabla till allt. Hela hans verk visar att räddningen av ett människoliv är den högsta frihetskampen. Sådana hjälpmedel, som han inte skulle ha tagit till för att uppnå sina mål, existerade ej. Han

skaffade också läkemedel och livsmedel, han stödde de svenska och schweiziska skyddade husen, men även deras innevånare.

- Vi vet att Wallenberg fick hjälp av många som vi idag inte ens vet namnet på.

Många anonyma hjältar deltog i räddningsaktionerna, till övervägande del men inte uteslutande ungerska medborgare. De judiska "självhjälparna" kunde naturligtvis bara i begränsad omfattning verka, eftersom de ju vid en viss punkt skulle ha avslöjat sig själva. Villkoren blev allt strängare och mot slutet söktes Wallenberg själv av tyskar och pilkorsare. Hans öde kan dock ses som ett exempel på landets öde. Den 17 januari 1945 för det sovjetiska imperiets officerare bort honom och låter honom försvinna i sovjetiska fängelser och läger. Det är tragiskt att han genast fick erfara och förstå vad den sovjetiska befrielsen innebar.

- Fram till idag kan man inte veta med total säkerhet vad som hände honom. Finns det nyare forskningsresultat?

Sådana personer har släppts från fängelset i Moskva som talat med honom i början av 50-talet. Nu har nya uppgifter kommit i dagsljuset, eftersom vi fått ett privatbrev vars brevskrivare berättat om en ungerskättad läkare som varit närvarande när Wallenberg torterades. Denne man, som ungersk läkare, släpptes inte dit, när den svenske diplomaten "kurerades", som brevet säger, men det är uppenbart att vi skulle kunna vinna många nya informationer med stöd av denna rapport. Brevskrivaren vet om denne läkare bara att han bor i Madrid, men vi känner inte till hans exakta adress. Vårt sällskap har tagit i anspråk Röda korset och andra internationella organisationer, för om vi finner denne man har vi ju ett nytt trovärdigt vittne. Det är heller inte säkert att Wallenbergs död kan konstateras, eftersom den ryska underrättelsetjänstens dokument fortfarande är oåtkomliga.

- Det lever fortfarande en misstanke hos många att man var tvungen släpa bort de som reste sig mot fascismen för att kunna bevisa en total brist på motstånd?

Hur man behandlade Wallenberg överensstämmer med det sovjetiska imperiets stil. Det är min personliga åsikt att detta var ett karaktäristiskt beteende för imperiet och för den av denna styrda ungerska diktaturen. Morden på biskop Vilmos Apor och andra som gjorde något för det ungerska oberoendet, passar in i denna bild. Å andra sidan spelade även anarkin en roll och det är bevisat att anarki och diktatur är system. Min far hade i sin ägo ett papper från marskalk Tolbuhin, att han hjälpt dem som partisan, eftersom han tillsammans med sina kamrater förhindrat att 400 vagnar ammunition exploderat och därigenom räddat många sovjetsoldater från döden. Det var endast genom att fly

som min far kunde rädda sig från "malenkij robot" (liten arbetsplikt), eftersom en sovjetsoldat mitt framför ögonen på honom rev sönder Tolbuhins skyddsbrev vid en identitetskontroll.

- Hur kan idag organisationerna för mänskliga rättigheter förverkliga Wallenbergs ideal? Vi kan ju tala om samhällsdiskriminering, men det föreligger knappast fara för fysisk förintelse.

Man får inte glömma vad som hänt. Det kan hända att situationen blir farlig inte för judarna, utan låt oss säga för de ultrafattiga, såsom utgörande en fiktiv börda. Här skulle jag vilja hänvisa till professor Imre Magyari, som beskrev den enklaste formen av arbetstjänst och yttrade: han beskriver inte sitt öde för att han lidit särskilt mycket, utan för att han som läkare anser det viktigt att fastslå den samhälleliga sjukdomsprocessen. Det är nämligen nödvändigt att vi skall kunna se exakt de villkor som gjorde det möjligt att hota människor med förintelse. När ekonomiska svårigheter föreligger kommer de sociala spänningarna lagbundet och i deras spår diskriminerande bemödanden på grund av ras, religion, fattighet eller hälsotillstånd. Toleransens åskådning måste därför genomsyra hela samhället och detta måste vi arbeta för.

- Kan man inte ängslas för att vissa begrepp, som respekt för det annorlunda, devalveras och slits, om man nämner dem för mycket?

Om vi varje dag talar om respekt för det annorlunda, kommer det till slut att bli det mest osympatiska begreppet som finns. Vårt sällskap åtar sig att vi varje år kommer att nämna holocaust, men inte ovillkorligen varje dag. Man måste inte tala om "europaskap" heller varje dag, eftersom människorna då förr eller senare blir rädda för det. I vårt sällskaps program finns också att vi med konkreta exempel och med ett verkligt handlande, skall försöka bygga in en samhällelig tolerans i det allmänna medvetandet. Tidigare startade hos oss de minneshögtider om holocaust och vi minner varje år om Wallenbergs födelse och bortförande, men vi anordnar också välbesökta utställningar och olika fora. Allt detta i Wallenbergs anda, som inte behövde rädda förföljda från en majoritetens Ungern utan från ett totalitärt system, stött av ett litet skikt, som under falska hänvisningar sade sig stödas av en majoritet. Wallenbergs liv är samtidigt ett budskap till nuet: Han kom från Europa för att rädda människor i ett annat europeiskt land - detta är kanske det vackraste exemplet på europaskap.

Nehéz úgy méltamunk az ember mentő svéd diplomata, Raoul Wallenberg tevékenységét, hogy ne essünk az ismétlések csapdájába. A második világháború végén 15 ezer, többnyire zsidó származású magyar állampolgár életét mentette meg, s bár akkor, emberfeletti bátorságot és leleményességet követelő erőfeszítései ma már kristálytisztán kirajzolódnak előttünk, tragikus módon homályba vész, mi történt vele, miután 1945 januárjában elhurcolták a szovjetek. Nemrég ünnepeltük születésének nyolcvanötödik évfordulóját. Mint évől évre mindig, most is a nyolcvanas évek végén alakult Raoul Wallenberg Egyesület keretei között meg az ünnepség méltó keretét. Ez az emberi jogi szervezet az, amely nemcsak Wallenberg célkitűzéseinek mai érvényesítését segíti elő, de arra is ügyel, hogy a svéd diplomata munkássága továbbra is példaképpé legyen.

– Milyen kérdéseket vet fel Wallenberg születésnapja? Több mint fél századdal ezelőtti bátor kiállásnak van még ható üzenete? – kérdeztük Kaiser Györgyöt, a Raoul Wallenberg Egyesület soros elnökét.

– A nemzeti főhajás annak az embernek szólni, aki több mint tizenötezer magyar állampolgár életét mentette meg egy olyan időszakban, amikor faji, rasszista alapon több mint húszezerezt magyar polgárunka vetett el az életét. Nem azért mentette meg őket, mert zsidók voltak, hanem mert veszélyben forogott az életük. Tette mindent egy gazdag családból származó svéd fiatal ember, aki addig a külvilág szemében a playboy életét élte. Válassza, hogy eljön Magyarországra, és itt értesít meg igazán, mekkora a feladat, egyben a felelőssége, rá kellett döbönnie

Az embermentés a legfőbb szabadságharc

WV
29/8.

Wallenberg emlékezete

a kockázata mértékére is. Mődjia lett volna visszavonulni, 6 azonban még többre is vállalkozott, mint amit várhattak tőle.

Közvetlenül, személyesen vett részt az embermentés irányításában, s kiváló szervezőképességével olyan partnereket tudott maga mellé felsorakoztatni, akik önállóan, szabadon is képesek voltak mindent. Egész munkássága azt mutatja, hogy az emberélet mentése a legfőbb szabadságharc. Nem létezett számára olyan módott volna. Gyógyszert és élelmiszert is szerezett, támogatta a svéd és a svájci védett házakat, de azok lakói is.

– Tűjünk, Wallenberget sokan segítőték olyanok is, akiknek nevét máig sem ismerjük.

– Nagyon sok névvel en hős vett részt az embermentő akciókban, túlnyomórészt, de nem kizárólag magyar állampolgárok. A zsidó származású „önmegmentés” természetesen csak korlátozott mértékben működhetett közre, hiszen egy ponton túl magukat buktathattak volna le. A feltevések is egyre szigorodtak, a végén már magat Wallenberget is keresték a németek, a nyilasok. Az ő sorsa azonban mintha az ország sorsát is példázta. 1945. január 17-én a szovjet impérium tisztjei elviszik és eltűnnek a szovjet börtönökben, lágerekben. Az a tragikus, hogy 6 rögtön megértette, megélt, mit jelent a szovjet felszabadítás.

– A mai napig nem lehet tudni teljes bizonyossággal, mi lett vele. Vannak-e újabb kutatási eredmények?

– A moszkvai börtönből szabadultak ki olyanok, akik még beszéltek vele az ötvenes évek elején. Most újabb adatok kerülhettek napvilágra, mivel börtönükben szült egy olyan magyar származású orvos, aki ott volt, amikor Wallenberget vossal, aki ott volt, amikor Wallenberget kintorák. Ezt az embert mint magyar orvost nem engedték oda, amikor a svéd diplomata „gyógykezelésként” így fogalmazta lelevel, de nyilvánvalóan sok új információ nyelhetünk a beszámolója alapján. A levélről csak azt tudja el az orvos, hogy Madritban él, de nem ismeri a pontos címet. Egyesületünk a Vöröskereszt és más nemzetközi szervezetek segítségével veszi igénybe, hisz ha megtaláljuk ezt az embert, lesz egy újabb hiteltani. Az sem biztos, hogy megállapítható Wallenberg halála, mert az orosz titkosszolgálat dokumentumai még mindig hozzáférhetetlenek.

– Sokakban él a gyanú: talán nem éppen azért kellett elhurcolni a faszimusz szemből fellejtőket, hogy lehessen bizonyítani az ellentétet teljes hiányát?

– A szovjet bürokrácia stílusának felelt meg, ahogy Wallenberggel elbának. Személyes véleményem, hogy a bürokrácia és az általa generált magyar diktatúra jellegzetes viselkedésmódja volt ez.

Ebbe a képbe illett bele Apór Vilmos püspök és mások meggyilkolása, olyanoké, akik a magyar függetlenség ügyéért lettek kivégeztetve. Másrészt azonban az anarchia is közrejátszott, bizonyítva: élestereték a közéletével. Edesapának például Tolbuhin marsalltól papíra volt arról, hogy partizánként segít nekik, mivel társai val egyútt megakadályozta 400 vagon lószert felrobbanását, így sok szovjet katona halálát. Edesapám később mégis csak sokkés árdn menekült meg a málenkij robotól. Egy szovjet katona ugyanis a személtára tépe össze Tolbuhin meglevelet az igazolatlansáig.

– Wallenberg eszméit miként tudja érvényesíteni ma egy emberjogi szervezet? Hiszen társadalmi diszkriminációról beszélhetünk ugyan, de emberek fizikai megsemmisülésének veszélyéről aligha.

– Nem szabad elfelejteni mindazt, ami történt. Lehet, hogy nem a zsidókkal, hanem mondjuk az ultraszegényekkel, mint a társadalom állítólagos teherével, kapcsolatban válik veszélyessé a folyamata. Itt a néhai Magyar Imre professzorra utalnék, aki az enyhébb munkaszolgálatot írta le, és úgy nyilatkozott: nem azért írja le a sorsát, mert 6 sokat szenvedett, hanem fontosnak tartja orvosként a társadalmi kórfolyamat rögzítését. Szükséges ugyanis, hogy pontosan lássuk, melyek voltak azok a

feltételek, amelyek lehetővé tették, hogy embereket a megsemmisítés veszélyé nyegessen. Amikor gazdasági nehézségek vannak, törényszerten előjónak a társadalmi feszültségek, s nyomukban a faji, vallási, szegénységi, egészségi alapon történő diszkriminatív törekvések. A toleráns szemléletmódnak ezért kell áthágnia az egész társadalmat, és nekünk ezen kell munkálkodnunk.

– Nem félt-e, hogy bizonyos fogalmak, mint például a másodlagos niszlete, megköphatnak, devalválódhatnak, ha túl sokat emlegetik ezeket?

– Ha mindennap a másodlagos niszletekről beszélünk, a végén még ez lesz a legelleneszenvesebb fogalom. Egyesületünk azt vallja, hogy a holocaustról minden évben meg kell emlékezni, de nem okvetlenül mindennap. Az európaiságról sem minden alkalommal kell beszélni, mert az emberek előbb-utóbb még felni kezdenek tőle. Egyesületünk programjában is az szerepel, hogy mindig a konkrétumok felmutatásával, a tényleges szereplésen keresztül próbáljuk meg a köznevelés építeni a társadalmi toleranciát. Annak idején tőlünk indultak el a holocaustmegemlékezések, minden évben megemlékezünk Raoul Wallenberg születéséről és elhurcolásáról, de rendezünk igen látogatott kiállításokat és fórumokat is. Mindent Wallenberg szellemében, akinek nem a többségi Magyarországról kellett megmenteni az üldözötteket, hanem egy arra hamisan hivatkozó, szűk rétegre támaszkodó totalitárius rendszertől. Wallenberg élete egyben üzenet a másnak: Európából jött egy másik európai országba embereket menteni – ez talán a legjobb példája az európaiságnak.

Megyeri David

52-01-76

snell
Hagyomány/nyomtatás

1997-10-31

Aamb Stefan Gullgren

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

För: EC (Hallqvist)

Kopia: EI (Olson), Kabsek, rekryfax amb Riga

Avd.	Grupp	Mål
P	2	Eu 1

EC

Re Raoul Wallenberg

(1 bil.)

Igår kväll inkom närslutet fax från Susan Mesinai vari meddelas att hon ämnar uppskjuta sitt besök i Moskva till december. Faxet föranleder följande kommentarer från vår sida.

1. Av faxet framgår att Mesinai på något sätt bibringats intrycket att det skulle råda osäkerhet om huruvida det planerade mötet med arbetsgruppen 12-13 november kommer äga rum eller ej. Hon tycks även tro att vi från svensk sida uppställt en rysk reaktion på vår aide-mémoire före arbetsgruppsmötet som ett absolut villkor för att överhuvudtaget genomföra mötet. Guy von Dardel förefaller ha uppfattat läget på motvarande sätt, att döma av ett brådsnande fax från honom igår från Senegal (!) där han f n befinner sig på semester.

Från ambassadens sida utgår vi från att det hela rör sig om ett missförstånd och att arbetsgruppsmötet kommer att äga rum såsom planerat. Ett klargörande från departementet med denna innebörd till samtliga berörda oberoende experter framstår som i hög grad påkallat.

2. Beträffande Susan Mesinais beslut att uppskjuta sitt Moskva-besök må följande noteras. Visserligen meddelade Kosatjov (MID) idag att Vinogradov vid FSB kommer att befinna sig på semester hela nästa vecka, men Nikisjikin vid MVD uppgavs vara

informerad och beredd att ta emot (Kosatjov förklarade dock att en formell framställning med närmare angivande av vilka dossierer hon ville studera hos just Nikisjkin skulle komma att krävas. Detta var dock närmast en formsak som kunde klaras av efter hennes ankomst till Moskva - några principiella hinder för henne att fortsätta sitt undersökningsarbete förelåg ej.)

Vi inser att vi nu måste meddela den ryska sidan att Mesinai beslutat uppskjuta sitt besök en månad men vill samtidigt framhålla att detta knappast kommer att öka trovärdigheten hos de oberoende experterna i den ryska sidans ögon. Det är en i sammanhanget lycklig omständighet att Vinogradov ej är på plats nästa vecka, då vi kan hänvisa till detta som en bidragande orsak till Mesinais beslut. Det är dock ett faktum att den ryska sidan kommer anse sig ha vidtagit en rad åtgärder på vår uttryckliga begäran, bl a utfärdat ett enmånadsvisum för Mesinai, till ingen nytta.

3. Av Mesinais fax framgår även att hon och Marvin Makinen planerar att tillbringa två månader i Ryssland för att tillsammans med två andra medarbetare (ryska arkivexperter får man förmoda) genomföra följande delprojekt: Vladimirundersökningen, persondossiererna, de psykiatriska klinikerna, samt fond 451.

Om det verkligen skulle förhålla sig så att Mesinai och Makinen tror att alla hinder för att genomföra dessa delprojekt nu skulle vara undanröjda, bör de nog snarast tas ur den villfarelsen. Den enda undersökning som den ryska sidan hittills givit klartecken till att fullfölja är den som avser persondossiererna. Beträffande Vladimir har vi t v ingen som helst reaktion på Makinens senaste metodförslag, även om vi nog kan förvänta oss en sådan inför arbetsgruppsmötet. Av skäl som vi tidigare angivit bör man emellertid inte göra sig några större förhoppningar.

Beträffande klinikerna och fond 451 har vi ju från svensk sida inte ens riktat en detaljerad framställning härom till den ryska sidan, åtminstone inte på senare år, med undantag för de kortfattade omnämningarna i vår aide-mémoire i oktober. Generellt bör nog klargöras för de oberoende experterna att Moskva-resor "på chans" i förhoppning att kunna lösa utestående tillståndsfrågor på plats i Moskva ej har särskilt stora förutsättningar att bli lyckosamma. Först måste tillträdesfrågan lösas och därefter kan datum för besöken planeras.

4. Vi vill avslutningsvis erinra om våra kryfax 533 och 563 som återger såväl den ryska sidans som ambassadens reflektioner på de oberoende experternas, som det förefaller, ökade inflytande över RW-utredningen. Vi ser fram emot att i sinom tid få ta del av departementets kommentarer till innehållet i dessa telegram.

HIRDMAN

October 30, 1997

MOSCOW 100-40-21

Mr. Stefan Gullgren
Second Secretary
Swedish Embassy - Moscow

URGENT

Dear Stefan:

After communication with Guy, Marvin and Susanne I have postponed my trip to Moscow until after Thanksgiving -- which is the only time really that Marvin can come to work on the Vladimir files until the Spring.

This was not the easiest decision I ever have had to make in my life. I kept pushing until the final hour in hopes that certain conditions would improve, but given the uncertainties of the moment, and tremendous pressures on me, this seems to be the only true and sensible solution. The monies I received from the Swedish Government have already been applied to my ticket and this can be transferred to the appropriate date without penalty. The rest are in a safe place. But as I think you know, the monies allocated to us overall still demanded some fundraising to support a two month effort for four people -- i.e. Marvin's work in Vladimir; my work in the prisoner files, medical facilities and records and with Marvin in Vladimir; Guy and Susanne's work in Sweden as well as in Russia; and our collective work in Font 451.

We are way below the mark in overall funding and by postponing, the monies that have been raised can hopefully be increased to the benefit of all. If I go on what little I have now, I will not be able to stay on to work with Marvin. And there is the issue of fairness of appropriations as well. But, mostly, of maximum effectiveness which means we are in a position to concentrate on this and put our heads together.

As I understand the Working Group Meeting is up in the air, pending a real response from the Russians regarding the Aide Memoire, I am basically taking a stand with the Swedish Government in insisting that this be acted upon as well. We all feel that we will have one strong crack at this and we want access assured and the ground as prepared as possible as soon as possible. If indeed they do not act in favor of opening the records of Vladimir, I assume this will be brought up in Stockholm at Yeltsin's visit.

Please forgive me for any work this may cause you, but I assume it should not be too much. I would appreciate your informing Mr. Vinogradov and Mr. Nikishkin that I look forward to reviewing the files in December, and Dr. Dmietreva as well -- if her office contacted you. The only other person who may contact you is the American Ambassador's office, in which case I would also ask that you inform them you expect to see me in December.

If, of course, everything is resolved momentarily -- I will be there to begin working.
If not, I am requesting a visa for the month of December instead.

Susan Ellen Medinai
Susan Ellen Medinai

ANTAL SIDOROV